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INTRODUCTION 
At 9: 07 a. m. on October 25,1983, President Reagan, accompanied by Prime 
Nfinister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, addressed journalists in the White House 
Briefing Room. Surprising the audience, Reagan announced that: 
on Sunday, October 23d, the United States received an urgent, formal request 
from the five member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada 
... Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island. ' 
He gave three reasons for the U. S. ' participation: "to protect innocent lives, including 
up to a thousand Americans, ... to forestall further chaos... [and] to assist 
in the 
0 
restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions. 
Grenada is the southern most island microstate in the Windward Islands chain in 
the Eastern Caribbean. It is 133 square nidles in area, about twice the size of 
Washington D. C., and in 1983 had a population of approximately 85,000. In the U. S. 
3 Grenada was practically unheard of by most Americans outside of tourist circles. In 
October 1983 this obscure island was thrust into the international limelight for its 
"fifteen minutes of fame. " 
1 "Remarks of the President and Prime NUnister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the 
Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada, October 25,1983, " U. S. President, Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States (Washington D. C.: Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Records Service, 1983), Ronald W. Reagan, 1983, p. 1505. 
2 Ibid., p. 1506. 
3 To be fair it was not just Americans who knew nothing of Grenada. At one stage there was 
uncertainty over exactly how "Grenada" should be pronounce One anecdote relates how a Russian 
television station announced that the US. had invaded Granada in Southern Spain! 
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Although much has changed since 1983 and the days of President Reagan, the 
Soviet Union and the Cold War, the Grenada intervention raised many important 
issues that have been the subject of numerous studies in the last decade. What were 
the implications for international law and its role in decisionmaking? To what extent 
was the intervention an example of the U. S. reassertion of hegemony in the region? 
This question was related to speculation about the future role of Britain in the region. 
Several weeks after the intervention Barbadian Prime NEnister Tom Adams stated 
that 1983 was "the watershed year in which the influence of the United States, willy- 
nilly, came observably to replace that of Great Britain. "4 
Grenada had been a close ally of Cuba and consequently the intervention had 
important implications for the nature of Cuba! s future relations with her Caribbean 
neighbours as well as the U. S. The People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) had 
been the focus of much interest for radicals throughout the region and its dramatic 
implosion was a serious setback to socialism in the Caribbean. 
It was probably in the Eastern Caribbean that the intervention had the most 
impact. The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)5 had not agreed with 
the larger Caribbean Community's (CARICOM)6 desire for a peaceful solution and 
deliberately kept CARICOM in the dark about their request to Washington for help. 
Regional integration suffered somewhat as relations between the OECS and 
4 Anthony P. Maingot, "American foreign policy in the Caribbean: continuities, changes, and 
contingencies, " Internafional Journal XL (Spring 1985): 327. 
5 The OECS was established in 1981 and consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserratý St. Kitts-Ncvis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
6 CARICOM was established in 1973 and consists of the OECS countries as well as the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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CARICOM were slow to heal after the intervention. Another issue bought to the fore 
was the military, political and economic dimensions of the security of microstates. 7 
The focus of this study will be the actual decisionmaking process that led the U. S. 
to intervene in Grenada. As such events go, the Grenada crisis has the advantage of a 
clearly definable duration; October 13 until October 25,1983. With the passing of 
time more sources have become available which has facilitated a more complete 
reconstruction of the crucial period. A relatively large number of Reagan officials 
have published memoirs in recent years! Interviews with participants and recently 
available declassified U. S. government documents have also been important sources. 
In examining the Grenada crisis I have divided the study into seven chapters. 
Chapter one outlines the theoretical basis of the thesis; I discuss the psychological 
process of analogical reasoning and the positives and negatives commonly associated 
with the use of analogies by foreign policy decisionmakers. The chapter concludes 
that historical analogies can be misleading but that they are powerful cognitive tools 
that aid decisionmakers in defining a situation and selecting a policy option. 
Chapters two and three examine U. S. -Grenadian relations during the Carter and 
Reagan administrations between March 1979 and Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice 
7 Commonwealth Study Group, Vulnerability. Small States in the Global Society (London: 
Commonwealth Secruariat, 1985) was specially commissioned after the intervention to address such 
issues. 
8 Among the more useful ones are: Allan Gerson, The Orkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy IrIthout 
Apology. America at the United Nations, 1981-1985 (New York: Free Press, 199 1); Frank McNeil, 
War and Peace in Central America: Peace and Illusion (New York. Charles Scribnees Sons, 1988); 
Constantine Menges, Inside the National Security CounciL 7he True Story of the Making and 
Unmaking ofReagan's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); Ronald W. Reagan, 
An American Life: The Autobiography (New York., Simon & Schuster, 1990); George P. Shultz, 
Turmoil and Diumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1993) 
and Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Ciltical Years at the Pentagon (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1990). Also of use were memoirs by the former British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey 
Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994) and former Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993). 
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Bishop's visit to Washington in June 1983. The origins of the March 1979 revolution 
via the rise and fall of Grenada! s Prime Minister Eric Gairy and the origins and 
triumph of the New Jewe19 Movement (NM in deposing him are traced. Grenada's 
relations with the U. S. and her Eastern Caribbean neighbours are charted. An account 
of the steady deterioration in U. S. -Grenadian relations is provided; the PRGs 
alignment with the Soviet bloc, Cuba! s involvement in the construction of an 
international airport, with potential military use, on Grenada, the failure to arrange 
elections, the suspension of the constitution, the large numbers of political prisoners, 
the suspension of habeas corpus, the closure of Grenada! s only independent 
newspaper. Simultaneously the PRG maintained a constant flow of anti-U. S. rhetoric. 
In response the U. S. adopted a "distancing" policy: Washington employed a 
combination of economic, political and military pressure to isolate Grenada. Bishop's 
June 1983 trip to Washington D. C. was designed for public relations purposes and to 
take the heat off the PRG for a while rather than primarily as an effort to normalise 
relations. 
Chapter four examines the dernise of the PRG in the summer of 1983 and the 
events which climaxed in Bishop's death on Wednesday, October 19. After Bishop's 
arrest on Thursday, October 13, a train of events was set in motion that resulted in an 
overt military intervention only two weeks later. The decision to intervene was a 
result of events in three locations: Washington, Barbados and Grenada. 
Consequently, a day-by-day analysis reconstructs the flow of these events and 
interactions between the three venues for the crisis period. Several important events 
between Bishop's house arrest and his death effectively established the foundations 
9 Jewel is an acronym for Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation. 
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for, and direction of, subsequent decisionmaking. In Washington the State 
Department's Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) convened daily and advocated an 
evacuation of U. S. nationals to avoid a potential hostage situation; the Joint Chief of 
Staffs QCS) reviewed evacuation procedures; a U. S. -Caribbean plan to rescue 
Bishop was discussed and on the morning of Wednesday, 19 October, Barbadian 
Prime Minister Tom Adams confirmed the Eastern Caribbean leaders' feelings by 
requesting U. S. participation in a military action. 
The central period of the crisis, between Thursday, October 20 and Tuesday, 
October 25, is the focus of chapters five and six. Chapter five covers the period 
between Thursday, October 20 and Saturday, October 22. During this time several 
key developments occurred: the attention on Grenada was elevated to Cabinet-level 
in Washington; the OECS met in Bridgetown, Barbados, and issued an oral request 
to the U. S. inviting them to participate in a multinational military force; CARICOM 
met in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, and proposed a non-military solution and at a Special 
Situations Group (SSG) meeting President Reagan made a "75 percent"10 
commitment to action. 
Chapter six examines the period from early morning on Sunday 23 when President 
Reagan's party returned from Augusta, Georgia, to Washington, until the final order 
was given to launch operation Urgent Fury on Tuesday 25. The key events of this 
short period include: the impact of the Beirut bombing; U. S. diplomats' meetings with 
a member of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) on Grenada; the dispatch of 
Special Emissary ambassador Frank McNeil to meet the Caribbean leaders and assess 
their rationale for action, the issuing of a formal written request by the OECS; the 
10 "Britain! s Grenada Shut-Out, " The Economist, Nlarch 10,1984, p. 22. 
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request of Grenada's Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon for assistance and ReagaWs 
ultimate decision to accede to the OECS request and intervene. 
Chapter seven concludes this study by addressing the central question of this 
work: How did historical analogies influence the U. S. policymakers in deciding to use 
force in Grenada? Having established the influence of Munich and Vietnam on 
Reagan officials, the different options Washington had to chose between during the 
Grenada crisis are listed. The significant historical analogies used by decisionmakers, 
the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam and Cuba, are identified and their impact assessed. 
Finally, the recommendations of each analogy are examined and how these factors 
not only promoted intervention but helped shape the form of Urgent Fury. 
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CRAPTER1 
ANALOGICAL REASONING 
In the 1950's and 1960's a "cognitive revolution"' in the social sciences 
emphasised the centrality of human information processing in understanding 
behaviour. As Simods "bounded rationality" theory posited: "limits on decision- 
makers time and information processing capabilities force them to take cognitive 
short-cuts that do not allow for maximizing decisions or full incorporation of new 
information. t12 The analogy is a central simplifying mechanism in this process. 
Accordingly, decisionmakers are "satisficers" whose search for decision options is 
sequential and the first option that meets minimum objectives is adjudged "good 
enough" and chosen. 3 Thus "bounded rationality" was at variance with the traditional 
rationality thesis that: 
decision-makers survey all possible courses of action, weight probable costs and 
benefits, and select a course of action that achieves a maximum value outcome in 
terms of the decision-makers' complete set of rank-order preferences. 4 
The cognitive psychology approach emphasised that the decisionmaker was: 
1 Cognitive in this context refers to "all the information processing activities of the brain, ranging 
from the analysis of immediate stimuli to the organization of subjective experiences... [Clognition 
includes such processes and phenomena as perception, memory, attention, problcm-solving, 
language, thinldng, and imagery. " Martha L. Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making. * The 
Influence of Cognition (Boulder, Colo.: Westvicw Press, 1986), p. 6. 
2 Andrew Owen Bennett, "Theories of Individual, Organizational and Governmental Learning and 
the Rise and Fall of Soviet Military Interventionism, " (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 1990), p. 92. 
For Simon's work see Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rafionality, 2 vols. (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1982). 
3 Bennett, "Theories of Individual, " p. 93. 
4 Ibid., p. 92. 
I 
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in large part shaped by the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates 
his physical and social environment... it is recognized that in order to experience 
and cope with the complex, confusing reality of the environment, individuals have 
to form simplified, structured beliefs about the nature of their world. 5 
The decisionmaker was conceived of as a "naive scientist" who used "knowledge 
structures" such as analogies, belief systems, operational codes and schemas to 
process information, understand the environment and make decisions. 
Analogies, schemata/operational codes and ideological beliefs, constitute the three 
main knowledge structures associated with learning: "a change of beliefs, skills, or 
procedures based on the observation and interpretation of experience. "' The subject 
is traditionally divided into three levels: individual, organisational and governmental 
learning with individual learning being the most important as it is the basis for 
organisational and governmental learning. 
The application of cognitive psychology to foreign policy decisionmaking has 
experienced theoretical, methodical and practical problems: disillusionment at 
previous results, skepticism about the relevance of cognitive psychology to foreign 
policy decisionmaking, establishing a link between beliefs and action, access to 
7 reliable data and the principle of parsimony. Another problem was the fact that the 
5 Cottarn, Foreign Policy Decision Making, p. 19. 
6 Jack S. Levy, "Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual mineficld, " International 
Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 296. Levy emphasiscs that learning does not automatically 
involve "policy change, an improved understanding of the world, or an increasingly complex 
cognitive structure. " Ibid., p. 283. 
7 Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively, " in Robert Axelrod (ed. ), Structure of 
Decision: 77ze Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 
22. Reber defines parsimony as a "general heuristic which states that if.. two theories are equally 
tenable the simpler one is to be preferred. " Arthur S. Reber, 7he Penguin Dictionary ofPsychology 
(London: Penguin, 1985), p. 519. Ibus systemic, governmental and bureaucratic explanations of 
decisionmaking have traditionally predominated. 
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psychological theories employed had originated under laboratory conditions, a far cry 
from the world of political decisionmaking. 
Although no one explanation or level of analysis can fully account for 
decisionmakers behaviour, the application of cognitive psychology to foreign policy 
decisionmaking has increased understanding of that process immensely although it is 
necessary to remember that: 
Both psychological and rational models are seriously underpredictive. In many 
circumstances either can be consistent with almost any outcome, making them 
nearly impossible to falsify. To make definite predictions about any particular 
actor's behavior, both models require standards of knowledge of actors! goals 
and information sets that can rarely be met outside a controlled experiment. ' 
Each theory has advantages and disadvantages in seeking to explain events but the 
adoption of one method has often excluded the explanations offered by the other. 
Analoizical Reasoning 
Rather than employing every psychological concept to analyse the U. S. decision 
to intervene in Grenada, I will concentrate on the use of historical analogies by 
decisionmakers to learn from history. Some of the major questions associated with 
this aspect of learning theory are: when do certain actors learn, what types of lessons 
are learned, from what type of events, under what conditions and with what results. 9 
Learning from history is a ubiquitous concept that underlines the general belief 
that the past teaches lessons that can be applied to the present and the future. The 
principal device employed in this process is the analogy, "an inference that if two or 
more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in 
8 Chaim D. Kaufman, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological 
Explanations of Political Decision Making, " International Stu&es Quarterly 38 (1994): 558. 
Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy, " p. 280. 
9 
another. "10 This may be represented by Fischer's statement, AX: BX:: AY: BY. A 
resembles B in terms of X; A also possesses Y which therefore infers that B 
possesses Y too. Thus via analogical reasoning BY has been inferred from three 
V "known" values. " The fundamental idea whenever an analogy is used is to clarif 
unfamiliar points in terms of the familiar. 
The validity of studying the influence of analogies is reinforced by the belief 
among many cognitive psychologists that analogical reasoning is inherent to all 
human beings. As Holyoak and Thagard emphasize; "Comparing novel situations to 
familiar ones and finding correspondences between them, and then using these 
correspondences to generate inferences about the new cases, is integral to human 
thinking. " 12 What makes analogies so alluring is that they are time-saving cognitive 
shortcuts. As previously mentioned, the human n-dnd is incapable of processing the 
large amounts of information involved in foreign policy decisionmaking and utilizes 
analogies as "knowledge structures" which help order, structure, interpret, simplify 
and understand information. Conversely, when there is a lack of information, 
analogies allow decisionmakers to go beyond the information available by relying on 
the suggestions provided by the analogy. 
The basic principles of analogical reasoning are clearly relevant to foreign policy 
decisionmaking as Gilovich points out: 
contexts that might be especially prone to this type of process are those in which 
the decision makers! training involves studying past decisions and their outcomes 
10 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at Wan Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Pletnam 
Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 6. 
11 David Hackett Fischer, Hislorians'Fallades. - Toward a Wc of Historical Thought (New York. 
Harper & Row, 1970), p. 243. 
12 Keith J. Holyoak and Paul Thagard, Mental Leaps., Analogy in Creative Thought (Cambridge: A 
Bradford Book, Mrr Press, 1995), p. 262. 
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or in which the nature of the decision making process largely involves a consider- 
ation of the success or faure of similar past decisions. " 
Ernest May's 1973 book 'Eessons" of the Past brought prominence to the subject and 
in the years since it has received increasing attention. "' In the policyrnaking context 
analogies can be thought of as "diagnostic devices"; Khong has proposed six 
important functions: "(1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the 
policymaker, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provide prescriptions. They help 
evaluate alternative options by (4) predicting the chances of success, (5) evaluating 
their moral rightness, and (6) warning about the dangers associated with the 
options. "" The first function, the definition of the situation, is the most important as 
it is the stage at which some options will be rejected and other options will be 
promoted. 
The Sceptics ViýmToint 
The relationship between the past, present and future and the role of history in 
providing "lessons" 16 which are used by decisionmakers is a contentious issue. Carr 
13 Thomas Gilovich, "Seeing the Past in the Present: The Effect of Associations to Familiar Events 
on Judgments and Decisions, " Journal ofPersonality and Social Personality 40 (1981): 802. 
14 The most extensive works on historical analogies are: Ernest May, "Lessons" ofthe Past., The Use 
and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), Earl C. Ravenal, Never Again: Learning From America's Foreign Policy 
Failures (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), Goran Rystad, Prisoners of the Past?: The 
Munich Syndrome and Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era (Lund, Sweden: 
CWK Glecrup, 1982), Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest Nby, Thinking in 271me: The Uses of History 
for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), Alex Hybel, How Leaders Reason: U. S. 
Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 
Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, The World in 7heir Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and 
Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), George 
W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds. ), Learning in U. S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, 
Colo.: Wcstview Press, 199 1) and Khong, Analogies at War. 
15 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 10. 
16 A lesson in this context is will be understood as "an explicit policy-relevant statement that is 
based on experience that has at least an implied application to later events. " W. Zimmerman and 
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argued that "the function of history is to promote a profounder understanding of both 
past and present through the interrelations between them. to 17 As we shall see, the 
difficulties and dangers involved in analogical reasoning are numerous. A large 
proportion of historians and political scientists argue that analogies are in fact used to 
justify/advocate a pre-determined policy rather than to analyze policy options. AIR 
Taylor wrote that, "men use the past to prop up their own prejudices. " Fairbank 
echoed this, describing history as "a grabbag from which each advocate pulls out a 
'lessod to prove his point. "" 
This use of historical analogies is defined by Melanson as "declaratory history": 
Decisionmakers use declaratory history not only to educate, justify, manipulate 
and mobilize the public, but also to illuminate the relationship between current 
declaratory policy and presumed historical experience... Declaratory history 
does not aim to be comprehensive, complex, or controversial. It usually repeats 
a limited number of themes, excluding others completely, and targets different 
audiences with somewhat different historical accounts. 19 
The Reagan administration' s declaratory history was dominated by the portrayal of 
the Cold War as a period of "peace through strength" and comparisons of the 1970's 
with the 1930's and the dangers of appeasement; the most obvious result was the 
massive defence spending of the administration. " 
Robert Axelrod, "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy, " World Politics 34, no. 1 
(1981): 6. 
17 Edward Caff,, "at is History? (London: Abcmillan, 1962), p. 62. 
18 Jervis, Perceplion andAfisperception, p. 217. 
19 Richard Melanson, "Action History, Declaratory History, and the Reagan Years, " MIS Review 9, 
no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1989): 229. 
20 Ibid., p. 237. 
12 
The other point the critics make is that decisionmakers "misuse" history. 21 Critics 
point to decisionmakers' tendency to extract specific lessons from a past event and 
then apply them literally to the new situation without regard for the differences in 
time, space and history. 22 "Lessons" are frequently ambiguous and open to a variety 
of interpretations. They tend to be overgeneralised, oversimplified and overused. 
Once a past event is chosen as an analogy it can dominate the proceedings and there 
is a danger that policymakers will use it unquestioningly to define the situation and 
choose an option whilst disregarding other possible analogies and relevant 
information. 
The concern of the critics is not unfounded to be sure. Analogies are obviously 
useful tools. of advocacy but as Jervis counters: 
If history merely reinforced established beliefs, people with different outlooks 
would not draw the same lessons from events, people would not disproportion- 
ally use as analogies events they experienced firsthand, and historical experience 
would not alter decision-makers views. ' 
As Khong observes, "the fact that policymakers use the same analogies tojustify their 
choices does not vitiate the diagnostic role of the analogies in helping policymakers 
arrive at these choices. "24 It is undeniable that policyrnakers have, on the whole, not 
21 Misuse in this sense is defined as "a use of past events which is faulty in that it violates the rules 
of logical and/or stated judgment and inference. " Yaacov Y. I. Vcrtzbcrgcr, "Foreign Policy 
Decisionmakers as Practical-intuitive Historians: Applied History and its Shortcomings, " 
International Studies Quarterly 30 (1986): 225. 
22 George C. Herring, "Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Uses of History, " in Kenneth M. Coleman 
and George C. Herring, The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conj7ict and the Failure of U. S. 
Policy (Wilmington, Va.: Scholarly Resources, 1985), p. 106. 
23 Jervis, Perception andMisperception, p. 217. 
24 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 16. Emphasis in original. Indeed, as Anderson suggests, 
justification of a policy is constrained by what is acceptable and what is not. In this situation if 
policy is not consistent with a [historical] precedent it is often deemed unacceptable. Therefore, 
"actions which cannot be plausibly justified in terms of desired precedents are at a bargaining 
disadvantage, given the limits of legitimate advocacy. " Paul A. Anderson, "Justifications and 
Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Dedsion-Making, * Amefican Journal of Political 
Science 25 (November 1981): 748. 
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used history very well and this fact has been well documented. However, as Khong 
perceptively emphasizes: 
unless one first answers the question of whether and how the analogies in 
question affect the selection of policy, there is not much point in making the 
assessment that the analogies are used badly. That is, if analogies do not affect 
the decision outcome, it does not matter if they are used badly or wisely. 25 
The Use of Historical Analoaies 
Before proceeding further in discussing the use of historical analogies it would be 
advantageous to delineate exactly what is meant by analogy, to avoid semantic 
confusion with terms like metaphor, extrapolation, insight and precedent. 
Metaphor, often used interchangeably with analogy, is a "figure of speech in 
which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action that it does not literally 
denote in order to imply a resemblance. "N This identification and fusion of two 
objects creates a new one with the characteristics of both. Shakespeare's "All the 
world is a stage", is a prime example. The metaphor transfers the meaning of stage to 
the meaning of the world. Metaphor operates via what Zashin and Chapman term 
"the association of ideas": 
Metaphor is an art of speech and prose: it is a tactic of immediate expression. 
Through it, a speaker or writer attempts to shape and even manipulate the imagi- 
nation of his audience. By combining certain words, he is able to induce an un- 
usual picture of images in their minds. 27 
This involuntary process exploits feelings, emotions, images, connotations, words 
and so on that the individual has accumulated over time. The metaphor, Eke the 
25 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 9. 
26 Patrick Hanks (ed. ), Collins Diclionary ofthe English Language (London: Collins, 1983), p. 927. 
27 Elliot Zashin and Phillip Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy: Toward a Renewal of 
Political Language, "Journal ofPolifics 36 (1974): 3 10. 
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analogy, is central to communication, persuading and influencing people, helping 
them to interpret subjects. They are used to clarify, magnify, embellish and add 
concreteness to an idea, argument or event. For historians, Fischer described 
metaphors as "useful and ornamental in the articulation of ideas. 09 
There are two views on the function of metaphors: the substitution view argues 
that the metaphor does not add any meaning to a statement which could not have 
been expressed with other words and only implies similarities already existing. 
Alternatively, the interaction view argues that the metaphor actually creates the 
similarities and adds meaning to statementS. 29 Metaphors have been crucial in the 
development of political theory; "political science has always resorted to metaphors, 
to the device of proceeding from the known to the unknown. 00 
Metaphors are often described as an abridged form of an analogy; both share 
many of the same mental processes. Metaphors and analogies are obviously not 
mutually exclusive; when a historian uses a metaphor he draws an analogy via "a 
multiple simultaneous mental perception or vision of two or more related thingS. 01 
An example of the relationship between metaphor and analogy can clarify the 
situation: if a negotiator at a conference is described as having "played his hand well" 
a card game metaphor has been drawn. If the situation is now interpreted in terms of 
28 Fischer, Historians'Fallacies, P. 224. 
29 Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy, " p. 296. 
30 Martin Landau quoted in Eugene F. Miller, "Metaphor and Political Knowledge, " American 
Politcial Science Review 73, no. I (Much 1979): 155. 
31 Warren A. Shibles, Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History (Whitcwatcr, Ark.: 
Language Press, 1971), p. 24. As with analogies, "a metaphor is understood by finding a mapping 
between the target domain... and the source domain. The degree to which the analogy is viewed as 
metaphorical will tend to increase the more remote the target and domains are from each other. " 
Holyoak and Thagard, Mental Leaps, p. 220. 
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the basic abstract category and relationships of poker, an analogy is being used. 32 
Using metaphor as analogy though, only implies that the two domains are alike in 
some respects. Many authors proffer that metaphors "may thus be viewed as 
expressing the vague and confused but primal perception of identification, which 
subsequent processes of discrimination transform into a conscious and expressed 
analogy between different things. 03 Metaphors and analogies operate in the same 
field of establishing relationships between two events via similar differences or 
carrying from one domain to another. 
The most important difference between metaphor and analogy is the phase of 
thought process. The meaning of metaphor is grasped via the images it evokes; this 
process is performed by the brain quickly and often subconsciously. Metaphors are 
frequently used unintentionally,. more through habit than any careful consideration. 
Analogies however, are more abstract and deliberate. Comparisons, implicit in 
metaphors, are explicit with analogies and too involved to be induced spontaneously; 
consequently, an analogy's purpose is often announced and the audience's conscious 
cooperation sought with such phrases as "Think of it this way. . . 
04 The analogy 
utilizes abstract categories and relationships and transfers them from one domain to 
another to organize the latter; the metaphor employs new images of one domain, 
evoked by juxtaposing it with another which is acknowledged to be similar and 
different simultaneously. Thus, "in the metaphor, the similar and different interact to 
32 Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy, " p. 312. 
33 Shiblcs, Metaphor, p. 75. 
34 Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy, " p. 3 10. 
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produce a meaning that is not to be found in either subject alone. In the analogy, 
there is no tension or interaction. 05 
In conclusion, metaphors are generally considered to be useful devices to enliven 
prose, stimulate the use of analogies, convey effect and highlight features. It would 
seem to be taken less seriously. Winston Churchill believed politicians used them to 
speak strongly because they were unsure of what to say and critics argue that 
metaphors actually bypass logic. For example, one author concluded that "analogies 
belong to logic: metaphors belong to aesthetics. 06 Analogies lend force to an 
argument and are considered essential to thought, serving as hypotheses. 
Extrapolation is another process used to compare the past and present. This 
involves "perceiving the present event as an organic extension of a past event whose 
causes are known. The assumed continuity is also applied to the causes of the present 
situation which, by definition, are then the same as those of the earlier event. 07 The 
primary difficulty of this process is that the "claim to forecast [the] likely future... 
ignores many key determinants of that future. 08 The use of this device differs 
essentially from analogy by assuming some continuity and association between the 
past and present or future. Analogical reasoning assumes discontinuity but some 
correspondence between two or more events separated in time. 
Two further terms require attention: insight and precedents. When referring to a 
situational or contextually triggered insight it can be defined as "a novel, clear, 
35 Ibid., p. 317. 
36 Joshua Gregory quoted in Shibles, Metaphor, p. 123. 
37 Vertibcrger, "Foreign Policy Dccisionmakers, " p. 226. 
38 Solomon Encel, Pauline K. Marstrand and William Page, 7he Art ofAnticipation: Values and 
Methods in Forecasting (London: ? vL Robertson, 1975), p. 76. 
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compelling apprehension of the truth of something occurring without overt recourse 
to memories of past experiences. 09 Whilst insight does clarify a situation and help 
decisionmakers understand events and create policy, it clearly differs from analogy in 
that it does not manifestly rely on previous experiences. Precedents create "a norm 
for the future and when analogous situations are observed. .. the precedent 
'recommends' a certain pattern of behavior"; consequently analogies are a prerequisite 
for precedence. 40 
The Analo 
Analogical reasoning is the most pervasive mode of reasoning used in the 
everyday communication of unfamiliar ideas. It is the primary cognitive process 
employed in all decisionmaking operations: 
what analogies do, essentially, is offer those to whom they are proposed a ready- 
made conceptual organization for something unfamiliar or probabilistic... by 
suggesting that the object of concern is "isometric" or parallel with or similar in 
relevant respects to something else which is familiar, well understood, and uncon- 
41 troversial . 
In terms of cognitive psychology, analogical reasoning occurs when individuals 
"abstract a solution strategy from a previous problem and relate that information to a 
new problem that... [they] are trying to solve. 9942 
Cognitive psychology is a general approach to psychology which accentuates the 
internal mental processes by suggesting that "behaviour is not specifiable simply in 
39 Rcber, The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, p. 3 60. 
40 Lars-Goran Stenclo, Foreign Policy Predictions (Lund, Sweden: Studentlittcratuer, 1980), p. 
110. 
41 Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy, " p. 312. 
42 Jerome S. Bruner, A Study of Thinking (London: Transaction, 1986), p. 220. 
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terms of its overt properties but requires explanations at the level of mental events, 
mental representation, beliefs, intentions and so on. t143 This approach criticizes the 
other psychological viewpoint of behaviourism. which argues that the only valid 
subject matter for investigation is observable, quantifiable behaviour because it does 
not provide any coherent characterization of cognitive processes such as thinking and 
decisionmaking. 44 In practice these two camps are not mutually exclusive but 
interactive to varying degrees on various subjects. 
For decisionmakers, "knowledge structures" such as analogies promise order and 
control. Man has a limited cognitive capacity and cannot cope with the vast amounts 
of information available and so employs analogies to order, structure, interpret, 
simplify and understand the information. They are fundamentally a "short-cut" 
mechanism that allow individuals to process information and solve problems; 
reasoning cannot proceed very far without them. 45 Mefford suggests that: 
reasoning by analogy probably exerts greatest impact in the initial steps of the 
overall process. It helps shape the decision makers initial orientation and posture. 
It is here that candidate interpretations are first marshaled, later to be scrutinized 
and reworked or rejected. Evaluation and calculation come later. 46 
Current situations frequently provide nebulous and incomplete information for the 
decisionmaker to construct a policy from. In this situation analogies are used to 
supply extra information to complete gaps in the knowledge of the present situation 
and to identify what the result of a particular option might be, or if a particular course 
43 Reber, Yhe Penguin Dictionary, p. 129. 
44 lbid., p. 130. 
45 Dwain Mefford, "Analogical Reasoning and the Definition of the Situation: Back to Snyder for 
Concepts and Forward to Artificial Intelligence for Method, " in Charles Hcrmann, Charles Kegley 
and James Roscnau (eds. ), New Directions in the Study ofForeign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1987), p. 223. 
46 lbicL, p. 223. 
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of action is prescribed. This is when analogies can become disingenuous; they are 
invoked on the basis of factors that were not causal and significant in the original 
situation and therefore inappropriate to the new situation but remain influential in 
decisionmakers' minds. Learning from history is obviously a potentially beneficial 
action but there are many pitfalls which need to be avoided. There are numerous 
examples of decisionmakers being misled by erroneous analogies, yet analogies still 
remain a present part of decisionmaking. To understand why this is so and how 
analogies are used in general, it is helpful to examine the psychological process of 
analogical reasoning. 
Using past experiences to help solve a current problem is technically described as 
the analogical transfer of a problem-solving strategy. Naturally, solving one problem 
previously will not always help solve another problem on every occasion. There are 
three stages in analogical transfer. Firstly, recognition: this involves identifying, 
accessing and retrieving an analogy (the base)47 from the memory with which to 
reason. Secondly, abstraction: the problem-solver abstracts a general structure, 
procedure or principles (lesson) from the base. Thirdly, mapping: the problem-solver 
48 applies this knowledge to the present problem (the target). I win examine each of 
these stages in detail. 
RecoWtion 
47 A base is a person or situation from which knowledge is transferred so as to be able to make a 
prediction for the target. Stephen I Read, "Similarity and Causality in the Use of Social Analogies, " 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 23 (1987): 190. 
's The target is the person or situation for which the prediction is to be made. lbid., p. 190 and 
Bruner, A Study of Thinking, p. 227. 
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Knowing the solution for an analogous problem is not useful unless the 
decisionmaker realizes the problem is analogous to the current situation. How are 
analogies identified and retrieved from the memory and how are specific ones 
chosen? Retrieval in this sense is based on what Holyoak and Koh describe as 
"summation of activation. v49 Multiple shared features, particularly if they are causally 
related, trigger the memorized representation of a similar situation. These shared 
features result in the retrieval of an analogy. Such similarities are divided into 
"surface" and "structural. " 
It is acknowledged that retrieval is facilitated by surface cueing, superficial 
similarities between X and Y that are not necessary for problem-solving. Gentner and 
Landers presented a group of students with 32 short stories (14 were fillers), two 
acted as bases. The students received three target story variations - one was a true 
analogy, one an apparent analogy and one a false analogy to the base stories. Their 
results revealed that the apparent match target story triggered the retrieval of a base 
analogy more often that the true analogy target story did. This led them to conclude 
that whilst structural cueing is important, the retrieval of the apparent target story 
indicated that surface cueing was a dominant factor. 50 A ready example of this can be 
seen in U. S. decisionmakers' comparison of Korea and Vietnam: a land war in Asia, a 
divided nation, Northern communist-backed aggressors and so on. These surface 
similarities reinforced belief in the Korean analogy. Such surface similarities are 
ostensibly those that are most accessible and the quickest to be recalled, therefore 
49 Keith J. Holyoak and Kyunghee Koh, "Surface and structural similarity in analogical transfer, " 
Memory and Cognifion 15, no. 4 (1987): 333. 
so Mark T. Keane, Analogical Problem-Solving (Chichester, West Sussex: Ellis Horwood, 1998), p. 
62. 
21 
having more impact on the selection of source analogies than the application of 
analogies. 
The other main theory of retrieval is the structural-and-surface cueing thesis. 
Here, structural similarities are those that correspond relations of event X to 
relations of event Y. They are the causally relevant factors. Structural cues are the 
goal features (for example the containment of communism, removal of a government 
or rescue of nationals) which are matched with the potential analogy in the memory. 
The surface component of this theory is the object features which are matched with 
objects of a similar structure base in the memory. " 
Although surface and structural similarities are influential, dissimilarities can be 
just as important. Surface dissimilarities can be structure-preserving (causally relevant 
factors) but structural dissimilarities are structure-violating, altering the causal 
relationship between the two situations, making the potential analogy less useful and 
less likely to be used. Unlike surface differences, structural differences between the 
base and the target impairs mapping and makes the analogical solution more difficult 
to derive since further transformation is required to generate a solution that is viable 
in the target situation. 52 In an ideal world, decisionmakers would only use structural 
similarities as retrieval cues but they cannot consistently distinguish between surface 
and structural features and therefore irrelevant surface features do affect the solution 
planned by influencing the selection of an analogy at the outset. Research conducted 
would indicate that once an analogy has been retrieved, surface features have less 
51 Ibid., p. 63. 
52 Holyoak and Koh, "Surface and structural similarity, " p. 338. 
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impact than structural ones. Simply put, recognizing structural similarities and 
ignoring surface ones is the key to successful analogical reasoning. 
Retrieval of potential analogies is determined by what is called the "availability" 
and "representativeness" of the analogy to the target. Analogies are stored in the 
memory on an unequal standing; it is this that produces the idea of the availability of 
an analogy. Availability refers to the ease with which certain information can be 
retrieved from the memory. Recent events are more accessible as their impact has not 
been diminished by time to any great extent or overshadowed by subsequent events. 
For President Truman in 1950 the North Korean invasion of South Korea was 
interpreted as a classic case of aggression which had to be opposed; the capitulation 
at Munich and its results loomed large in his mind. "Big" events such as Munich and 
Korea are also likely to be prominent in the memory. Revolutions and wars influence 
entire generations. For U. S. administrations in general, Latin American revolutions 
are available as rejections of U. S. values and an opportunity for Soviet penetration of 
the U. S. ' backyard. The 1979 Grenadian Revolution triggered memories of the 1959 
Cuban Revolution. Such an analogy was highly accessible because it was a dramatic, 
relatively big event that has remained conspicuous in U. S. foreign policy towards 
Latin America ever since. 
Wars are conceivably the most available events due to their severity and 
destructiveness which make them the most influential events for many 
decisionmakers, They are more likely to learn from an aggressive outcome than a 
negotiated solution to a problem simply because the former is more dramatic. " 
Memories of World War One reminded decisionmakers of the dangers of an 
S3 Jcrvis, Percepfion andMisperception, p. 235. 
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uncontrolled arms race leading nations stumblingly into a war. World War Two 
revealed the dangers of appeasement, isolationism and punitive peace treaties and the 
"total" nature of war. Korea suggested that future wars in the nuclear age would be 
limited affairs and that a pattern had been set for the emergent Cold War. Vietnam 
led policymakers to conclude that fighting a land war in Asia against an indigenous 
guerrilla foe was futile, that incrementalism. was ineffective and that domestic 
opposition undermined the war effort. 
The availability of major events like wars and revolutions are juxtaposed with 
another measure of availability - success or failure. As Jervis points out, events in 
foreign policy are rigidly classified as a "success" or "failure. " The obvious problem is 
how to define success and failure in terms of foreign policy; a simple definition may 
be the achievement of desired aims. Normally past successes will result in policy 
continuity and failure will produce policy change. However, in foreign policymaking 
nothing is clear-cut; desired results are compromised, changed, unclear and often 
unrealistic. 
The perception of a past event as a success frequently means that it will be 
ignored as an analogy. The assumption is that because everything turned out 
favourably the policy was correct. Minimal attention is paid to the costs of the policy, 
other options that were available, the element of luck involved and the possibility of 
failure. 54 When a past success is used as an analogy it is often used too quickly and 
without careful comparison simply because it is perceived as a success and therefore 
relatively uneventful for policymakers when searching for an analogy. Successful 
event analogies are not always misused. The British management of the media during 
54 Ibid., p. 232. 
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the Falklands conflict reinforced in the U. S. ' mind the desirability of strict control of 
the media during wartime and hence they excluded the media entirely from Grenada. 
Failures would appear to be more available in the memories of decisionmakers. 
Fischhoff describes this as the "focus on failure" and warns that: 
although it has legitimate goals, focus on failure is likely to mislead us by creat- 
ing a distorted view of the prevalence of misfortune. The perceived likelihood of 
events is determined in part by the ease with which they are imagined and remem- 
bered. Belabouring failures should, therefore, disproportionally enhance their 
perceived frequency in the past (and perhaps in the future). 55 
For example, the predominant analogies used in U. S. politics in reference to President 
Reagan's Central America policy were Cuba and Vietnam, two strongly negative 
analogies. 56 
The central aims of decisionmakers in using the past is to avoid mistakes that were 
made previously and why they were made, believing that history shows what not to 
do rather than what to do. It is probable that previous failures are used as "additional 
demands" for the next time, incorporating the unsuccessful solution into the 
representation of the new problem as an additional problem constraint. 57 
In a similar way to successes, failures produce the assumption that other options 
would have been better and that the decisionmakers involved should have realized 
this. The idea that the policy followed was perhaps the best option available or that 
55 Baruch Fischhoff, "For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, " 
in Daniel Kahncman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds. ), Judgment Under Uncertainty. 
Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 339. 
56 As Lc-vy points out "the most likely outcomes to trigger learning arc failures that were either 
unexpected at the time or unpredictable in retrospect, though predictable failures are still more 
likely to lead to learning than are successes. " Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy, " p. 305. 
57 Mary L. Gick and Susan J. McGarry, "Learning From Mistakes: Inducing Analogous Solution 
Failures to a Source Problem Produces Later Successes in Analogical Transfer, " Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 18, no. 3 (1992): 624. 
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even good decisionmaking using all the information available at the time still produce 
a bad result is less likely to be considered. 
The context of the original policy is ignored or overlooked due to the bias of 
hindsight. Contextual differences can present difficulties when transferring lessons. 
As a consequence, either the past will be defined simplistically to make it more 
similar to the present than it is or the current situation is manipulated to resemble the 
past more than it does. 5' Using historical analogies to establish terms for examining 
the current situation that are out of historical context decrease the usefulness of the 
analogy. For example: 
The categories Leon Trotsky borrowed from the French Revolution - Jacobinism, 
Thermidor, and Bonapartism - were too much the product of one historical epoch 
and national history to be useful in explaining, or even in helping to explain, the 
evolution of another. " 
There are also a number of individual-oriented factors that increase the availability 
of a memory. First hand experience of an event is very influential. Leng, in an article 
studying coercive bargaining in recurrent crises, argued that in this process 
"experience learning" focused on a previous crisis; its lessons were then interpreted in 
terms of realpolitik credibility and demonstrations of power. He concluded that: "the 
propensity to draw lessons from the outcome of one dispute to guide policy-making 
in the next is especially strong when statesmen find they are engaged in a second and 
third crisis with the same adversary. j160 President Kennedy's experience of the 
abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco undoubtedly affected his handling of the missile crisis the 
58 Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakcrs, " p. 237. 
59 Jay Bergman, "The Perils of Historical Analogy: Leon Trotsky on the French Revolution, " 
Journal of the History ofIdeas (1987): 73. 
60 Russell J. Ung, "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Barganing in Recurrent Crises, " Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 3 80. 
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next year. Actual participation in policymaking always has more impact on an 
individual and his memory of the event than secondary experiences. However, first- 
hand experience can have an overbearing influence later and produce lessons that are 
overgeneralized and overused. 61 Individuals use what they have learned, observed 
and experienced in analogical reasoning although it is uncertain which is most 
influential or effective. For example, countries rarely appear to learn lessons from 
other countries' experiences; the U. S. did not learn from France's in Vietnam. It 
would appear that countries tend to concentrate on what has happened to them 
relatively recently. However, "there is usually no reason why the recent past will be a 
better guide than the remote past or why what happened to one's own state will be 
more informative than what happened to others. tv62 U. S. feelings of exceptionalism 
could perhaps help to explain this. 
Decisionmakers early experiences are especially available for analogical use. The 
early years of political life are the most influential as individuals are at their most 
impressionable and receptive to new ideas and beliefs. 63 The political issues of this 
formative period, and the stand taken, often form a belief-system for an individual's 
subsequent career. Both Presidents Truman and Johnson, to use the example of 
'51 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 239. Conversely, personal experience can be suppressed 
and sometimes there is simply no precedent amongst personal experience. Nfichael Fry, 
"Introduction, " in Nfichael Fry (ed. ), History, the ffbite House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as 
Historians (London: Pinter, 199 1), p. 16. 
62 Jervis, Percepfion andMispercepfion, p. 269. 
63 In a biography of Ronald Reagan, Cannon noted that "Reagans enduring model for presidential 
performance in times of economic crisis was his first political hcro, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The 
relief program of the New Deal had provided jobs for his father and brother in 1933, earning from 
Reagan an emotional loyalty that transcended all subsequent philosophical mutations. " Lou Cannon, 
President Reagan: The Role ofa Lifelime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 199 1), p. 108. 
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Korea and Vietnam, had been affected by Munich during their early careers and 
hence facing up to aggression was a feature of their presidencies. 
What Jervis describes as the "generational effect" postulates that if an 
administration is of the same generation they are likely to be influenced by the same 
events when reasoning by analogy. 64 Mannheim argued that: 
The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same gener- 
ation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the. individual with a 
common location in the social and historical processes, and thereby limit them to 
a specific range of experiences, predisposing them to a certain characteristic mode 
of thought and experience and a characteristic type of historically relevant action. 65 
The Reagan administration were sentient of World War Two. Reagan, George Shultz 
and Caspar Weinberger, amongst others, were of that generation and remained aware 
of the Munich syndrome throughout their careers. For the postwar generation 
Vietnam is the most available analogy. 66 This theory does not automatically mean 
that the same generation will have the same interpretation of events or even invoke 
67 the same analogy. Decisionmakers have a bank of analogies in their memory, some 
are common to a generation and others are more individual. However, "we can be 
' Such events are typically those that have a lasting impact and captivate public attention and 
establish a consensus on their meaning. Howard Schuman and Cheryl Ricgcr, "Historical Analogies, 
Generational Effects, and Attitudes Toward War, " American Sociological Review 57 (June 1992): 
316. 
65 Ole Holsti and James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Petnam and the 
Breakdour ofConsensus (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 1. 
66 The use of Vietnam as an analogy is complicated by the fact that there is a lack of consensus over 
what the lessons of Vietnam actually are to start with. See David FromIdn and James Chace, "What 
Are the Lessons of Vietnam?, " Foreign Affairs 63 (1985): 594-612. 
67 In a recent study by Schuman and Rieger on the invocation of the Munich and Vietnam analogies 
in relation to the 1991 Gulf War they found that those participants born before 1945 favoured the 
Munich analogy 70/30 whereas the post-1945 generation demonstrated a 50150 split. However, the 
study concluded that "rather than past experience controlling the present, the present controlled the 
past, as most of the Americans of all generations came to accept the analogy to World War Two - an 
analogy that justified massive military action. " Schuman and Rieger, "11istorical Analogies, " p. 325. 
This is an indication of the influence of present policy preferences; the Bush administration 
repeatedly used the Munich analogy in public statements. 
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fairly confident that events exert an independent influence when large numbers of 
people with a range of characteristics and beliefs all learn the same lessons from an 
event. "" Munich is the classic example of this and Vietnam is the very antithesis of 
it. 
Representativeness 
Analogies are also retrieved according to their "representativeness. " The 
decisionmaker has to gauge the similarity of the current situation with a specific 
analogical situation in the memory. In doing this they "look for causes that resemble 
the explained effect when applying it in its primitive form to the search for causal 
explanation. 09 In general, decisions are based on beliefs concerning the probability 
of uncertain events and people rely on a limited number of heuristic" principles to 
reduce the complexity of assessing problems and predicting solutions to simple 
judgmental operations . 
7' Heuristics do not guarantee the discovery of a solution to a 
problem. 
Representativeness is one such heuristic whereby the probabilities are evaluated 
by the degree to which X represents Y or X resembles Y. Yet, "as the amount of 
detail in a scenario increases, its probability can only decrease steadily, but its 
68 Jervis, Perception andMisperceplion, p. 249. 
69 Vertzberger, The World in Their Afinds, p. 144. 
70 Heuristics arc "general principles for reducing complex judgment tasks to simpler mental 
operations by emphasizing some properties of the data and ignoring others. They are informal 
intuitive procedures that are applied both consciously and thoughtlessly. Heuristics arc not 
necessarily applied consistently, even by the same person to the same type of problem and 
circumstances. " Ibid., p. 144. 
71 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Judgment Under Uncertainty, " in Kahncman et al., 
Judgment under Uncertainty, p. 4. 
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representativeness and hence apparent likelihood may increase. "72 This process helps 
to explain the influence of surface similarities in the selection and retrieval of 
analogies. Problems can occur when high degree of representativeness is perceived; 
this reduces the close examination of the reliability and validity of evidence and 
increases the level of faith the decisionmaker has in the prediction. 73 
Abstraction 
Once an analogy is recognized as possibly useful the next stage is to abstract the 
general characteristics from it to use in solving the target situation. Abstraction is 
"the cognitive process whereby an abstract idea or concept is isolated from a number 
of exemplars. "74 Abstraction can take place at multiple levels of differing 
generalit Y. 75 Gick and Holyoak used the "radiation problem" and "The General" to 
demonstrate. The radiation problem presents a doctor with a stomach tumour. An 
operation is impossible but unless the tumour is removed the patient Will die. There 
are rays that will kill the tumour but they are so intense they will also Ul the 
surrounding tissue. Lower intensity rays will not ldlI the tissue or the tumour. How 
might the tumour be destroyed and the patient saved? The General scenario has a 
small country ruled by a dictator from a stronghold. A rebel leader promises to 
capture the fortress and assembles his forces along one of the approach roads. 
However, the road is mined and a large force could not use it simultaneously and a 
72 Amos Tversky, "Judgmcnts of and by Reprcscntativcncss, " in Kahneman ct al., Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, p. 98. 
13 Vertzberger, 7he World in Yheir Minds, p. 148. 
14 Rcber, 7he Penguin Dictionmy, p. 3. 
15 Mary L. Gick and Keith J. Holyoak, "Analogical problem solving, " Cognitive PsycholoSy 12 
(1980): 310. 
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small force would not be enough to overthrow the dictator. How was the dictator to 
be removed? The solution to both problems is convergence - the division of one force 
(rays/men) into smaller groups attacking the target simultaneously from different 
positions. 
At a low level of abstraction both stories have a number of corresponding details 
(a small group of rebels, low intensity rays). At a more abstract level, corresponding 
details include the overpowering of an object in a region that must be preserved. It is 
assumed that the decisionmaker's requirement of an analogy determines the selection 
of the level of abstraction, specific or general. Analogical reasoning implies the 
comparison of two concepts at the same level of abstraction and Gick and Holyoak 
suggest that there is an optimal level where an analogy becomes a guide to a solution 
for a target situation. 
The optimal level theory is problematic. Analogies can be complete at one level 
(general) but not at another (specific). Therefore: 
for use in solving a problem the optimal level of abstraction for representing an 
analogy may be that which maximizes the degree of correspondence between the 
two related systems. In many cases a very detailed representation will include dis- 
analogous relations, while a very abstract representation will omit information 
about important correspondences. 76 
Thus for the decisionmaker the greater the level of abstraction, the greater the 
completeness and apparent value of the analogy is. This does occur at the cost of 
deleting details which do not correspond though. In conclusion, "the optimal level of 
representation for successful analogical thinking may, typically, lie at an intermediate 
76 lbid, p. 314. 
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level of abstraction, and it may yield an analogy that is less than complete. 07 It 
seems that such a trade-off is unavoidable. 
The concept of schema-induction also contributes to an explanation of how 
individuals abstract general characteristics from an analogy. Schemas are "a generic 
concept stored in memory, referring to objects, situations, events, or people. It is a 
collection of knowledge related to a concept" that "has default values... providing a 
prototype against which specific examples can be compared. 08 Thus the schema for 
a bird would contain "default values" about colour, size, beak shape and so on. 79 
Schemas facilitate the storage and retrieval of information from the long-term 
memory. Like analogies, schemas "can reduce information processing requirements 
by focusing attention, economizing on memory storage, providing a basis for 
extrapolation beyond present information, and enabling decisionniakers to envision a 
sequence of outcomes to a desired goal. "O The schema perspective contributes to an 
understanding of analogical reasoning by suggesting how decisionmakers match 
current events with past ones and infer that because two separate events are similar in 
one respect that they will be in another as well. 
Schema-induction basically deletes the differences between the base and target 
situation while preserving similarities. 81 Each individual analogy represents a schema. 
In the previous example of the radiation problem and The General, the goal of 
77 Mary L. Gick and Keith J. Holyo* "Schema induction and analogical transfer, " Cognitive 
Psychology 15 (1983): 9. 
18 Deborah Welch Larson, The OKgins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 44. 
19 Ibid., p. 5 1. 
80 Bennett, " Theories of IndividuaL" p. 97. 
81 Gick and Holyoak, "Schema induction, " p. S. 
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overcoming a target is achieved via destroying a tumour and seizing a fortress. In 
using schemas to abstract similar features the representativeness heuristic of the 
analogy is crucial; "the similarity of the data at hand to some stored representation of 
objects and events always has been presumed to be the chief determinant of schema 
arousal and application. oM As Khong points out though, schema theorists concede 
that individuals are tentative in applying a schema to a novel situation when the fit 
does not seem accurate. 83 Schema-induction increases the probability that a possible 
analogy will be recognized. 
Mapping 
Mapping, the final stage of analogical reasoning, aims to create a parallel solution 
to a new problem by constructing a set of solution propositions that correspond to 
solution propositions of the original story. 84 Hesse has defined two varieties: 
horizontal and vertical. Horizontal mapping concerns those aspects of both situations 
that are similar. Vertical mapping concerns the causal relations which connect 
elements within one situation. " The two forms are inextricably linked. 
Due to the fact that analogical reasoning depends on correspondences between a 
base and target there is good reason to view mapping as the crucial stage. It is best 
when direct and obvious mapping is possible but this is infrequent; most mapping is 
incomplete. In such situations the "most useful analogy... is the one in which some 
of the overlapping features of target and base can be causally related to the outcome 
82 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 216. 
Ibid., p. 222. 
Gick and Holyoak, "Schcma induction, " p. 314. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
83 
84 
83 
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or behaviour of the base. , 86 The analogy therefore provides plausible causal 
relationships between matched features and outcome. Of course, before any mapping 
can occur the original analogy must be seen in the same light as the target problem. It 
is not essential to map all aspects of the base to the target to generate a solution but 
the causal antecedents of the base outcome must be mappable; if they are not the 
analogy should be rejected as misleading. 17 This operation is where the bad use of 
history occurs. Decisionmakers repeatedly prove unable to identify these causal 
antecedents and hence subsequent mapping of misleading analogies results and the 
lessons of history that are applied are inappropriate. 
The use of surface and structural sin-dlarities to identify potential analogies 
governs which ones are used. While structural features are influential in recognition, 
surface features are influential in mapping. In theory, decisionmakers should use both 
types of similarities to recognize analogies but only structural similarities to abstract 
solutions. It is important to remember that perhaps the central theoretical idea shared 
by all the major theories of analogical reasoning assume that people strive to achieve 
some sort of coherence in the mapping they establish between the elements of the 
source and target analysis. "' Spellman and Holyoak proffer that this coherency is 
shaped by certain constraints; structural constraint implies that mappings should be 
one-to-one. " Decisionmakers thus favour unique one-to-one mappings although 
'6 Stephen J. Read, "Analogical Reasoning in Social Judgment: The Importance of Causal 
Theories, " Joumal ofExperimental Social Psychology 46, no. 1 (1984): 15. 
87 Gick and Holyoak, "Schema induction, " p. 6. 
88 Barbara Spellman and Keith I Holyoak, "If Saddarn was IEder then who was George Bush? 
Analogical mapping between systems of social roles, " Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 
62, no. 6 (1992): 914. 
89 lbid, p. 914. 
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one-to-many are possible. In general, individuals generate mappings that conform 
with certain basic restraints of coherency. 
Even if analogies are nearly complete, the mapping of irrelevant dissimilarities 
from the base to the target is probably unavoidable. There are three reasons for 
failing to map a solution with an analogy at hand: unable to apply the analogy even if 
the effort was made; unable to locate a potentially useful analogy in the memory or 
unable to notice an analogy relevant to the target problem. 90 It is extremely difficult 
for a decisionmaker not to map irrelevant features and if mapping from the base to 
the target is proving troublesome then it is unlikely to produce a target solution. 
Mapping, the stage where the lessons of the analogy hopefully provide help with the 
new problem, is far from straightforward and when the foreign policy making process 
is taken into consideration it is understandable that analogical transfer appears to 
produce misleading results. 
The Problems of Analogies 
Decisionmakers continue to [mis]use analogies not only because they are a 
fundamental cognitive processing method and instinctive, but because they are short- 
cuts which aflow decisionmakers to go beyond the information available to them at 
any one time. Any mechanism that offers such advantages is almost irresistible; in a 
crisis situation where time is of the essence and the information available decisive, 
analogies promise speed and extra information. 
Decisionmakers appear to act consistently in relying on the first analogy that 
comes to mind, often bearing only superficial similarity to the new situation, and fail 
90 Gick and Holyoak, "Analogical problcm solving, " p, 316. 
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to search for other possible analogies. This focus on one analogy occurs possibly 
because of the complexity of remembering several multiple cause-effect situations. 
Read adds: "it is only when people do not perceive (or learn) the causal rule that they 
rely on a single, similar instance. "" Analogising from one instance is weaker than 
from several but it seems to be the norm. One particular trap the decisionmaker can 
fall into in this situation is what Fischer terms the fallacy of the "perfect analogy": 
"reasoning from a partial resemblance between two entities to an entire and exact 
correspondence. " The problem is that "an analogy, by its very nature, is a similarity 
between two or more things which are in other respects unlike. A 'perfect analogy' is 
a contradiction in terms, if perfection is understood. .. to imply identity. "92 Thus, 
reasoning from a partial resemblance has been transformed into deducing an exact 
correspondence between X and Y. If there are no dissimilarities then there is no 
analogy in the first place. 93 
The greater the number of analogies available the less likely it is that one will 
dominate decisionmakers minds; the range of alternatives are therefore important. 
Often individuals memory banks do not contain a relevant analogy and even if they 
do the analogy is not automatically recalled. The constraints of decisionmaking and 
the dangers of analogical reasoning mean that a detailed search for, and comparison 
of, other relevant analogies is not always done. As Holyoak and Thagard point out: 
A single analog can seldom provide a complete basis for a decision, but aspects 
of several analogs can often provide part of the basis for developing a coherent 
plan. Although analogy-based inferences never guarantee optimal decisions, they 
'91 Stephen J. Read, "Once is Enough: Causal Reasoning from a Single Instance, " Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 2 (1983): 333. 
92 Fischcr, Historians'Fallacies, p. 247. 
93 As Stenelo concludes; "Analogy exists somewhere between the extremes of absolute identity and 
total difference. " Stenelo, Foreign Policy Prediclions, p. 110. 
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derive the strongest possible justification when multiple source analogs are mapped 
to the target. 94 
Decisionmakers rely on a small number of examples that are generally consistent 
and confirmatory rather than inconsistent ones. 95 Cognitive psychology describes this 
as cognitive dissonance. This theory contends that individuals' knowledge, beliefs, 
behaviour and so on, emphasize consistency; inconsistencies are therefore 
psychologically worrying and will motivate the individual to minimize dissonance and 
also to consciously avoid situations and information which is likely to increase 
dissonance. 96 An analogy may initially appear appropriate and decisionmakers feel it 
is authoritative and decrease their sensitivity to subsequent information that 
contradicts the analogy. A reservoir of analogies can be biased in such a way and 
therefore conclusions reached can lack validity and be misleading. 
Retaining beliefs and the value of an analogy and ignoring contradictions produces 
faulty diagnoses and faulty policies. This phenomenon is "perseverance": incoming 
information is compared with/fitted into a schema and information that does not fit is 
ignored or not given the weight it meritS. 97 Decisionmakers can rationalise away 
contradictions or dissimilarities: 
a poor fit between the past situation and the case in hand does not automatically 
lead to the analogy being dropped because the situation in hand can be manipu- 
lated until its structural features more closely resemble the past situation, thereby 
94 Holyoak and Thagard, Mental Leaps, p. 146. On a similar theme, Houghton proffcrs that 
analogics arc always used, even when there is no obvious analogy for the current situation. 
Policymakcrs "may use partial analogies, and may 'mix and match! these, drawing on different 
precedents at diffierent stages as if each constituted a different piece in a jigsaw puzzle. " David 
Patrick Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign Policy Situations, " paper 
presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 
September 1-4,1994, p. 4. 
95 Vertiberpr, "Forcign Policy Dwisionmakus, p. 240. 
96 Leon Fcstinger, A Theory ofCognitive Dissonance (London: Tavistock, 1957), p. 3. 
97 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 37. 
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rendering the analogy 'operative. '98 
The "false consensus" perseverance creates leads decisionmakers "to see their own 
behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing 
circumstances while viewing alternate responses as uncommon, deviant, and 
inappropriate. "99 Even when evidence totally discrediting a person! s beliefs is 
presented, these beliefs may not change. Two groups of students were each given 30 
suicide notes and asked to identify the genuine ones. One group were told they had 
done well and identified approximately 70 percent and the other group were told they 
had performed poorly and only identified 30 percent. The first group thus felt 
confident about their abilities and the second group did not. Before being handed a 
second series of notes both groups were told that the first set were all false. 
However, researchers found that when questioning the students they still felt either 
confident or not in their ability to distinguish between true and false, depending on 
which group they had been in. The basis for their beliefs had been completely 
discredited yet they still retained those beliefs to a surprising extent. 
It is unsurprising that the use of analogies has been associated with below par 
policy decisions. The proclivity to see causes as dramatic as the outcomes leads 
decisionmakers to assume the most salient aspects of the results were caused by the 
most salient aspects of the preceding event. The apparently unimportant aspects are 
discarded without considering if they may be relevant to the current situation. 
Analysis of a past event also encounters another problem: 
People pay more attention to what has happened than to why it has happened. 
Thus learning is superficial, overgeneralized, and based on post hoc ergo propter 
98 Houghton, "The Role of AnMogical Reasoning, " p. 35. 
99 Lee Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs, " in Kahneman et al., Judgment Under Uncertainty, p. 
140. 
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hoc reasoning. As a result the lessons learned will be applied to a wide variety of 
situations without a careful effort to determine whether the cases are similar on 
crucial dimensions. 100 
Even when notice is taken of why a particular event occurred, decisionmakers' 
explanations tend to be overly deterministic; Munich is the classic example. For the 
U. S., Munich demonstrated that appeasement led to war. As Kuklick comments, 
invoking Munich was almost a "sacred act" and "[t]hat Munich led to war was a 
dogma believed by all those who had been initiated in the practice of diplomacy and 
its explication was almost ritualistic in its defence of policy. "101 From this 
interpretation of Munich, reinforced by the experience of World War Two and 
Korea, the U. S. formed a set of general political assumptions: the world was bipolar, 
Communism was inherently aggressive and desired world domination, local conflicts 
were Soviet-inspired and appeasement and compromise were ineffective and invited 
disaster. 102 The obvious problem is that it is far from clear that had 11itler been stood 
up to at Munich that he would have been deterred and war avoided. 103 
Decisionmakers rarely examine closely the causes and do not search for other 
examples; analogies actually become a substitute for thorough analysis: 
the choice of historical analogy often occurs before rather than after the analysis 
that might reveal its validity and premature fixation on a particular historical 
precedent can attentuate, or even eliminate, the search and analysis activities that 
are necessary to determine which past episodes, if any, might be appropriate. 104 
100 Jervis, Perception andMisperception, p. 228. Emphasis in original. 
101 Bruce Kuklick, "Tradition and Diplomatic Talent: The Case of the Cold Warriors, " in Leila 
Zenderland (ed. ), Recycling the Past. - Popular Uses ofAmerican History (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 125. 
102 Rystad, Pfisoners of the Past, p. 44. 
103 See Gerhard Weinberg, "Munich After Fifty Years, " Foreign Affairs 67 (1988): 165-78 and 
Robert J. Beck, "MunicWs Lessons Reconsidered, " International Security 14 (1989): 161-9 1. 
104 Holsti and Roscnau, American Leadership, p. 9. 
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The cognitive allure of analogies would indicate that analogical reasoning will 
continue to be invoked in a plethora of situations without real consideration of their 
appropriateness. The use of analogies as self-evidence occurs because: 
the only way to prove the appropriateness of an analogy would be an exhaustive 
description of both objects being compared. But it is precisely to avoid this oner- 
ous task that the analogy is introduced in the first place. We compare something 
problematic with something familiar... this does not require exhaustive descrip- 
tion. For this reason, an analogical argument cannot prove anything. 'O' 
Analogies can only act as a useful tool to understand history as an auxiliary. As 
Fischer warns, "so successful are analogies in creating the illusion of sense and 
certainty that they are widely used as a method of proof in their own right. 006 
Analogies can suggest plenty but ultimately prove nothing. 
Additionally, analogies are frequently used to predict and provide prescription for 
the future rather than analyze the present. When decisionmakers use analogies to 
predict, the process often conveys an unconscious hope of advancing the realization 
of the prediction. 107 The problem is that using analogies to devise a prediction 
presents a use for which the facts are not available, making the entire exercise 
untestable and inconclusive. 
Individual Beliefs 
Befief-systems are central in searching for, storing and interpreting information 
relevant to a particular situation. Alexander George's influential development of 
105 Zashin and Chapman, "The Use of Metaphor and Analogy, " p. 313. 
106 Fischer, Historians'Fallacies, p. 256. 
107 Caff, "at is History? p. 65. For a detailed description of predictions see Stcnclo, Foriegn 
Policy Predictions. 
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Leites' concept of an "operational code"108 was based on the significance of 
decisiomnakers beliefs. George argued that beliefs are: 
a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of politi- 
cal events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also 
provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strat- 
egy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action. '09 
Cognitive constraints on information processing make it impossible for an individual 
to act with objective rationality and hence these belief-systems tend to shape 
incoming information into existing structures, making it harder to recognize and cope 
with change. "0 
With no prior knowledge or preconceptions, understanding events would require 
more time and effort and the outcome would be inaccurate. Prior beliefs are therefore 
central: "an inevitable consequence of our willingness to process evidence in light of 
our prior beliefs is the tendency to perceive more support for those beliefs than 
actually exists in the evidence at hand. ""' Ross et al. describe this as "confirmation 
biases. 012 They contest that confirmatory evidence is taken at face value but 
discrepant evidence is examined skeptically; processed evidence therefore sustains 
108 George defined the Operational Code as: "a set of beliefs about fundamental issues of history and 
central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action. " Alexander L. George, 
"The 'Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decison- 
Making, " International Stu&es Quarterly 13 (1969): 19 1. George simplified and refined the 
"operational code" that had been pioneered by Nathan Leitcs in A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, 
Ill.: Free Press, 1953) by formulating two sets of five questions and applying them to decisionmakers 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs to discover how individuals' belief systems are related to, and 
determine, policy choices. 
109 George, "The'Operational Code, " p. 19 1. 
110 Holsti and Rosenau,. American Leadership, p. 180. 
111 Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs, " p. 149. 
112 Craig A- Anderson, M. Lepper and Lee Ross, "Perseverance and Social Theories: The Role of 
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, " Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 39 (1980): 1038. 
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prior beliefs. Biased searching, recalling and assimilation supports beliefs even when 
faced with contradictory new data. 113 This vicious circle helps to explain the repeated 
use of an analogy. 
Values and beliefs formed by an earlier event are carried through into later 
situations. President Truman's memories of Munich and his firm belief that history 
teaches lessons demonstrated the phenomenon that "those who believe that history 
repeats itself will aim to repeat the past, by learning history's lessons and reliving 
them. This makes it look as though history, indeed does repeat itself, encouraging 
more people to act the same. 014 The Bolsheviks believed that history repeated itself 
and remembered that the French Revolution produced a Napoleon and therefore 
mistrusted Trotsky because he was the most similar to Napoleon and trusted Stalin 
because he was the least similar. However, as Carr points out, it is possible that 
historically conscious people involved in two similar situations remember the 
outcome of the first and their actions are affected by that knowledge, for better or 
worse. "s This outlook leads perhaps to unconscious learning, pressure to apply 
lessons to every situation and an unawareness of this trend. 
The Political Environment 
The lack of historiographical consensus in U. S. foreign policy since 1945 and the 
present division over what the real lessons of Vietnam are, has not provided a firm 
basis from which to draw analogies: "the ambiguity of the policy environment can 
113 Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs, " p. 150. Confirmation bias theory is obviously interrelated 
with cognitive dissonance and cognitive consistency theory. 
114 Vertibergcr, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers, " p. 243. 
113 Edward Caff, "at is History? (LA)ndon: hlacmillan, 1962), p. 37. 
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erode the clarity of even the most precise historical analogy. """ Decisionmakers 
often know and associate with others who share the same generation, background, 
experiences, interests, beliefs and so on. Ross et al. term this "selective-exposure" to 
like-minded people: 
such people do, in disproportionate numbers, respond as we would in a wide 
variety of circumstances. Indeed, our close association is determined, in part, by 
feelings of general consensus, and we may be inclined to avoid those whom we 
believe unlikely to share our judgments and responses. 117 
This situation does not make mistakes or bad policy inevitable but it underlines how 
certain analogies can dominate while others are ignored. 
The typically small, hierarchical foreign policy decisionmaking group arrangement 
also influences analogical reasoning. Within this situation such factors as personal 
considerations, career prospects for example, domestic politics, bureaucratic interests 
and so on all have an influence. "" 
Another aspect linked to this is what Irving Janis identified as "groupthink. " This 
is a "mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a 
cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. "119 lEstory can 
produce a consensus among decisionmakers by activating the same historical memory 
and similar interpretations and therefore promote groupthink. 
"" Richard Mclanson, Witing History and Making Policy. The Cold War, Netnam, and 
Revisionism (New York: University Press of America, 1983), p. 225. 
117 Ross, "The Perseverance of Beliefs, " p. 143. 
"' As Houghton suggests, "the most persuasive analogies appear to be those which promise not only 
policy success, but polifical success as well. " Emphasis in original. Houghton, "The Role of 
Analogical Reasoning, * p. 38. 
115' Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink., A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 9. 
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Not All Bad 
Having examined the cognitive process of analogical reasoning and detailing the 
potential dangers of using analogies, it would be easy to conclude that the 
employment of historical analogies by foreign policy decisionmakers, is an accident 
waiting to happen and should be avoided at all costs. Psychological theories propose 
that there are irresistible cognitive reasons for individuals to use analogies to process 
information and understand their environment that prevent this. Despite this, there 
are good reasons to use analogies. 
The all-important definition of the situation stage marks the point at which 
competing options are selected or rejected. Analogies help eliminate options and 
narrow down the range of alternatives requiring further consideration, thus reducing 
the complexity of the situation for the decisionmaker. Simultaneously, analogies can 
promote a particular option. This is especially helpful in crisis situations where time is 
short and information ambiguous. As Vertzberger summarises, analogies: 
help in cognitive economization, provide illustrations and a sense of direction, 
structure argumentation, and help clarify ideas. However, their main contribution 
to decisionmaking tasks lies in their power to stimulate thought by pointing to 
potentially relevant factors, variables and causes for the diagnosis and prognosis 
, 120 of current events. 
In their justificatory role, especially to the public, analogies are powerful tools; they 
"can brilliantly reinforce a reasoned argument... suggest and persuade, inform and 
illustrate, communicate and clarify. 021 lEstorical analogies also provide an important 
sense of perspective and proportion to current situations. 
I' Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Dccisionmakers, " p. 243. 
121 Fischer, Historians'Fallacies, p. 244. 
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Conclusion 
As we have seen, analogical reasoning is a three stage process: recognition and 
retrieval from the memory of an analogy relevant to the current problem to act as a 
base; the abstraction of the relevant properties of the analogy to be used and, finally, 
the mapping of the solution structure to the target to construct inferences about that 
target. The difficulties of this process have given analogies a bad reputation as 
misleading rather than helpful. 
Unsurprisingly, it is the negative aspects that have attracted attention. Most critics 
agree that Santyana! s maxim that "those who forget history are condemned to repeat 
it, " should be reversed to read "those who do not forget the past can be led to 
misapply it. "122The fundamental assumption behind analogies is that history not only 
contains lessons but will readily reveal them. The compelling desire to use them can 
prove restrictive; "on occasion they may exert such control on imagination and 
debate that they effectively exclude all other possibilities. "23 
In conclusion, it is a catch-22 dilemma: analogies are difficult to use and 
frequently mislead so in theory better analogical reasoning would result in better 
policy. However, analogical reasoning is a psychological process and difficult to 
alter. 124 In this case it would seem that analogies will always be used as an 
inescapable feature of human decisionmaking. 
This study will now progress to examine the influence of historical analogies upon 
U. S. foreign policyrnakers in terms of U. S. -Grenadian relations between 1979 and 
122 Gilovich, "Seeing the Past in the Present, " p. 808. 
123 Mefford, "Analogical Reasoning, " p. 239. 
124 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 255. 
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1983, concentrating primarily on the decision to use military force by Washington in 
October 1983. Firstly, a brief account of the U. S. ' history of interventionism in the 
Caribbean is provided to examine the important role of historical analogies in 
previous intervention decisions. 
U. S. Interventionism in the Caribbean Basin 
As early as 1823 the U. S. proclaimed the importance of Latin America to the U. S. 
President James Monroe announced that: "We should consider any attempt on their 
(Europe) part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous 
to our peace and security. " 125 As Maingot observes, this Monroe Doctrine marked 
the "earliest rumblings of incipient hegemony. "126 In 1904 President Theodore 
Roosevelt added a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: 
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the 
ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require inter- 
vention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of 
the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however 
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of 
an international police power. 127 
Victory in the 1898 Spanish-American War had seen the U. S. acquire, almost 
overnight, a global empire stretching from Cuba to the Philippines. The U. S. was 
now an imperial power in the Caribbean although she preferred to think of it 
euphemistically as "beneficial imperialism" rather than the economic exploitationism 
of European imperialism. 
125 Graham H. Stuart and James L. Tigner, Latin America and the United States (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 2. 
126 Anthony P. Maingot, The United States and the Capibhean (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 15. 
127 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 
1750 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989), p. 232. 
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In 1898 the U. S. had no real historical memories on which to draw for the full- 
scale interventions she would undertake in the Caribbean. Between 1898 and 1933 
intervention was the zeitgeist of the U. S. ' Caribbean policy: interventions in Cuba 
(1906-09), Nicaragua (1912 and 1927-33), Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915-34) and the 
Dominican Republic (1916-24) totalled over 50 years of occupation. A variety of 
methods were employed: overt military intervention and occupation, gunboat 
diplomacy, surrogate troops, customs control, economic sanctions, treaties, 
supervised elections and so on. Justifications for these actions remained fairly 
consistent: humanitarianism, economic interests, the Monroe Doctrine, treaty 
obligations, the protection of nationals and property and the promotion of 
democracy. 
The occupation governments in Cuba and the Philippines were the first 
appropriate analogies available. Throughout the succession of interventions, 
analogies advocated intervention and occupation as necessary to achieve the desired 
results. Instead of providing specific lessons analogies were used cumulatively to 
develop models for occupying countries. Experience led the U. S. to learn how run an 
occupationary government: seizing customhouses, running receiverships, promoting 
favoured election candidates, supervising elections with marines, fighting anti- 
guerrilla campaigns and so on. Fundamentally: 
the same purposes inspired the policy of successive administrations. .. The meth- 
ods used in attempting to achieve them varied from one administration to another, 
but more because of accumulating experience and increasing involvement than be- 
cause of any differences in the ultimate goals. 128 
128 Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 ffcstporL 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1964), p. 53 1. 
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Ultimately, though, the U. S. failed to learn from their experiences that lasting 
solutions could not be imposed on Latin America. Interventions were unpopular and 
more often than not increased opposition to the U. S. Under President Franklin 
Roosevelt's Good Neighbour Policy unilateral intervention was eschewed in favour 
of coRective security measures to exclude extra-hemispheric powers. The 
simultaneous resort to supporting National Guards and dictators, such as General 
Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and General Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican 
Republic, can be seen either as a failure by the U. S. to learn from their experiences or 
as the learning of the wrong lessons. 
The advent of the Cold War produced a sense of Soviet threat to the Hemisphere, 
reminiscent of the "Red-Scare" of the 1920s and Washington's apprehension about 
Soviet intentions in Mexico, and changed the U. S. ' approach to Latin America from 
a regional perspective to a global one. Events in Europe and Southeast Asia 
convinced the U. S. that the Soviet Union was set on world domination; the Third 
World was incorporated into the bipolar power system and any unrest there must be 
Soviet-sponsored and had to opposed. The first example of this in the Caribbean was 
Guatemala in 1954. 
Guatemala's President Jacobo Arbenz had pursued a progressive policy of 
modernisation. Washington came to the conclusion that Arbenz was a Communist 
based on his political connections to Communist leaders in labour organisations, the 
Communists in his government's bureaucracy, his reforms'29 and pro-Soviet line in 
the United Nations. 
129 The most significant of these reform was the Agrarian Land Bill which expropriated land from 
the landowning oligarchy and foreign companies and redistributed it amongst the rural poor to 
promote their participation and organisation in the transfer of power. James Handy, "The Most 
Precious Fruit of the Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Land Reform, 1952-54, " Hispanic 
American Historical Review 68, no. 4 (November 1988): 705. In Guatemala the American United 
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The Munich and "loss of China" analogies advocated swift and decisive action. 
The form of action was influenced by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) 
successful destabilisation of the Mossadeq regime in Iran in 1953. The Iran analogy 
was almost irresistible: it involved many of the same people, was recent, available 
and, most importantly, successful. The analogy suggested a covert operation and also 
predicted that success would produce a pro-U. S. regime. 
The CIA designed an operation that relied on psychological demoralisation and 
political destabilisation. An exiled Guatemalan Colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas, was 
chosen to lead a "ragtag" force of about 150 exiles and mercenaries into Guatemala, 
stopping just inside the border. 130 The idea was: 
to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military 
strength. Through air support and massive use of radio broadcasting, the CIA 
was working to support the impression of Castillo Armas's strength as well as to 
spread the impression of the regime's weakness. "' 
The plan worked; Arbenz assumed that this was the vanguard of a full-scale 
intervention and resigned soon after. 
The axiom that "nothing succeeds like success" is apposite. Both Iran and 
Guatemala were destined to be used as analogies. Both analogies increased 
Fruit Company (UFCO) owned 42 percent of the country's land, 80 percent of which was 
expropriated. When Arbcnz offered two million dollars in compensation, based on the lands taxable 
value, UFCO refused and demanded 16 million dollars. Central America had long been considered 
by the U. S. as the preserve of U. S. companies and that the region should be kept safe for their 
business; "In the past UFCO and its sister companies had bribed politicians, pressured governments 
and intimidated opponents to gain extremely favorable concessions. To the Guatemalans it appeared 
that their country was being mercilessly exploited by foreign interests which took huge profits 
without maldng any significant contributions to the nation! s welfare. " Stephen Schlesinger and 
Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit. The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, 1983 ed. 
(Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Prcss/Doubleday, 1983), p. 73. 
130 Richard Immerman, "Guatemala as Cold War 11istory, " Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 4 
(Winter 1980-81): 642. 
131 Stephen J. Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and U. S. Foreign 
Policy, " Diplomatic History 20, no. I (Winter 1996): 93. 
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poficymakers complacency and ensured there would be no policy change or detailed 
analysis of either operation. 
The Guatemala analogy was evident in the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba. 
Washington approached Fidel Castro as they had Arbenz: initial recognition and 
willingness to support moderate reforms. When Castro also passed an Agrarian 
Reform Law, nationalised foreign property, expelled moderates from his government 
and developed popular support by identifying with the working-class and well- 
organised Communist party, Washington concluded that Castro was a Communist 
and compromise with Cuba useless. 
The Guatemala analogy suggested that the gradual imposition of a trade embargo 
would be ineffective so President Eisenhowees first move was overt economic 
pressure. 132 Additionally, the analogy suggested that economic pressure alone was 
not necessarily enough to topple a regime. Mlitary pressure was also needed. The 
analogy promoted a covert military solution. 
By January 1960 President Eisenhower had decided that it was time to "really do 
something about Castro. " 133 The CIA designed an operation whereby 1400 Cuban 
exiles would make a surprise amphibious landing at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and 
establish a beachhead, the exiles' planes would destroy Castro's airforce and 
communications, CIA radio would create an atmosphere of uncertainty and 
confusion, Castro would panic, lose support and widespread unrest would produce a 
132 Hybel, How Leaders Reason, pý 95. 
133 Lucien S. Vandenbrouckc, Perilous Options: Special Operations As An Instrument of U. S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 11. 
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COUP. 
134 The operation proved to be a "perfect failure" in practice; the exile force 
were captured within two days. 
135 
The success in Guatemala was bound to influence the CIA. Once again, many of 
the same personnel were involved in the planning of both operations. Guatemala was 
often referred to as "the successful practice run. 036 Cuba was not Guatemala. In 
Guatemala the exile force was not designed to remove Arbenz but to convince the 
Guatemalan n-filitary that if Arbenz was defeated a U. S. intervention would follow. 
Thus a military coup removed Arbenz not the intervention. Castro had realised 
Arbenz! s mistake and abolished the old Cuban army and established a new loyal one 
with some 40,000 members. 137 Castro had also fought a guerrilla war and was 
unlikely to flee like Arbenz had. 
Guatemala had instilled a dangerous sense of overconfidence in the CIA, a "can 
do" feeling of omnipotence. As Gleijeses concludes, Guatemala: 
was a psychological operation that needed only a minimal paran-dlitary compo- 
nent - the "spark"; the Bay of Pigs was, or should have been a military operation 
If the CIA had paused to reflect on the former, they would have recoiled from 
the latter. Instead, the agency wallowed in euphoria. 138 
134 Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central American 
Revolutions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 12. 
135 For more details on the Bay of Pigs see also: Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: 7he Untold Story 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), John Prados, Presidents'Secret Mars. CM and Pentagon Covert 
Operationsfrom World War Two 7hrough Iranscan; (New York* Quill William Morrow, 1986) and 
Trumbull 1-figgins, 7he Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CM at the Bay of Pigs (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1987). 
136 Maingot, The United States and the Caribbean, p. 102. 
13' Lucien S. Vandenbrouckc, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs, " 
Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 3 (Fall 1984): 473. 
138 Piero Glcijeses, Shattered Hope: 7he Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 199 1). 
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Consequently, the lessons of Guatemala, and Iran for that matter, were based on 
"perceptual distortions and misinterpretations. " 139 The lack of intelligence on 
conditions in Cuba meant that Washington was unaware that an exile intervention 
was never likely to trigger an uprising and that there was no widespread opposition 
to Castro. Such a lack of information made analogies an irresistible method of 
reasoning. 
The final use of force in the Caribbean prior to Grenada was in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965. Once again analogical reasoning was in evidence. Indeed, most 
studies of the intervention concur with Lowenthal's conclusion that "the aim of 
preventing 'another Cuba! shaped American policy toward the Dominican Republic at 
every stage after Trujillo's death in'1961. to 140 
After the Cuban revolution the U. S. concluded that right-wing dictatorships 
conceivably stimulated revolution rather than precluding it. An analogy was with 
Cuba was apparent: "Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to X. But who would X 
be? " 141 Fearing a "domino effect of Castro-like governments" in the region, the U. S. 
State Department advocated a military intervention to "prevent a Castro-type 
government or one sympathetic to Castro. " 142 Action was rendered unnecessary 
when Dominican dissidents assassinated Trujillo in May 1960. The U. S. supported 
139 Martha Cottani, Images and Intervention: U. S. Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), p. 44. 
140 Abraham F. Lowenthal, 7he Dominican Intervention, Johns Hopkins ed. (Baltimore, N. J.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 26. 
141 Picro Gleijescs, The Dominican Crisis (Baltimore, N. J.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 
p. 34. 
142 Rabe "The Caribbean Triangle, " p. 64. 
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the seven man Council of State that came to power until elections could be held in 
December 1962. 
The election was won by the lower-class Partido Revolucionario Dominicano 
(PRD) candidate Juan Bosch. The U. S. soon became disenchanted with Bosch: land 
reforms and nationalisations harmful to U. S. business interests promoted obvious 
analogies with Guatemala and Cuba. BoscWs pro-civil liberties policies prompted 
Washington to conclude that Bosch tolerated Communists and was unwilling to 
suppress them. Bosch was unseated by a military coup in September 1963. 
Washington decided that as Bosch had allowed Communism to return any 
government that removed him should be supported. However, the unelected junta, 
headed by Donald Reid Cabral, was deeply unpopular. 143 The Constitutionalists 144 
launched a countercoup. The initial unrest was contained by Reid but when he failed 
to secure U. S. support he resigned. The Constitutionalists announced a provisional 
government until Bosch! s return. Now the Loyalists'145 forces hit back. 
Washington had badly misjudged the situation and found it hard to tell which 
group had the upper hand; the basic fear was that the Communists within the 
Constitutionalists group would gain control. The U. S. embassy in the Dominican 
Republic reported that: 
All indications point to the fact that, if present efforts of forces loyal to the 
government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the 
Communist party. If the situation described above comes to pass... we should 
intervene to prevent another Cuba from arising out of the ashes of this uncontrol- 
143 The CIA estimated that only five percent of Dominicans supported the junta. Lester D. Langley, 
The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia 
Press, 1989), p. 237. 
144 This group was composed of a mixture of PRD and military officers. 
145 This group was composed of anti-Bosch military officers. 
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lable situation. '46 
On April 28,1965, the first contingent of 23,000 U. S. troops arrived in Santo 
Domingo; President Johnson explained that this was necessary to "save the lives of 
our citizens, to save the lives of all our people. .. 
[and] to help prevent another 
Communist state in the hemisphere. il 147 
The Communists were only ever a weak minority presence amongst the 
Constitutionalists but as the Secretary of State at the time, Dean Rusk, admitted, 
Washington had learnt from Cuba that: "a small but highly disciplined group could 
seize power in the midst of confusion and have a political influence far beyond their 
numbers. "M Another lesson was that "the only way to prevent such an occurrence 
was for the U. S. to take swift unilateral action should a Communist takeover of 
another Latin American country seem likely. "149 Indeed, Washington perceived two 
simple options: "the choice is: Castro in the Dominican Republic or U. S. 
intervention. " 150 
The Cuba analogy was dominant: it was a major, recent, negative event which was 
very available as a base. The Bay of Pigs episode had discredited the Guatemala 
analogy's recommendation of covert action but not the suggestion that the cause of 
the unrest was Communist subversion. 
146 Daniel I. Papcrmastcr, "A Case Study of the Effects of International Law on Foreign Policy 
Decisionmalcing: The United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, " Texas 
International Law Journal 24 (1999): 483. 
147 Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: US Interventionism in Central Ame? Ica and the Caribbean 
(London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), p. 64. 
148 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: WX Norton & Co., 1990), p. 372. 
149 Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States and Latin America. An Historical Analysis of Inter- 
American Relations (London: Heinemann Education Books, 1974), p. 241. 
150 Papermaster, "A Case Study, " p. 482. 
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Analogies had defined and advocated firm action, the type of action, the result of 
inaction and the likely result of action in each case: Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs and 
the Dominican Republic. This study will now proceed to examine the influence of 
analogies in the case of Grenada. 
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CHAPTER 2 
U. S. -GRENADIAN RELATIONS: THE CARTER YEARS (1979-1981) 
in this chapter I wHI examine the development of U. S. -Grenadian relations from 
the March 13,1979, Grenadian revolution until the end of the Carter administration 
in January 1981. The antecedents of the revolution in post World War Two 
Grenadian politics under the corrupt, repressive and autocratic regime of Eric Gairy 
are traced, along with the rise of the NJM who eventually overthrew Gairy. This 
chapter will study the U. S. ' initial optimism about good relations and the subsequent 
deterioration of relations and the policy of "distancing" that Washington adopted. 
U. S. -Grenadian relations during this period set the pattern for future years. 
The Rise and Fall of Eric Gairy 
Between 1951 and 1979 Eric Gairy dominated Grenadian politics. He had become 
involved in trade unionism in Aruba whilst working as a clerk in the oilfields. At the 
time of his return to Grenada in 1950 the island consisted of a small, white upper- 
class, a small mulatto middle-class and the majority black working-class. 
Maldistribution of land was one of the main grievances of the majority of Grenadians: 
98 percent of the farmers owned 53 percent of the land and 1.45 percent owned 
44.68 percent of the land. ' Gairy took up the cause of some evicted worker-tenants 
and won sizable compensation from the landowner. 
1 Tony Thomdike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society ( London: Frances Pinter, 1985), P. 
30, 
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Realising that the support of a trade union expedited the route to power Gairy 
registered the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union (GMMWU) in July 1950. 
When negotiations over a 50 percent wage rise for sugar workers failed Gairy 
organized Grenada! s first ever General Strike for February 19,1951.2 After leading a 
demonstration to Parliament to demand an audience with the Governor, Gairy was 
arrested and exiled to CarriacoU. 3 Rioting ensued, only subsiding when Gairy was 
released two weeks later. 
The unrest occurred just a few months before the introduction of universal 
suffrage. Gairy seized the opportunity to exploit his popularity and established the 
Grenada People's Party (GPP) and in the 1951 election won seven of the eight seats 
on the Legislative Council with 71 percent of the vote. 4 The GMMWU was Gairy's 
vehicle to power and once there his true colours began to show. In the 1954 elections 
Gahys party, now changed to the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), won six of 
the eight seats but received only 46 percent of the vote. 11is increasing divorce from 
the interests of the people was evident; of the 83 laws passed by the 1954 
government only one really concerned working-class interests. 5 GULP subsequently 
lost the 1957 election, gaining only two seats and 44 percent of the vote. In October 
1957 Gairy was disfranchised for five years for marching a steel band through an 
opponent's political meeting. Assuming the status of a martyr he remained popular 
2 Approximately 5,000 agricultural workers and 1,500 public workers participate& Thomdike, 
Grenada, p. 33. 
' Carriacou is the main island in the Grenadian-administered part of the neighbouring Grenadines 
chain. 
4 Brian Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary 77jeory. An Assessment of Cuba, 
Nicaragua and Grenada ( London: Macrniflan Press, 1993), p. 137. 
3 David E. Lewis, Refonn and Revolution in Grenada: 1950 to 1981 (Havana, Cuba: Casa De Las 
Americas, 1983), p. 33. 
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with the working-class as a charismatic, messianic leader of the same colour and 
beliefs as them; a "People's Champion. " Singharn characterized Gairy as the "hero" 
amongst the "crowd" - "the hero does not have a genuine mass party; he has 
supporters who are personally committed to following him but who are not 
controlled by him. vt6 
GULP won the 1961 elections but in 1962 a Commission of Inquiry into the 
Control of Public Expenditure dismissed the government for corruption and financial 
irregularities, an episode that became known as "squandermania. 117 The 1962 election 
was dominated by the demise of the West Indian Federation. The opposition 
advocated union with Trinidad and Tobago but Gairy remained equivocal on the 
subject. GULP subsequently lost the election gaining only four seats and 46 percent 
of the vote. 8 The opposition government did little to appease the Grenadians 
concerns and GULP won the 1967 election. 
Between 1951-67 Gairy had become the most powerful trade union leader, fought 
the Colonial Office, businesses and the civil service and improved the position of the 
masses. However, he had simultaneously presided over violent strikes, been 
disfranchised and had his government dismissed. Consequently, "by 1967 when Gairy 
had returned to political office he was certainly the most controversial personality, 
positively the most loved and most hated individual on the island. "9 
6 Aaron Segal, "Background to Grenada: When the Social Scientists invaded, " Caribbean Review 
XII (December 1983): 42. 
7 Tony Thorndike, "Gremda: Maxi-Crisis for Nfini-State, " Vie Morld Today 30 (Octobcr 1974): 
440. 
8 Thorndike, Grenada, p. 38. 
9 D. Sinclair Dabreo, The Grenada Re'volution (Castries, St. Lucia: Management and Publicity 
Services Publication, 1979), p. 50. 
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In 1967 Grenada attained Associated Statehood status. Great Britain were now 
only responsible for Grenada! s defence and foreign affairs. Working-class support for 
Gairy now began to wane as he sought to distance himself from the masses politically 
and socially, using Government as a tool of personal power for self-aggrandizement. 
By 1970 the Black Power movement had become a visible force in several 
Caribbean nations politics. In early 1970 in Trinidad and Tobago, Black Power was 
evident in a series of nationwide protests which acted as a catalyst for an abortive 
coup by the army. 'O Concerned about the possibility of links to the Black Power 
movement from Grenada, there was a relatively large Grenadian emigrant community 
in Trinidad and Tobago, Gairy announced that: 
It is said that when your neighbour's house is on fire, keep on wetting your own 
house. We are now doubling the strength of our Police forces, we are getting in 
almost unlimited supplies of new and modem equipment. " 
It was at this time that the "police aides" (the Mongoose Gang) were established. In 
November 1970 a nurses strike was forcibly broken up and Gairy announced the 
formation of a Night Ambush Squad and Special Secret Police Force. Other security 
measures included an Emergency Powers Act allowing the police to search 
opposition houses and the Public Order Amendment Act which restricted anti- 
government demonstrations. 12 Harassment,, intimidation and terror were regularly 
employed to deter opposition to the government. 
10 Paul Sutton, "Black Power in Trinidad and Tobago: The Crisis of 1970, " The Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics XXI, no. 2 (July 1983): 115. 
" Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard Mclanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New 
Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean (Bouldcr, Colo.: Wcstview Prcss, 1985), p. 
24. 
12 Ewart Archer, "Gairyism, Revolution and Reorganization: Three Decades of Turbulence in 
Grenada, " Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics XX[H, no. 2( July 1985): 96. 
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The majority of Grenadians did not appear keen on Independence but Gairy was 
resolute. 13 The GNP opposed independence on the grounds of economic viability and 
the prospect of an even more powerful Gairy and his secret gangs. 14 Predictably 
GULP won the 1972 election and 13 of the 15 seats via "a combination of vote 
rigging, gerrymandering, the use of patronage and genuine support among the rural 
poor who were still identifying more with Uncle GahY than the elitist Grenada 
National Party. "15 Unrest pervaded 1973. On November 18 that year the six main 
figures in the NJM were badly beaten by police and arrested in what became known 
as "Bloody Sunday. " Opposition to Gairy now traversed all sections of society; a 
nonpartisan Committee of 22 was formed which included the Church, businesses and 
trade unions, advocating strikes and demonstrations. 16 The Committee ended their 
action when Gairy agreed to establish a Commission of Inquiry under Sir Herbert 
Duffus and promised to disarm and disband his "aides. " Gairy later suspended the 
commission until after independence. 
By January 1974 Grenada was gripped by a General Strike; Gairy had run out of 
money to pay the civil service and police, taxes went uncollected and fuel and food 
ran low. He was only saved by Britain's decision to advance Grenada 1100,000 on a 
13 Usually if an Associated State wanted independence the government would have to gain a two- 
thirds majority in a referendum on the subject. However, in response to his inquiries, Britain 
informed Gairy that if he won the 1972 election on the issue Grenada's case would be considered 
understandingly The GNP were informed rather than consulted about this arrangement two weeks 
before the election. Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, Grenada : Revolution and 
Invasion (London: St. Martin! s Press, 1984), p. 11. 
14 Thorndike, "Maxi-Crisis, " p. 440. 
15 Schoenhals and Mclanson, Revolution and Intervention, p. 25. 
16 Ken 1. Boodhoo, "Violence and Mlitarization in the Eastern Caribbean: Grenada, " in Alma H. 
Young and Dion E. Phillips (eds. ), Militafization in the Non-Hispanic Cadbhean (Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 71. 
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L2.25 million loan and $2 million (Eastern Caribbean dollars) from Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica. 17 On February 7,1974, Grenada became independent 
and Gairy's power was absolute. 
The 1973-4 unrest had reduced Gross National Product by 33 percent and the 
economy never recovered. Unemployment settled at 50 percent and the national debt 
reached $60 million (Eastern Caribbean dollars). 18 Money from the then European 
Economic Community (EEC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
CARICOM soon dried up, affected by Gairy's corruption, repressive rule, ý advocation 
of a United Nations (UN) agency to study unidentified flying objects and his relations 
with countries like Chile. In the 1976 election GULP won 9 of the 15 seats with 52 
percent of the vote but had relied on paternalism, coercion and ballot-rigging to do 
so. '9 Gairy's rule now grew only more dictatorial and self-serving, further alienating 
the populace. 
Gairyism had come to represent "corruption, anti-democratic activity, arrogance, 
personalism, tyranny, violence, criminality and buffoonery. "20 As Thorndike says of 
Gairy: 
he had successfully exploited the grievances of the common people in 1951 and set 
Grenada upon a new course. Twenty years on, he had betrayed most of his promises 21 
and failed to realize that the world, including Grenada, had moved ahead . 
17 Schoenhals and Mclanson, Revolution and Intervention, p. 29. 
18 Payne et al., Grenada, p. 14. 
19 Colin Henfrey, "Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenadian Experience, " Latin American 
Perspectives 11, no. 3 (1984): 19. 
20 W. Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution (Havana, Cuba: Casa Dc 
Las Americas, 1979), p. I 11. 
21 Thorndike, Grenada, p. 40. 
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The New Jewel Movement 
The inspiration of the NJM was primarily the Black Power movement which 
swept the Caribbean, especially between 1968-70, reaching its zenith with the unrest 
in Trinidad and Tobago. The Black Power ideology exerted a significant influence on 
the future Grenadian Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. Bishop had left Grenada in 
1963 to study law in England and returned via Trinidad in 1970. That year he 
participated in a meeting of Caribbean radicals on Rat Island off St. Lucia. The 
tangible result in Grenada was the establishment of Forum, a political movement 
promoting change. 22 Forum was replaced by the Movement for the Advancement of 
Community Efforts (MACE) which was subsequently replaced by the Movement for 
the Assemblies of People (MAP) in 1972. MAPs ideology opposed one leader 
domination, was anti-elections, emphasized a decentralized state, opposed corruption 
and conspiratorial takeovers. 2' Bishop was influenced by the ideas of Tanzanian 
leader Julius Nyerere's Christian Socialism and the writings of Trinidadian Marxist 
C. L. R. James amongst others. Bishop aimed to replace Gairy's distortion of 
Parliamentary Democracy with a system of "participatory democracy" and "people's 
assemblies" throughout Grenada. MAP's ultimate political problem was that in a 
predominantly conservative and rural society it was a radical and urban entity and 
therefore lacked widespread support. 
Coincidentally at the same time another group of educated and disaffected young 
men formed the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation (JEWEL), 
led by an economist, Unison Whiteman. JEWEL was generally a less overtly political 
22 Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada, p. 76. 
23 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 146. 
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movement than MAP, consisting mostly of self-educated farmers. It advocated social 
and political change and gained substantial support amongst rural Grenadians. As 
Hardt suggests, "JEWEL became a viable political organization because, unlike 
Bishop's MAP, the leaders were addressing their firiends and neighbours, not the 
anonymous masses. 04 
A logical development occurred on March 11,1973, when MAP and JEWEL 
merged to form the New Jewel Movement. They issued a Manifesto with the slogan: 
"Well Be Free in 73. " This document envisaged an intrinsic change in the island's 
economic and political structure, the establishment of a welfare state, people's 
participation in politics and an improvement in the standard of living amongst other 
things . 
2' The Manifesto also pronounced that: "When a government ceases to serve 
the people and instead steals from and exploits the people at every turn, the people 
are entitled to dissolve it and replace it by any means necessary. tt26 As Davidson 
concludes, the Manifesto was "short on political ideology and long on pragmatism 
aimed at social justice. "27 For now the main objective was the removal of Eric Gairy. 
The NJM`s cause was helped by Gairy's determination to achieve independence as 
it united the opposition to him: 
Apart from the reservations concerning Grenada! s viability as a state, for the GNP 
and the oligarchy, independence meant the removal of the final constraint which 
would give Gairy a free hand to continue and consolidate his incursions against 
them. For the growing mass movement it meant unfettered "mongoose" power, 
further victimization and dictatorship. 28 
24 D. Brent Hardt, "Grenada Reconsidered, " Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Stu&es in International 
Affairs 11, No. 2 (Summer 1987): 28 1. 
25 Thorndike, Grenada, p. 45. 
26 Payne et al., Grenada, p. 13. 
27 Scott Davidson, Grenada., A Study in Politics and the Limits ofInternational Law (Aldershot, 
Surrey: Avebury, 1987), p. 9. 
28 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 144. 
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The NJM organized rallies, demonstrations and protests. In May 1973 a People's 
Convention on Independence held at Seamoon attracted 10,000 people. 
Gairy's only response to the nascent power of the NJM was intimidation and 
force. Of the NJM he blustered: "These irresponsible malcontents, these disgruntled 
political frustrates coming from abroad, .. coming 
here, metaphorically and literally 
hot and sweaty, and shouting 'Power to the People'. "29 This was the first time he had 
faced non-middle-class GNP opposition and he realized that the NJM were eroding 
his traditional base of support amongst the rural working-class. Gairy only increased 
support for the NJM with episodes such as the previously mentioned "Bloody 
Sunday. " Thus by January 1974 the lines had been drawn: 
No longer was it a fight for power, or a change in the present political system! s 
antagonism between the GULP Government and the New Jewel Movement. From 
then on it was a struggle which involved all citizens against the abuses of the Gov- 
ernment. 30 
For the NJM the rubicon had been crossed. Bishop later identified spring 1974 as 
the turning point when the decision was made to construct a Leninist Party. The NJM 
now focused on the urban working-class rather than the rural masses. Whilst 
appearing to remain a populist party to its supporters the NJM in reality was 
becoming a classic Marxist-Leninist vanguard organization with a conspiratorial and 
hierarchical command structure, restricted membership and clandestine ideology. 31 
Links were established with communist groups in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and 
29 Chris Searle, Grenada. - 7he Struggle Against Destabilization (London: Writers & Readers 
Publishing Cooperative Society., 1983), p. 15. 
30 Lewis, Reform and Revolution, p. 95. 
31 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 15 1. 
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Jamaica and in December 1975 a Grenada-Cuba Friendship Society was 
established. 32 During 1977 Bishop, Whiteman and Coard all visited Cuba. Indicative 
of the NJM's changing structure was the formation within the Party of the 
Organization for Research, Education and Liberation (OREL) in 1975. OREL 
consisted of young, privileged middle-class radicals who supported revolution. 
The return to Grenada of Bernard Coard in 1976 is important in understanding the 
continued development of the NJM. Coard had been an international relations 
lecturer at University of the West Indies. He was a firm believer in Marxism and the 
11non-capitalist path of development. " Coard was the intellectual ideologue of the 
Party and most identifiable with the further development of a vanguardist NJM. 
In the 1976 elections the NJM allied with the GNP and United People's Party 
(UPP) to form a People's Alliance. 33 Although they lost, the People's Alliance won 
six seats (NJM three, GNP two and UPP one). This provided the NJM with several 
advantages: as part of the Alliance their radical image was moderated and the Party 
legitimated, widened the base of support beyond the urban working-class and youths, 
established the NJM as the official Opposition rather than the GNP and provided 
34 them with a domestic and international platform. Gairys victory caused the NJM to 
32 During 1977 Bishop, Whiteman and Coard all visited Cuba. The society actually remained secret 
until 1978 because as Einstein L4Duison later cxplainedL "the whole question was how to deal with 
Cuba in the context of our own political situation here. You had to be careful so that you didn! t 
appear to be a communist in this countr3r, that would have affected the struggle, that would have 
affected the alliances that were necessary to be formed. " John Walton Cotman, The Gor7lon Tree: 
Cuba and the Grenada Revolufion (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 49. 
33 The GNP represented mainly the middle-classes and businessmen and never had much support 
outside St. George's. The UPP represented the interests of the business community. 
34 'Momdike, Grenada, p. 5 1. 
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hasten their conversion to a vanguard party. Having seen "scientific socialism" in 
Cuba, the NJM now viewed socialism as "the only solution to our problems. 05 
Between 1976 and 1979 the NJM infiltrated the trade unions, organizing working- 
class support and even undermining Gairy's support in his GMMWU. The ever- 
growing violence and victimization expanded middle-class support for the NJM, as 
did Bishop's popularity and charismatic leadership. Simultaneously the NJM became 
more socialist and Marxist in tone; the People's Alliance folded when the NJM 
refused to say they were "not communists. 9936By 1978 they were the most influential 
force in Grenadian politics. 
In February 1979 Gairy's popularity rose slightly in line with the fifth anniversary 
of independence and rumours of new elections circulated; the NJM feared they would 
be unable organize effective opposition. The tension in Grenada was increased when 
it was revealed that two Grenadian-bom U. S. citizens, James Wardally and Chester 
Humprey, had been arrested on February 22,1979, in Baltimore by U. S. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents for crossing state lines with guns for 
transshipment to Grenada. 37 On March 10 a meeting of senior NJM leaders got wind 
of a major action against them by Gairy. Their houses had been searched that same 
day and one member, Vincent Noel, who had not been at the meeting, arrested. The 
other leaders decided to go into hiding. On March 12 Gairy left for New York to 
35 "The Struggle for Democracy and Against Imperialism in Grenada, August 1977, " Bruce Marcus 
and Michael Taber (eds. ), Maurice Bishop Speaks. - The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 
1979-83 (New York: Pathfinder, 1983), p. 22. 
36 Denneth Modeste, "Grcnada: Tumultuous IX-cades, " Freedom at Issue, no. 8 (Scptember-Wober 
1984): 5. 
37 Robert Pastor, "The U. S. and the Grenada Revolution, " in Jorge Heine (ed. ) A Revolution 
Aborted., The Lessons of Grenada (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), p. 186. 
The two jumped W on October 2,1979, and escaped back to Grenada. 
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meet with UN officials; NJM leaders learnt from sympathetic sources in the police 
and army that Gairy had allegedly left behind orders for the NJM leadership to be 
assassinated. 38 
The 1979 Revolution 
At 4: 00 p. m. on March 12 the NJM's Security and Defence Committee consisting 
of Bishop, Coard, Whiteman and Austin secretly met to discuss "Operation Apple, " 
the contingency plan to topple Gairy that had been in preparation for four years. 39 
The vote was split, with Bishop and Whiteman against action. Another NJM member, 
George Louison, was brought in to break the deadlock: he voted in favour of 
action. 40 There was a certain sense of "now or never" about the choice; Bishop later 
explained that it was a case of "them or us... and we diddt plan on it being us.,, 41 
The main target was the Army barracks at True Blue. Apart from the advantage of 
surprise, the NJM was unsure of what the reaction would be, had to trust that the 
38 The NJM claimed that Gairy had deliberately lcft Grenada to distance himself from the situation; 
a more likely scenario is that Gairy's absence was a coincidence. He had been present on the island 
for previous atrocities and it would probably have made more sense to remain to ensure that 
everything went smoothly. Additionally it is perhaps difIricult to understand why Gairy would want 
to eliminate the entire NJM leadership at that particular time rather than any other, Gairy's 
popularity had risen slightly and the ATF investigation into arms smuggling which clearly 
implicated NJM leaders was progressing. Thus it is possible that the NJM leaders perceived an 
increasing threat to their future and this acted as the basis for the origin of the death threat claim. 
39 Most of the military training had taken place secretly in Grenada although six NJM leaders had 
traveled to Guyana for four weeks training in late 1978 with the support of Guyana! s President 
Forbes Burnham. John Walton Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution: The Impact and Limits 
of Cuban International Aid Programs, " 2 vols. (Ph. D. diss., Boston University Graduate School, 
1992), p. 195. The US. was aware of the NJM leaders! visits to Cuba, Guyana and Eastern Europe 
prior to 1979. Telephone interview with Frank Ortiz, August 10,1994. 
40 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 155. 
41 Manning Marable, Afilcan and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to the Grenada 
Revolution (London: Vcrso, 1987), p. 221. 
67 
populace would support them, that Gairy's supporters would not fight and, most 
importantly, that the Police and Army would not provide any significant resistance. 42 
The coup began at 4: 15 a. m. on March 13,1979. Austin led the 46-man National 
Liberation Army armed with only 16 rifles, two shotguns, a few pistols and Molotov 
43 
cocktails in the main attack on the Army barracks. The surprise attack encountered 
minimal resistance with soldiers either surrendering or fleeing. A simultaneous attack 
on Pearls was also victorious and by 5: 00 a. m. the radio station at Grand Anse was 
seized. By 6: 00 a. m. the NJM was broadcasting, encouraging people to join the fight 
and telling the Police to surrender. 44 At 10: 15 a. m. Bishop broadcast as Prime 
Minister, promising that: 
all democratic freedoms, including freedom of elections, religious and political 
opinion, will be fully restored to the people... [T]his revolution is for work, for 
food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future. 45 
Once the Army had been overcome and the radio station taken the people 
enthusiastically supported the NJM. By 4: 00 p. m. aU opposition had evaporated and a 
carnival atmosphere prevailed as the island celebrated Gairy's demise. 
In view of the new government's near immediate extension of relations with Cuba 
there has, been much speculation that Cuba was involved in the coup. Ashby 
42 Lewis, Reform and Revolution, p. 15 1. 
43 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions p. 155. 
44 Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada, p. 125. 
45 "A Bright New Dawn, March 13,1979, " Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (eds. ), Maurice 
Bishop Speaks. 7he Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow, 1979-83, p. 25. Although the NJM 
referred to their victory as a "revolution" it is often referred to as a coup. Marable suggests that the 
action was "not a genuine social revolution, but a political insurrection against a despotic and 
corrupt regime... the NJM would gain a mandate to expel Gairy from power, but not a national 
consensus to implement socialism. " Marab1c, Afilcan and Caribbean Politics, p. 220. Meeks 
suggests that the NJM`s action was "a revolution from above, marginally distinguishable from a 
coup detat by its execution by armed irregulars and by the willingness of the leadership to mobilisc 
popular support, though firmly under its command. " Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 156. 
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unequivocally states that a team of Cuban commandos participated and that a Soviet 
ship harboured in Grenada at the time was present to observe this "national 
liberation" venture that had been orchestrated by Cuba. 46 In a CIA report to 
Congress a less fantastic conclusion was reached: "as far as we can tell, the coup 
occurred. .. from local, circumstances. The Soviets had nothing to do with it, or the 
Cubans either. t#47 In interviews with three of those who planned and led the coup 
Cotman confirms that only the 46 NJM members were involved, the Cubans had no 
foreknowledge of the coup and played no role, most of the modem weapons used 
were smuggled in from the U. S. and acquired by NJM members and that no 
Guyanese participated. 48 
The U. S. Response 
As foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum it is essential to examine briefly 
President Carter's Latin American policy. Since 1945 Latin America had traditionally 
been subsumed as just another arena in the Cold War by successive administrations. 
Differentiating the Caribbean from Central America, although not from the 
perception of the region as the U. S. ' "backyard, " Carter emphasized economic 
development 
'49 
democratization, human rights, ideological pluralism, a respect for 
46 Timothy Ashby, 7he Bear in the Badýwd. Moscow's Caribbean Strategy (Lexington, Va.: 
Lexington Books, 1984), p. 84. 
47 U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Inter- 
American ATairs. Economic and Political Future ofthe Caribbean (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1979), 
p. 14 1. 
48 Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution, " p. 198. 
49 Carter founded the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development: composed of 
thirty countries and fifteen international bodies. It quadrupled the aid given to the region in four 
years. Robert Pastor, "The U. S. and the Caribbean: the Power of the Whirlpool, " Annals of the 
Amefican Academy 533 (May 1994): 27. 
69 
national sovereignty and the encouragement of regional cooperation and a Caribbean 
role in world affairs. 50 Unfortunately, Carter's optimistic image of a world system 
composed of a variety of significant issues and actors forming a global community 
was increasingly challenged by world events. 51 By 1979 the Administration was 
divided, producing an incoherent and unstable image of the world on which to base 
poficy. 52 Within a year of the NJM's coup the U. S. had reverted to the orthodox Cold 
War anti-Communism view of the region to combat the war, revolution, instability 
and Soviet and Cuban expansionism occurring. 
The U. S. reaction to the coup was one of surprise. Prime Minister Bishop quickly 
contacted the neighbouring Caribbean governments to express his desire for 
continued relations and to promise early "free and fair" elections. Bishop phoned the 
U. S. ambassador Frank Ortiz, " on March 13 to assure him that U. S. citizens and 
property were safe, that good relations were desired, that the new government would 
be non-aligned and that elections would be held promptly. Deputy Prime Minister 
Coard also contacted Ortiz to inform him that Grenada wished to continue receiving 
aid from the U. S. and Britain. 54 From what was known about Bishop and his 
colleagues Orthes initial assessment was that they were: 
50 Payne ct al., Grenada, p. 46. 
51 1979 also witnessed the Nicaraguan Revolution, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran hostage crisis, 
the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
52 Jcrel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community. Beliefs and Their 
Impact on Behavior (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1980), p. 113. 
53 Ambassador Ortiz was based in Barbados and accredited to the other Eastern Caribbean islands 
as well. 
" in response the embassy dispatched Consul Richard La Roche to Grenada that day. He met with 
Coard on March 16; Coard indicated that Grenada would look to the US., UK. and Canada for 
assistance. In a pattern that would become familiar no specific request was made. Frank Ortiz, 
confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "'Subject: USG and Assistance to Bishop Government in 
Grenada, * 281729Z, April 1979, Bridgetown 01615, section 1, p. 2. U. S. government cables will be 
cited by author, recipient,, subject, time and date, telegram number and then section and/or page. 
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well-educated, young idealists and violence prone. They appear to be ideologically 
committed to Marxism but have not demonstrated particular hostility to the US. 
More than anything they are anti-Gairy. It is probable that the revolutionary group 
are still uncertain of success and are fearful that we, the British or others may take 
actions against them. 55 
In Washington the reaction to the revolution varied; the CIA and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) saw the NJM as Cuban Marxists pure and simple, whereas 
the State Department were less concerned. The National Security Council (NSC) 
took the middle line. NSC Latin American Senior Director Robert Pastor penned a 
memo to National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski suggesting that the U. S. 
work through CARICOM and support their call for elections. Elections would ensure 
continuity, prevent Bishop from forming "revolutionary councils, " test the extent of 
Bishop's following and establish a good precedent by demonstrating that forceable 
takeovers were illegitimate. Pastor proffered that "if CARICOM can put Grenada 
under its umbrella, Cuba will remain far outside. "6 Pastor warned cautiously that the 
situation "could go [in] either direction, and a fair amount depends on what we 
choose to do, with whom and when" and consequently he proposed a meeting of the 
subcommittee of the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (a mini-SCC) to "mesh 
different agencies perceptions of the problem into a single and common view, " 
The time and date reference requires some explanation; in the above telegram (281729Z) "28" 
indicates the day of the month and "1729" indicates the time the telegram was sent. The "Z" refcrs 
to Zebra which means Greenwich Mean Time (GNM. A final note: the Eastern Caribbean is fours 
hours behind GMT and Washington D. C. five hours behind. A collection of declassified cables can 
be found at the National Security Archives in Washington D. C. A number of other cables were 
provided courtesy of Dr. Nfitch Leventhal (see bibliography for details). 
55 Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Situation Report 
Twelve Forty-Fivc Local, " 131954Z, March 1979, Bridgetown 00869, p. 1. 
56 Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to Zbigniew BrzezinskiMavid Aaron, "Subject: Next 
Steps in Grenada, " March 14,1979, no. 1603, p. 1. 
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especially encouraging the State Department to appreciate the political dimensions 
and urgency of dealing with the issue effectively and expediently. 57 
The mini-SCC convened on March 15 and included representatives from the State 
Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff QCS), CIA, DIA and the NSC. Pastor, for one, 
categorized the PRG as "reasonably idealistic socialist" in the style of Jamaican Prime 
Minister Michael Manley but also pragmatic. The replacement of the police and army 
by the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) and the quasi-Communist propaganda 
emanating from Radio Free Grenada (RFG) did create some suspicion. " The 
Pentagon were characteristically apprehensive and the NSC staff allegedly considered 
imposing a naval blockade. " Despite the differing departmental opinions a consensus 
was reached, particularly on the subject of Cuba: 
Bishop and his group could probably be co-opted by the U. S. or perhaps by Cuba. 
They are sensitive to international reaction to their coup, and eager to obtain inter- 
national legitimacy, but if we are not sensitive to their overtures, it is conceivable 
that they could turn to Cuba. 60 
It was agreed that supervised parliamentary elections were important and that 
Washington would wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting and get British 
and Canadian support to back CARICOMs call for elections. Pastor made the point 
that if Bishop won an election the U. S. should be willing to help him. 61 
51 Robert Pastor, NSC secret memorandum to Reg Bartholomew, "Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on 
Grenada - March 15 1979, " March 15,1979, unnumbered, p. i 
58 Robert Pastor, "Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada, " Joumal 
ofInter-Amefican Studies and WorldAffairs 28, no. 1 (1986): 6. 
59 John M. Goshko, "Caribbean Nfinistates are a New Source of Concern for U. S., " ff4shington 
Post, July 6,1979, p. A12. 
60 Zbigniew Brzezinsld, NSC secret memorandum to the President, "Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on 
Grenada, " March 15,1979, no. 1629, p. 1. 
61 jbiCL, p. 1. 
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A furious Gairy requested U. S. help to restore him but the absence of any group 
supporting him and his universal unpopularity in the Caribbean (when consulted by 
Washington, Prime Nfinister Tom Adams of Barbados described Gairy as 
"indefensible") made his reinstatement insupportable. 
The Eastern Caribbean Reaction 
Grenada! s neighbours were similarly surprised by the coup. The shared experience 
of colonialism had given the Eastern Caribbean a collective identity and fostered 
close social, economic and political links. The 1958 West Indies Federation had been 
an attempt to consolidate these ties but collapsed in 1962 amongst internecine 
squabbling. In 1968 the Caribbean Free Trade Association was formed, later 
becoming CARICOM, to promote economic integration, intra-regional cooperation 
62 and coordination in foreign affairs. Therefore, the first undemocratic change of 
power in this close community was destined to have a profound impact. 
The immediate response was a meeting of the Commonwealth Caribbean 
Ministers in Barbados on March 14-15.63 The Ministers commented that events in 
Grenada were contrary to traditional methods of changing power but that it was an 
internal matter and that there should be no external interference. They also expressed 
their desire for a return to constitutionality as soon as possible to preserve the unity 
62 Payne et al., Grenada, p. 89. 
'3 The only CARICOM member not represented was Trinidad and Tobago whose initial reaction to 
the revolution was indifference. Relations were destined to remain "formal and cool" and as one 
Trinidad and Tobago government official explained in June 1980: "The official Trinidad and 
Tobago position on revolutionary Grenada is clear and uncompromising: so long as there is no 
properly elected government in St. Georgc's, there is no possibility of cooperation. Officially, 
diplomatic relations continue: We recognize countries not governments. .. We are not telling Grenada what to do or what not to do. All we are saying is - dont come to us for loans or assistance 
until you clear up this situation. " EPICA Task Force, Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution 
(Washington D. C.: EPICA Task Force, 1982), p. 57. 
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of the region and hoped that the election pledge would be honoured and offered help 
if it was requested. 64 On March 15 George Louison, the PRG's representative, 
reaffirmed to the Ministers Grenada! s intention to hold elections soon and to remain 
within CARICOM. The meeting was divided along the question of recognition; 
Jamaica and Guyana favoured quick recognition to normalize relations, but the 
smaller states were more wary, fearing that this would encourage "more Grenadas. " 
Knowing that Jamaica and Guyana would soon recognize Grenada, the Eastern 
Caribbean leaders attempted to obtain Gairy's resignation and his Deputy Prime 
Minister Herbert Preudhomme's support for -a proposal to Grenadian Governor- 
General Sir Paul Scoon that Bishop be appointed Prime MiAster. In theorY ffis 
would provide a veneer of legitimacy to the PRG. Such legal maneuvering ffiled due 
to Preudhomme's intransigence. Subsequently, on March 20, Barbados, Guyana and 
Jamaica officially "recognized" Grenada. 
More alarmist reactions were evident at an emergency meeting of the West Indies 
Associated States (WIAS) on March 20. The Prime Ministers of Antigua and 
Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
the Premier of Montserrat condemned the Revolution and refused to recognize 
Grenada until there was a return to constitutional rule. In reality only Dominica and 
St. Lucia were independent sovereign states and could withhold recognition. 65 Other 
suggestions made included excluding Grenada from the regional legal system, 
suspending Grenada from the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority, ceasing 
' UK Parliament. House of Commons. Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report. Caribbean and 
Central America. Session 1981-1982, p. 287. 
65 Davidson, Grenada, p. 42. WIAS finally granted dc facto recognition to Grenada in Iýby but only 
after the PRG had again promised to hold elections. 
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Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) service and examining the feasibility of a 
regional defence force "empowered to intervene, under a mutual defence treaty, in 
the event of future rebellions by armed and trained revolutionaries" against any of the 
governments concerned. 66 St. Lucia! s Prime Nfinister, John Compton, sent a request 
to Britain to send a military force to depose the PRG, believing that "nipping things 
in the bud" would be preferable to dealing with the situation once the PRG were 
established. 67 As Payne et al. conclude: 
they were terrified lest the Grenada "virus" began to spread, infecting next their 
islands and thus bringing about their downfall. It was a crude, gut reaction to an 
event which the Commonwealth Caribbean was unfamiliar. 69 
Despite these early doubts Grenada was accepted because Gairy had been a 
universally disliked character; 69Bishop was well-known and liked and his friendship 
with Prime Ministers Forbes Burnham and Michael Manley helped the PRGs case in 
the regional bodies. Secondly, faced with a fait accompli there was a desire to 
maintain a sense of regional identity and solidarity. Thirdly, the PRGs promise of 
elections, desire for good relations and retention of the Governor-General and 
membership of the Commonwealth, CARICOM and the Organisation of American 
States (OAS) boded well. Finally, the Eastern Caribbean tradition of tolerance and 
non-interference was reinforced by President Carter's promotion of ideological 
I "Eastern Caribbean, " Keesings Contemporary Archives, August 10,1979, p. 2969 1. 
61 interview with Joseph Edmunds, August 2,1994, Washington D. C. Edmunds is the Current St. 
Lucian ambassador to the U. S. 
' Payne et al., Grenada, p. 9 1. 
69 Prime Minister Adams commented that: "many of us were so glad to be rid of Gairy... that we 
(the Eastern Caribbean) were prepared to overlook the means by which this regime was ended. " 
Robert Pastor, *The Impact of Grenada on the Caribbean: Ripples from a Revolution, " in Jack W. 
Hopldns (ed. ), Latin America and the Caribbean Record, Volume 111,1983-1984 (New York 
Holmes & Meier, 1985), p. 12. 
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pluralism. As one Caribbean diplomat noted, Bishop made "all the right moves. "70 
Recognition gave the PRG some breathing space to honour its promises and more 
importantly, "despite the absence of specific reciprocal ties, processes of interaction. . 
. tend to create norms and mutual obligations. 'M Grenada! s neighbours always 
remained apprehensive but were willing to give the PRG a chance. 
Meetiniz the PR 
Despite expressing concern about the need for elections, Ortiz interpreted the 
unusual situation as an opportunity, believing that "the assumption of power might 
moderate some of the extremist ideas which the NJM had advocated. "72 On March 
21 PRG representatives Kendrick Radix and Dessima Williams met with Ashley 
Hewitt, the State Department's Director of Caribbean Affairs, in Washington. Radix 
promised that elections were a priority and would be open to observers and that 
Grenada! s foreign policy would be independent. 7' At this stage it was clear that the 
U. S. ' aim was to seek ways to facilitate early democratic elections. 
70 "Grenada Special: A Souvenir Edition covering the Grenada coup, " Grenada Documents 
Microfiche Collection (GDMQ, no. DSI-83-C 005533, p. 12. After the intervention a vast quantity 
of PRG documents were shipped to Washington. They are available for public inspection on about 
12,000 microfiches at the National Archives. The "DSI-83-C" classification remains the same 
throughout and so I shall only rcfcr to the documents using the final six digit number. 
71 Anthony P. Maingot, "The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemispheric Security Policy: The 
Lessons of Grenada, " in Georges Fauriol (ed. ), Security in the Americas (Washington D. C.: 
National Defense University, 1989), p. 242. 
" Lawrence Rossin, US. -Grenada Relations Since the Coup: A Background Paper (Bridgetown, 
Barbados: U. S. embassy, 1983), p. 1. This paper was written by a political officer at the Barbados 
embassy and is based on telegrams, airgrams, memoranda, interviews and other unspecified 
material. 
73 JbiCL, p. 1. 
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Washington believed that "any sanctions at this stage could be 
counterproductive, " only serving to push Grenada into Cuba's arms. 74 Ortiz reasoned 
that if the PRG did not feel threatened they would organize elections quicker. The 
U. S. officially "recognized" Grenada on March 22 whilst repeating the call for 
75 elections. In Washington the prevailing mood was one of optimism as there was a 
sincere belief that here was a case where the U. S. could successfully influence a 
11socialist" group to democratize for the first time. 76 
Ambassador Ortiz met with Bishop and Whiteman on March 23 to convey the 
U. S. ' official recognition of Grenada and to express a desire to continue relations. 
Moving on to a number of talking points Ortiz offered to increase the number of 
Peace Corps volunteers, provided details of five pending U. S. Agency for 
International Development (AID) programmes the PRG were unaware of and pointed 
out that as these were administered via the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) they 
frequently took time to receive and therefore the PRG might be interested in the 
$5,000 available immediately via the Special Development Act funds for community 
projectS. 77 Bishop expressed interest but was non-committal; he wanted the Peace 
14 lbid, p. 4. The theory posits that unsympathetic, or hostile, U. S. responses to Third World 
revolutions "'pushes" them towards the Communist bloc. The PRG was moderately successful in 
persuading people of Washington! s unresponsiveness over aid and warning against relations with 
Cuba had indeed "pushed" the PRG towards Cuba. Ambassador Ortiz later warned Washington that 
such a belief was gaining currency in the region although it was his belief that "a Mar7dst-Lcninist 
like Bishop is not 'driven! into the Communist camp; that is where he started out to go. " Fmnk V. 
Ortiz, "Letters to the Editor, " Atlantic Monthly 253, no. 6 (June 1984): 12. 
75 It is important to remember that for the U. S. diplomatic recognition is an act of approval rather 
than just an act of recognizing reality. U. S. non-rccognition of Grenada for any protracted period 
was unviable due to the presence of a sizable number of U. S. citizens, notably at St. George's 
University Medical School (SGU), on the island. Telephone interview with John Bushnell, July 29, 
1995. 
76 Telephone interview with Ortiz. 
77 Ortiz, "Letters to the Editor, " p. 9. 
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Corps volunteers to come but was unable to discuss specific economic requests yet 
78 
and that it would take a few months for the PRG to get on their feet. Ortiz then 
underlined that the PRGs election promises had made U. S. recognition possible and 
that three months would be an "acceptable maximum" time period until elections and 
that six months would "reawaken concern. 09 Bishop explained that Gairy had left 
the political system in a mess and that even six months was an unrealistic timefi-ame. 
As Rossin concludes: "U. S. policy toward Grenada was, until this point, 
characterized by hopefulness tempered by a concern engendered by the evasiveness 
about elections. .. coupled with the 
knowledge of the past radical NJM 
viewpoints. "go 
U. S. concerns heightened on March 25 when Bishop suspended the Constitution 
and announced ten fundamental People's Laws which legalized the PRG and gave the 
PRA police powers amongst other things. Bishop undertook to return to 
constitutional rule as soon as possible. A "lingering optimism" still remained in the 
State Department; a quick election was unlikely but this did not preclude the 
development of a constitutional framework. " The State Department were beginning 
to clutch at straws. The NSC were more cautious: "He [Bishop] is obviously trying 
to maintain a good relationship with the U. S., but his proclivities to 'revolutionize' the 
78 On March 28 Bishop called the cmbassy to put the arrival of the Peace Corps on hold for a couple 
of weeks. Ortiz, "Subject: USG and Assistance to Bishop, " section 1, p. 3. 
"' Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 7. 
80 lbicl, p. 12. 
81 Ibid., p. 13. 
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political system in Grenada may lead him toward a'Cuban model', which in turn may 
lead to closer ties with, if not dependence on, Cuba. 02 
Bishop had moved fast to consolidate the Revolution: 
Within a week of the coup, he had arrested many of his political opponents and 
transferred military and police powers to his followers. Recognized by all his 
neighbours, he had also received assurances of good relations and offers of aid 
from both the U. S. and UK . 
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Concluding that the PRG had used the election issue to gain recognition Washington 
policymakers decided that "our main purpose is to keep Grenada from drifting into 
the Cuban orbit. We continue to feel that this can best be accomplished by working 
with the new government. , 84 In light of Jamaica's good relations with Grenada, 
Hewitt visited Prime Minister Michael Manley on April 4 to discuss the ideological 
orientation of the PRG and its relationship with Cuba and how the U. S. might best 
develop a productive relationship. 
A new factor was added to the equation on April 4 when a Cuban plane unloaded 
small arms in Grenada. On April 7a Cuban flight from Guyana to Cuba was diverted 
to Grenada and unloaded more arms and eight Cubans. The following day another 
Cuban plane, allegedly experiencing technical difficulties, landed and left behind more 
arms and Cubans. On April 9 the Guyanese ship Jamaito docked in St. George's 
carrying more arms and finally, on April 14, the Cuban ship Malawas docked with 
yet more arms. 's 
92 Robert Pastor, confidential NSC memorandum to Zbignicw Brzczinski/David Aaron, "Subject: 
Update on Grenada, " March 27,1979, no. 187 1, p. 2. 
83 Pastor, "Does the United States, " p. 8. 
84 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relafions, p. 15. 
85 Pastor, "Does the United States, " p. 8. A 1981 Grenadian Chief of Staff memorandum detailed the 
arms received from Cuba in April 1979: 3,400 Soviet and U. S. rifles with three million rounds; 200 
machine guns with half a million rounds; 100 pistols with 66,000 rounds; 100 shoulder-fired rocket 
launchers with 4,000 rockets; 12 82mm mortars with 4,800 shells; 12 75mm cannon with 600 shells 
79 
The PRG were supersensitive about the threat of a Gairy countercoup and on 
April 7, claiming that Gairy was organizing a mercenary invasion, officially requested 
arms from the U. S. via two junior embassy officials on Grenada. The U. S. remained 
unaware of the arrival of Cuban arms. Bishop also asked Britain, CARICOM and 
planned to ask Canada for military assistance. The next day, using the Gairy threat to 
justify his actions, Bishop told a rally that he planned to ask for Cuban and 
Venezuelan military help and expected Cuban diplomatic recognition and technical 
and material assistance soon after. 96 Bishop confirmed his requests to these countries 
at a press conference on April 9. From the timing of the arrival of Cuban and 
Guyanese transports it is irrefutable that arms were on route to Grenada even before 
Bishop's public request to the West or Cuba. Unsettled by these developments the 
States Department dispatched ambassador Ortiz to Grenada on April 9. 
Ambassador Ortiz found the island in the midst of an invasion scare and witnessed 
PRA soldiers fire on a Holiday Inn charter plane. Ortiz met first with Coard for 30 
minutes and later Bishop on April 10. Ortiz commented that the invasion scare would 
deter tourists and Coard replied that Gairy was a threat. The ambassador assured 
Coard that Gairy was in the U. S. and not on a neighbouring island as the PRG 
claimed and suggested that a friendly Western country could send a naval vessel to 
Grenada on a courtesy call as a deterrent to any invasion but Coard felt it would only 
scare people. Ortiz informed Coard that the embassy was ready to send AID officers 
to meet with PRG officials but Coard repeated the familiar message that the new 
government were not ready. Instead he said that a $3.7 million loan would help the 
and 12 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns with 237,000 rounds. Grenada: A Prefindnary Report 
(Washington D. C: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1983), p. 22. 
86 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relafions, p. 18. 
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PRG's progress. Ortiz tactfully replied that "there was some chance Grenada's frieds 
(sic) together might be able to help and that they were all ready to start talking. " 87 
Coard again delayed, explaining that he was very busy but would be in Barbados 
soon where talks could be continued. The meeting concluded with Ortiz mentioning 
that the talking points for his meeting with Bishop later that day would include a 
statement about relations with Cuba but Coard did not respond. " 
Meeting With Bishop 
Ambassador Ortiz's meeting with Bishop has received much attention as the 
purported starting point for the deterioration of U. S. -Grenadian relations and merits 
some attention. Bishop was aware that Ortiz was there to carry out some important 
instructions but Ortiz began by telling Bishop that he would like to talk informally 
first. Ortiz had a fair amount of leeway because until this meeting Washington had no 
firm Grenada policy. '9 The ambassador also made a point of mentioning that he 
would be traveling to Washington soon and that the details of affairs would be 
available to high officials there. 
The first subject was Gairy. Rumours of an invasion were widespread and Ortiz 
told Bishop that the uncertainty this situation engendered was detrimental to the 
island's economy, law and foreign relations. He assured Bishop that Gairy was in San 
Diego and explained that the U. S. Neutrality Act was strictly enforced and that the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation were keeping track of Gairy's activities although they 
87 Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting %ith 
Minister of Finance Coard, " 11 1603Z, April 1979, Bridgetown 0 1363, section 1, p 2. 
" In his report Ortiz wrote: "Coard is generally believed to be the hard-core ideologue and evil 
genius of the Bishop government. " Ibid., p. 2. 
89 Telephone interview with Bushnell. 
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had no firm evidence of any invasion plans. " Ortiz asked Bishop if he could provide 
evidence of Gairy's alleged plotting but all he could offer was that he knew Gairy was 
in touch with people who could organize a mercenary force. 91 Ortiz suggested that it 
would be helpful if the PRG publicized Gairy's location to calm their fear; Bishop 
agreed but could provide no explanation as to why this had not been done. The offer 
of a visit by a naval vessel was again made but Bishop echoed Coard's response in 
saying that it would only "cause confusion. We dodt want that. "92 In relation to the 
Gairy threat Ortiz, now speaking formally, told Bishop: 
Although my government recognizes your concerns over allegations of a possible 
countercoup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada! s best interests to 
seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall an armed attack. We 
would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop 
closer ties with Cuba. 93 
Ambassador Ortiz continued to speak formally, reading verbatim the text of a 
non-paper containing ten talking points. 94 Once again Gairy was discussed. Ortiz 
then asked Bishop if there would be a follow-up to the PRGs request for arms that 
had been made on April 7. Bishop said that there would not be so Ortiz pointed out 
that the U. S. had no details of the numbers or types of arms required; Bishop 
estimated that 500 semi-automatic rifles and 200 machine guns should suffice. 9' 
90 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 21. Ortiz even gave Bishop Gairy's phone and offered to fly 
someone to San Diego to verify Gairy's whereabouts. Telephone interview with Ortiz. 
"' Frank Ortiz, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime 
Nfinistcr Bishop, " 11 1843Z, April 1979, Bridgetown 0 1368, section 1, p. 3. 
92 Ibid., p. 3. It could possibly have sent a confusing message to the Cubans just as relations with 
Grenada were taking off. 
93 Rossin, U. S. -Grenad, a Relafions, p. 2 1. 
94 A non-paper is not an official document but an exact copy of talking points. Ortiz left one with 
Bishop to avoid any ambiguity. Telephone interview with Ortiz. 
95 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relafions, p. 22. , 
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The conversation now returned to the crucial subject - Cuba. Bishop told Ortiz 
that "after one month there had been no response to Grenada! s urgent needs from its 
traditional friends and that it had to find help where it could. "960rtiz pointed out that 
the U. S. had only received the request for arms a few days ago and the specific 
details about ten minutes ago and so it was difficult to call the U. S. "unresponsive. " 
Bishop conceded the ambassador's point and blamed overwork. 97 Ortiz then cut to 
the quick: 
I asked him [Bishop] point blank if the Cubans had offered assistance. He firmly 
said they had not. I asked him what his response would be if they did. He answered 
that depends on the circumstances. I asked what he meant by that. He replied if 
mercenaries invade [the] PRG would get help wherever it could. 9' 
Ortiz suspected, correctly, that Cuban arms were arriving but Bishop did not know 
this; when Ortiz said out of ignorance that he would be "particularly concerned about 
arms" Bishop probably assumed that the ambassador knew for certain and that the 
U. S. would intercept the shipments or inform the Eastern Caribbean governments. 99 
Ortiz stressed that Grenada was an independent and sovereign country and could do 
what it wanted but that the PRG should "have no doubts that developing close ties 
with Cuba would greatly complicate relations with Grenada! s neighbors and with 
friendly countries Eke the U. S. "'00 Noting Bishop's "apparent exhaustion" Ortiz 
decided to close the meeting and told Bishop that the U. S. was willing to provide aid, 
96 lbid, p. 22. 
97 Ibid., p. 22. 
98 Ortiz, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop, " section 2, p. 2. 
' Telephone interview with Ortiz. 
100 Ortiz, "Subject: Grenada: Meeting with Prime Minister Bishop, " section 2, p. 2. 
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possibly even arms, if a clear indication of Grenada's needs was provided. The ball 
was in Grenada! s court for the moment. 
"In Nobodýs Backyard" 
The PRG's response came at 8: 00 p. m. on April 13 when a Bishop speech was 
broadcast on RFG. He spoke at length about his meeting with ambassador Ortiz. 
According to Bishop, Ortiz had made "veiled threats" against Grenada! s tourist 
industry, saying that if talk of "mercenary invasions by phantom armies" continued 
Grenada would lose all its tourists. "' Moving on to the question of economic aid 
Bishop acknowledged that Ortiz had outlined the multilateral basis of U. S. aid via the 
CDB and that bureaucracy often made obtaining aid a slow process. In light of this he 
melodramatically charged that the only aid available in the near future was "the paltry 
sum of a few $5,000 (sic)... all that the wealthiest country in the world can offer to a 
poor but proud people. 002 For a grand finale Bishop returned to the threat of a 
mercenary invasion to inform people that if Cuba offered assistance Grenada would 
accept it, affirming that: 
No country hag the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country or who 
to be friendly with. We certainly would not attempt to tell any other country what 
to do. We are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale. "' 
The Morning Afte 
There are alternative interpretations of the "Backyard" speech and its significance 
but in Washington it was viewed as a purposeful distortion of events by Bishop to 
"' "In NobocVs Backyard, April 13,1979, " Marcus and Taber (eds. ), Afautice Bishop Speaks, p. 
27. 
102 Ibid., p. 29. 
103 lbici, p. 29. 
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justify the "already-in-train" move towards military and diplomatic ties with Cuba. In 
his speech Bishop had ignored the five AID programs mentioned previously and 
emphasized the SDA funds that Ortiz had discussed only with Coard. The State 
Department felt that Bishop had portrayed Ordis notification of U. S. displeasure of 
the development of "closer ties" with Cuba as an outright threat to encourage 
Grenadians to support the PRG's ties with Cuba. 104 
Back in Washington the NSC met to reassess the situation; until now the 
approach to Grenada had been "relaxed but concerned, " based on the assumption that 
the PRG were "manipulatable" as Pastor detailed: 
We premised this posture on the belief that Bishop and his followers were of the 
Manley "socialist democratic" school, but that they were pragmatic and could be 
co-opted by us or, for that matter, by the Cubans. The feeling was that as time 
passed, the realities of governing... would steer Bishop towards working with us 
... A more confrontational strategy by us could perhaps push the Grenadians in [to] the arms of the Cubans. '" 
The Manley analogy was now discarded as it became clear that Bishop was moving in 
the direction of a one-party state with close ties to Cuba. Washington was now at an 
important crossroads: "adopt a different strategy to try to counter Grenada! s drift 
towards the Cubans" or concentrate on "preventing similar kinds of coups on 
neighboring islands. " 106 
As Pastor underlined, it would have to be the U. S. who acted as the "catalyst" to 
counter the drift towards Cuba in the region. However, he felt that this would be best 
achieved from behind the scenes by supporting Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 
104 Rossin, US -Grenada Relafions, p. 24. 
105 Robert Pastor, secret NSC memorandum to Zbignicw Brzezinski/David Aaron, "Subject: Time to 
Reassess US Policy to Grenada and the Caribbean: Second-Gcneration Surrogates?, " April 14,1979, 
no. 2271, p. 1. 
lbicL, p. 2. 
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calling for elections, a cessation of the militarization of Grenada, the freeing of 
political prisoners and the delegitimization of Cuba! s involvement by linking it to the 
arms build-up and lack of elections. 107 Other measures included the establishment of 
a regional police force, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and naval vessel visits. 
This "regional" strategy placed the emphasis on consultation with Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago to ensure wider Caribbean support for U. S. policy. If the 
"regional" approach proved unproductive Pastor speculated that: 
we should test Bishop's alleged interest in good relations with the U. S. by playing 
with him on aid. We should send teams down to survey, but we should keep from 
making firm decisions until the direction of his "revolution" is clarified. "' 
It would appear that such a policy was the State Department's preference as they 
believed the PRG was co-optable and favoured trying to "buy out" Grenada now. 109 
At a mini-SCC meeting on April 27 Washington made the decision. The co- 
optation strategy of providing bilateral aid was rejected because it was felt that it 
would have a negative effect on the democratic Eastern Caribbean countries who 
needed aid just as much and also set a precedent for other regimes to confront the 
U. S. in order to receive more aid. "O Perhaps more importantly Bishop had never 
displayed much interest in being co-opted; PRG requests for aid had been non- 
specific, vague and perfunctory in nature. 
107 Ibid., p. 3. 
108 Robert Pastor, secret NSC memorandum to David Aaron, "Subject: Mini-SCC Meeting on 
Grenada - April 27,1979,10: 30-11: 30 am, " April 23,1979, no. 2385, p. 2. 
109 Ibid, p. 2. 
110 It dawned on Washington that supporting the democratic countries in the regionmas essential if 
the threat of "more Grcnadas" was to be reduced Telephone interview with Bushnell. 
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Consequently, the "pressures and incentives" of the "regional" strategy won out. 
Grenada! s neighbours would pressure the PRG to hold elections and reduce their ties 
to Cuba. All the islands would receive more aid except Grenada who would be told 
that if they implemented changes they too would receive aid. The security capability 
of the region would also be increased. The participants concluded that this option 
was: 
more congruent with the Administration's approach to the region; and... the 
regional nations could probably have a more positive influence on the PRG than 
could the US. It appeared the NJM was comfortable with the US as its enemy, 
and perhaps the best strategy for the US was to avoid giving them a target. "' 
The change of policy was not as instantaneous as it might appear. The embassy 
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) John Eddy visited Grenada on May 9 to meet with 
Bishop to, among other things, solicit the specifics of Grenada! s aid requests-' 12 
According to John Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, Grenada remained eligible for regional aid; Washington scaled down bilateral 
programs and if Grenada had asked for this they would not have received 
anything. 113 
As Payne suggests, it is difficult to believe that the PRG expected the U. S. to be 
entirely sympathetic to their policies. Grenada could have accepted U. S. aid to reduce 
the mounting tension but this might have jeopardized the opportunity of a closer 
relationship with Cuba: 
I" Pastor, "Does the United States, " p. 14. 
112 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relafions, p. 30. 
113 Grenada's attitude to regional aid suggested they were disinterested anyway. About six months 
after the revolution a new Coast Guard training programme began. There was uncertainty as to 
whether Grenada should be included, it was decided that if the Grenadian representative was a 
member of the PRG they would be rcjected but if it was a career civil servant they would be 
accepted. As it was, nobody skowed up. Telephone interview with Bushnell. 
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perhaps the best way to resolve the contradiction was to go on the attack and try 
to organize a diplomatic front against the United States around the themes of non- 
intervention and sovereignty - that would be ideologically satisfying in itself, would 
allow the Soviet Union to be courted, and could indeed be the most effective con- 
straint upon the United States. '" 
In a 1982 interview with Pastor both Bishop and Coard insisted that the "Backyard" 
speech response was a mixture of inexperience and emotion and not premeditated. "' 
Pastor goes on to suggest that the speech should be seen in view of the PRG's Third 
World Marxist outlook which charged U. S. imperialism as the cause of all ills. 
On April 17 the State Department issued a statement explaining that Ortiz had 
simply been relating his government's position on a number of issues. In Washington 
the PRG's response was seen as "aimless provocation by an irresponsible regime. " 116 
Ortiz remained sanguine and proposed that the U. S. "see the record straight" by 
telling the PRG "either as a formal USG statement or as a private, personal aside, 
that assurances that the Cubans would leave would be met with USG responsiveness 
to Grenada's development needs" 117 and let him take any flak such statements might 
attract as he was leaving soon. However, the State Department had decided enough 
was enough on the Cuban issue and rejected the idea. 118 Soon after, an AID team 
visiting the Caribbean deliberately excluded Grenada. This signified the beginning of 
the "distancing" policy that did not change substantially until October 1983. 
114 Anthony Payne, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Revolutionary Goverment, " in Heine (ed. ), 
A Revolution Aborted, p. 140. 
11 -5 Pastor, "Does the United States, " p. 11. 
116 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 26. 
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Rediscoveriniz the Cold War in the Caribbean 
In examining the remainder of the Carter Administration's term I will outline the 
U. S. ' general perceptions of Grenada and the Caribbean and then address the key 
events which demonstrated the progression of relations. 
The Caribbean had always been viewed as an area of central importance to U. S. 
national security for several reasons: access to raw materials, the protection of sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs) and the Panama Canal amongst others. The U. S. 
has traditionally pursued a policy of "strategic denial" of geopolitical presence to 
non-hernispheric powers that could be a potential threat. From Washington's 
viewpoint Cuba was the "rotten apple" in the middle of this vital area. After the 
activism of the 1960's Castro had pursued a more opportunistic strategy in the 
1970's. A CIA officer categorized Cuban efforts as "a multifaceted, carefully 
coordinated mechanism designed to promote Cuban policies and undercut US 
influence. "' 19 Grenada was seen as a classic example of this. 
Britain's gradual withdrawal from the Caribbean left a legacy of political and 
economic instability to the newly independent microstates of the Eastern Caribbean. 
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations perceived the creation of a strategic 
vacuum that could unsettle the global balance of power. As a result the U. S. 
encouraged a militarization of the region and integrated it into a broader global 
context. 120 When the Grenada revolution was followed by left-wing electoral 
1,9 "Statement of Daniel Lynch, Office of Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, " U. S. 
Congress. Economic and Political Future ofthe Caribbean, p. 116. 
120 Dion E. Phillips, "The Increasing Emphasis on Security and Defense in the Eastern Caribbean, " 
in Young and Phillips (eds. ), M711itarization. p. 44. A prime example of the literature on the strategic 
vacuum argument is: Richard Sim and James Anderson, "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum, " 
Conflict Studies 121 (August 1980): 1-24. 
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victories in Dominica and St. Lucia it resurrected U. S. fears of "splashing dominoes" 
in the Caribbean. As one government official warned somewhat dramatically, there 
was "the possibility of upheaval producing radically inclined regimes on the smaller 
islands that might spread to larger countries like Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic and balkanize the region with antagonistic political and economic 
systems. 021 
The domino theory posits that unrest in one country will engender the progressive 
and sequential collapse of neighbouring regimes for similar reasons. It is "prediction 
oriented" and long-term in timescale but offers no explanation as to why events 
would be triggered. '22 Such thinking would receive more attention during the Reagan 
administration. President Cartees "discovery" of a Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba 
prompted him to announce that: "We will increase our economic assistance to 
alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to 
insure the abUity of troubled people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist 
domination. "123 On October 1,1979, Carter established a Joint Task Force at Key 
West, Florida. 
The Deterioration of Relations 
The tone of fiiture relations was soon set when, on May 8, Bishop accused the 
CIA of conducting a multistage "Pyran-dd Plan" to destabilize Grenada. 124 The U. S. 
121 Schoenhals and Mclanson, Revolution and Intervention, p. 115. 
122 Stcnclo, Foreign Policy Pre&c1ions, p. 149. 
123 Tad Szulc, "Caribbean, " New York 771mesMagazine, hby 25,1979, p. 57. 
124 Bishop outlined a three-stage plan: 1. false media reports and the recruitment of prominent 
individuals to generate internal dissatisfaction. 2. violence and arson and 3. assassination. Rossin, 
U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 29. The accusation was based primarily on two fires that had occurred 
on Nby 6. A SGU student had burnt down his cottage accommodation and coincidentally a building 
in St. George's was gutted in a suspected case of arson. 
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called the accusation "unwarranted and without foundation. " Interestingly, at the 
same time Bishop told the U. S. embassy's DCM Eddy that he understood relations 
had got off to a bad start and wanted to improve them and believed that the White 
House and State Department wanted good relations and that the CIA were acting 
without authority. 125 In public and in private, as the Grenada documents confirm, 
Bishop saw CIA-backed agents behind every bush. Perhaps by targeting the CIA he 
felt he was not criticizing the U. S. government directly and that, given the CIA! s 
history and image, the accusation would be more believable. 
Probably by coincidence rather than in reaction to Bishop's "Pyramid" speech, 
NSC Director Brzezinski sent a memo to CIA Director Stansfield Turner on May 8 
conveying President Carter's concerns about the growing Cuban presence in Grenada. 
The memo suggested some sort of covert effort to bring these developments to the 
attention of the international media. 126 The CIA responded on May 14 with a 
proposed political programme that went beyond Brzezinski's original suggestion by 
intending to counter the Cuban presence in Grenada. According to Gates, Carter 
signed a "finding" on July 3,1979, that authorised covert operations to promote the 
127 democratic process and support domestic resistance to the Marxist PRG. 
When the Senate Intelligence Committee were briefed on the plan on July 19 they 
expressed their "strong displeasure, " pointing out how such action would contradict 
the administration's stance on human rights and non-interference, and sent a letter to 
125, Ibid., p. 30. 
126 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows. * The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How 
7hey Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 143. 
12'7 lbid, p. 143. 
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the President informing him that they could not "support the projected covert action 
directed at Grenada. " 12' Although the Committee had no legal jurisdiction over 
covert operations, the CIA, to the White House's dismay, respected the Committee's 
reaction and all plans for covert action against Grenada were shelved on July 23, 
1979.129 
In contrast to the support for covert action by the White House, NSC and CIA 
the State Department continued its more moderate line. On June 7 Assistant 
Secretary of State Viron Vaky met with Deputy Prime Mnister Bernard Coard for 40 
minutes at the second annual meeting of the Caribbean Group. Reflective of the State 
Department's optimism, Vaky told Coard that Washington wanted a "constructive 
relationship" and that there had been "misunderstandings" in the past but that this 
could be avoided in the future by establishing a "free and candid" dialogue. 130 Coard 
apparently agreed that it was time to rebuild the relationship but restated with "force 
and conviction" that Grenada was not a client state and would accept help ftom 
wherever it was offered. 131 Vaky inquired as to what the "true story" was concerning 
the Cubans in Grenada but Coard sidestepped the issue. Despite learning nothing 
new, Vaky felt that "the atmospherics were good and tended to support the 
impression we have received from several sources that the NRG (sic) is looking for 
ways to mend fences with us. 032 
128 Ibid., p. 143. 
12' Ibid., p. 143. The CIA had recently been the focus of an extensive Congressional investigation. 
130 Warren Christopher, confidential telegram to Amcmbassy Bridgetown, "Subject: Meeting 
Between Bernard Coard, Finance Nfinister of the NRG (sic) in Grenada, and Assistant Secretary 
Vaky, " 160009Z, June 1979, Washington D. C. 154578, p. 2. 
131 Ibid., p. 2. Vaky described Coard as "intelligent, aggcssivc by nature, and self-confident and in 
explaining his govcrmncnfs policies and goals he was cogent and quite convincing. " Ibid., p. 4. 
132 Ibid., p. 4. 
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By June 1979 the U. S. embassy had adopted a policy of regular consular visits 
and reduced direct contact with the PRG, working on a "listen and report" basis. 133 
Ambassador Ortiz, who the PRG had seemingly taken a personal dislike to, was 
succeeded by Sally Shelton that same month. The PRG made noises about improving 
relations and the State Department and embassy felt that Shelton's appointment was 
Ilan opportunity for the U. S. to make another effort at reconciliation with the PRG 
and a new start at achieving our objectives. " 134 The U. S. remained concerned about 
human rights, the lack of elections, the militarization of the island and the growing 
influence of Cuba. Shelton was instructed to make U. S. concerns clear and inform 
Bishop that to remove the causes of "tension or misunderstanding" their dialogue 
should be based on "frankness and candor. "135 An indication of the Mrs position 
was demonstrated immediately when they postponed Sheltods presentation of her 
"credentials" for seven weeks due to a newspaper article in which she had expressed 
her concern about PRG policies and relations. 
Ambassador Shelton finally met with Bishop on July 23,1979. The extradition of 
Gairy on charges of murder, fraud and misappropriation of government funds, was 
one of the topics discussed. Shelton explained that extradition was a complex and 
lengthy process. Afterwards she concluded that Gairy's return was important to the 
PRG but warned that it would be an easy target for more anti-U. S. propaganda and 
that she thought the PRG did not place a high priority on good relations with the 
133 Telephone interview with Bushnell. 
134 Warren Christopher, secret telegram to Amembassy Bridgetowl, "Subject: Talizing Points for 
Your Meeting with Prime Mnistcr Nburice Bishop of Grenada on June 18, " 142202Z, June 1979, 
Washington D. C. 153150, p. 2. 
135 Ibid., p. 3. This was essentially the same message Vaky had given to Coard previously. 
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U. S. 136 A Department of Justice extradition expert visited Grenada in February 1980 
to discuss the case in detail. He informed the PRG that their case would be legally 
stronger if they charged Gairy with financial rather than political crimes, although it 
could be a lengthier legal process. In reply Radix thanked the official and said, "you 
can leave it to us now. 037 
The next time the U. S. heard of the matter was via the media when Bishop 
accused the U. S. of procrastination. Washington felt impelled to announce that the 
Grenadian documentation on the case was "insufficient and inadequate" and that 
there was no evidence that Gairy had been plotting against the PRG and that the PRG 
had been told this repeatedly. 138 Washington's pique was discernible; they had made 
an appreciable effort to respond to the extradition request and advised the PRG how 
to expedite the process but once again the PRG had used the public arena to 
denounce the U. S. The PRG seemed interested in certain subjects but appeared to 
prefer to use them to generate anti-U. S. propaganda more than anything else. 
Grenada! s ties with Cuba, and later the Eastern Bloc, were the central concern of 
the U. S. and precluded the normalization of relations. A Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) meeting was due for September 21,1979, and the Carter administration had 
spent the previous six months consulting with NAM governments in an attempt to 
encourage moderate leaders to participate in voting to prevent Cuba, Nicaragua (sic) 
and Grenada steering the organization towards a "natural alliance" with the Soviet 
136 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relafions, p. 36-7. 
137 Ibid., p. 40. 
138 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Union. '" Unfortunately, the U. S. embassy in Barbados mistakenly passed on to 
Bishop a letter from the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that was intended only for 
certain Latin American leaders, concerning the Cuban resolution to be proposed at 
the meeting. 140 Seizing an irresistible opportunity to denounce the U. S., Bishop used 
his speech at the meeting to accuse the U. S. of trying to get Grenada to lead a 
movement against Cuba and divide the NAM. 
In December 1979 at a UN vote to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
Grenada joined Cuba as the only supporters of the action. For the State Department 
this was a "deep disappointment and a prime cause of disillusionment. " 141 
Henceforth, Grenada courted the Soviets as a mixture of ideological affinity and 
expediency. A number of economic and technical agreements ensued. 
Bishop had announced in November 1979 that a second airport would be 
constructed at Point Salines. The need for improved airport facilities had been 
discussed several times since 1955.142 A 1980 World Bank Memorandum confirmed 
earlier studies when it "identified air access as a major constraint on full utilization of 
existing capacity and further development of the [tourist] sector. Pearls Airport 
cannot accommodate international flights or night landings. 043 The PRG placed the 
139 Robert Pastor, 7he Carter A&Wnistration and Latin America: A Test qfhinciple (Atlanta, Ga.: 
Carter Center of Emory University, 1992), p. 29. The Nicaraguan revolution did not occur until July 
1979. 
140 Rossin, US. -Grenada Relafions, p. 78. 
141 lbid, p. 83. 
142 Brian Hudson, "The Changing Caribbean: Grcna&s New International AirporL" Caribbean 
Geography 1, no. I (Nby 1983): 52. 
143 Hugh UShaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphcrc Books, 
1994), p. 88. 
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airport at the centre of their economic strategy, anticipating that tourism and 
improved transport facilities would act as a catalyst for the economy. 144 
Grenada had already signed an extensive economic and technical agreement with 
Cuba and now Castro offered to contribute $10 million, 85 pieces of equipment and 
250 technicians towards the project. 145 Grenada requested U. S. help but it was 
unsurprisingly declined on political and economic grounds. 
With Cuba! s public offer of aid almost pre-empting Bishop's announcement of the 
airport project many in Washington concluded that it was part of a Soviet-Cuban 
masterplan to convert Grenada into a military outpost. Strategists argued that at 
9,000 feet the runway was designed to be able to handle military aircraft and that 
Castro wanted a secure staging post for moving troops to Angola and that Grenada 
would become a projection of Soviet power as part of a geopolitical circle of bases in 
the Caribbean. 46 This would pose an intolerable threat to the SLOCs which carried 
much of the U. S. ' trade and, more importantly, would act as a major supply route to 
allies in time of crisis in Europe. 147 The PRG did little to assuage Washingtores fears. 
When asked about the possibility of Cuba and the Soviet Union using the airport to 
transport troops to "hotspots" such as Angola, Bishop replied: 
suppose there's a war next door in Trinidad, where the forces of Fascism are about 
to take control, and the Trinidadians need external assistance... Why should we 
oppose anybody passing through Grenada to assist them. "' 
'" Jay Mandle, Big Revolution, Small Counoy (Lanham, Md.: North-South, 1985), p. 23. 
I's Lewis, Reform and Revolution, p. 219. 
" Telephone interview with former Department of Defense official, October 10,1994. 
147 Michael Desch, "Turning the Caribbean Flank. Sea-Lane Vulnerability During a European 
War, " Survival (November-December 1987): 530. 
" Larry Rohtcr, "Grenada: A Tiny Exporter Of Revolution?, " Newsweek, March 31,1980, p. 44. 
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Incontrovertible proof that the Cubans or Soviets would have used the airport does 
not exist. President Reagan would place greater emphasis on the intended use of the 
airport and I will examine his use of the issue later. Whether it would have been used 
as a military facility is inconsequential; the airport's potential use as a military facility 
and Cuban involvement in its construction meant that the US. perception of it was as 
a potential Soviet-Cuban military facility. 
Consolidatiniz the Revolution 
In keeping with the accusations of destabilisation the PRG moved to control the 
media. The oppositionist Torchlight newspaper was closed down by the government 
in October 1979 for printing "lies and distorted information and... excluding pro- 
government news, thus threatening national security. " 149 People's Law 81 was passed 
to limit individuals to a four percent stake in any particular medium and banned 
foreign ownership entirely. This law automatically transferred all foreign shares, and 
those of Grenadians who held more than four percent, to the PRG. 150 Despite its 
compliance with People's Law 81 the Roman Catholic Church's Catholic Focus was 
closed down by the PRG after its first issue. 
Once in power the PRG began to rely increasingly on state repression for control. 
Numerous counterrevolutionary plots, real and imagined, were uncovered and arrests 
made. The most serious of these occurred on June 19,1980, when a bomb exploded 
near the podium the entire PRG Cabinet was on at a rally in Queens Park. Three 
149 John A. Lent, "Mass Mcdia and Socialist Goverruncnts in the Commonwcalth Caribbcan, " 
Human Rights Quarterly (1982): 387. 
"0 The main targets of this arrangement were a Grenadian, D. UB. CromwelL who owned 22 
perccntý and the Trinidad Erpress newspaper which owned 13 percent. lbid, p. 387. 
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members of the crowd were killed. Bishop soon after claimed that the assassination 
attempt was one of the "foul deeds of imperialism. " 151 
True to form the PRG used the bombing to generate more anti-U. S. propaganda. 
The chosen forum this time was the UN; on July 2 the Grenadian Representative 
circulated a note with details of the assassination attempt. The PRG's penchant for 
propaganda victories was highlighted by this as talks between the State Department 
and PRG officials, with a view to "high-level" dialogue, were in process. 152 
Unsurprisingly the talks quickly ceased. 
In the aftermath of the Queens Park bombing civil liberties were again eroded as a 
Terrorism (Prevention) Law was passed. The number of political prisoners climbed 
further and Bishop derided democracy as: 
a situation where every five years, and for five seconds in those five years, a 
people are allowed to put an "Y' next to some candidate's name, and for those 
five seconds they became democrats. 153 
The PRA functioned as the enforcers of NJM policies and assumed the: 
responsibility for protecting the revolution from counter revolutionaries. They 
quickly became the eyes and ears... Allegations or mere suspicion of being a 
"counter" resulted in detention because "no one would be allowed to stop the 
wheels of progress" ... 
[T]he net of suspicion of being a "counter" was spread 
very wide. 154 
151 Rossin, U. &-Grenada Relafions, p. 53. 
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In Washington such actions only served to reinforce and advance perceptions of the 
PRG as a hard-line socialist government with a less than healthy respect for human 
rights. 
In November 1979 two American citizens in Grenada had been arrested and 
denied access to U. S. consuls. This "mini-hostage" situation was naturally cause for 
concern. Remarks by the PRGs Minister of Industrial Development Kendrick Radix 
at the UN and later by minister of Mobilisation Selwyn Strachan suggested that the 
PRG's obsession with the extradition of Gairy might lead them to seize U. S. citizens 
in retaliation for perceived U. S. tardiness over Gairy. Such a scenario may or may not 
have been far-fetched but the spectre of another hostage crisis led Washington to 
instruct Shelton that in her next meeting with Bishop, scheduled for December 17, 
1979, to "carry out a demarche on the treatment of American citizens arrested in 
Grenada and PRG violations of consular conventions" and convince Bishop that the 
protection of U. S. citizens was of paramount concern for Washington. '" 
Washington expected Bishop would again express his desire for good relations; 
this time in light of all that had occurred in the past few months, the message from 
Washington was that Bishop should get the: 
definite impression that we view the PRG as responsible for the deterioration in 
U. S. -PRG relations and any improvement in our relations can only occur if there 
are important changes in the way the PRG relates to the U. S. 156 
The prospects for this were minimal. 
155 Cyrus Vance, confidential telegram to, Amembassy Bridgetown, "Subject: Tallcing Points for 
Meeting with PM Bishop, " 15003Z, December 1979, Washington D. C. 322604, p. 1. 
1-56 lbicL, p. 2. 
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MilitaMEconomic and Political Policies 
As U. S. hopes for an improvement in relations ebbed, their policies reflected this. 
In February 1980 Bushnell warned that: "The rapid reduction in the British role in the 
Caribbean requires us to open the door to cooperative security relationships... To 
do otherwise is to leave the field to Cuba, which is aggressively expanding its 
influence with its smaller Caribbean neighbours. 057 The U. S. made its feelings clear 
in May 1980 with the Operation Solid Shield military manoeuvres in the region 
involving 20,000 men, 42 ships, 350 aircraft and a landing at Guantanamo in Cuba. 158 
The message sent to Grenada was unequivocal. 
U. S. economic aid was the most realistic method of nudging Grenada away from 
Cuba. Bishop had included economic destabilization as part of the CIA! s "Pyramid 
Plan" and it is difficult to dispute that U. S. policy was punitive. The first example of 
this occurred in January 1980 after severe floods in Grenada. The PRG requested 
help from the OAS' Emergency Unit, FONDEM, but the U. S. AID delegate 
questioned the need for aid and insisted that an investigation be conducted. '" Aid 
was finally granted but only after a long delay. 
On August 2-3,1980, Hurricane Allen swept through the Eastern Caribbean badly 
damaging the all-important banana CrOPS. 160 The Windward Islands Banana 
Association (WINBAN) and St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica immediately 
157 U. S. Congress, Economic and Political Future ofthe Caribbean, p. 69. 
158 Pearce, Under the Eagle, p. 154. Bishop protested that the exercise was "planned to intimidate, 
and to bring horror to our people. " "Grenada and Solid Shield 1980, " GDMC, no. 006896. 
159 Chris Searle, Grenada, p. 56. 
" 97 percent of the crop were lost in St. Lucia, 95 percent in St. Vincent, 75 percent in Dominica 
and 40 percent in Grenada. Pearce, Under the Eagle, p. 141. 
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requested U. S. aid, but Grenada did not. It was not until September 8, when the 
Grenadian Representative to the UN passed a letter to the U. S. Representative, that 
Grenada requested help. The U. S. ' final decision was to dispense $1.8 million 
between St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica because they were the worst affected. 
Grenada received nothing on the grounds that she suffered less damage and bananas 
were not the island's main crop. Washington was cynical: "What it really was was a 
case of a belated, dubious and relatively unjustified Grenadian request for aid 
probably made precisely so it would be rejected and could be used for 
propaganda. it 161 The inherent bad faith that pervaded relations and the politicization 
of the economic aid programme was manifest in this decision. 
In the U. S. ' defence it must be remembered that both ambassadors Ortiz and 
Shelton had offered aid when the possibility of good relations still existed but by late 
1979 this was not the case. Rossin acknowledges that while many of the PRGs 
allegations of economic destabilization by the U. S. were "either created from whole 
cloth or are serious distortions of the original situations. Others did happen, and 
represent efforts by the United States to protect its own security and interests as the 
major aid donor in the region. it 162 
The regional approach of the AID programs also complicated matters because 
"direct assistance to individual islands or organizations on individual Islands is 
precluded much to the consternation of the citizenry who see their problems as 
specific and immediate. "16' Regional bodies such as the CDB were large 
161 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 68. 
162 IbicL, p. 62. 
163 U. S. Congress, Economic and Political Future ofthe Caribbean, p. 68. 
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bureaucracies and made receiving aid a slow process. Setting aside the fact that the 
PRG were probably never seriously interested in receiving U. S. aid, it is not difficult 
to imagine the PRG concluding that the U. S. was dragging its feet over the aid 
question. 
As a Commonwealth country, Grenada also approached Britain for help. The 
newly elected Thatcher government was a firm supporter of the "Special 
Relationship" and declared their support for Washingtores line; London had been 
pulling out of the Caribbean and saw no reason to oppose the U. S. ' policy. The 
PRG's application for a new bilateral aid programme was rejected. Overseas 
Development Minister Neil Marten explained to the House of Commons that "greater 
weight should be given in the allocation of British aid to political. .. 
considerations. to 164 The authoritarian PRG were clearly excluded. 
The U. S. ' economic policy undoubtedly had an important impact on the PRG but 
they were already following their chosen road. As Ambursley points out, the PRG's 
economic policy involved the mobilization of a sources of international sources of 
financial aid. 165 With Grenada! s ideological disposition and Cuba! s desire to help 
Grenada become a showcase for Cuban Third World aid programmes it was 
inevitable that closer ties would develop. 
164 Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, Brifish Government Policy on Grenada Since 1979 
(London: n. p., 1983), p. 4. Grenada had received a L2.25 million grant from Britain upon 
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1980-81, June 9,1981. 
165 Fitzroy Ambursley, "Grcnada: the New Jcwcl Rcvolution, " in Robin Cohcn and Fitzroy 
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Politically, the distancing tactics were also evident. After visiting the embassy in 
Barbados, U. S. Senator Ottley reported that ambassador Shelton felt she was 
overextended and accredited to too many places and that more regular visits and a 
greater physical presence would enhance relations. 166 The recommendation was 
never followed up. The U. S. also refused to recognize the PRG's nominee as 
ambassador to the U. S., Dessima Williams. 167 Ambassador Shelton was forbidden 
from paying the customary farewell visit to Grenada irrespective of Bishop's invite to 
discuss "matters of mutual interest with a view to promoting and developing friendly 
relations. " 16' Ambassador Shelton and some of her staff believed that it would be in 
Washington's best interest to accept the invite: 
particularly in view of the apparent shift in PRG views on the questions of Gairy's 
extradition and Williamsý agrement. It may well be that the PRG would like to 
remove these irritants from our bilateral relations so that it can begin on a different 
footing with the new U. S. President, a suggestion supported by a diminution of 
anti-U. S. rhetoric... Our policy of distancing ourselves from the PRG may be 
having an effect with Bishop appearing to feel that it is better to talk face-to-face 
than to continue to hurl epithets pUblicly. 169 
Shelton's view had few supporters in Washington or the embassy; by January 1981 
the patience and appetite for improved relations had disappeared. The bottom line 
was that good relations were dependent on the reduction of links with Cuba, a return 
166 Memo, Jcffrcy Farrow to Robert Pastor, NSC, March 28,1980, "Pastor" folder, White House 
Central File-Name File, Jimmy Carter Library. 
161 Washington had reservations about Williams due to her repeated verbal attacks on the U. S. as 
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to constitutional government, free and fair elections, improved human rights, a 
reduction in anti-U. S. rhetoric and a true non-aligned policy. This was hardly a 
flexible line that left room for Grenada to manoeuvre in, but the Grenadian leopard 
was not about to change its "spots. " The U. S. had classified Grenada as "a country 
which seeks and exploits occasions to harm. the interests of democratic societies 
around it. " 170 Washington felt deceived by the PRG's move towards Cuba and 
violation of its commitments to elections and irritated by Bishop's incessant 
accusations and thus decided it was preferable to ignore and isolate Grenada. The 
embassy summed up the U. S. ' perception of the situation in October 1980: 
The PRG continues in its mindset that all differences between us are the fault of the 
United States Government, that they have not acted in any way against us, and that 
it is up to the USG to take steps to correct these matters... We are more useful to 
the PRG as a bogeyman than as a friend. 171 
It must be remembered that Grenada was never a major concern, mostly being 
handled at Assistant Secretary level. This would change gradually with the accession 
of the right-wing Reagan Administration. 
Unease in the Backyard 
After an optimistic start Grenada! s relations with its neighbours declined. The 
post-independence islands realized they could not afford a national military capability, 
reasoning that international security arrangements, such as the OAS, or the U. S. ' 
historical pre-eminence would protect them. In addition, CARICOM felt immune to 
political extremism and regional instability, being isolated by the long tradition of 
170 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relafions, p. 85. 
171 Virgil RandolpI4 confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Blames U. S. for 
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Westminister democracy. 172Until the 1979 coup the Eastern Caribbean governments 
"did not assert a perception of threat to national security in the traditional sense. " 173 
The Eastern Caribbean's threat perception saw Grenada as a "threat to 
governmental survival through contagion and possibly subversion, as well as a threat 
to the traditional political culture. " 174 Caribbean concern was increased by left-wing 
electoral victories in June and July in Dominica and St. Lucia respectively. On August 
13 and August 16,1979, Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia signed the Declaration of 
St. George's which, among other things, stated that: "popular democracy, respect for 
the rights of workers and social and economic justice for the masses must be the main 
objectives of their government. it 175 It appeared that a "new Left" was emerging in the 
region. Throughout the islands various left-wing opposition groups flexed their 
muscles in anticipation. 
The threat Grenada posed was exaggerated but it must be remembered that a 
small force of men could overthrow a government and there were a number of coup 
scares during this period. With the Eastern Caribbean governments growing disquiet 
the militarization in Grenada only exacerbated the situation. 
Grenada's relations with the U. S. worsened almost as fast as those with Cuba, and 
later the Eastern Bloc, improved. By tr-ýd-April there were 2,000 Cuban-armed PRA 
172 H. Michael Erisman, "The CARICOM States and U. S. Foreign Policy: The Danger of Central 
Americanization, " Journal ofInter-Amefican Stu&es and WorldAffairs 3 1, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 142. 
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and militia members and approximately 40-80 Cuban advisors in Grenada. "' Prime 
Nfinister Adams, the harshest critic of the PRG, described the Grenada-Cuba military 
fink as "obnoxious, dangerous and unwise. 11177 Several secret military agreements 
were also signed; that security relationships existed was assumed because in the 
smallness and intimacy of the Eastern Caribbean system each leader knows 
approximately the security relationships of their neighbours but this was not so with 
Grenada, increasing their unease. 17' The leaders had always assumed that the U. S. 
would act to prevent Cuba establishing a presence in the area but that presumption 
was now being challenged. 
The inflexibility of the PRG foreign policy's "principled positions" and description 
of Cuba as a "beacon" for the Revolution gave little scope for cooperation with other 
governments. The neighbouring states continued to pressure Grenada over human 
rights, links with Cuba, political prisoners and elections. Bishop's unflattering 
response to Tom Adams' remarks in November 1980 suggesting Grenada! s lack of 
elections would restrict the ability of the CDB to attract investors, compared Adams 
to "an expectant dog barking for his supper, he rushes in to please his new master 
Reagan like all good yard fowls by attacking Grenada. 079 This invective mirrored 
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Grenada's relations with the U. S. Adams had pursued a policy of "quiet diplomacy" 
towards Grenada rather than utilizing the media and there was great concern over the 
personal and very public nature of Bishop's criticism. 
Whilst the Eastern Caribbean tolerated Grenada they simultaneously pursued a 
more security-oriented path. Only a few weeks after the coup, Tom Adams and 
Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Eric Williams signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding acknowledging security problems, notably, "terrorism, piracy, the use 
of mercenaries and the introduction into the region of techniques of subversion. " ISO 
In May 1979 WIAS agreed on the future establishment of the OECS which included 
plans for a regional defense force. 
Grenada! s militarization was unsurprisingly interpreted as "offensive" rather than 
"defensive" and, as Bushnell told Congress, "these events. .. triggered concern 
among Caribbean leaders themselves about the security of the region, and led them to 
approach us and others for help. ""' After the Soviet Brigade incident, Carter 
designated Barbados, who had never received U. S. military aid, for a special role and 
disbursed five million dollars for communication and navigational equipment to 
"strengthen the security of the entire Eastern Caribbean. 082 Other measures included 
increased International Military and Education Training (IMET) programs, wider 
access to military training, introducing the use of the FMS credit system and more 
180 Dion E. Phillips, "Defense Policy in Barbados, 1966-88, " Journal ofInter-American Studies and 
WorldAffairs 32, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 77. Having almost been toppled by a radical-led revolt and 
army mutiny fcd by Black Power militancy in 1970, Williams had pursued a repressive policy 
against perceived left-wing subversion. Bishop! s letters to Williams went unopened. 
"' "Statement of John A. BushnelL Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intcr-Amcrican Affairs, 
Department of State, " U. S. Congress, Economic and Political Future ofthe Caribbean, p. 12. 
182 Phillips, "Defcnse Policy in Barbados, " p. 80. 
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emphasis on a Regional Coast Guard training programme. 193 When the British 
Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington visited the region in August 1980 he brought 
details of ten million dollars of aid. 184 
Apart from Grenada, only Barbados had a standing army, the Barbados Defense 
Force (BDF). "' In December 1979 Prime Minister Adams had received a request for 
help from the newly elected St. Vincentian Prime Minister Milton Cato to help him 
quell an uprising by a group of Rastafarians on Union Island in the Grenadines. 
Adams' intelligence reports convinced him that it was the beginning of a wider revolt 
and he did not hesitate in sending a detachment of the BDF to St. Vincent to "hold 
the fort" and free the St. Vincentian police to retake Union Island. This episode was 
notable as the first time one Commonwealth Caribbean country had provided military 
aid to another. Having demonstrated the will to act swiftly against any potential 
threat, Adams, clearly thinking of Grenada, served notice that the operation was "an 
assertion by a freely and democratically elected government that the forces of law and 
183 " Statement of John A. Bushnell, " U. S. Congress, Economic and Political Future of the 
Caribbean, p. 8. 
184 Barbados purchased a gunboat, converted four shrimping boats to patrol vessels and received a 
secondment of Royal Navy officers. St. Vincent received L250,000 and purchased a patrol craft, as 
did St. Lucia. Britain also enhanced the regional police training programme. Bloch and Fitzgerald, 
Bmish Govemment Policy, pp. 6-7. 
185 The BDF was formed in August 1979 and by 1983 contained some 610 members. Phillips, 
'Barbados Defense Policy, ' p. 81. The Dominica Defense Force (Dominican Defence Force) was 
disbanded in April 1981. The DDF had displayed its animosity toward Prime Minister Charles ever 
since her election in 1980. In deciding to disband the DDF Charles cited "the army's EC$ three 
million annual cost, the apparent ties of some of its members to the coup attempt... insubordination 
and lack of discipline among its ranks, its failure to contribute to post-hurricanc reconstruction, the 
poor upkeep of its quarters, and. .. missing weapons. 
" Janet I-ligbie, Eugenia: The Caribbean's Iron 
Lady (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 202. Members of the defunct DDF were later involved in 
another abortive coup against Charles. Of the other islands, the St. Kitts-Ncvis Defense Force was 
also disbanded in 1981 partly due to a lack of justification for its maintenance and the new 
govemmcnfs doubts about the allegiances of the army and police leaders. St. Lucia only had a 
police force as did St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force credtod in 
September 1981 was the only other military organisation. Ivclaw Lloyd Griffith, 7he Quest for 
Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subor&nate States (Armonk N. Y.: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1993), p. 130. The islands basically relied on their police forces for security matters. 
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order will be used to ensure that the rule of 'one man, one gun' would not prevail 
throughout our region against the rule of 'one man, one vote'. 086 
Interestingly, as Maingot observes, Grenada's excessive militarization did not 
generate a "security dilemma" which can occur when "the means by which one state 
provides for its security creates insecurity for others. " 117 Military aid to the region 
increased dramatically but this was multilateral in nature, with Barbados at the hub. 
St. Vincent's former leader, James "Son" Mitchell, succinctly summarized the generai 
Eastern Caribbean countries sentiments towards militarization: "the more arms we 
have available in the country, the greater will be the temptation to solve our problems 
with a coup. ""' 
Conclusion 
In conclusion it is possible to say that Gairy was an eccentric, repressive, autocrat. 
The political awakening and subsequent enfranchisement of Grenada! s youth was 
particularly influenced by the Black Power movement and out of this the NJM 
emerged. After losing one fraudulent election to Gairy the NJM believed that force 
was the only way to remove him. Thus on March 13,1979, a NJM coup toppled 
Gairy, a widely popular action in Grenada and the region. 
The U. S. sought, and accepted, the Eastern Caribbean and British judgment in 
deciding to recognise the PRG. Bishop's pledge to hold "free and fair" elections 
assuaged U. S. suspicions and left Washington sanguine about fiiture relations. They 
186 F. A. Hoyos, Tom Adams: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 110. 
187 KJ. Holsti, International Politics., A Frameworkfor Analysis (Englcwood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- 
Hall, 1992), p. 67. 
188 Anthony P. Maingot, "The United States in the Caribbean: Geopolitics and the Bargaining 
Capacity of Small States, " in Bryan ct al., Peace, Development and Secufity, p. 74. 
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conceded that the PRG had different views but initially believed that they wanted 
good relations with the U. S. Holding the PRG to their promise of early elections was 
of central importance; elections would have signified the PRG's good intentions, a 
readiness to rely on a honest test of their support amongst Grenadians and legitimised 
the new government. 189 Frustrated by the PRG's evasiveness over their aid 
requirements the U. S. grew concerned when it was apparent that Grenada was 
establishing close ties to Cuba. 
When ambassador Ortiz informed Bishop that the effect of "an intimate 
relationship between the NRG (sic) and Cuba in the military and security areas might 
eventually be to limit the breadth and depth of the kind of relationship that would be 
possible with the US, "190 Bishop, in a style that became familiar, publicly blasted the 
U. S. for telling Grenada who they could have relations with. At this formative stage 
the U. S. lacked solid information on the PRGs intentions and consequently 
decisionmakers had to rely on images which acted as filters. This is significant 
because once Cuba became involved the image of Grenada was affected and their 
evident "rejection of the traditional relations was not seen as a sign of independence. 
Instead, the U. S. concern was that they would become dependents of the enemy. "191 
Whilst it is important not to over-emphasize the Ortiz episode its impact on an 
inexperienced PRG, feeling vulnerable and sensitive to criticism, was negative. In 
fight of the U. S. patience and optimism of the previous weeks it was a turning point: 
189 Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections., US. -Staged Elections in the 
Dominican Republic, I'letnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1986), p. 18 1. 
190 Christopher, "Subject: Talldng PointsN p. 7. 
191 Cottarn, Images and Intervenfion, p. 25. 
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the PRGs "response confirmed the impression in Washington that these young 
Marxists wanted to provoke the U. S. to justify their militarization and alliance with 
Cuba. 192 
About six weeks after the revolution the NSC held a mini-SCC meeting that 
recommended the previously described "regional" strategy to President Carter. With 
no sign of elections, a steady flow of anti-U. S. rhetoric, vague requests for aid and 
the growing ties with Cuba, it appeared that the PRG's professed interest in good 
relations was superficial. It is likely that the PRG clearly understood that their 
political programme was of the type Washington would not find acceptable. 
Although they may have wished for normal diplomatic relations they were not willing 
to sacrifice their domestic and international political programme in order to secure 
Washingtoifs blessing. 
At the State Department the feeling was that good relations with Grenada were 
not unrealistic but only possible if the PRG did things they were not going to do. 
Grenadian relations with Cuba would have been acceptable, to the State Department 
at least, if they had been on the same level as Grenada! s relations with the U. S. 
According to Bushnell, Washington did not have the conscious impression that the 
PRG deliberately wanted bad relations but felt that they knew their actions would be 
incompatible with normal relations with the U. S. 193 Despite the fact that covert 
action was planned for, in the overall scheme of things in Washington, Grenada was 
never high on the list. 
192 Pastor, "Does the United States, " p. 12. 
193 Tclcphone interview with Bushnell. 
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As the point of contact with Grenada, the U. S. embassy in Barbados was more 
optimistic but as time passed the absence of elections, rising numbers of political 
prisoners, press restrictions and relationship with Cuba provided little incentive for 
talking with the PRG. Washington settled into its "distancing" policy, adjusting it to 
suit its concerns. Some ties with Grenada were cut and the establishment of new ones 
was avoided; attention was focused on issues where contact with the PRG was 
unavoidable, basically the welfare of U. S. citizens and SGU business. 
In the Eastern Caribbean the coup "opened up a Pandora's Box of questions 
related to legitimacy, morality, constitutionality and recognition. "194 Grenada's 
relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union and the prospect of Grenada acting as a 
political precedent was unsettling. The other islands also feared the divisive effects of 
the PRITs ideological stance: 
The NJM posture and rhetoric were somewhat extreme in the degree of alignment 
with Cuba, and the USSR, and the extent of hostility to the United States. Some 
countries, therefore, distanced themselves from Grenada, thereby weakening the 
region's collaborative and supportive network. "' 
Whereas U. S. -Grenadian relations nose-dived almost immediately, Eastern Caribbean 
leaders followed their own agenda, albeit a more security conscious one. The left- 
wing victories in Dominica and St. Lucia were ephemeral; in 1980 the political 
climate in the region changed with a series of right-wing victories in Jamaica, St. 
Kitts-Nevis, Dominica and Antigua, as well as Ronald Reagan's victory in the U. S. 
By January 1981 the PRG were relatively isolated and relations with her neighbours 
decidedly frosty. 
194 Gonsalvcs, "The Importancc of the Grcnada Rcvolution, " p. 3. 
195 Griffith, The Questfor Secuilty, p. 234. 
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With Reagans accession the Caribbean was viewed in even starker Cold War 
terms and U. S. -Grenadian relations reached an impasse. From this time on 
Washington resigned themselves to the fact that relations were never likely to 
improve unless Grenada wished them to. As Cottain notes, "once policy 
considerations began, any return to any earlier stage was difficult"; the PRG provided 
the U. S. embassy in Barbados with little positive news to report to Washington and 
consequently incoming information generally confirmed "earlier interpretations and 
decisions to allow consideration only of alternatives in the current stage. , 196 For both 
governments relations had an almost irreversible quality that effectively militated 
against cooperative relations. 
196 Cottam, Images and Intervention, p. 34. 
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CHAPTER 3 
U. S. -GRENADIAN RELATIONS: THE REAGAN YEARS (1981-1983) 
In this chapter I will examine U. S. -Grenadian relations from President Reagan's 
inauguration until Prime Minister Bishop's visit to Washington in June 1983. Whilst 
the Reagan administration pursued a policy similar to that of its predecessor, relations 
were noticeably more antagonistic. I will concentrate on certain episodes that 
highlight the development of relations and examine the economic, political and 
military pressure that the U. S. exerted on the PRG. The Reagan administration 
adopted a very different approach to Latin America from Carter and consequently 
this has to be understood as background to U. S. -Grenadian relations. 
Ronald Reagan portrayed the 1970's as a decade of "doubt, defeat, deceit, and 
despair, " flightening and angering the public into supporting him. ' By January 1981 
d6tente had been discredited, a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union adopted and 
defence spending increased. Reagads beliefs were those of a committed Cold 
Warrior: the world system was bipolar, Communism was monolithic and 
expansionist, local conflicts were communist-inspired and compromise was a sign of 
naivete and weaknesS. 2 Reagan later described the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" 
and "the focus of evil in the modem world. 113 He was also strongly influenced by the 
' Melanson, "Action History, " p. 230. 
2 Rystad, Pfisoners ofthe Past?, p. 44. 
3 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 316. 
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legacy of Vietnam, which he believed had produced a more isolationist U. S., hesitant 
to protect its interests overseas. 
The administratioWs Latin America policy was heavily influenced by the Santa Fe 
Committee, a group of five Conservative academics, and their New Inter-American 
Policyfor the Eighties report which warned that the Caribbean was: 
becoming a Marxist-Leninist lake. Never before has the Republic been in such 
jeopardy from its exposed southern flank. Never before has American foreign 
4 policy abused, abandoned, and betrayed its allies to the south in Latin America. 
The administration' s geostrategic outlook amalgamated the Caribbean and Central 
America and defined it as a "Caribbean Basin. "5 This was a highly ideological 
concept based on bipolarity and the "linkage" theory of world affhirs where change 
represented instability which was fomented by the Soviets and Cubans and was a 
security threat. 5 An increasingly strong Soviet military and expansionist Soviet policy 
in Central America led Reagan to adopt a hard-line. Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig threatened to "go to the source" of the instability (Cuba) and Reagan promised 
that El Salvador would be the place where the U. S. would draw the he against 
communism. Aid to Nicaragua was frozen, military aid and advisors sent to El 
Salvador and a contra army funded in Nicaragua. 
Although Reagan talked tough, his Central America policy was restricted by two 
influential historical analogies. As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Langhorne Motley said: "There are two things the American people do not 
4 Robert paStor "irl 01. 9 po . US, Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 67. 
I The Basin includes the Caribbean islands, Me)dco and the littoral countries of Central America 
and Northern South America. 
6 W. Andrew Axline, "Political Change and US. Strategic Concerns in the Caribbean, " Latin 
American Research Review 21 (1986): 217. 
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want... Another Cuba on the mainland of Central America, and another Vietnam. 0 
Another pro-Soviet communist regime was unacceptable and so was the use of U. S. 
soldiers in a potentially sustained campaign to prevent it. The impact of these 
analogies led to the selection of secretly funding a contra army. 
In the Caribbean, Cuba was the target of U. S. attention. Reagan was determined 
to oppose and contain Cuban/communist activity in the region. As one official stated, 
"Cuba is the vital cog - the element that transforms Soviet ideology, power, and 
money into an effective policy instrument in the Western Hemisphere. "" In April 
1981 an interagency task force under Secretary of State Haig considered blockading 
Cuba, fomenting an internal uprising, intercepting Cuban troop ships and planes and 
even a military invasion. 9 Fundamentally, Reagan continued the U. S. policy of 
isolating Cuba. 
The Importance of the Caribbean to the U. S. 
The new administration portrayed the Caribbean as a vulnerable "backyard" area 
that must be secured and denied to extra-hemispheric incursions. " This geostrategic 
view stressed the importance of the ability to counter Soviet and Cuban activity, 
access to raw materials, secure SLOCs, access to U. S. military bases and protection 
7 WaItcr LaFcber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (Ncw York- WX 
Norton & Co., 1993), p. 280. 
8 Nestor Sanchez, "The Communist Threat, " Foreign Policy 52, (Fall 1983): 44. 
9 'NIax Azicri, "Cuba and the U. S.: What Happened to Rapprochement? " in Barry B. Levine (ed. ), 
7he New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 176. 
10 James P, Greene and Brent Scowcroft (eds. ), Western Interests and U. S. Policy Options in the 
Caribbean Basin, Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin (Boston: 
0elgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984), p. 144. 
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of the Panama Canal. " Security was seen as an essential precondition for political, 
economic and social development. The U. S. has inescapable ties with the Caribbean; 
Secretary of State George Shultz warned in 1982 that "if this region should be 
dominated by regimes hostile to us or if it becomes the scene of prolonged social 
upheavals, the impact on our economy and society would, indeed, be of major 
proportions. 02 In 1981 alone, U. S. exports to the region totaled $6.8 billion, imports 
$9.9 billion and investment $22.5 billion. 13 
The Caribbean Basin was also a test site for U. S. credibility. During the Cold War 
images and perceptions were pivotal. Reagan warned that: "If we cannot defend 
ourselves in this area... we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would 
collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put 
at jeopardy. to 14 Reagan had promised to restore U. S. credibility during his election 
campaign and the "backyard" was the place to start. 
Images 
The Reagan administration's perception of Grenada can contribute to 
understanding the decline of relations. Images are basically: 
perceptual filters that organize our environment and enable us to predict and re- 
spond to that environment... they contain "facts, " which we hold as true, and 
" The significance of these factors has been questioned: Schoultz argues that whilst SLOC's are 
important, the Panama Canal is more a convenience than necessity as most of the important cargoes 
do not use it and the U. S. possesses a multi-ocean navy. Lars Schoultz, National Security and 
United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 218. 
For a detailed study of the significance of the Panama Canal see John Major, Pfize Possession: the 
United States and the Panama Canal (ýkw York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
12 lbiCL, p. 117. 
13 Thomas Enders, "A Comprehensive Strategy for the Caribbean Basin, " Caribbean Review M, no. 
2 (Spring 1982): 11. 
14 Michael Klare, "The Reagan Doctrine, " New Statesman, November 4,1983, p. 10. 
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which tell us how we can and should respond to that behaviour. 's 
States naturally categorize other states and ascribe them attributes of each particular 
category. Richard Cottarn described five images: enemy, ally, imperial, colonial and 
complex. 16 The Soviet Union and Cuba fitted the enemy category and Grenada fitted 
Martha Cottanfs category of "dependent of the enemy. "17 The images were based on 
the country's military and economic strength, domestic policy and goals and cultural 
sophistication generally. The dependent image portrayed a childlike, unsophisticated, 
populace, incapable of making and implementing decisions unaided, a leadership 
whose intentions threatened the U. S. and were conditioned by the U. S. ' relations with 
the enemy state and a country that was weak and whose reliance on the enemy 
increased its influence in the area. " 
Images are time-saving devices and the processing of information would be 
impossible without them but they are problematical too. Once Grenada was 
stereotyped U. S. policyrnakers adopted a simplified view and overlooked the more 
complex reality. As images also contribute to the evaluation and interpretation of 
information they tend to ignore or distort information that is not consistent with the 
image. 19 Thus, assuming Grenada was seriously interested in improving relations, her 
attempts would be interpreted through this "dependent of the enemy" image rather 
than at face value. 
15 Cottarn, Images and Intervention, p. 10. 
16 Cottarn, Foreign Policy Decision MaA! ng, p. 46. 
17 Cottarn, Images and Intervention, p. 11. Grenada was variously classified as a Sovict-Cuban 
satellite, surrogate, protdgd and vassal state. 
18 Ibid., p. 2 1. 
19 Jervis, Perception andMisperception, p. 143. 
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Another evident factor was "inherent bad faith. " Each side were disposed to 
believe that good behaviour was forced upon the other by the situation but that bad 
behaviour was indicative of the opponents negative disposition rather than the 
20 
situation which consequently reinforced the negative stereotype of the opponent. 
With neither willing to credit the other with good behaviour a return to better 
relations was unlikely because: 
when the opponent behaves in a seemingly conciliatory fashion there is a strain to- 
ward rendering such discrepant information consistent with one's preexisting neg- 
ative image of him, and this leads to various stratagems for discounting, ignoring, 
or discrediting that new information. 21 
Washington's image of Grenada and the bipolar nature of the world system acted 
as parameters to policy formulation. As Glad concluded, "Reag&s Manichean world 
view is accompanied by certitude that it is the correct one. For him there are no 
ambiguities about the nature of the enemy which deserves further exploration, no 
moral dilemmas, no questions about the'facts'which support it. 02 
U. S. -Grenada Relations 
With the impasse that had been reached under Carter the PRG hoped that with a 
new President relations might improve. This was to prove fallacious. As a presidential 
candidate in 1979 Reagan had cautioned that "the Caribbean is rapidly becoming a 
Communist lake in what should be an American pond and the United States 
' Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy. The Effective Use of 
information andAdvice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 59. 
21 Ibid., p. 65. 
22 Betty Glad, "Black and White Thinking: Ronald Reagan! s Approach to Foreign Policy, " Political 
Psychology 4, no. I., (1983): 5 1. 
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resembles a giant, afraid to move. . . "23 As president he appointed 
like-minded 
individuals, "true believers, " to all the high governmental positions. Consequently, 
U. S. policy was to change in style rather than content. Despite the fact that during 
the Reagan administration several Cabinet officials spoke publicly about Grenada, 
including the President, it would appear that until October 1983 it was never a major 
issue. Grenada was never on the front burner. As Motley said of Grenada; "It's not 
something people dwelled on, but it could be considered a minor irritant. "24 Cuba 
and Nicaragua were the U. S. ' main concerns and Grenada was considered a minor 
"adjunct to a problem. 'M For the first six months of the Reagan term Grenada policy 
was a de facto continuation of the Carter policy and throughout 1981 this policy 
26 essentially drifted along on autopilot. 
The U. S. sent an unambiguous signal to the PRG by not accrediting its new 
ambassador to Barbados, Milan Bish, to Grenada and continuing to refuse to accept 
Grenada! s nominee ambassador to Washington, Dessima Williams. Some embassy 
officials favoured a softer line toward Grenada and even ambassador Bish, although 
he viewed the PRG as a communist Soviet/Cuban style government, believed that a 
degree of reconciliation was possible. 27 As one of the main functions of an 
ambassador is to collect information and facilitate the exchange of views, the absence 
23 Gregory Treverton, Deci&ng to Use Force in Grenada, (Harvard: Case Program John F. 
Kennedy School of Governmen4 1986), p. 9.1 
24 PBS Frontline, Opcmtion Urgcnt Fury, tmnscript no. 602 (New York. Joumal Gmphics, 1988), 
p. 5. 
I Intcrview with Craig Johnstonc, Scptcmber 9,1994, Washington D. C. 
2' Tclephone intcrview with Bushncll. Bushncll was the Assistant Swretary of Statc for Intcr- 
Amcrican Affairs during the Cartcr administration and rcmaincd in government as part of the 
transition team until mid-1981. 
27 interview with Nfilan Bish, September 21,1994, Grand Island, Nebr. 
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of one was naturally criticized. Former ambassador to Costa Rica, Frank McNeil, 
commented that "we didn't have the diplomatic presence on the island and I think we 
pretty much lived by the descriptions in our own rhetoric. "28 To be fair, tabs were 
kept on Grenada: there were always two political officers and two consular officers 
available for the PRG to talk to and the presence of U. S. medical students and the 
new airport meant it received the most attention of all the Eastern Caribbean islands 
the U. S. embassy in Barbados covered. 29 
By contrast the PRG were obsessed about U. S. activity. The Gretwda Documents 
reveal that in private, as well as in public, Bishop accused the U. S. of propaganda, 
political, economic and military destabilization. These charges were exaggerated 
rather than completely erroneous. The constant barrage of accusations led the U. S. 
embassy to conclude that these allegations were made with "indetem-linate 
proportions of genuine alarm and calculated CyniCiSM. "30 
Point Salines International Airport 
The PSIA was a central issue in U. S. -Grenadian relations. As previously 
discussed, the need for a second airport was not a new idea . 
31 The PRGs economic 
development plans centred on tourism and they felt that a modem airport was a 
prerequisite. In reality the PSIA was a major cause of the economic crisis that 
28 PBS Frontline, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 6. 
29 Telephone interview with Linda Flohr, December 19,1994. 
30 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 6 1. 
31 The cýdsting airport at Pearls was 15 miles from St. George's, had a 5,250 foot runway which 
could not accommodate jets and had no night landing facilities which meant visitors had to 
overnight in Barbados which cost Grenada $1.3 million in lost revenue each year. Courtney Smith, 
"The Development Strategy of the People's Revolutionary Government: The Political Economy of 
Economic Transformation in Grenada, 1979-1983" (Ph. D. diss., University of Hull, 1988), p. 328. 
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engulfed Grenada by 1983. The Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank and the 
OAS Secretariat had all recommended the PSIý but questioned its economic 
feasibility. The PSIA consumed 40-50 percent of capital investment funds and $81 
million of the $98.8 million (Caribbean dollars) in Cuban civilian grants Grenada 
received. 32 The PRG were reliant on foreign aid to construct the airport and operate 
the tourist sector. A 1982 World Bank report concluded that a 10,000 foot runway 
was not essential, tourist numbers would have to increase substantially, the 
accommodation and infrastructure was inadequate, more airflights would be 
necessary and that the marketing of Grenada was not productive. 33 
The PSIA was of symbolic value too. In a 1981 speech Bishop restated the PRG's 
"seriousness and determination to transform the dream of our international airport 
into a concrete reality. 04 Tourism is the lifeblood of the Eastern Caribbean and 
airports are essential but they are also a sign of prestige and for Grenada the PSTA 
represented a sign of independence and economic development. 
The U. S. concern from the start had been that the Cubans were seizing an 
opportunity to obtain a safe airport from which to transport their troops to Angola 
and that the PSIA would extend Soviet-Cuban power projection in the region. When, 
in January 1981, the European Commission, under the Lome Convention, agreed to 
provide facilities at a Grenada donors meeting in Brussels in April, the U. S. decided 
to make their views known. 
32 Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution, " p. 132. 
33 Smith, "The Development Strategy, " p. 342. 
34 "Together We Shall Budd Our Airport, March 29,198 1, " Marcus and Taber (eds. ), Mautice 
Bishop Speaks, p. 143. 
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The U. S. argument rested on several points: the airport was too large for 
Grenada! s tourist requirements and was a bad economic development model that wa s 
uncoordinated with the overall development plan, international support would distort 
the pattern of aid to the Eastern Caribbean, the Commission's concentration on one 
island that is also aligned with the Soviet bloc would seem to reward Grenada! s 
human rights violations, Cuban involvement in the area would be extended, Western 
donors would be paying to enhance Cuba! s image and contribute to the establishment 
of a Cuban military facifity. 35 Apparently, most governments contacted by the U. S. 
36 were sympathetic to their case and did not attend or only observed. The PRG 
accused the U. S. of sabotage. Delegates from the European Commission, World 
Bank, CDB, OPEC, Venezuela, Syria and Iraq attended the April 14-15 meeting. 
Although there was not consensual support the Commission issued a Joint 
Communiqu6 saying that they were sympathetic to the project and Grenada! s goals. 
The material result was several small grants, less than the $30 million Grenada had 
optimistically hoped for. 
In a March 26,198 1, letter to President Reagan, Bishop addressed U. S. efforts to 
dissuade potential funders for the PSIA and expressed his "deep concern and 
dissatisfaction with the position of your administration. 07 In a trend that was 
fan-dliar, Bishop said in the same letter that he desired good relations. The U. S. 
response was candid: "The United States Government does not like the airport 
" Rossin, US -Grenada Relafions, p. 7 1. 
36 The most public opposition came from the European Commission Development Commissioner, 
French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, who complained about the U. S. ' "robust diplomatic 
offensive" in Le Afonde. lbid, P. 72. 
37 "Official Briefing Document (Draft), rLd.: Appendix H- Prime Minister BisholYs Letter to 
President Reagan, March 26,198 1, " GD. W, no. 002303. 
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project, for it is clearly not in the interest of American security or the security of the 
Caribbean. 08 Washingtons line was that whilst it would do nothing to prevent the 
construction of the airport, it would aim to prevent its use in a threatening fashion. 39 
With funding coming from countries such as Libya and Iraq, the U. S. could do little 
to prevent construction, but they had made clear their future intentions. 
U. S. protestations that the PSIA was a military facility undoubtedly served 
propaganda purposes but it was a private concern too and came up "not 
infrequently"40 when Grenada was discussed. Whilst not classifying the airport as a 
military facility the government were sentient of its potential: 
The airport was far larger than anything required by even the most expanded 
tourist trade and it was clear from that size, as well as the nature of its runways 
and the supporting facilities, that a great deal more than commercial use was in- 
tended. 41 
Hypothetically, the airport would enable Soviet NEG-23's to cover the entire 
Caribbean Basin and act as a base for Cuban flights to Angola and Soviet bloc flights 
to Central America. When Libyan planes, clandestinely shipping arms to Mcaragua, 
were detained whilst refuelling in Brazil in April 1983, President Reagan pointed out 
that if Grenada! s PSIA was operational they could have stopped there. 42 
The U. S. also argued that the promotion of tourism and the construction of 
infrastructure associated with it were insufficient. Eastern Airlines had told the PRG 
that it would require 2,200 hotel rooms to justify an air service; even by 1983 
38 Rossin, US -Grenada Relations, p. 73. 
39 Ibid., p. 73. 
40 Interview with Johnstone. 
41 Caspar Weinberger, Fightingfor Peace: Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael 
Joseph , 1990), p. 
72. 
42 Grenada: A Preliminary Report, p, 5. 
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Grenada only possessed 645 . 
4' The PRG were obviously aware of the airport's 
military potential too: in December 1981 Minister of National Mobilization Selwyn 
Strachan told a Workers Party of Jamaica meeting that the airport would be available 
to regional allies when necessary. " The only reference concerning the use of the 
airport in the Grenada Documents is a short note in Central Committee (CC) member 
Liam James! notebook: "The Revo has been able to crush counterrevolution 
internationally. Airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military. "45 The Grenadian 
project manager of the PSIA confirmed that the airport whilst not a purely military 
facility would have a dual use. 46 Considering the Cold War geopolitical mindset of 
the administration and the steady deterioration of relations it is unsurprising that they 
chose to emphasize the military potential of the airport and Grenadian perfidy. 
The image of a Soviet-Cuban airbase was contradicted by reality. U. S., British 
and Finnish firms were involved in construction and it was far from secret; the U. S. 
medical school was nearby and students went jogging on the runway. The 9,000 foot 
runway was a similar length to most of those in the region. Strategically, the airport 
was never mentioned in the Milita7y Postures of the JCS or Department of Defense 
reportS. 47 Discounting the fact that no concrete evidence of military use existed, the 
U. S. were suspicious because they found the PSIA hard to justify on economic 
43 Smith, "The Development Strategy, " p. 326. 
44 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 73. 
45 "Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 27th May, 1981, " Grenada 
Documents, document 53, p. 3. 
46 Interview with Lawrence Rossin, October 28,1994, Washington D. C. 
4' Humberto Garcia Muniz, Boots, Boots, Boots: Intervention, Regional Security andAfilitarization 
in the Caribbean (Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico: Caribbean Project for Justice and Peace, 1986), p. 5. 
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grounds. Once again image rather than reality proved decisive; no matter what the 
PRG said or did they could not dispel U. S. doubts and preconceptions. 
Economic Pressure 
Upon taking office Secretary of State Haig reaffirmed existing policy by 
instructing the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to ensure that Grenada would not 
receive "one penny" from any International Financial Institution (IFI), adding 
Grenada to the State Department's unofficial "hit liSt. "49 In March 1981 the PRG 
applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $19 million, three-year 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The U. S. ' IMF representative suggested that the 
proposal should be postponed, arguing that the money would be used to finance an 
investment rather than an adjustment program, as EFFs were designed to do, and 
that more worringly it would replace money already spent on the airport . 
49 The PRG 
accused the U. S. of manipulating the IMF and threatened to withdraw. When 
Kendrick Radix met with the Head of the Caribbean Section of the State Department 
in May, he reported that the official admitted U. S. interference with the INIF/airport 
and that the U. S. considered such action "legitimate. "50 Nevertheless, on April I the 
IMF announced that Grenada had purchased $2.5 million under compensatory 
financial facilities and on May 12 authorized a one-year $4.1 million standby 
programme to support the PRGs financial programme. The U. S. felt that the standby 
program was a thinly disguised version of the first year of the postponed EFF, that 
48 Robert J. Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Polifics, Law and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 27. 
49 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 74. 
50 "Nfinutes of Political Bureau, " Grenada Documents, document 53, p. 3. 
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the money would be used for investment rather than adjustment and that it would not 
improve Grenada's balance of payments. " The U. S., who abstained from the vote, 
were dismayed when the M approved a $3.5 million programme anyway. 
Further disagreement arose soon after over a report by IMF experts, who had 
visited Grenada in January and February, which decided that Grenada! s "fiscal 
situation had improved considerably" and recommended a three-year $6.3 million 
loan for capital projects. As one official stated, Coard, a skilled, slick operator who 
impressed people with his intellectual capabilities, "pulled the wool over the eyes of 
the M"; it seems that the experts showed Coard the draft report, which was not 
especially favourable, and he persuaded them to change it "dramatically. "'2 Again the 
U. S. successfully opposed the loan on the grounds that the money would be used on 
the airport. They also blocked a World Bank endorsement of a PRG "Public Sector 
Investment Program" for three million dollars from the International Development 
Agency. 
In US-Grenada Relations Rossin explains that the U. S. ' oppositional stance was 
primarily an expression of a consistent policy on the use of EFFs and emphasized that 
"the United States Government has a mandate to ensure that the money it contributes 
to international financial institutions is spent properly. "" He admits that the PSIA 
was also a contributing factor; considering the previous efforts to block aid for the 
PSIA and the attention the subject had received since 1979 it is probable that the 
PSIA may well have been the main motivation. The U. S. could not block all funds to 
51 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 75. 
52 Interview with John Kelly, Fcbmary 17,1995, London. 
53 Rossin, US. -Grenada Relations, p. 75. 
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Grenada but it could seriously pressure Grenada via the IFI's and did not hesitate to 
do SO. 54 For Washington considerations of economic aid were indivisible from the 
wider state of relations. 
In March 1981 AID drafted a four million dollars aid programme focusing on 
infrastructure projects as a follow-on from an earlier Basic Human Needs 
programme. Having discussed the matter with the Caribbean leaders, Washington 
decided to exclude Grenada on the grounds of human rights violations, the absence 
of elections and as a bad investment of scarce resources that were needed 
elsewhere. '5 However, when the CDB board convened on June 19 they decided that, 
contrary to what had been agreed previously, they could not accept the loan because 
Grenada was being excluded on political grounds. Reagan was not deterred by the 
weakening effect this would have on the CDB or the effectiveness of AID missions 
which channeled half of its total aid to the region through the CDB. 56 
Freedom of the Press 
On June 12 a group of 26 shareholders produced the Grenadian Voice, the first 
private newspaper since Torchlight. It was closed down by the PRG after one issue 
54 The PRG proved quite adept at garnering foreign aid. Pryor estimates that Grenada received 
$125.1 million between 1979-83 from various countries and IfTs. Frederick Pryor, "Socialism via 
Foreign Aid: The PRUs Economic Policies with the Soviet Bloc, " in Heine (ed. ), A Revolution 
Aborted, p. 156. 
" Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 76. Grenada had been due to receive $444,000 under the 
programme. General Accounting Office (GAO), AID Assistance to the Eastern CxIbbean: Program 
Changes and Possible Consequences (Washington D. C.: GAO ID-83-50,1983), p. 15. 
' The GAO report concluded that: "The Bank provides a channel for AID to assist the Eastern 
Caribbean efficiently and cffectivcly. Support to the CDB also encourages regional cooperation 
needed for the region to prosper. These factors, together with AID's potential difficulties in 
managing its assistance program, provide strong argument for AID to make use of this development 
organization. We recognize that policy differences between the CDB and the US government 
regarding assistance to Grenada may be hard to resolve. But in our opinion, there would be 
advantages if this could be accomplished. " GAO, AID Assistance, p. 19. 
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on June 19; they claimed that the "Group of 26" included former shareholders in the 
defunct Torchlight, had been issuing counterrevolutionary pamphlets, had links to the 
CIA and were supporting a CIA propaganda campaign. 57 A series of "Peoples 
Laws" were passed which prohibited the publishing of any new papers. Bishop 
attacked U. S. imperialism and the CIA: 
this is not about freedom of the press, it is about overthrowing the Grenadian 
revolution... [and] when the revolution speaks, it must be heard, listened to 
Whatever the revolution commands, it must be carried out; when the revolution 
talks no parasites must bark in their comer. " 
As Meeks concludes, with the earlier refusal to re-open the Torchlight and now the 
forced closure of the Grenadian Voice could "only be attributed to paranoia and 
rampant authoritarianism. "59 The U. S. had long identified human rights and basic 
fteedoms as lacking in Grenada: "This decision is the latest evidence of the PRGs 
continuing efforts to stifle free speech and the open debate of public issues in 
Grenada. As such, it reflects the regime's contempt for democratic practices and 
values. , 60 U. S. perceptions were reinforced by the introduction of preventative 
detention by the PRG in September 198 1. 
Ocean Venture 
The PR19s CIA paranoia was not totally unfounded. Although it did not become 
public knowledge until February 1983, President Reagan had been willing to consider 
57 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 58. 
58 "Freedom of the Press and Imperialist Destabilization, June 19,198 1, " Marcus and Taber (eds. ), 
Maurice Bishop Speaks, p. 164. 
59 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 161. Meeks was the editor of the PRG-controllcd Free West 
Indian newspaper during 1981-82. 
60 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 59. 
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a covert operation as early as July 1981 when the CIA presented a plan to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee "to cause economic difficulties for Grenada in hope of 
undermining the political control of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop" but not to 
overthrow hiM. 61 The Committee rejected it because it contained "unusual and 
unspecified components. @162 One Committee member explained the consensus view: 
"yes, there was an operation and we all thought... that it was just a small island and 
so the Cubans or the communists control it, so what? ot63 A covert CIA operation was 
hardly necessary to cause Grenada economic hardship which was an existing facet of 
U. S. policy already. 
Since 1979 the PRG had constantly warned about the danger of invasion and the 
U. S. did little to calm these fears. From August I until October 15,198 1, the largest 
naval maneuvers since 1945 occurred. "Ocean Venture" involved 120,000 troops, 
250 warships and 1,000 aircraft from 14 nations. Part of the maneuvers included 
"Operation Amber and the Amberines" (an unsubtle allusion to Grenada and the 
Grenadines) on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques. Amber and the Amberdines were 
designated as "our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean, " who was supported by "Orange" 
(Cuba) who were in turn supported by "Red" (Soviet Union), and the objective of the 
exercise was to "rescue twenty U. S. citizens held hostage there after negotiations 
with the Amber Government had broken down" and to organise elections that would 
61 Patrick E. Tyler, "U. S. Tracks Cuban Aid to Grenada: In '81 Senate Unit Nixed CIA Plan to 
Destabilize Isle, " Washington Post, February 27,1983, pp. Al, All. This was probably an updated 
version of the CIA! s plan that had been opposed by the Senate Intelligence Committee two years 
before in 1979. 
62 lbicL, p. All. 
63 Ibid., p. Al. 
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produce a government "favourable to the way of life we espouse. "64 The maneuvers 
were probably aimed primarily at Cuba who were transporting arms to Nicaragua at 
the time. 
The PRGs response was that "the manoeuvre code-named Amber and the 
Amberines was a trial run preparatory to a military invasion of Grenada and the 
Grenadines. "65 On August II Bishop sent another letter to Reagan, criticizing the 
U. S. ' propaganda and diplomatic offensive, economic aggression and military 
destabilization and restating that PSIA was a non-military facility. He went on to say: 
your Administration has consistently demonstrated an overtly hostile attitude 
towards the people and Government of Grenada... Members of your Admini- 
stration have persistently made false, malicious and misleading statements... 
particularly in regard to our international airport project. "' 
The letter concluded by saying that the U. S. ' actions have been interpreted as a 
"virtual declaration of war" and that if no reply was received this would be taken to 
mean that the U. S. "does not desire even normal or minimum relations. ov67 Despite 
the accusatory tones of the letter, Bishop wrote that he still wanted good relations. 
The PRG also telexed the Commonwealth Secretariat, pointing out the 
similarities between "Operation Amber and the Amberines" and Grenada! s situation. 
Bishop warned that the PRG were "absolutely convinced that our country is about to 
be subjected to a military invasion by the United States of America. "68 Letters were 
also dispatched to a number of government leaders, international organizations and 
64 Searle, Grenada, p. 37-8. 
"s "Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Bureau, " GD. MC, no. 002308. 
66 "Official Briefing Document (Draft), ncL: Appendix II - Prime Minister Bishop! s Letter to 
President Reagan, August 11,1981, * GDMC, no. 002303. 
67 Ibid. 
68 "Telex to Secretary General, Commonwealth of Nations, " GDAfC, no. 002303. 
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prominent political figures. The PRG put great emphasis on utilizing the public arena 
to combat the perceived U. S. threat. 
Washingtods reply to Bishop's letter was sent on October 6,1981, by DCM 
Ludlow Flower from the U. S. embassy in Barbados. It read: "While the points raised 
in your letter have been carefully considered, we continue to look for indications of a 
serious commitment by your government to establishing a climate conducive to better 
relations with the United States. 09 On October 20 the embassy received a reply from 
a low-level PRG official informing them that Flowees letter had "not been referred to 
Bishop because it ignored the points made in Bishop's letter. "70 
In November 1981 a military manoeuvre on the Honduras-Nicaragua border, 
"Readex 183,, " examined methods to deal with populist or revolutionary movements 
in the region. In a speech soon after, Bishop described the Reagan administration as a 
"fascist clique" and "neutron warmongers. 01 Against this background it is not hard 
to see why the U. S. could not reconcile the PR(Ys desire for good relations with such 
inflammatory rhetoric. The Reagan administration perceived no reason to make an 
effort to improve relations. By late 1981 it appears that Washington firn-dy viewed 
Grenada! s repeated calls for "high-level" dialogue as "propagandistic and insincere"; 72 
an unavailing option and a waste of time. 
69 Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Text of Grenada-U. S. 
Exchange of Letters Released, " 11 1453Z, NWch 1982, Bridgetown 01335, p. 1. 
70 Ibid., p. 1. 
71 "Grenada Is Not Alone, November 23,198 1, " Marcus and Taber (eds. ), Afautice Bishop Speaks, 
p. 25 1. 
72 Bish, "Subject: Grenada: Tod of Grcnada-U. S., " p. 2. 
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Raising the Stakes 
Grenada now gained more attention in Washington; Secretary of Defence Caspar 
Weinberger described the PRG as a "Cuban satellite" in his annual report to Congress 
on February 8,1982.73 On February 24 Reagan unveiled his Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI). 74 The CB1 was partly a response to Commonwealth Caribbean 
leaders lobbying efforts and partly to criticism that the U. S. was ignoring the socio- 
economic causes of the unrest in the region. The CBI was based on security though; 
Reagan described the Caribbean as a "vital strategic and commercial artery" for the 
U. S. and that "the well-being and security of our neighbours in this region are our 
own vital interests. 05 The CBI would reinforce the effectiveness of military aid. 
There was much criticism of the CBI; the emphasis on private investment 
excluded Grenada, Nicaragua and Cuba, 87 percent of Caribbean exports entered 
duty-free already and of the original $350 million made available, $128 million was 
earmarked for El Salvador and only $10 million for the Eastern Caribbean. 76 A much 
amended, reduced and delayed version was only passed by Congress in August 1983. 
The PRG charged that the CBI addressed U. S. national security concerns rather than 
the real problems of social and econonfic development. 
In his address to the OAS promoting the CBI, Reagan had warned of 
73 Hybcl, How Leaders Reason, p. 268. 
74 The CBI included one-way Free Trade, investment incentives for U. S. businesses, technical 
assistance to the private sector and $350 million in bilateral aid. Robert Pastor, "Sinldng in the 
Caribbean Basin, " Foreign Affairs 60, no. 5 (Summer 1982): 1039. 
71 *Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of 
American States, February 24,1982, " U. S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States (Washington D. C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 
1982), Ronald W. Reagan, 1982, p. 211. 
76 Schocnhals and Melanson, Revolulion andIntervenfion, p. 128. 
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the dark future foreshadowed by the poverty and repression of Castro's Cuba, 
the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada and Nicaragua, and the 
expansion of Soviet-backed, Cuban-managed support for violent revolution in 
Central America. 77 
In hearings before the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs in June 1982, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Stephen Bosworth 
argued that the U. S. had not sought to exclude Grenada from the CBI when it was 
submitted to Congress but that it did not propose direct aid to Grenada although 
other elements of the programme would be available. Of Grenada, Bosworth said: 
its remarks and characterizations of the Caribbean Basin program, as it describes 
it as "chicken feed, " and "only a guise for the attainment of military objectives in 
the area, " would certainly seem to indicate that it has no desire to participate. 78 
These were general Caribbean criticisms and certainly not confined to the PRG. As 
the Caribbean nations had to request CBI help the U. S. telexed the PRG about their 
possible participation. It seems that Unison Whiteman, the Foreign Minister, was pro- 
participation but that other government members, including Bishop, felt that 
participation would make Grenada appear opportunistic and that they should consult 
with Micaragua and Suriname to see if they had been asked. 79 The PRas ideology 
and concern about their image as a Soviet bloc aligned country overruled 
participation in the CBI irrespective of its financial benefits or even as a possible 
initiator to better U. S. relations. 
When President Reagan visited Barbados in April 1982 he told regional leaders 
that Grenada "now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will 
"Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, " Public Papers ofthe Presidents (PPP), p. 211. 
U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs. United States Policy Toward Grenada (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1982), p. 47. 
79 "Nfinutcs of the Political and Economic Bureau, August, 3 Ist, 1993, " GDMC, no. 002306, p. 5. 
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attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours. "'O In Washington, Weinberger told 
the Council on Foreign Relations that America "must be prepared to halt and seek to 
reverse the geographic expansion of Soviet control and presence. "" This rhetoric 
was backed up by "Ocean Venture 82" between April 28 and May 16,1982.60 naval 
vessels, 350 planes and 45,000 men participated. One operation involved 2,000 
Marines and Army airborne troops landing at Blue Beach on Vieques and seizing an 
airstrip garrison just inland. 92 To an insecure PRG this increased their anxiety and 
reinforced their belief that the U. S. would invade in the near future. 
This negative trend in relations continued throughout 1982. As Congressman 
Michael Barnes commented: "If the United States has a policy toward Grenada, it 
appears to consist of not answering Grenadian mail and avoiding being seen in the 
same room with officials from Grenada. "93 A House of Commons Report on Central 
America and the Caribbean was harsher, concluding that the Reagan administration 
displayed "a paranoid antagonism towards any government in the area which may be 
remotely described as left wing let alone Marxist. 944 During 1982 Grenada continued 
to pursue its socialist policies; Bishop visited East Germany, Bulgaria and Libya to 
80 "Remarks in Bridgetown, Barbados, Following a Luncheon Meeting With Leaders of Eastern 
Caribbean Countries, April 8,1982, " U. S. President, PPP, p. 448. 
81 Klarc, "The Reagan Doctrine, " p. 10. 
82 David Eric Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust By Governments: Deception As Process 
and Practice, " (Ph. D. diss., Yale University, 1988), p. 17 1. 
83 Schoultz, National Secu? lty, p. 242. 
84 Christopher AbeL "Documentary Review. House of Commons. Fifth Report from the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Session 1981-82. Caribbean and Central America, " Journal of Latin American 
Studies 15 (October 1983): 473. 
135 
raise money and in July signed a military agreement with the Soviet Union in 
Moscow. 85 
Relations appeared to quieten after the rhetorical volleys about the CBI. It is 
likely that this represented a lack of interest on the U. S. side but Grenada naturally 
interpreted it differently, reasoning that the U. S. ' recent inactivity was not a change in 
policy but tactics and suggested in private that the U. S. might use the private sector 
to find a credible Grenadian to replace Bishop. Hence, "peaceful infiltration and 
penetration through the private sector... [T]he destabilization could thus take place 
from within. "86 The PRG had made persistent accusations of U. S. destabilization 
plans since 1979. 
A lessening of these charges in 1982 had led some to believe that the PRG was 
toning down its anti-U. S. rhetoric to prepare the way for improved relations. The 
embassy was more pessimistic: 
in view of the PRGs past rhetorical record and more importantly its continued 
consolidation with Cuba/ USSR. We think the invasion theme was temporarily 
suspended, not because the PRG intended to send a positive signal to [the] U. S. 
but because the many false alarms served to undermine the regime! s domestic 
credibility and a certain momentum and revolutionary alertness had already been 
accomplished amongst army and militia through the use of the "external threat" 
strategy. 117 
85 The Soviet Union and North Korea were far from generous with the terms of their agreements. 
For example, the PRG had problems meeting the cost of importing the aid from North Korea and 
talks on this matter dragged on for years. Dae-Ho Byun, North Korea's Foreign Policy. - the Ache 
Ideology and the Challenge of Gorbachev's New 7hinking (Seoul, South Korea: Research Center for 
Peace and Unification of Korea, 199 1), p. 158. 
86 "The International Situation During 1982-1983: An Analysis, 16.2.93, " GRUC, no. 004636, p. 4. 
97 Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, no subject heading, 162143Z, rLd. [March 
1982? ], Bridgetown 01526, p. 2. 
136 
Such inherent bad faith and cynicism typified relations and indicates that even if the 
U. S. had made overtures it would have been far from certain that the PRG would 
have responded. 
A Question of Nutmeg and National Securi 
The rhetorical attacks on Grenada resumed in December 1982. At the annual 
Miami Conference on the Caribbean, Vice President George Bush called Grenada 
"economically weak, militarized, repressive and dependent. "88 The PRG telexed the 
U. S. Embassy saying that Bush's remarks were "regrettable" and "inaccurate, 
misleading and made in a context in which Grenada was not allowed to respond. "89 
During February and March 1983 Grenada was censured by several senior 
members of the Reagan administration. On February 27 the Washington Post 
reported on the aborted 1981 CIA plan (see above), which was probably deliberately 
leaked to put pressure on Grenada. In the article the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Inter-American Affairs Nestor Sanchez stated that Grenada was a "vital 
surrogate" of Cuba and that the Cubans were constructing air and naval facilities in 
excess of Grenada! s needs. 90 On March 9 Sanchez described Grenada as a "Cuban 
prot6gV9' The next day President Reagan joined in: 
Grenada, that tiny little island... is building now, or having built for it, on its soil 
and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the 
88 "Text of a Telex Sent to the United States Embasy (sic) in Barbados on December 30th, " GDAfC, 
no. 002303. 
89 lbi(L 
90 Tyler, "U. S. Tracks Cuban Aid, " p., Al 1. 
91 Gerald Hopple and Cynthia Gilley, "Policy Without Intelligence, " in Peter Dunn and Bruce 
Watson (eds. ), Amefican Intervention in Grenada. - Ae Implications of Operation "Urgent Fury" 
(Boulder, Colo.: Wcstview Press, 1985), p. 56. 
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storage of munitions, barracks, and training grounds for the military. 92 
He proceeded to explain how this would extend Soviet and Cuban power and 
admonished that "it isn't nutmeg that's at stake in the Caribbean and Central America; 
it is the United States national security. "" 
On the March 23 Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and 
again, with the aid of satellite photos, drew attention to Grenada: 
the Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an 
airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who 
is it intended for? 94 
Reagan concluded that "the Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can 
only be seen as power projection into the region. "" Also during March, Weinberger 
asserted that Grenada was undergoing a rapid military buildup and Undersecretary of 
Defense Fred Ilde presented aerial photos of Grenada to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Reagan returned to Grenada yet again in his April 27 address 
to a Joint Session of Congress, suggesting that Point Salines would facilitate the 
transshipment of arms to Nicaragua. 96 
This litany of indictments should not be seen as solely for the consumption of the 
PRG. Central America was the main focus of U. S. attention and things were not 
going well by 1983; the Contadora peace plan was introduced in January 1983 and 
whilst the U. S. professed their support it was not exactly flavour of the month in 
' "Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, March 10,1993. " PPP, 1983, p. 372. 
93 Ibid., p. 373. 
94 "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23,1983. " PPP, p. 440. 
95 Ibid., p. 440. 
' "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America, April 27,1983. " PPP, p. 
609. 
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Washington. Also, Congress were becoming increasingly sceptical of the 
administration! s Central America odyssey. Consequently, Grenada was a convenient 
tool to use to demonstrate to Congress the threat posed by Soviet-Cuban activity in 
the region and the necessity for continued aid to the Contras. 
As before, the rhetorical attacks were backed up with military displays of strength. 
During March, 77 U. S. ships had assembled off Barbados and several moved to 
within six n-dles of Grenada. This was followed by "Operation Universal Trek" in 
May 1983 which demonstrated "how US forces could land in a small Caribbean 
nation where a civil war [was] taking place. "97 
An internal PRG draft letter to the U. S. Embassy reveals that "until the recent 
statements, the Peoples Revolutionary Government felt fairly confident that these re- 
assessments had dispelled the unfounded and unreasonable fears of the US 
Administration. "9' In public, Bishop, who had curtailed his visit to the NAM Summit 
in India to return home, harangued the "warmongering Reagan" and his "fascist 
clique" with "their arrogant designs for regional and world domination" and warned 
that the PRG were "convinced that an armed attack against our country by 
counterrevolutionaries and mercenaries organised, financed, trained, and directed by 
United States imperialism, is imminent and can come any day now. "99 Once again 
Grenada turned to the international arena to counter the perceived threat. 
At the UN on March 28 Unison Whiteman echoed Bishop in announcing that 
"based on a careful analysis of evidence we are convinced that the Reagan 
97 Beck, 7he Grenada Invasion, p. 28. 
98 "Draft/ letter to the US embassy, " GDMC, no. 002308. 
99 "An Armed Attack Against Our COuntrY Is Immincnt, March 23,1983, " Marcus and Taýcr 
(eds. ), Maurice Bishop Speaks, p. 279. 
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Administration is planning an aggression. We believe the attack is imminent. "100 As 
with previous episodes the Grenadian response was shaped by a mixture of 
propaganda benefit and real fear. A Special Report to the Security and Defence 
Committee and Political Bureau detailed military weaknesses; a small People's 
Revolutionary Army, an inexperienced n-dlitia and the concentration of arms at only a 
few different sites. 101 In addition, the PRA conducted manoeuvres against an aerial 
and seaborne invasion. 
It would appear that the PRG leadership were among the few who believed such 
threats were real rather than imagined. As the embassy remarked: "PRG charges of a 
U. S. or U. S. -backed invasion did not appear to have dampened the enthusiasm of 
most Grenadians for Americans and things American. "102 However, the PRG 
monopoly of the media made it easy to shape the perceptions of the populace and 
predictably "popular support for the PRG and interest in the militia and army. .. 
increased markedly since Reagan mentioned Grenada in his March 10 speech. 9003 
The President's focus on PSIA perturbed most Grenadians who viewed the airport as 
vital to the island's future; they felt that the mysterious goings-on at Caviligny merited 
more attention. 104 
100 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada, p. 112. 
"' "Special Report to Security and Defence Committee and the Political Bureau, 16.4.83, " GD. WC, 
no. 005196. 
102 Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada After the Bishop- 
Reagan Exchange: Quiet, Puzzled, Disgruntled, " 201845Z, April 1983, Bridgetown 02334, p. 2. 
103 IbicL, p. 5. 
104 Nfilitary equipment arrived during blackouts, road blocks were placed around the site and Cuban 
and Soviet military advisors were frequently present there. Ibid., p. 7. 
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This flurry of activity marked the end of the overtly confrontational stage of 
relations. The next time Grenada came to prominence was with Bishop's June 1983 
visit to Washington where he met with U. S. officials. There has been much 
conjecture about the purpose of this trip and its repercussions. 
The first year of Reagares term had seen a continuation of the Carter policy of 
distancing and isolation. The PRG were determined to ensure the survival and 
consolidation of the revolution against efforts, real or imagined, to overthrow or 
isolate it. External help from ideologicafly compatible regimes was obtained and 
strident rhetoric employed to alert the world to the U. S. ' alleged intentions. 
Unfortunately, this only reconfirmed the U. S. ' suspicions and increased the tension. 
The administration had wearied of the constant public criticism and "with no change 
in the attitude or policies of the PRG, they (relations) remain cool and are conducted 
at a level appropriate to the PRGs conduct. "'O' Any improvement in relations would 
have had to be initiated by Grenada as the U. S., despite its economic obstructionism 
and overemphasis of Grenada as a military threat, were not actively looking for a 
solution to a situation that was no more than a sideshow to Central America. 
At a Congressional Hearing in 1982, Sally Shelton, the former ambassador to 
Barbados, commented that, "you have a lot to gain by talking with people, and a lot 
to lose by not talking with them. "106 The Reagan administration did not 
105 "Statement of Stcphcn W. Bosworth, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, " U. S. Congress, United States Policy toward Grenada, p. 29. 
106 lbid., p. 95. In fact when embassy officials visited Grenada to meet PRG officials the meetings 
proved invariably fruitless. In early 1983 DCM Flower visited Grenada aftcr receiving an invite, to 
discuss the question of dialogue, from Bishop at a reception in Jamaica for CARICOM Summit 
participants in November 1982. Bishop failed to turn up for the meeting with Flower who met 
Unison Whiteman instead. Flower categonsed the trip as a "take their temperature" cxcrcisc to 
acknowledge high4evel contact but that it was unproductive and "a %=W of time. " Tclcphone 
interview with Ludlow Flower, November 2,1995. 
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conceptualize the situation in this manner. Many administration officials interpreted 
the PRGs calls for talks as a public relations act and in general found the prospect of 
talking to Marxist-Leninists as "too distasteful and inconsistent with its own tough 
posturing to be a serious option. " 107 It is hard to imagine that serious negotiations 
would have yielded anything. 
A Difference of Opinion 
The most comprehensive summation of the problem areas of U. S. -Grenadian 
relationship from the U. S. ' point of view was provided by Bosworth when he told 
Congress that for relations to improve Grenada should cease their anti-U. S. 
propaganda, restore democracy, hold elections, improve human rights and practice 
genuine non-alignment rather than being a Cuban surrogate. '" Once again the 
impetus was on the PRG to make the first move in making changes that were 
practically unpalatable for a government of its ilk. If, as Bosworth commented, the 
U. S. were confident that the PRG were aware of their views the U. S. must have been 
conscious of the unlikelihood that the PRG would accede to their wishes. The 
administration had decided they would restate their position clearly and leave the ball 
firmly in Grenada! s court. 
There had been no tangible changes in the PRG's stance. Anti-U. S. propaganda 
remained a staple feature and a return to constitutional democracy seemed 
increasingly remote and free and fair elections improbable in what had become a one- 
party authoritarian state. As Henfrey points out though, the U. S. ' emphasis on 
107 John Horton, "The Real InteUigcnce Failure, " Foreign Service Journal (February 1985): 24. 
log "Statement of Stephen W. Bosworth, " US. Congress, United States Policy Toward Grenada, p. 
31. 
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elections meant that if the PRG had held them it could be construed as bowing to 
U. S. pressure. 109 The PRG did make appreciable advances in social justice, education 
and various economic programmes but "the building of 'a new democracy' serving 
the interests and needs of the Grenadian masses became... dependent upon state 
repression. ""o Bishop's opponents were incarcerated, the PRA was used to enforce 
PRG policy and the media firn-Ay govemment-controlled. The U. S. however, had 
supported more repressive governments than the PRG; there was another factor, the 
major one, that condemned the PRG. 
The issue of non-alignment was pivotal. The PRG believed that: 
Non-alignment does not imply for us that we must be neutral in the sterile and 
negative sense... Non-alignment for us is a positive concept characterizing a 
vigorous and principled approach to international issues. It is an affirmation of 
that fundamental attribute of all peoples and states to sovereignty, independence 
and the right to freely determine their own domestic and foreign policy. "' 
For the PRG this meant alignment with the Soviet bloc, especially Cuba. Barely a 
month after the 1979 revolution the U. S. had let Grenada know that it would view 
with "displeasure" any closer ties Grenada developed with the U. S. ' bugaboo, Cuba. 
Cuba had been classified as an enemy state by successive U. S. administrations 
since 1960. A sort of "Cubaphobia" influenced policymakers, making relations "a 
total impossibility on a strictly ideological basis, " and "an equally elusive commodity 
at a rational, pragmatic level of decision making. ""' NJM contact with Cuba had 
started prior to 1979 and continued to deepen thereafter. The PRG identified closely 
109 Colin Henficy, "Between Populism and Leninism, " p. 137. 
110 Cynthia NUhabir, "Heavy Manners and Making Freedom Under the People's Revolutionary 
Government in Grenada, 1979-1983, " Intemational Joumal ofthe SocioloSy ofLaw 21 (1993): 233. 
111 "Grenada's Foreign Policy, " GDMC, no. 006097, p. 7. 
112 AzicrL "Cuba and the United States, " in Levine (ed. ), The New Cuban Presence, p. 17 1. 
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with Cuba for several reasons: the shared problems of capitalist underdevelopment, a 
positive view of Cuban socialism, a respect for Cuba! s international actions, a 
confidence in their commitment to anti-U. S. parties in the Caribbean and the belief 
that Cuba would provide substantial financial aid. 113 There was also a good personal 
rapport between Castro and Bishop. 
From "No More Cubas" to "Splashiniz Dominoes" 
In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson was influenced by the Cuba analogy when he 
decided to intervene in the Dominican Republic; the prevention of "another Cuba" in 
the hemisphere became a policymaking maxim. In ensuring this, the other 
predominant analogy in U. S. foreign policy had to be avoided, "another Vietnam. " 
President Reagan, as well as several of his cabinet, were from the World War Two 
generation who believed appeasement encouraged aggression and that military 
strength was more likely to guarantee peace. However, Vietnam taught Reagan that 
sending U. S. troops to fight protracted wars against the spread of communism was 
inconceivable. In fact, Reagan invoked the past more frequently than any incumbent 
since 1945.114 In his 1982 CBI address to the OAS in which he called Grenada 
"totalitarian, " Reagan warned that: 
If we do not act promptly and decisively in defense of freedom, new Cubas will 
arise from the ruins of today's conflicts. We will face more totalitarian regimes 
tied militarily to the Soviet Union - more regimes exporting subversion, more 
so incompetent yet so totalitarian. 115 
Comm, "Cuba and the Grenada Revolution, " p. 10 1. 
Deborah S. Smith-Howell, "Using the Past in the Present: The Rhetorical Construction of the 
Presidency" (Ph. D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 1993), p. 143. 
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144 
Analogically, Grenada was the potential "new Cuba" who would export revolution 
throughout the Caribbean. ' 16 Thus a domino effect would be triggered, a process 
which the U. S. had to oppose and/or reverse. 
The public use of an analogy does not guarantee its use in private but memoirs 
and interviews suggest that Grenada was probably not seen as an exact potential 
replica of Cuba but as another conununist regime aligned with Cuba. Using Khong! s 
"analogical explanation" 117 framework it is possible to suggest that the U. S. defined 
Grenada in terms of Grenada! s relationship with Cuba. The stakes were high in terms 
of reaffirming U. S. credibility. The implied solution was to counter any Soviet-Cuban 
aggression, although not with the direct use of force (economic and political pressure 
on the PRG and economic and military support to its neighbours). The chances of 
success were viewed as good as Grenada was not a realistic military threat. The 
moral rightness of this anti-Communist crusade was beyond doubt for Reagan. The 
danger of inactivity was a Caribbean Basin dominated by Soviet-Cuban aligned 
regimes and the destruction of U. S. credibility globally. 
Inextricably linked to the Cuba analogy is the domino analogy. Glad and Taber 
suggest that the domino theory is adopted for several reasons: the lessons of history 
(Munich and Vietnam predominantly), it provides an explanation of the world and 
prescribes simple answers, it serves the immediate domestic political, organizational 
and psychological interests, acts as a substitute for a lack of information about the 
116 In April 1981 a DIA report described Cuba's influence over Grenada as "remarkable" and 
"growing" and that "Bishop and co are determined to evangelize or revolutionize their neighbours if 
they can. " James Herbert Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions 
During the 1980's: A Comparative Analysis of Operations Urgent Fury, El Dorado Canyon and Just 
Cause" (PhR diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993), p. 53. 
117 Khong, Analogies at War, p. 10. 
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target, it helps to win public and Congressional support for a more active policy and 
acts as an easy guide to action. 118 
Reagan had made his beliefs clear in 1980; "the Soviet Union underlies all the 
unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there 
wouldift be any hot spots in the world. "119 Grenada was consequently seen as a 
Soviet probe to test the U. S. ' resolve and that if the U. S. did not respond, this "loss" 
would lead to others. This thinking is certainly reflected in the statements of many 
administration officials. In October 1981 Haig warned: 
we have a vital interest in not allowing the proliferation of Cuba-model states 
which would provide platforms for subversion, compromise vital sea lanes and 
pose a direct military threat at or near our borders. .. In the short run we must 
work to eliminate Cuban/Soviet influence in the region, and in the long run we 
must build politically stable governments able to withstand such influences. 120 
Speaking before the Subconunittee on Foreign Affairs, Bosworth stated that: 
the PRG had become a center for solidarity meetings and established close ties to 
small radical movements from elsewhere in the Caribbean. Grenada to some 
degree acts as a bridge for Cuba to radical... groups in the eastern Caribbean. 121 
Grenada! s militarization was perceived to be partly to legitimize the revolution but 
also feasibly to export revolution to a vulnerable, susceptible Eastern Caribbean. At 
the time, the poor standard of living in many islands provided a plausible scenario for 
the domino effect; the PRG appealed to many and the U. S. was concerned that the 
118 Betty Glad and Charles Taber, "Images, Learning, and the Decision to Use Force: The Domino 
Theory of the United States, " in Betty Glad (ed. ), Psjvhological Dimensions of War (NeOury Park, 
CaliL: Sage Publications, 1990), p. 63. 
119 Pastor, "The U. S. and the Caribbean, " p. 29. 
120 Cotman, 7he Gorrion Tree, p. 84. 
121 "Statement of Stephen W. Bosworth, " U. S. Congress, United States Policy toward Grenada, p. 
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PRG would serve as an example to like-n-dnded groups in the region. 122 Nestor 
Sanchez painted the most portentous scenario: 
the Caribbean islands are weak militarily and economically. Active on many of 
these islands are leftist elements bent on seizing power at any price and linked to 
Cuba, Libya, and others of like mind. The tiny eastern Caribbean countries could 
fall overnight, as did Grenada. The Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica are 
perhaps less vulnerable, but each has serious weaknesses and each has been a tar- 
get of Fidel Castro in the past. 123 
The implication was that a supine U. S. reaction would embolden the communists, 
encourage regional radical groups, disillusion Caribbean allies and reduce U. S. 
credibility. 
The domino theory is a worst case scenario and therefore will always be part of 
decisionmakers thinking. It is, however, a misleading one. Originating in World War 
Two Europe it was [mis]applied to Southeast Asia and its use in the Caribbean did 
not incorporate the conditions in the region. The theory overlooked the indigenous 
roots of the Grenadian revolution, obscured the tradition of democracy in the 
surrounding states and overestimated the impact of the revolution on Grenada's 
neighbours; rather than bandwaggoning they took measures to oppose or inoculate 
themselves against the revolution. '2" 
Grenada-Caribbean Relations 
After the brief flirtation with leftist governments in several islands, the Eastern 
Caribbean reverted to its traditional political make-up as right-wing governments 
were elected in St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Lucia and Dominica. Grenada lost their only 
122 Interview with KcHy. 
123 Sanche7, "The Communist Thrcat; " p. 49. 
124 Glad and Taber, "Images, Learning and the Mcision to Use Force, " p. 73. 
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real ally in the region in October 1980 when Jamaican Prime Minister Michael 
Manley lost to Edward Seaga who followed a staunchly pro-U. S. line. As relations 
with the U. S. worsened, relations with the Eastern Caribbean did not follow suit, 
adopting a more pragmatic approach than the doctrinaire anti-communism emanating 
from Washington. 
The first manifestation of this stance was displayed in June 1981 when the CDB 
rejected a four million dollar U. S. grant because it expressly excluded Grenada, on 
political grounds, thereby contravening the bank's charter. In Washington this 
rejection was interpreted predominantly as a criticism of the political input into 
multilateral aid programmes rather than criticism of U. S. efforts to isolate 
Grenada. 125 Whilst Dominica! s Prime Minister Eugenia Charles described the episode 
as "a foolhardy decision which will not bring the results they are seeking, " she 
continued to criticize Grenada and urge the PRG to refuse U. S. funds so the other 
islands could accept it. '26 Several other countries subsequently approached the U. S. 
about bilateral programs. 127 
On June 18,1981, the OECS Treaty was signed at Basseterre, St. Kitts. The 
OECS was designed to promote cooperation, unity, sovereignty, a harmonized 
foreign policy and economic integration. It also included provision for collective 
security in Article 8.12' Grenada! s inclusion demonstrated the reduced fear of 
125 Rossin, U. S. -Grenada Relations, p. 76. 
126 Iligbie, Eugenia, p. 214. 
127 Another form of available U. S. aid was via direct assistance to the private sector and AH) 
devised ways to fimel aid through the CDB vnthout it reaching Grenada; the CDB could be used to 
administer trust funds for specific activities on particular islands for example. GAO, AID 
Assistance, p. L 
128 Article 8, paragraph 4, of the OECS Treaty states that: "The Defence and Security Committee 
shall have responsibility for coordinating the cfforts of Member States for collective defence and the 
preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties 
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subversion in the Eastern Caribbean and the respect for Bishop. The OECS was 
based on consensus rule and it seemed counterproductive to create a fuss over 
Grenada. Bishop described the OECS as "an encouraging and significant 
development for our subregion and region in general. The closer coordination in 
fields such as economics and foreign policy... will help to further consolidate the 
integration process. " 
129 
The larger organization, CARICOM, also decided not to discriminate against 
Grenada. In March 1981 a team of Caribbean experts reporting on CARICOM' s 
integration strategy surmised that they "did not consider that ideological differences 
between individual member countries constituted a real obstacle to 'meaningful 
regional integratiod. ""O At a CARICOM foreign ministers' meeting in July, the 
CDB's stand was endorsed and a final communiqu6 "noted with concern the 
economic aggression being waged by the United States against Grenada. 031 
In September 1981 CARICOM Foreign Ministers met to discuss the recently 
announced CBI. They insisted that "participation in the program should be open to all 
territories in the region" and that "criteria used in granting aid should not be based on 
political or military considerations. " 132 Having lobbied Washington hard for a "mini- 
among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external dcf: nce and security, including 
measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal 
or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
rccognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. " William C. Gilmore, The Grenada 
Intervenflon: Analysis and Documentation (London: Mansell, 1984), p. 8 1. 
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Marshall plan" for the Caribbean, the Caribbean leaders were frustrated by the lack of 
details and the emphasis on private investment and trade rather then direct aid. In 
addition, Reagans obsession with anti-communism and Grenada appeared 
incongruent with reality in the region. As Payne et al state, "the regiows rather muted 
reaction to the US plan was revealing. .. [I]t demonstrated 
how far the PRG had 
come in the preceding year in winning the grudging respect of several of its 
CARICOM colleagues. 033 Admittedly, the other Eastern Caribbean countries were 
not about to reject the CBI because of Grenada's exclusion but they remained 
consistent in their stance toward Grenada. 
During president Reagaifs 1982 Barbados trip only the leaders of Antigua, 
Barbados, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis and St. Vincent were invited to meet with him. 
As we have seen, Reagan told them that Grenada "now bears the Soviet and Cuban 
trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its 
neighbours. " 134 Barbadian Prime Minister, Tom Adams! response was that Grenada 
was not a military threat and that he wanted to "get on with policies of economic 
development. "M The U. S. ' hard-line did not coincide with Eastern Caribbean views; 
they had learrit to accept the PRG and now wished to conduct "business as usual" 
after the 1979 disturbance to the equilibrium of the region. 
133 Payne et al., Grenada, p. 96. 
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The Declaration of Ocho Rios 
The Third meeting of the CARICOM heads of government was scheduled for 
November 16-18,1982, at Ocho Rios in Jamaica. 136 Although Grenada had been 
gradually reassimilated into Caribbean politics, the PRG still faced criticism from 
certain quarters. In May 1982 Antiguan Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
Lester Bird commented that: 
while external manipulation is a reality, equally there have been other external 
efforts which have struck responsive chords in some Caribbean countries. I 
speak here of the question of ideology, where Caribbean territories are more 
firmly wedded to ideological bonds with third countries than they are committed 
to regional integration. 137 
Grenada came under attack again in July from Adams, supported by Seaga, who 
proffered that the CARICOM Treaty should be amended to commit members to 
uphold "the principal of political liberty and the protection of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual through adherence to the principle of the rule of law 
and practice of free, fair and regular elections. " 138 Adams! proposal, considered by 
some to be engineered by the U. S., was not raised at the November 1982 meeting. 
Political issues dominated the meeting. The result was the Declaration of Ocho 
Rios. This recognized the "political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights" of the 
populace, promoted integration as the only viable option for development, accepted 
that each country should be free to chose its own path of development and, most 
notably, that: 
while recognizing that the emergence of ideological pluralism in the Community 
136 This was the first meeting since 1975. 
137 to The Political Situation in the Caribbean and Grcnada! s Present Position within that Scenario, " 
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responds to internal processes and is an irreversible trend within the international 
system, we are committed to ensuring that it will not inhibit the processes of 
integration. 139 
CARICOM asked the U. S. to consider aid to regional organizations such as the 
CDB, rather than purely bilateral programs, to help the integration process. 
For Grenada the meeting was a relative success. The PRG had sent a "high 
powered" delegation to Ocho Rios to combat the expected opposition of Adams and 
Seaga and to convey their position and reaffirm their commitment to regional 
integration, one of the "principles" of PRG foreign policy. During the meeting Bishop 
made a symbolic gesture by announcing the release of 28 detainees. In a private 
conversation with Trinidadian Prime Minister George Chambers, Bishop undertook 
to hold elections but reiterated his commitment to "participatory democracy. " 140 In 
February 1983 the Caribbean leaders endorsed "ideological pluralism. " By the next 
meeting of CARICOM in July, Bishop had established a constitutional commission to 
draft a constitution and at the meeting assured Chambers that elections would be held 
by 1985. 
The Eastern Caribbean's Toleration of Grenada 
The centrality of regional integration to the CARICOM and OECS Charters 
underlines how essential cooperation is. As head of the CDB William Demas pointed 
out, "what is lacking in the smaller eastern Caribbean islands in terms of size and 
natural resource endowment could be more than fully compensated by joint and 
coordinated actions on the external front to realize their latent geopolitical power. 041 
139 "CARIBBEAN commuNrry, "P. 31948. 
140 Ibid., p. 31946. 
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The islands also had established cultural and population ties; Thomdike describes 
Caribbean societies as "compact and homogenous with. .. a strong sense of 
community and widespread and interlocking kinship networks. " 142 This tradition of 
interrelationship helps to explain that once the initial threat from Grenada was 
perceived to have decreased the Eastern Caribbean were not willing to weaken the 
unity of the region by exiling Grenada. 
The Eastern Caribbean operates on the ballot and consequently in such small 
countries the leaders are in closer contact with the populace than larger countries. 
Hence, the Prime Nlinister's main concern is the population rather than Washingtods 
desires. 143 The relationship between the region' s leaders also helped to accommodate 
Grenada. They felt that Bishop was a potential force for moderation and were willing 
to give him the benefit of the doubt, even though they knew about Grenada's 
militarization and ties to Cuba, and followed what a St. Lucian official termed 
"constructive engagement. "144When Bishop established a constitutional conference 
in June 1983 it gave some sort of encouragement to the other leaders. As Charles 
said: 
I didn! t think he was changing his Communist intentions... but I think he was 
a practical man and I think he reaaed he couldnt do these things if he didn't 
have the people with him. And that he didn! t have the ma ority of the people with 4 
him. So he was prepared to work it in such a way that he got the majority of the 
people going along with him. 145 
"2 Tony Thorndike, "Politics and Society in the south-eastern Caribbean, " in Colin Clarke (ed. ), 
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The significant thing is that Grenada was not treated as a pariah and thus the 
possibility of improved relations was always possible, something notably absent from 
U. S. -Grenadian relations. 
The Eastern Caribbean had not dismissed the threat posed by a militarized 
Grenada but reassessed the probability of it. Contrary to President Reagan's image of 
"splashing dominoes, " they perceived the threat not as a "territorial one (a physical 
takeover by Grenada/Cuba/Soviet Union) but a threat to government/survival 
through contagion and possibly subversion, as well as a threat to the traditional 
political culture. "146Grenada represented the usurpation of Westminister democracy 
and displayed no signs of holding elections and had established close politico-military 
ties to Cuba. Although Grenada was received in the political arenas of CARICOM 
and the OECS, the other member nations simultaneously made provisions for 
improved security. 
The definition of security in the Eastern Caribbean usually encompasses military, 
political and economic threats, ranging from outright civil war or intervention 
through coups and social conflict to debt and economic mismanagement. '47 The 
islands! economic weaknesses meant that the less they have to spend on defence the 
better. On average the islands spend less than one percent of GNP on defence. With 
economic affairs assuming prominence and the leaders! different threat perception, 
there was no consensus on Grenada or the question of an operational collective 
security mechanism. 
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The Eastern Caribbean's security concerns were articulated on October 29,1982, 
in Roseau, Dominica, when Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and Barbados signed a "Memorandum of Understanding Relating 
to Security and Military Co-operation. " The Memorandum was wide-reaching: 
to prepare contingency plans and assist one another on request in national 
emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, 
maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, 
natural and other disasters and threats to national security. 148 
The Regional Security System (RSS) the Memorandum established provided the 
operational and institutional instruments for collective security which had been 
outlined in the OECS Treaty. The Eastern Caribbean felt the need for a stronger 
military capability than they possessed and decided to ask Barbados to join them. 149 
The specific exclusion of Grenada was perhaps a more accurate indication of the 
attitude toward the PRG amongst her neighbours, than the CARICOM relations. 
A RSS was not a new idea but its emergence in 1982 was a clear reaction to the 
Grenada situation. Regional leaders admitted that the Memorandum had been spurred 
by concerns about Grenada; Prime Minister Bird believed that the purpose of the 
Memorandum was to establish "a regional defence/security system which would 
insure against the forcible overthrow of democratically elected governments, thereby 
preventing any replay of the Grenadian revolution. "150 The RSS provided some 
semblance of security, even if it could only act as a "trip-wire, containing a situation 
148 Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, p. 88. 
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until assistance from abroad could be obtained. "151 Additionally, it acted as a forum 
where the members could confer without Grenada! s presence. 
The RSS' formation marked the zenith of an increased emphasis on security that 
was greatly promoted by the Reagan administration. It was Washingtods belief that 
security, democracy and economic development were inextricably juxtaposed and 
that democracy was the best fi-amework for economic and social development. For 
the State Department, "Grenada provided another reason for giving economic and 
security assistance to the other poor but certifiably democratic nations of the 
Caribbean. 052 The U. S. offered the Eastern Caribbean significant economic and 
military carrots to secure their support against Grenada. Between 1980-83 economic 
aid increased from $323.9 million to $759 million and military aid increased from 
$13.8 million to $195.2 million; between 1980-86 in general, there was a 212 percent 
increase in economic aid and a 2052 percent increase in military aid. 153 
The recession-hit Eastern Caribbean welcomed any increase in U. S. aid, even if 
the military percentage of it grew from four percent to 25 percent and was negotiated 
on a bilateral basis and therefore was detrimental to the integration process. Aid was 
also conditional on an anti-Communist policy by each government. As Charles 
admitted: 
Weak governments must fall into fine and learn to beg properly... Thus this 
fragile island... must court a special relationship with Washington and, possibly 
as an inducement, has increased rhetoric against the Bishop regime. 154 
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Undoubtedly disquieted by Reagan's cold war ideology, the Eastern Caribbean, even 
if they had not felt threatened by Grenada, could not realistically afford to object to 
U. S. aid on the grounds that it excluded Grenada. U. S. aid and the strings tied to it 
help them to express their latent fears about Grenada via the creation of a RSS. 
The PRG and its Caribbean Neiahbours 
An internal PRG report concluded by warning that "Grenada does need to seek 
possible friends in the region, in order to prevent the isolation which would provide 
imperialism with a valuable front of assistance. ""' This train of thought appeared to 
pervade the PRGs thoughts. CARICOM was seen as a useful forum in which to 
oppose U. S. policies. The PRG considered their relations with most of CARICOM as 
normal but were pessimistic about its members. Jamaica was seen as a "lackey of the 
U. S. " and Barbados as the U. S. ' "watchdog for [the] Eastern Caribbean. 056 St. 
Lucia, Barbados, Jamaica, Dominica and St. Vincent were classified as an anti- 
Grenada bloc in CARICONt Trinidad's "neutral" position was interpreted as 
"suspect, " Guyana was an "ally of convenience" and only in Antigua, whom the PRG 
believed saw themselves as mediators between the U. S. and Grenada, was the "door. 
.. not closed to dialogue. " 
157 This would suggest that irrespective of their inclusion 
in the OECS and CARICOM the PRG felt isolated in the region but were not 
prepared to compromise their "principled positions" to improve the situation. 
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The PRG continued to extend their ties to the Soviet bloc and Third World 
socialist-oriented regimes and underwent a substantial militarization process that 
dwarfed that of its neighbours. During its time the PRG signed five secret military 
agreements with Cuba, North Korea and the Soviet Union, all but one pre-dating the 
Eastern Caribbean Memorandum of Understanding. By 1986 these agreements would 
have provided the PRG with four Peoples Revolutionary Army battalions and 14 
militia battalions equipped with 10,000 rifles, 450 machine-guns, 294 rocket 
launchers, 84 mortars, 12 cannon, 60 anti-aircraft guns, 60 armed personnel carriers, 
four patrol boats and 20,000 uniforms. 15' However, the general consensus is that this 
build-up was designed to defend, rather than export, the revolution. This trend is 
reflected in the Grenada Documents; Grenada did act as a contact for left-wing 
Eastern Caribbean groups to Cuba but the PRG displayed no fervid desire to export 
revolution. A December 1983 CIA assessment concluded that the PRA was "mainly 
engaged in enforcing the NJM policy" and that the militia assisted the PRA in 
defending the country, performed neighbourhood control duties and served as a 
"vehicle for ideological recruitment and indoctrination. "' 59 The assessment also 
concluded that "the large numbers of weapons seized in Grenada were intended 
primarily for use by Grenadians in their own defense--first in anticipation of an 
invasion by counterrevolutionary pro-Gairy forces, later in reaction to U. S. Navy 
exercises in the Caribbean. 060 Naturally, for Grenada! s neighbours such objective 
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conclusions were clouded by their own security concerns and the PRG's Marxist- 
Leninist power structure, ties to the Soviet bloc, anti-U. S. posturing and progressive 
militarization. 
Mr. Bishop Goes to Washington 
In June 1983 Bishop visited Washington where, amongst other things, he met 
with U. S. government officials and discussed the normalization of relations. The trip 
has been interpreted variously as a public relations and lobbying exercise or as an 
indication that Bishop was seriously considering moving away from the Soviets and 
that his visit possibly made hard-liners within the party uncomfortable and 
contributed to his demise in October. 
In January 1983 Secretary of State Shultz had sent the first official communication 
to Grenada, via the leader of the Congressional black caucus, Mervyn Dymally, 
informing the PRG that all personnel at the embassy in Barbados, except the 
ambassador, would be accredited to Grenada. " Dymally in turn invited Bishop to 
Washington, supported by the influential black lobby group Trans-Africa. An 11 -day 
visit was arranged for the beginning of June. Bishop's entourage arrived on May 30; 
during the visit Bishop spoke at the Sixth Annual Trans-Africa Dinner, met with 
congressional representatives, the secretary-general of the OAS, the secretary-general 
of the UN, addressed the Latin American group in the UN Security Council and held 
public meetings in Detroit, New York and Washington. 
Shortly before the trip, the PRG's "North American Resistance Movement" 
submitted a report to the Political Bureau (PB) that detailed a 26-point plan to 
"51 Thomdike, Grenada, p. 13 1. 
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mobilize public and congressional opinion to limit attacks on Grenada, win long-term 
contracts and solicit concrete assistance. The report concluded that: 
the attacks (and fightbacks) have widened and deepened our support and sym- 
pathy and the awareness of our situation among progressives, academics and 
Blacks. We are making progress on building a wider network of friends and allies 
vital for our future work. 162 
An earlier report from Grenada! s OAS representative Ian Jacobs, on his eight-city 
tour of the U. S. to counter Reages SDI attack, echoed this and recommended "a 
properly organised, planned and continuous propaganda campaign that always keeps 
our revolution in the minds of the North Americans. " 163 In a letter to Bishop, Gail 
Reed, the American-bom wife of the Cuban ambassador to Grenada, Julian Torres 
Rizo, advised him to justify the trip in terms of the long history of relations between 
the two countries, the large numbers of Grenadians living in the U. S. and tourism and 
economic links: "the purpose of the visit is to reaffirm and develop these ties at as 
many levels as possible, and by so doing help lessen the tensions that have cropped 
Up. to 164 Reed emphasized the need to deny that the trip would be a cover for a 
meeting with Reagan as this would make Grenada appear opportunistic. Therefore, 
Bishop should concentrate on addressing the people directly and leave "open the 
possibility of meeting with the Reagan administration if it were to come off. "165 
Obviously advice can be ignored but Reed's letter would not suggest that talks with 
the U. S. were of primary importance. A PB document reinforces this supposition; it 
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outlines three "strategic objectives" of the trip: to convey Bishop as a "sober and 
reliable statesman, " to develop "unshakable links" with the U. S. black community and 
to promote tourism. 166 
The visit was portrayed to the media and public as a goodwill mission from a 
small, poor country that was not a security threat and had "unwittingly" been caught 
in the middle of President Reagan! s geopolitical designs for Central America. 167 In a 
similar vein at the OAS, Bishop reiterated that Grenada had repeatedly sought good 
relations but had been spurned by the U. S. and restated that the new airport was a 
civilian project vital to Grenada! s economy. 
Whilst professing that "our concern is to do everything we possibly can to get 
some form of high-level dialogue going, "'" Bishop again took the opportunity to 
criticize the U. S. He told the OAS that Grenada could not support the CBI as it 
excluded them and sought to divide the region. During the trip he also complained 
that "after all these years of independence Grenada has not been able to get 'one 
single cent' from the World Bank or been able to establish a stand-by arrangement 
with the INff 169 One notable factor is that the tone of the criticism had been 
moderated at least. In a speech to U. S. workers in New York the PRGs 
misperceptions were highlighted. First of a Bishop announced that "at the level of 
the people, there has never been any problem. We have always had excellent relations 
"' Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: 7he Untold Story (New York Madison 
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with the people of the United States. " 1711 In reality, apart from Grenada's established 
supporters in the U. S., Americans could not be divorced from their government. 
Secondly, Bishop acknowledged the importance of normalized relations but promised 
to continue to build the revolution and that "we will always have relations - warm and 
fraternal, close relations - with the people and government of Cuba. "171 Such 
speeches are obviously tailored for public consumption but relations with Cuba had 
been a constant in Grenadian policy. Bishop was patently aware that the U. S. was 
unhappy with Grenada! s ties to Cuba and on the eve of a meeting with U. S. officials 
this statement could be perceived as an effort to let the U. S. know the Grenadian 
position. 
The alternative explanation is that Bishop was seeking a rapprochement with the 
U. S. The Grenadian economy was stalling, PSIA was consuming much of the foreign 
aid received, the PRG was growing increasingly unpopular amongst the populace and 
isolated in the region and recently U. S. rhetorical attacks had escalated. There was an 
obvious incentive to improve relations, especially financial ones. Bishop had had a 
lengthy conversation in Grenada with the British Undersecretary at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) John Ewer in January 1983. Ewer possibly helped 
persuade Bishop of the need to re-direct the PRG when he unequivocally told him 
that the restoration of aid required the restoration of the constitution, the release of 
political prisoners and elections. 172 Thus in this scenario Bishop, in his own words, 
170 "Iýburice Bishop Speaks to U. S. Working People, June 5,1983, " Marcus and Taber (eds. ), 
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went to Washington "in search of a dialogue ... to clear up personally the 
misconceptions which exist. "173 
According to Bishop's press statement the initiative for a meeting began when 
PRG Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman asked DCM Flower to arrange two 
meetings while the Grenada delegation was in Washington with President Reagan or 
an "appropriate high official" and with Secretary of State Shultz. 174 It appears 
nothing resulted from this and when Bishop arrived in the U. S. he again asked for a 
meeting. The government initially refused to meet Bishop. Only after much media 
criticism, congressional pressure and the personal intercession of Senators Claiborne 
Pell and Lowell Weicker on Bishop's behalf did the government change its mind. 
Bishop had requested a meeting with the President but the administration offered 
a meeting with the U. S. ambassador to the OAS William Middendorf The 
arrangement was that Middendorf would meet with Bishop and Dessima Williams to 
present certain points to Bishop, obtain his reactions and, subject to them, suggest 
that another meeting at a different level might be possible. Bishop rejected this as 
"inappropriate" and did not even turn up, leaving Williams to inform Middendorf that 
Bishop wanted to see the President and that the Prime Minister had an "open-ended" 
agenda. 175 The U. S. then relented and organized a meeting with someone 
"reasonably close" to the President to hear what Bishop had to say. 176 A meeting 
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with the unusual combination of President Reages National Security Advisor 
William Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam was scheduled for June 7. 
In Washington there was a mixed view of the visit. The U. S. embassy in Barbados 
sent a telegram to Shultz saying: 
The fact is that if the PRG had wished to return to democracy, they have had 
more than four years to do so, but have made no move whatsoever in that 
direction. Instead, Westminister-style democracy has repeatedly been declared 
dead, and the constitution and election will change nothing as both will be devised 
to assure continued PRG control over the country. 177 
Other officials echoed these sentiments. Weinberger did not favour a government 
meeting because of Bishop and the PRGs bad reputation and the belief that he was 
simply after financial aid. 179 Others were more optimistic; rumours circulated that 
Bishop was considering distancing Grenada from Cuba. Shultz described the 
administration! s decision to meet Bishop as "an effort on our part to size him up and 
see how committed he was to his present course. " 179 In a draft of a post-intervention 
speech Reagan revealed: 
I, too, was convinced that Bishop was at least contemplating a change in his 
earlier position. That is why I asked my Advisor on National Security, Bill Clark 
to meet privately with Prime Minister Bishop during his visit... It seemed we 
were cautiously taking some steps toward a new relationship. ISO 
At the meeting Bishop proposed an exchange of ambassadors, the extradition of 
Eric Gairy and the cessation of U. S. economic and propaganda destabilization. 181 He 
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proceeded to say that the bottom line was "dialogue and normal relations" and 
advocated a Joint Commission to discuss differences and possible cooperation. "' 
Clark replied that the U. S. had no problem with dialogue but was concerned about 
the PRCFs conduct: 
we had some doubts about his bona fides, and... we hoped he could demonstrate 
his true desire for better relations by lowering the level of rhetorical attacks on the 
United States; and if he was prepared to do that, we were prepared to entertain 
some of the specific suggestions he had as to intermediary ways to get back to a 
regular relationship. 183 
For the U. S., actions spoke louder than words. Clark also expressed concern about 
Soviet influence among Grenada! s neighbours and warned that "Soviet influence in 
[the] region is not acceptable. it 184 According to the PRG notes, Clark went on to 
express his hope that Grenada would keep the parliamentary system and not revert to 
the East European model, that there should be a change in Grenada! s criticism and 
apparently agreed to a second secret meeting. Clark made it clear that the U. S. 
preferred to conduct discussion in private rather than in response to public attacks. 
Encouraged by the U. S. ' willingness to discuss normalization, a possible moratorium 
on denunciations was discussed. Clark then left the meeting and Dam underlined that 
the key issue was Soviet/Cuban influence and the need to see some change in 
Grenada! s conduct. Bishop brought up the subject of economic destabilization and 
then told Darn, "we can explore any range of subjects and give (our) fullest assurance 
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that we constitute no threat to the U. S. ""' Conspicuous by its absence from the 
notes is the question of PSIA and it is possible that it was now discussed. Dam 
expressed his interest in Bishop's assurances and then the 45 minute meeting came to 
an end. 
The Results 
The U. S. had approached the meeting in the standard diplomatic manner and 
found Bishop intelligent, articulate and non-provocative. 116 The talks were formal 
and frank but did not change anyone's minds about the PRG, it was, to use Bishop's 
words, an "exploratory" meeting. Ambassador NEddendorf was not alone in thinking 
that Bishop was having second thoughts about the increasing Soviet influence in 
Grenada. 187 One conclusion the U. S. did reach was that Bishop was more moderate 
than some of his CC colleagues and would be easier to do business with than the likes 
of Bernard Coard; they also wondered if Bishop had the power to pursue this 
normalization path. "s Critics have suggested that Bishop's visit was a missed 
opportunity to improve relations but as Dam stated, one meeting does not 
automatically translate into good relations. Dam had tried to create the basis for 
further meetings but it was never followed up and he categorized this as a failure on 
the U. S. ' pan. 189 
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Bishop described the talks as "a useful first step in the recommencement of 
dialogue between the governments" and had "delayed" an invasion, but added "we do 
not think the threat has been entirely removed. "'" He was promised nothing 
substantive by the U. S.; Clark had agreed to respond to Grenada! s proposals but the 
emphasis was on the PRG changing its behaviour. In fight of the events to come 
many have suggested that Bishop's visit contributed to his downfa. 
The general theory is that Bishop and his supporters favoured establishing an 
election timetable and rapprochement with the U. S. This conflicted with the Marxist- 
Leninist hard-liners who favoured reform of what they saw as Bishop's "one-manism" 
leadership and "petty bourgeois" (sic) tendencies, nationalization, government 
intervention in the economy and closer alignment with the Soviets. 191 By June 1983 
an ideology and power struggle was already underway within the PRG; there had 
been a week-long debate over Bishop's trip and the final vote was not unanimous 
with Coard and Liam James expressing their uncertainties. 192 To Bishop's opponents 
in the government dialogue was tantamount to ideological compromise. Some on the 
CC also felt that Bishop had acted without consulting them by going beyond what 
had previously been agreed in his dealings with the U. S. As Thorndike points out, 
Bishop had conceded too much for some: he had ordered the moratorium on 
denunciations to continue, possibly promised to reduce the Soviet and Cuban 
presence once Point Salines was completed, had established a Constitutional 
Commission and recently released political detainees. 193 Interestingly, Grenada! s 
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ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Richard Jacobs, learnt of the Bishop's trip via 
the Voice of America (VOA) and when asked about the nature of the Clark meeting 
by the Soviet's Director of the First Latin American Department Vladimir Kazimirov, 
who found out via the press, had to tell him that "thus far the results are 
confidential. " '94 Presumably Bishop's visit did exacerbate tensions with the PRG but 
the argument that Bishop was moving away from the Soviets is harder to sustain. 
Bishop visited North Korea in April 1983 and stopped over in Moscow. He met 
with Andrei Gromyko who expressed Soviet "solidarity and understanding" with 
Grenada. At the end of June the two countries signed four contractual arrangements 
under the 1982 economic and technical cooperation agreements. 19' A July 1983 
summary of Grenada-Soviet Relations by Jacobs reported that the Soviets were 
impressed with the PRGs management of power, that Grenada should "be the 
sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in the region" to 
increase the PRGs prominence in Soviet eyes and to generally continue to support 
the Soviet line internationally. 196 These episodes contradict the theory that Bishop 
visited the U. S. because he wanted to distance himself from the Soviets. From the 
Soviet side, Kazimirov seemed more concerned that the Grenadian ambassador had 
not informed him personally of Bishop's trip rather than why Bishop was there. 
Moscow had always dealt with Grenada cautiously due to doubts over the PRGs 
reliability and the possibility of a direct confrontation with the U. S.; the recent 
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escalation of tension by the U. S. may have meant that even the Soviets, presuming 
they were more confident of the PRG's allegiances, were not as concerned as they 
may have otherwise been about Bishop's visit if it lowered tension in the region. 
Conclusion 
President Reagan was determined to restore U. S. credibility and increase military 
capability after the perceived malaise of the Carter years. Due to geography and 
history the Caribbean Basin was destined to be the testing ground for this 
reinvigoration of U. S. foreign policy. Reag&s fervent anti-communism saw the 
Soviet Union as the cause of all ills in the region; combined with influence of the 
domino theory the administration thus feared "a chain reaction of leftist revolutions 
would turn the once subservient tropical basin into a rim of hostile Marxist states 
taking their cues from Castro's Cuba. 99197 The NSC staff knew of ReagaWs beliefs and 
ensured he received information that magnified the communist presence in the region. 
This supported the contentions of those who argued that even threats to minor 
interests should be met because all interests are interlinked and it reflected on U. S. 
global credibility. 
To the U. S. the PRG did little to assuage Washington! s view of them as a 
Soviet/Cuban proxy. By 1983 the PRG had a CC and PB, a PRA and militia 
outnumbering its neighbours combined forces, a developed propaganda machine and 
monopolized media, mass organizations and an internal security apparatus. '" The 
U. S. could not reconcile the persistent anti-U. S. rhetoric emanating from St. 
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George's with Bishop's professed desire for good relations; this combination led 
Washington to view talks as "futile and time-wasting. "199 Real concerns about 
Grenada! s ties to the Soviet bloc, the absence of elections, the possible military use of 
PSIA and the threat to the other islands aside, Washington was never convinced that 
Grenada seriously wanted normalized relations and with no real time pressure or 
security threat, the Reagan administration pursued a gradualistic approach of 
economic, political and military pressure; such extremes as covert or overt military 
action were unnecessary and unlikely. 200 
As we have already seen, the nature of the Eastern Caribbean meant that the other 
islands were inevitably affected by events in Grenada and its relations with the U. S. 
President Reagan made quite clear his displeasure with Grenada by excluding them 
from the CBI and withholding aid from the CDB. The Eastern Caribbean were not 
prepared to compromise the unity of the region by isolating Grenada. Several of the 
Caribbean countries had ignored U. S. pressure and established diplomatic relations 
with Cuba in the late 1970's and were not about to blithely follow the U. S. fine now; 
they had their own regional concerns to consider. As Payne et al comment: 
the local leaders' rather cool reaction to Reagans crude anti-Communism showed 
that they had been rather more sophisticated in their acceptance of the reality of 
ideological pluralism in the Commonwealth Caribbean than had their supposedly 
more worldly neighbours in Washington. 'O' 
However, Washington's image of Grenada as a poor, backward, third world regime 
that was a "minor irritant" reinforced the power asymmetry between the countries 
and meant that the U. S. assumed they could pursue their chosen policy without any 
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serious repercussions. The U. S. never achieved any regional or international 
consensus on its policy towards Grenada and were not concerned about it. For the 
region Grenada was a "fact of fife"; via CARICOM the islands hoped to nudge 
Grenada towards constitutionalism, believing this would also place constraints on 
Grenada! s n-dlitarization. 202 Simultaneously the Eastern Caribbean felt ever more 
insecure militarily and established a RSS to calm their underlying fears. 
Bishop's visit to Washington was seen by many as a chance to repair fences. 
Several lower echelon U. S. officials tried to promote it as such an opportunity but 
they were overruled by those higher up. 20' In a press statement Bishop told reporters 
that: 
We are here to speak to different strata and sectors of the American society with 
the hope of providing a better understanding of the Grenada revolution and to 
initiate a dialogue with officials of the U. S. Administration with a view towards 
normalizing relations between out two governments. 204 
Throughout the visit the emphasis was on contact with the public, media, Congress 
and Grenada! s friends in the U. S. In this sense the trip could be considered a success 
although Bishop was probably preaching to the converted most of the time. As to the 
question of normalizing relations, presuming Bishop was sincere his meeting was no 
more than a tentative first step on a long road. The history of U. S. -Grenadian 
relations counted against him and sceptical, or oppositional, U. S. officials gave little 
incentive, such as a progressive restoration of diplomatic links, to Bishop. This was 
clearly the prevalent opinion at the embassy in Barbados: 
The PRG continues to place prime importance on potential publicity gains 
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which only a meeting with the President would have generated in their view, 
rather than to be pinned down on the main issues impeding a normalization of 
relations. Refusing to talk on the basis of diplomatic formalities in our opinion 
amounts to simply a transparent excuse to avoid the target issues... Bishop's 
much publicized crusade to "forge a new beginning" in our relationship as he put 
it... has regretfully, but predictably, amounted to nothing new at all. 20' 
Payne concludes that: "the Washington visit should be interpreted, not so much as a 
change of strategy in any sense, even less an ideological compromise, but rather a 
tactical adjustment designed to take the heat off the revolution for a while. 06 It is 
difficult to believe that the PRG would have reduced its ties to Cuba and it is this 
which was the crux of the problem for the U. S. June was an anomaly; relations 
thereafter continued in a similar vein and the issue of normalization was lost amongst 
the internal power struggle that eventually consumed the PRG. 
The deterioration of relations during the Reagan administration was a 
continuation of the trend that was established during the Carter administration, albeit 
more pronounced. In conclusion, "given the nature of the Bishop regime's political 
objectives and of its foreign support, the administration had substantial grounds for 
wishing the PRGs demise, if not for taking active steps to remove it. "207 Reagans 
policy was one of attrition rather than actively seeking the removal of the PRG as 
they simply did not merit a military solution. The implosion of the revolution in 
October would change this. 
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CHAPTER4 
DEATH OF A REVOLUTION: PRELUDE TO AN INTERVENTION 
By the summer of 1983 the tension in U. S. -Grenadian relations had decreased. 
Simultaneously though the PRGs internal problems grew increasingly 
insurmountable: a faltering economy, waning popular support and an internecine 
Party power struggle culminated in the implosion of the PRG in October 1983 and its 
replacement by a Revolutionary Military Council which was then overthrown by a 
multilateral U. S. -Eastern Caribbean military force. In this chapter I will trace the 
decline of the PRG and the subsequent arrest of Bishop and his death on Wednesday, 
October 19, and the U. S. and Caribbean reaction to these events which laid the 
foundations for a military intervention. 
After June 
Despite Bishop's Washington meeting with U. S. officials in June 1983 no 
substantive change in relations materialized. Indeed, it seemed as if the U. S. 
discounted Bishop's visit as a propaganda exercise rather than a serious effort at 
improving relations. According to one senior Jamaican leader, even after June a U. S. 
official had encouraged Jamaica and other Caribbean nations to "isolate Grenada as a 
communist outpost and to consider taldng military action against the Bishop 
regime. " I 
1 Patrick E. Tyler, "The Niaking of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning, " Washington Post, 
October 30,1983, p. A14. 
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The U. S. also continued its policy of economic isolation. In August 1983 Grenada 
secured a three-year Extended Agreement with the MW worth $14.715 million, 
although only $9.7 million of this would be available for direct public sector use with 
the rest being spent on M-identified problem areas of the economy such as banking 
2 and the private sector. The PRG believed that once they had the INff's "seal of 
approval" the economic climate would improve and attract more domestic and 
3 foreign capital. However, as Smith concludes, the PRG`s: 
recourse to the IMIF on the scale it did in mid-1983 - an institution notorious for 
dictating and subverting the economic policy and strategy of progressive regimes 
... 
is clear evidence of the severity of the crisis which gripped the Grenadian 
economy. 4 
Apparently, the State Department were willing to support the Grenadian request but 
the Treasury failed to agree. 5 Although the U. S. did therefore oppose the application 
the IMF ignored their objections anyway. These developments obscured the division 
within the PRG that would soon tear the government apart. 
The Beizinninja of the End 
An indication that all was not well within the PRG came in October 1982 when 
Deputy Prime Nfinister Bernard Coard, the chief political theoretician of the party, 
resigned from the PB and CC. Coard felt that his authority as Chairman of the 
Organizing Committee had been undermined and stated that he was "tired and sick of 
being the only hatchetman and critique... he concluded that he was the main fetter 
2 Smith, "The Development Strategy, " p. 528. 
3 Claremont D. Kirton, "Grenada and the RAF: The PRGs Extended Fund Facility Program, 1983, " 
Latin American Perspectives 16, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 122. 
4 Smith, "The Development Strategy, " p. 533. 
-5 "Nfinutes of the Political and Economic Bureau, August, 31 st, 1983, " GDCM, no. 002306, p. 7. 
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on the development of the CC because everyone was depending on him for 
everything especially in the area of the economy. " In response a CC meeting 
identified "petty bourgeois" (sic) tendencies in the party and suggested a more select 
membership7 and that "the party must be placed on a firm Leninist footing. "s Coard 
also cited accusations against him of undermining Bishop's leadership and a belief that 
if the stricter adherence to Leninism that he felt necessary was implemented it would 
cause "personality clashes" with Bishop. 9 The PRGs external relations with 
Grenadians were similarly troubled. 
By the fourth year of the revolution the populace had grown disillusioned with the 
PRG. The economic downturn meant the government struggled to meet Grenadians 
increased socio-economic expectations. The Marxist-Leninist dogmatism of the PRG 
had little in common with the masses and alienated the small middle-class sector. The 
PRG also criticized the Churches as subversive in a strongly religious society. The 
PRGs mass organizations gradually lost support and a combination of the dislike of 
regimentation and poor pay led to the demoralization of many PRA and militia 
members. 
6 "Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM, 14-16 September, 1983, " Grenada 
Documents, document no. 112, p. 43. 
7 There were never more than about 70 full members of the NJM as most of the 300 individuals 
were "candidate members" who were still receiving political education and lacked M voting rights. 
As Ambursley and Dunkerley comment "since the NJM was not just a left-iNing party but one which 
governed a country, its low membership in a society of approximately 85,000 people is remarkable. 
it confirms that the party continued to repudiate easy populism and membership for its own sake, 
and that it adhered rigidly to the concept of a 'vanguard organisatioif. " Fitzroy AmbursIcy and 
James Dunkerley, Grenada. - nose Freedom? (London: Latin America Bureau, 1984), p. 58. 
8 Mceks, Carlhbean Revolufions, p. 173. 
' hri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada, " Problems of Communism =11 
(July-August 1984): 16. 
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In March 1983 a report to the CC concluded that the government was "close to 
losing its links with the masses. 1110 The decision to restrict the size of party 
membership resulted in administrative overload as overworked officials suffered 
mental and physical exhaustion. Additionally, inefficiency at all levels, a lack of 
communication and physical isolation, most Grenadians were unaware of the 
existence of the CC, all served to reduce contact with the public. " The external 
pressure placed on the PRG by the U. S. had contributed to the militarization of 
Grenada that had occurred and the subsequent increased intrusion of the PRA, in 
particular, and nfditia into everyday life. 
Conspiracy Theo 
One typical explanation of the demise of Bishop is that it was the result of a 
carefully planned conspiracy by a radical faction of the PRG led by the ambitious and 
committed Leninist Bernard Coard who plotted to remove the more moderate 
Bishop. Accordingly, Coard used his position to appoint his OREL disciples into 
positions of power and then resigned to disguise his intentions. Finally, in late 1983 
the Coard faction manufactured a crisis to introduce the proposal of joint leadership 
and when Bishop expressed opposition they arrested him to clear the way for Coard's 
return. 12 Before examining the series of self-critical CC meetings that prefaced the 
Payne et al., Grenada, p. I 11. 
lbid., p. 106. 
12 Kai Schoenhals, "The Road to Fort Rupert: The Revolution! s Final Crisis, " Paper prepared for a 
conference on "Democracy, Development and Collective Security in the Eastern Caribbean: The 
Lessons of Grenada, " sponsored by the Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America 
(CISCLA) of Inter American University of Puerto Rico, San German Puerto Rico, October 17-19, 
1985: 1. 
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PRG's demise it is necessary to consider the other reasons for the events that 
occurred. 
That the CC were divided into Bishop and Coard supporters is indisputable, but 
the struggle that evolved was more of a classic power struggle involving personality 
and leadership differences rather than ideological ones. Bishop and Coard were very 
contrasting characters. 
Maurice Bishop was the public face of the PRG: "tall, handsome, popular, an 
inspired and inspiring public speaker, a man who had come to his leadership position 
in a spontaneous, natural fashion. .. who received the accolades and the 
recognition. it 13 As Marable states, "Bishop was the charismatic, symbolic fink 
between the PRG, the NJM and the Grenadian masses. "14 He was a "pragmatic" and 
"populist" politician and as his secret September 1982 Line of March speech 
revealed, he was also clearly committed to Marxist-Leninism. 1' However, Bishop's 
attitude to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine has been described as "ambiguous and 
reverential. it 16 Indeed, as Feuer points out, "his speeches contain little of the rhetoric 
or class analysis usually associated with Marxist-Leninism; there seems more 
emphasis on the youth, women and small farmers than the working-class. " 17 Finally, 
a factor that is important to remember, Bishop's political style was one of consensus 
and accommodation. Heine concludes that Bishop "was overaccommodating as a 
13 Jorge Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik. Charismatic Leadership, Political Management, 
and Crisis in Revolutionary Grenada, " in Heine (ecL), A Revolution Aborted, p. 241. 
14 Ntirablc, Afilcan and Caribbean Politics, p. 225. 
15 The Line of March speech can be found in Seabury and McDougall (a), 7he Grenada Papers, 
pp. 59-88. 
16 Hcinc, "The Hero and the Apparatchik, " p. 22 1. 
11 Carl Feuer, "Was Bishop a Social Democrat, " Caribbean Review X11, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 39. 
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leader. He didn't want to offend people, and therefore his own beliefs and positions 
were often compromised. "18 For example, when Coard made the decision to close 
Torchlight in 1979 when Bishop was abroad without consulting him, Bishop made no 
objection when he returned, despite his reservations about such a measure. 
Bernard Coard was the private face of the PRG. His forte was long-term planning 
and managerial strategy and he was responsible for the PRG's political economy 
policies. Coard was a dogmatic, ideology-oriented Marxist-Leninist who favoured a 
pro-Soviet hard-line policy. He was the man behind the party's organization and 
tactics and "from his positions on the Organizing Committee, the Politburo, and the 
CC, he kept trying to build a highly centralized, hierarchicaL elitist party structure in 
accordance with his own strict interpretation of Leninist doctrine. "19 It was this 
situation, combined with his former OREL associates support, that "enabled him to 
assign loyalists to strategic positions throughout the party, mass organizations, and 
government ministries. "20 According to some authors this process was all part of a 
masterplan to remove Bishop from power. 
As far as the working relationship between Bishop and Coard was concerned, 
"Maurice generally bowed to Bernard's tactical and ideological leadership with 
Bernard in turn accepting his position of chief ideologue/tactician while ceding the 
kudos of popularity and later national leadership to Maurice. "M Bishop respected 
Coard's understanding of the "science" of Marxist-Leninism and trusted his judgment. 
's Heine, "The Hero and the Apparatchik, " p. 244. 
19 Ibid, p. 238. 
20 CIA Report, "A First Look, " p. Al. 
21 Meeks, Cafibbean Revolutions, p. 171. 
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Coard accepted that Bishop epitomized the revolution for Grenadians but in private 
he criticized Bishop's leadership style; before his resignation from the PB and CC in 
October 1982 he criticized the "dead-weight" leaders on the CC. After heavy 
criticism by the Coard faction several pro-Bishop members were dismissed: Radix 
and Noel forcibly and Creft after resigning. 22 
Disregarding the theory of a multi-stage gradualistic plan by Coard to overthrow 
Bishop, there were obvious problems within the party. Most authors concur that the 
crisis which destroyed the PRG arose over the Coard faction's disappointment over 
the rate of social and economic transformation, the persistence of "petty bourgeois" 
(sic) tendencies in the NJM and the difficulties encountered in establishing a Marxist- 
Leninist party structure and control system. 23 As Ambursley and Dunkerly suggest, 
the division within the PRG "was not essentially about ideology, but it did centre on 
political tactics and party discipline, which inevitably helped to draw out and sharpen 
incipient differences of style, approach and strategy. toN At a series of CC meetings in 
July, August and September 1983 the power-struggle reached its violent 
denouement. 
The First Plenajy Session 
From July 13-19,1983, the CC convened its first ever Plenary Session. Here 
ideological, pofitical and organizational weaknesses were identified: 
The continued failure of the Party to transform itself ideologically and organ- 
izationally and to exercise firm leadership along a Leninist path in the face of the 
22 Marable,. Afilcan and Caribbean Polifics, p. 253. 
23 Payne ct al., Grenada, p. 106. 
24 Ambursley and Dunkerlcy, Grenada, p. 55. 
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acute rise in the complexities and difficulties facing the Revolution on all fronts. 25 
Concern was also expressed over the "emergence of deep petty (sic) bourgeois 
manifestations and influences in the party which has led to two ideological traits. 06 
Bishop's name was not mentioned but at subsequent meetings he would be strongly 
denounced for his petit bourgeois tendencies. 
The CC complained that mass organization activity had stagnated, workers 
attendance at classes was low and inconsistent, militia numbers had fallen, anti- 
Communist activity was rising as was Church activity; a report warned "how 
dangerously close the Party came to losing links with the masses. "27 Rather than 
trying to improve external relations with the masses the CC concluded that increased 
political and ideological training was required, more careful selection of political 
cadres and stronger leadership. 28 These criticisms would resurface at subsequent 
meetings as the crisis developed. 
The self-critical tones continued at an Emergency Meeting of the CC on August 
26,1983. In addition to concern about the neglect of the militia and low morale 
amongst the PRA, criticism now focused on the composition and function of the CC. 
Selwyn Strachan warned that "sections of the party have begun to rebel against the 
higher organs of the party... This silent rebellion will turn into open rebellion and if 
we do not address it now it will be resolved in a petty (sic) bourgeois way. "29 
25 "Centml Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13-19 July, 1983, " Grenada Documents, 
document no. 110, p. 1. 
26 lbid, p. 1. 
27 ibid, P. i. 
28 lbid, p. 7. 
29 "Minutes of Emergency Meeting of NIM. Central Committee Dated 26th August, 1983, " 
Grenada Documents, document no. I 11, p. 4. 
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Prophetically, Liam James cautioned that "we are seeing the beginning of the 
disintegration of the party. "" In summarizing the meeting Bishop agreed with James' 
diagnosis and recommended greater CC self-criticism, work committees and study 
groups to improve CC members performance and, ludicrously, that members should 
read a history of the Soviet communist party. 31 At the next meeting of the CC it 
would be Bishop and his supporters who became the target of criticism. 
Sgptember 1983 
An Extra-ordinary Meeting of the CC took place between September 14-16, 
1983. The meeting started ominously for Bishop when his agenda was rejected as 
"lacking in focus" and was replaced by the radicals! agenda consisting of an analysis 
of the present state of the party and revolution, an analysis of the CC and its main 
problems and discussion of the way forward. 32 Ewart Layne began proceedings by 
stating that the revolution was in more danger than ever. The population displayed 
"dispiritiveness and dissatisfaction"; he warned that: 
the party is crumbling, all mass organizations are to the ground, organs of 
people's democracy is about to collapse (sic). The internal state of the party is very 
dread (sic). There is wide protest against the higher organs, prestige has fallen in 
the eyes of the party members and the masses. The C. C. has proven its inability 
to give leadership to the process e. g. this time the C. C. cannot determine the stage 
the revolution is at. 33 
The participants felt that the CC was not providing adequate leadership and that the 
revolution lacked direction. Additionally it was felt that more attention had to be paid 
30 Ibid., p. 3. 
31 lbid., p. 6. 
32 "Extraordinary Mecting of the Central Committec, " Grenada Documents, documcnt no. 112, p. 3. 
33 lbid., p. 4. 
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to the people if the revolution was to survive. At the end of the first day Bishop 
concluded that there was a deep crisis caused by the weaknesses in the functioning of 
the CC and that this contributed to the low morale of the masses. 34 
On the second day Bishop was the target of direct criticism. Liam James led off by 
criticizing the "levels of disorganisation, low ideological level and failure to put the 
party on a firm M. L. [Marxist-Leninist] footing" and opined that "the most 
fundamental problem is the quality of leadership of the Central Committee and the 
party provided by Cde. Maurice Bishop. 05 James acknowledged Bishop's talents as a 
charismatic leader who had gained national and international respect for the 
revolution but suggested that he lacked the qualities to advance the revolution, 
namely: "a Leninist level of organisation and discipline, greater depth in ideological 
clarity [and] brilliance in strategy and tactics. 06 Other members of the Coard faction 
then joined in; Phyllis Coard, Bernard's wife, commented that: 
the Cde. (sic) Leader has not taken the responsibility, not given the necessary 
guidance, even in areas where he is directly in charge of the guidance is not ade- 
quate. He is disorganised very often, avoid (sic) responsibilities for dealing with 
critical areas of work. 37 
In response the pro-Bishop George Louison said that Bishop's leadership was "not 
the only problem. " Unison Whiteman, whilst accepting that Bishop had his faults, said 
that the CC were not exactly blameless. However, Bishop conceded that "it is correct 
as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities" and that he needed time to 
34 Ibid, p. 13. 
35 Ibid., p. 14. 
M lbicL, p. 14. 
37 Ibid., p. 16. 
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think about the situation . 
3' The stage had been set for what would some authors 
argue was the final step in Coard's elaborate plan to marginalise Bishop and seize 
power himself 
Having soundly criticized Bishop's leadership, James, seconded by Layne and 
Leon Cornwall, proposed a "Joint Leadership" plan: Bishop would be responsible for 
work with the masses, propaganda, the organs of popular democracy, militia 
mobilization and regionaLrinternational affairs. Coard would be responsible for Party 
organization work, the Organization Committee, Party organization and development 
and strategy and tacticS. 39 It would seem that the majority of the CC thought joint 
leadership was the most appropriate solution to the situation. There was general 
agreement that Coard's return to the CC and PB would be welcome and Bishop's and 
Coard's abilities did complement one another. As Meeks concludes, "joint leadership 
was not, as some have implied, a bolt out of the blue. It was simply the formal 
interpretation of Coard and Bishop's pre-1979 relationship. "40 Bishop did not initially 
oppose powersharing although he felt it was a vote of "no confidence, " his concern 
was what Coard's view of this arrangement was, the implementation of it and that 
joint leadership would project an image of a revolution undergoing a power struggle 
and near collapse . 
4' Again, Bishop asked for time to consider the proposal and 
suggested that the CC should talk to Coard whilst he (Bishop) was in St. Kitts 
38 Ibid., P. 19. 
39 Ibid., p. 2 1. 
40 Meeks, Caribbean Revolutions, p. 175. 
41 "Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee, " Grenada Documents, document no. 112, p. 
29. 
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attending their Independence Day ceremony. The meeting closed with a vote on the 
formalization of James' proposal which was passed by nine votes for, one against and 
three abstentions. 
On September 17 the CC met with Coard to discuss joint leadership. Interestingly, 
none of those who had questioned the proposal were present. Coard had actually met 
with Bishop before he left for St. Kitts. Coard agreed that the situation was grim and 
he believed that the Party would disintegrate in six months unless a "fundamental 
package of measures are done. o43 Coard was initially reluctant to return to the CC 
and PB and emphasized that the implementation of joint leadership must satisfy 
Bishop. 
On September 25 there was an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Full 
Members of the Party. A CC report was distributed that explained that joint 
leadership was: 
an attempt to bring a creative and scientific solution to the leadership question 
in our concrete circumstances and most fundamentally... it is the formal 
recognition of the leadership of our party for the first ten years... up to one year 
ago. 44 
Bishop's failure to attend was interpreted as "contempt to the C. C. decision and 
democratic centralism. , 45 Coard felt his presence without Bishop would be 
inappropriate so he did not attend either. Eventually the members voted to force both 
to attend. It appears that Bishop was having second thoughts, saying that, "I am 
42 The British Deputy fligh Commissioner David Montgomery remembers Bishop appearing 
worried, edgy and unusually quiet throughout the occasion and quick to return to Grenada the next 
day. Interview with David Montgomery, November 8,1995, London. 
43 lbid., p. 43. 
44 Thorndike, Grenada, p. 15 1. 
45 "Extra-Ordinary Gencral Mecting of FuU Mcmbcrs, Septcmbcr 25di, 1983, " Grenada 
Documents, docurawt no. 113, p. 10. 
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suspicious that Comrades have concluded that the party must be transformed into a 
Marxist-Leninist party and I am the wrong person to be leader. "46 Charges of 
"vacillation" and "individualism" were leveled against him. Despite his reservations 
Bishop's only response was accommodative; "I sincerely accept the criticism and will 
fulfill the decision in practice. voV Bishop and Coard then embraced and it seemed that 
the crisis had been averted. 
On September 27 Bishop and two of his main supporters, Whiteman and George 
Louison, unwisely left Grenada to visit Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Moscow, East 
Germany and Cuba. As acting party leader and Prime Minister in Bishop's absence, 
Coard was able to consolidate his position. It appears that during this trip Bishop, 
probably encouraged by Whiteman and Louison, had second thoughts about joint 
leadership. In Budapest, Bishop told his bodyguard, Cletus St. Paul, that the crisis 
was a "power struggle" and that "no state had joint leadership. "49 In Cuba, Bishop 
told Castro that he had "given little attention to the militia. I've given little attention 
to the work of the party. When I return I shall give more attention to the work of the 
party and mass organizations. v@49 It is unknown whether Bishop discussed the power 
struggle with Castro and, if not, how much Castro knew of the situation. According 
to one official, whilst in Cuba Bishop was told to be on his guard when he returned 
home. 50 The CC learnt of Bishop's change of mind when St. Paul phoned them from 
46 Ibicl., p. 14. 
47 Thomclike, Grenada, p. 152. 
48 Payne et al., Grenada, p. 128. 
49 Cotman, Yhe Gor7lon Tree, p. 211. 
-50 Interview with Kelly. 
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Cuba and hinted that "blood will flow. "51 The CC accused Bishop of discussing his 
problems with Castro and interpreted this latest development as a plot to eliminate 
the radicals. 
Bishop was now convinced that joint leadership was a plot to undermine his 
authority. When he arrived back only one member of the PB, a casually dressed 
Selwyn Strachan, was there to meet him. Bishop told Strachan that he wanted the 
joint leadership issue to be put back on the agenda and that he now favoured 
it 52 collective" rather than joint leadership. Bishop failed to attend a CC Emergency 
Session on Monday, October 10, and was only visited by Hudson Austin and Layne 
during this time. In a conversation with Vincent Noel the following day, Noel 
mentioned that Chalkie Ventour had spoken of an "Mghan solution" if Bishop 
continued to vacillate; Bishop had also heard of such talk and replied that "what was 
at stake was much more than whether he had petit bourgeois qualities or 
weaknesses. 03 
On Wednesday, October 12, the PB met in what was to prove to be the beginning 
of the end for Bishop. Prior to the meeting Bishop had realized that he either had to 
accept the CC's decision or get the support of the masses; hence St. Paul was 
instructed to circulate a rumour that Coard was planning to assassinate Bishop. In 
response the pro-Bishop militia members tried to arm and mobilize and the Army 
Chief of Staff, Einstein Louison, tried to rally support for Bishop in the PRA. At the 
meeting Bishop's challenge to the joint leadership decision received short shrift. He 
51 Payne et al., Grenada, p. 129. 
52 JbiCL' P. 129. 
53 "Letter from Noel to Central Committee, 10/17/83, " in Scabury and McDougall (eds. ), 7he 
Grenada Papers, p. 338. 
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was out-voted nine to three; James made it clear that "we have to be cold-blooded 
and cast all emotions aside, we have to be determined. MB [Maurice Bishop] is 
mainly responsible for the crisis in the party. 04 Bishop, George Louison and Fitzroy 
Bain were then accused of "one-manism, " "cultism" and "spreading rumours as a 
precondition for murdering the CC and chasing the party off the streets. "55 
Unbeknown to Bishop, the Coard faction had assembled key PRA figures at 1: 00 
a. m. that morning and informed them that Bishop had rebelled and that "they were to 
defend the working-class as a whole and not the life of any individual leaders. ', '6 At 
the meeting the PRA issued a statement supporting joint leadership: "Never will we 
allow cultism, egoism, the unreasonable and unprincipled desires of one man or a 
minority to be imposed on our Party. "57 With his power undermined and the PRA 
supporting his removal, Bishop's fate was sealed. 
At a meeting of all the 300 or so NJM members on Thursday, October 13, at 
10: 00 p. m. Bishop was denounced as having "disgraced the party" and was now 
"without redemption. "58 He denied spreading assassination rumours but when Errol 
George, a member of Bishop's security personnel, repeated the charges Bishop 
refused to deny George's claims, an action that was interpreted by the attendants as 
an admission of guilt. In an atmosphere that Noel described as "a horrendous display 
of militarism, hatred and emotional vilification, "59 an isolated and confused Bishop 
54 Grenada: A Prelimintuy Report, p. 34. 
55 Schoenhals; and Melanson, Revolution and Intervention, p. 73. 
56 1ý4arable, African and Caribbean Politics, p. 258. 
57 "Resolution of People's Army, 10/12183, " in Seabury and McDougall (eds. ), The Grenada Papers, 
p. 325. 
58 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 14. 
59 "Letter From Noel" in Seabury and McDougall (cds. ), 7he Grenada Papers, p. 338. 
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was a sitting duck. What happened next was a formality. On the pretext of a threat to 
the Coards and other CC members the CC voted to place Bishop under house arrest. 
He was put on RFG at 00: 15 a. m. to deny that there was any dissension within the 
Cabinet and to dismiss the assassination rumour. " On the morning of Friday, 
October 14, Bishop was informed by Austin and Strachan, that he had been expelled 
from the party. 
Under Arrest: October 13-19 
Even before news of Bishop's arrest reached Washington the power struggle in 
Grenada had attracted attention. The U. S. embassy in Barbados had been monitoring 
the situation and as Kenneth Kurze, the Counselor for Political and Military Affairs at 
the embassy, commented, "rumors that the radicals led by Coard were discontent 
(sic) and planning something (at the very least, pressure on Bishop to conform) had 
been circulating for weeks. 'M Amongst the first to pick up on this in Washington 
was the staunch right-wing anti-Communist Constantine Menges, the President's 
National Security Assistant for Latin American Affairs. 62 Menges was concerned 
I Bishops midnight broadcast was unusual in that he was introduced as the "Leader of the NJM" 
rather than "Prime Minister" as was customary and RFG normally went off-air at midnight and thus 
the only people likely to hear Bishop! s broadcast were those expecting such an announcement. 
Interview with Kelly. 
" Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 116. There had been rumours of a power struggle in the PRA 
back in April 1983. Ludlow Flower, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada 
After the Bishopaeagan Exchange: Quiet Puzzled, Disgruntled, " 201845Z, April 1983, 
Bridgetown 02334, section 4, p. 2. 
62 Menges had joined the NSC only two weeks earlier from the CU where he had been the National 
Intelligence Officer for Latin America. During his two-year stay at the CIA his ideological fervour 
had caused three Senators to write a protest letter to CIA Director William Casey after a Menges 
briefing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "turned into a harangue against Havana. .- 
denouncing Communists and attributing the woes of Central America to Moscow and Maridsm. " 
Bob Woodward, VEJL: 7he IV= of the CLI 1981-1987 (New York. Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 
189. Casey eventually decided Menges had outgrown his usefulness at the CIA where he was 
causing friction between Casey and his Deputy Chief of Intelligence John McMahon and so 
"shippee him off to the NSC. Woodward, ML, p. 257. 
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about the possible danger to U. S. citizens, predominantly the 800 or so medical 
students, on the island. He later recalled that: 
in crises there is opportunity, and I believed that this emergency just might 
present an excellent chance to restore democracy to Grenada while assuring the 
safety of our citizens. I immediately asked all the foreign policy agencies to pro- 
vide their latest facts on Grenada. I also sought up-to-date information on any 
activities by Cuban or Soviet-bloc secret police or military units that might be 
sent to help one or the other communist faction. Further, I suggested that there 
be an immediate increase in efforts to detect any movement of Cuban or other 
hostile forces toward Grenada. 63 
Subsequently, at a 7: 30 a. m. NSC meeting on Thursday, October 13, Menges gave a 
succinct summary of the situation in Grenada. After the meeting he drafted an 
ambitious, even presumptuous considering Bishop had not yet been arrested, one- 
page plan for "the protection of our U. S. citizens and the restoration of democracy 
on Grenada. It suggested action by an international, legal, collective security force 
that would include democratic Caribbean countries. #o64 
Later that day the State Department's Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) 65 
met, chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne 
63 Constantine Menges, Inside the National Secufity CounciL 7he True Story of theMaking and 
Unmaking ofReagan's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 60. 
64 Ibid., p. 60. Menges' forwardness might be partly explained by the fact that barely a week earlier 
on October 4,1983, he had secured presidential approval for a review of Eastern Caribbean regional 
security policy with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 105. The partially declassified 
document outlines a prograrnme to "signal our [U. S. ] support for the democratic Eastern Caribbean 
nations through enhanced public diplomacy and private assurances. " In addition an improved 
security programme to enable the Eastern Caribbean nations to address security threats was 
outlined: "U. S. material and training assistance. .. to upgrade the effectiveness of both the regional 
security forces and those of the individual states. " Christopher Simpson, National Security 
Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations., The Declassified History of US Political and 
Militwy Policy, 1981-1991 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 333. 
65 RIG was an offshoot of the five Inter-Agency Groups (IGs) that existed to handle each of the 
main regions of the world. IG's commonly had about 20 members; representatives from the 
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Treasury and so on. Motley was in charge of the IG for 
Latin America. He created RIG so that only the key actors would be involved: the Secretary of State, 
JCS, CIA and NSC. RIG reported to the National Security Planning Group. 
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Motley. Grenada was not originally on the schedule but this was amended to discuss 
the Bishop-Coard split and the possibility of further unrest and the threat this posed 
to U. S. citizens on the island. 66 Thus the NSC and RIG had both paid attention to 
Grenada before Bishop was arrested late that Thursday. 
Also that Thursday, President Reagan! s second National Security Advisor (NSA) 
William Clark announced his resignation to accept the position of Secretary of the 
Interior Department . 
67 The fight to replace Clark was to divert the attention of top- 
level officials for several days. Reagan had curtailed the role of the NSA and his NSC 
staff, removing their cabinet status and placing them under the direct control of the 
President's Counselor Edwin Meese . 
6' Two White House factions emerged in the 
struggle to find a successor to Clark, divided "not so much by ideology as by 
personality and a sense of who was better serving the interests of the President. , 69 
The Deaver-Baker-Shultz group advocated Baker as the new NSA. In opposition to 
this were the Clark-Weinberger-Meese-Casey group who argued that Baker lacked 
the necessary experience. However, the conservatives candidate, Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
was unacceptable to the pragmatists, with Shultz even threatening to resign if she 
was appointed. 
66 Interview with Langhorne Motley, August 25,1994, Washington D. C. 
67 Baker and Deaver had long wanted Clark removed and when Wan was fired from the Interior 
Department they saw their opportunity and suggested to Reagan that Clark was the logical 
successor. The dutiful Clark met with Reagan and Deaver and when presented with the proposal had 
no objections if that was what the President wanted. Allan Gcrson, The OrApatrick Mission: 
Diplomacy Without Apology., Amefica at the United Nations 1981-1985 (New York. Free Press, 
1991), p. 218. 
68 Kevin Mulcahy, "The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaldng 
in the Carter and Reagan Administrations, " Presidential Stu&es Quarterly XVI, no. 2 (Spring 
1986): 291. 
69 Gerson, TheUrApaftickAfission, p. 218. 
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Reagan eventually decided over the weekend of October 15-16 that he could not 
appoint Baker because of fierce opposition which he felt would cause "fliction among 
the cabinet and the White House staff. 00 The result was that Robert McFarlane, a 
former senior military staff aide on the NSC and at the time Clarles deputy, was 
appointed. In Cannon! s words McFarlane was "everyone's distant second choice... 
the compromise candidate. 01 McFarlane envisaged the NSA as an "honest broker" 
and the role of the NSC being "not to dominate the policy making process. Instead it 
must perform the much more difficult task of policy facilitation and coordination. "72 
McFarlane's newness and preoccupation with Lebanon, where he advised Reagan to 
hold the line when the NSC favoured withdrawal, meant that Grenada did not receive 
cabinet-level attention until Thursday, October 20. Another important factor was that 
McFarlane initially lacked close access to Reagan and therefore ended up siding with 
Shultz on many issues. 
Returning to the latest developments in Grenada, Washington learnt of Bishop's 
arrest from its embassy in Barbados. The embassy had had no one on Grenada at the 
time of the arrest or any intelligence assets there and so learnt of events from the 
British Deputy High Commissioner in Barbados David Montgomery. Montgomery, 
informed by the British representative on Grenada, John Kelly, 73 had contacted the 
70 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 434. 
71 IbU, p. 434. 
72 Robert C. McFarlane with Richard Saunders and Thomas C. Shull, "The National Security 
Council: Organization for Policy Maldng, " in R. Gordon Home (O; L), 7he Presidency and National 
Security Policy (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984), p. 262. 
13 Kelly had first reported rumours of Bishopýs house arrest and the danger to his life on Tuesday, 
October 11. Kelly remained in contact with the High Commission in Barbados throughout the crisis 
via the telephone and VBF radio in his small office in St. Georgc's. John Kelly's letter to the author 
dated December 21,1995. 
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embassy late on Thursday, October 13, to report "rumblings from Grenada indicating 
that Coard [is] about to throw Bishop out and declare a Marxist state. "74 Early on 
Friday, October 14, Montgomery confirmed that "Coard [had been] all but successful 
in his maneuver. 'M This was corroborated by Grenadians phoning Barbados. 
In the Caribbean, Barbadian Prime Minister Tom Adams heard of Bishop's arrest 
on Thursday, October 14, from a "friendly diplomatic source, " most likely the British. 
He described it as "an act so extreme as to imply some measure of imminent violence 
and disorder. "76 Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles did not initially share 
Adame concern, believing that "at that time I didn't feel it was my business to even 
think of interfering because if the people of the country want their leader kept under 
control, it's their business, not n-dne. "77 Irrespective of Charles' indifference other 
Eastern Caribbean leaders concluded that "whatever our differences in the past, Mr. 
,, 79 Bishop deserved the support of Caribbean governments in the circumstances. 
Adams contacted DCM Flower at the U. S. embassy and suggested that "we" 
(Barbados, OECS and the U. S. ) had to act. According to Flower, Adams was not 
proposing intervention at this stage but more a "united front. 09 
In Washington that Friday, RIG convened again to specifically discuss Grenada. 
The group, sentient of the possibility of a hostage situation and the inescapable 
74 Bish! s notes. 
Ibid. 
"I "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados the Hon. Mr. Tom Adams Explaining his 
Reasons for Taldng Part in the Invasion of Grenada, " in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, 
CaribbeanKfonthly Bulletin, October 1983, Supplement no. 1, Item M, p. 35. 
ffigbic, Eugenia, p. 223. 
78 " Full Texi of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 35. 
" Interview with Ludlow Flower, October 27,1994, Washington D. C. 
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analogy with Iran in 1980, which I will discuss later, reviewed standard evacuation 
procedures. There exists four "layers of active participation for protecting lives"80: 
the host government is reminded of its obligation to protect the welfare of foreign 
nationals; if the host is unable to guarantee this then they are requested to assist in the 
removal of nationals from the danger area; if the host is unable or unwilling to do this 
the U. S. will do it as long as the host pledges non-interference and finally a forced 
evacuation when the host is unable or unwilling to promise non-interference. 81 The 
last of these is usually referred to as a nonpermissive evacuation operation (NEO). 
Additionally, the Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS Vice Admiral Arthur S. 
Moreau, a RIG member, was instructed to tell the JCS to review their contingency 
plans for an evacuation operation. In turn, the JCS contacted the Commander-in- 
Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) Admiral Wesley McDonald at CINCLANT 
headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, and instructed him to "investigate the possibility of 
conducting U. S. Naval presence and possible non-combatant evacuation operations if 
the need to evacuate American citizens from the island arose. 02 
Concurrently, Menges showed his plan to RIG member Oliver North to assess the 
military requirements and to the NSC's senior intelligence director Kenneth 
deGraffenreid to survey the available intelligence. 83 Menges explained that it was 
so Interview with Motley. 
11 Stephen Edward Flynn, "Grenada as a "Reactive" and a "Proactive" Crisis: New Models of Crisis 
Dccisionmaking" (Ph. D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1988), p. 106. 
82 John Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction, " 7he University of 
Miami Inter-American Law Review 18 (Winter 1986-1987): 338. Grenada fclI into CINCLANT 
boundaries which were dominated by the Navy. Donn-Erik Marshall, "Urgent Fury: 'Me U. S. 
Military Intervention in Grenada" MA. diss., University of Virginia, 1989), p. 32. 
" Mcngcs, Inside the NSC, p. 62. 
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only a "personal idea" and that it should be kept secret. Both men expressed their 
scepticism that it would be adopted. 
Washington had interpreted Bishop's arrest as the result of a power struggle 
between Bishop and Coard factions but even by this stage it was clear that Bishop's 
arrest would not be the end of the story. Word of the arrest had spread around the 
island and when the Minister of Mobilization Selwyn Strachan, a henchman of 
Coard's, appeared at the offices of the Free West Indian newspaper to announce 
Bishop's removal and replacement by Coard, he was shouted down and chased off the 
premises. RFG officially broadcast this development at 3: 30 p. m. to an unsettled and 
stunned populace. Perhaps not anticipating the hostile reaction of the people, Coard 
instructed RFG to announce his resignation at 4: 00 p. m. to "put a stop to the vicious 
rumor that he has been attempting to replace Comrade Maurice Bishop as Prime 
Minister. 04 RFG also stated that all PRA reservists should report for duty the next 
morning at Fort Rupert. 
SaturdM October 15 
In Barbados U. S. ambassador Nfilan Bish approached the Barbadian Permanent 
Secretary of Defense and Security with the offer of a transport plane "to cover both a 
[voluntary] release of Bishop" or "Bishop's forcible freeing by a raid being 
contemplated by several Caribbean states. "" The exact origins of the plan are not 
"' Marable, Affican and Cafibbean Politics, p. 259. This announcement directly contradicted the 
broadcast of a mere thirty minutes before. 
85 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 96. One of the authors of the plan, Nbjor Mark Adkin, reveals 
that the rescue operation "assumed a hostile reception and was based on a surprise coup de main 
operation. The first phase would occur during darkness, with the troops arriving by helicopter. Key 
targets were Bishopýs house, the govemor-gcneral's residence, Pearls and Salines airfields, the radio 
station, and a series of blocking or ambush positions to the north and south of St. George's. " Mark 
Adkin, Urgent Fupy. The Battlefor Grenada (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 92. 
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clear but according to Bish it was a CIA initiative. 86 According to one embassy 
official, the hope was that Bishop's removal would prevent further violence and 
encourage stabilization in Grenada. 87 Planning for the rescue proceeded but events 
would soon make it redundant. 
In St. George's, Kendrick Radix organized 300 people in the market square and 
told them that Coard was "obsessed with power" and if they wanted Bishop free they 
should "seek out Coard. "' He was arrested soon after and ended up in Richmond 
Hill prison. On RFG Leon Cornwall condemned Bishop for spreading rumours and 
underlined that "until now Maurice Bishop has led the NJM and the PRG, but no man 
is above the party" 89 and that the PRA "would not tolerate any disruption of peace 
and calm on the island. "90 News of the situation in Grenada had reached Havana by 
now and on Saturday, October 15, Castro sent a frank letter to the CC saying that 
"the supposed notion that on passing through our country Bishop had informed me of 
the problems inside the Party is a miserable piece of slander" and that "everything 
which happened was... a surprise, and disagreeable. " Castro also made it clear that 
86 Interview with Bish. A prime candidate for designing such a plan was Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, 
the Latin America Division Chief of the Directorate of Operations at the CIA. It was Clarridge who 
had come up with the proposal for mining Nicaraguan harbours. Woodward describes Clarridge as 
"endlessly creative, difficult to deal with, not always precise, but always putting new things 
together. " Woodward, VEJL, p. 283. 
87 Interview with Flower. 
88 Payne ct al., Grenada, p. 132. 
89 BisWs notes. 
90 Schoenhals and Mclanson, Revolufion and Intervenfion, p. 75. 
91 "Letter from Castro to Central Committee, 10/15/83, " in Seabury and McDougall (eds. ), 7he 
Grenada Papers, p. 327. 
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Cuba would "pay strictest attention to the principle of not interfering in the slightest 
in the internal affairs of Grenada. 1192 
The Cuban response was watched closely by the embassy; at this early stage they 
reported that the Cubans appeared to be "avoiding taking sides at this point. They 
may be trying to mediate the dispute to insure the factional infighting does not break 
out into a divisive civil war. .. a situation which would endanger their position in 
Grenada. "9' With a relatively large Cuban contingent on the island it was felt that if 
the Cubans were to back one side against the other it would prove decisive: 
A complete political impasse would mean the military will have to weigh in. 
They are at present divided. Other things being equal, Coard could well need 
the Cubans to enforce a takeover. On the other hand, Bishop would probably 
not need the Cubans to restore his rule. 94 
For Washington, Cuban involvement would "create a whole new ballgame. "95 The 
embassy reported that the situation in Grenada remained "confused and fluid" but that 
the chances of civil war seemed low and the current level of violence was not a threat 
to the students although "should widespread disorders develop... U. S. citizens could 
be endangered. "96 In the event that Coard, should triumph the embassy recommended 
a more "energetic" response and promised to forward their suggestions. 97 
92 Ibid., p. 328. 
93 Mlan Bish, confidential telcgrm to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Current Situation, " 
n. d. [October 15,1983? ], p. 1. 
94 Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Unrest: Political 
Solution Talks Apparently Going On: Nfifitary Divided Between Coard. and Bishop, " 151602Z, 
October 1983, Bridgetown 06249, section 2, p. 1. 
95 lbid., p. 1. 
96 Bish, "Subject: Grenada Current Situation, " p. 1. 
97 BisWs notes. 
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Over the next three days (Saturday, October 15, to Monday, October 17) serious 
negotiations took place between Coard and Strachan and the pro-Bishop George 
Louison, who was arrested on Sunday, October 16, but allowed out to talk, and 
Unison Whiteman, who had returned from a UN trip that day, to find a solution to 
the crisis. The four met for several hours on each day; Louison reports that Coard 
was buoyant during the talks, believing that it was possible to remove Bishop because 
the CC was popular with the people and that: "once it was sold as a party decision 
and demonstrated that Maurice was resistant, they thought the masses of the people 
would say, Veil look, you cannot have somebody resisting the majority in that 
way`. "" 
George Louison believed that the joint leadership proposal was folly and that the 
party and CC had been discredited. He told Coard that it was imperative Bishop be 
released or it could lead to a civil war as Grenadians were growing increasingly 
restive. Coard was dismissive of the threat: "Well, the people can march, they can 
demonstrate, and we worft stop them. But they'll get tired... and life will return to 
normal. And we will continue the revolutionary process on a more Marxist, more 
Leninist footing. "99 The final meeting ended with Coard promising to convey 
Louison and Whitemaifs views to the CC and to produce a final concrete proposal by 
the next morning. 
At 12: 04 p. m. on Sunday, October 16, General Hudson Austin, indicating the 
growing dominance of the military in the crisis, went on RFG to provide the fullest 
98 Bernard Diederich, "Interviewing George Louison: A PRG Minister Discusses the Killings, " 
Cafibbean Review X11, no. 4 (December 1984): 17. 
" Mamble, Aftican and Caribbean Politics, p. 259. 
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account of the situation yet. He reaffirined collective leadership as a party principle 
and explained that: 
Maurice Bishop has deeply resented this collective leadership, and has taken 
the position that no action should be taken to which he is opposed. At the same 
time, he has become increasingly hostile to criticism and increasingly suspicious 
that other members of the leadership of the party may be seeking to seize power 
from him. 100 
Austin went on to deny rumours of a power struggle: "the struggle of Comrade 
Bishop has been the struggle of one man to exercise unlimited power. And that our 
party cannot and will not permit. "'01 Acknowledging that people were confused 
about what was happening, Austin informed them that Bishop was at home and safe, 
he did not mention he was under arrest though, and that the CC was in full control 
and that this was not a military takeover as rumours had suggested. Finally he 
stressed the need to "maintain unity in order to ensure that imperialism does not take 
advantage of this moment of difficulty. " 102 A note of insecurity was evident in this 
last statement. A disbelieving and increasingly angry population were not in the mood 
to listen though. 
Monday. October 17 
RIG met again for two hours on Monday, October 17, to review all the available 
information on Grenada. There was a general awareness of Reagans "frequent 
reminder that there must never be 'another Teheran! -a hostage situation involving 
100 "Statement Broadcast by General Hudson Austin on Behalf of the Political Bureau and the 
Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement, 16th October 1983, at. approximately 12: 04 p. m., 
on Radio Free Grenada, " Documents on the Invasion, Item IV, p. 5. 
101 Ibid, p. 9. 
102 Ibi(i, p. 10. 
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U. S. citizens. 003 Reagans election success had been strongly influenced by Carter's 
n-dshandling of the hostage crisis. In considering the situation in Grenada, Motley was 
driven by the Iran analogy and knew that Reagan would not tolerate a hostage 
situation for any period of time. 104 Motley, supported by Eagleburger, was concerned 
about the safety of U. S. citizens and argued that serious consideration of an NEO 
was necessary. However, Vice Admiral Moreau was unwilling to initiate planning 
yet. Similarly, the JCS were not convinced that all non-military options had been 
examined and that the quality of intelligence was inadequate. 105 Fundamentally, the 
JCS was unenthusiastic and "preferred to await specific high-level authorization 
before considering a military operation. " 106 
Meanwhile, Menges was still promoting his plan. He discussed it with a Defence 
Department official, probably Ikle, and explained that action was necessary to protect 
U. S. citizens, help Grenadians and stop the threat of Communism in the region and 
because it would have a positive effect in Central America and the Caribbean, 
encouraging allies and demoralizing communists. ' Menges was told abruptly that 
"this plan has no chance whatsoever in this administration. McFarlane doesn't like 
103 Mph Kinney Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy of a'Go'Decision, " Reader's Digest (February 1984): 
72. 
" Interview with Motley. Shultz echoes this feeling in his memoir: "He [Reagan] would not stand 
still while American hostages were held for 444 days. In factý he probably wouldn! t stand still for a 
week. " Shultz, Tunnoil and Tilumph, p. 328. 
105 Beck, 7he Grenada Invasion, p. 98. 
106 Don Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought to End Cuban lintervcntion', w Washington Post, November 6, 
1983, p. A2 1. 
'07 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 63. 
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you. He thinks you're too Reaganite... This is a waste of time. Take my advice. 
Don't do anything about Grenada. "108 
In Barbados, Adams had decided that as planning for Bishop's rescue proceeded it 
was time to discuss the situation with ambassador Bish face-to-face. Adams met with 
Bish and Flower having conferred with some of his fellow heads of state in the 
Eastern Caribbean. He suggested that the situation in Grenada provided the U. S. with 
a golden opportunity to remove an unpopular Marxist-Leninist regime and reduce 
Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. '09 In response to this tacit request for U. S. 
involvement Bish could only repeat the offer of a plane and promise to relay Adams' 
message to Washington. Bish actually disagreed with Adams at this stage, primarily 
because Grenada was part of the Commonwealth. "0 That same day the U. S. also 
received another request for help, this time from Eugenia Charles; she believed that 
Bishop had returned from Eastern Europe wanting a more moderate socialism for 
Grenada and that now the Marxist hard-liners had made their move the U. S. should 
deal severely with them. "' Charles spoke with Charles Gillespie, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, who relayed her oral request to 
Secretary of State Shultz. 
The embassy's earlier speculations proved accurate when they learnt from the 
Canadians that Coard had approached the Cubans for support but that they had been 
log Ibid., p. 64. Mcnges was even told that if he continued with his plan it could cost him his 
position on the NSC. 
" Interview, %ith Bish. 
110 lbid 
111 Bish! s notes. 
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non-committal. 1 12 The U. S. embassy in London cabled Washington to report that the 
situation was still "too murky to call" and that the success of the Coard faction would 
depend on "whether Bishop will phase out quietly, [the] extent of Cuban 
involvement, and how other Eastern Caribbean Commonwealth nations will 
react. " 113 One of the U. S. ' fears was that Bishop would call for Cuban intervention to 
oust Austin. It seems that the embassy at least felt that Bishop was the key to the 
present crisis and that what happened to him would be pivotal. "' In Washington 
President Reagan's Principal Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes had told 
reporters that: 
The situation in Grenada is fluid at this point and is unclear. It is unclear who is 
in charge. The military seems to be exerting an increasing amount of power... 
foreign journalists continue to be banned from the island and news reports are 
sketchy and incomplete. 115 
In order to remedy this problem and also to check on U. S. citizens, the embassy 
decided to send two officials, Kenneth Kurze and Linda Flohr, the Third Secretary, to 
Grenada. ' 16 
Thus by Monday, October 17, the decisionmaking process had changed up a gear; 
McFarlane had briefed Reagan on the situation and persuaded him of the need to 
order the go ahead with planning of a NEO. Henceforth, "planning took place in an 
112 ibid. 
113 AmembassY London, confidential telegram to Secretary of States, "Subject: Grenada: [excised] 
BishopVSlow Toppling', " 1815 1 IZ, October 1983, London 22273, section 1, p. 2. 
114 lbid, p. 2. 
15 "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9.21 A. M., October 17,1983, " The JfVte House: Office of the 
Press Secretwy (WHOPS), no. 876 /10-17, Box 33, Ronald Reagan Library (RRL). 
116 On Monday, October 17, two Barbadian military personnel, Alvin Quintync and Marita Browne, 
arrived in Grenada undercover to assess the situation. They returned to Barbados the next day. 
Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 92. 
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interagency forum with representatives of all relevant agencies participating on a 
daily basis. The President and Vice President were kept personally informed of all 
developments. "117 Washington were also aware by this time that the OECS'18 
leaders, along with Adams and Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga, were clearly 
in agreement about the need for military action and that they viewed U. S. 
participation as essential. 
In Grenada torrential rains kept the people off the streets as the CC met for what 
would prove to be the final time. Various options for dealing with Bishop were 
mooted: court martial, jail, continued house arrest, exile in Cuba and even a military 
solution. '19 As O'Shaughnessy notes, "it was clear to the Coard faction, as it was to 
their opponents, that the majority in the Central Committee would use force if 
necessary to impose their will. "120 The meeting concluded with a six-point proposal 
that would be presented to Bishop: the party was committed to a Marxist-Leninist 
strategy and Bishop would not impede it, Bishop would assume responsibility for the 
crisis, he would accept the principles of democratic centralism, remain an ordinary 
member of the NJM and on the PB as a consultant, accept the supremacy of the party 
over the state and his Commander-in-Chief post would be abolished. 121 Reading 
more like an ultimatum than a proposal, it was apparent that the CC had determined 
not to change its course. 
117 Langhorne A. Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " Department of State Bulletin 84 
(March 1984): 70. 
118 The OECS was established in 1981 and consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
119 Diederich, "Interviewing George Louison, " p. 17. 
120 aShaughnessy, Grenada, P. 129. 
121 IbicL, p. 130. 
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Tuesday, October 18 
On Tuesday morning the NSC met and Menges decided to present his plan to 
McFarlane. To Menges' surprise the NSA simply replied, "Well,. .. thafs okay. 
" 122 
Menges then met with Middendorf to probe likely OAS reactions to a military 
operation. Middendorf had served with previous Republican administrations and was 
a loyal Reagan supporter. He told Menges that "if it could be done, this would be a 
great step for freedom" but again cautioned that "I wouldn't get my hopes up. "123 
Menges also spoke to a Foreign Service Officer at the State Department who 
informed him that not much had been done there, despite Bisws cables, but that 
Seaga was due to meet with the OECS leaders. 124 That same day, Shultz authorized 
the establishment of a Grenada Task Force under Motley which, as Shultz reflected, 
"put into place a round-the-clock watch and. .. got us all mentally and 
administratively ready as the problem became more grave. " 125 Shultz now replied to 
Charles' Monday, October 17, request by asking for a formal evaluation of the 
situation by the OECS. According to Shultz this "attended to her request and showed 
her that we were responsive and alert, and, second, it set the stage for the United 
States to act in a manner consistent with our national interests and with international 
iaW. 026 
122 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 64. 
123 lbicL, p. 65. 
124 Ibid, p. 65. 
125 Shultz, Turmoil dnd Triumph, p. 326. 
126 lbid, p. 326. The Grenada Task Force had two main functions: "a) dealing with 
public/congrcssional/press on the U. S. citizen protection and -Avlfarc issue; and b) providing policy 
guidance and (initially on a contingency basis) coordination for the rescue operation. " Department 
of State, "The Grenada Operation: After Action Report, " n-d. [Novcnibcr 1983? ], p. 1. 
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In a move that was coincidental and fortuitous an II -ship Navy Task Force'17 left 
Norfolk, Virginia, en route to the Mediterranean where they were to relieve the U. S. 
24th MAU in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Simultaneously, the 
military crisis action team at Norfolk began to examine various possible courses of 
action. 128 
At the embassy in Bridgetown a diplomatic note was sent to Grenada asking for 
assurances about the safety of U. S. citizens and informing them of plans to send 
Kurze and Flohr to the island. 129 Grenada! s reply the next day stated that: 
the interests of U. S. citizens are in no way threatened by the present situation in 
Grenada which the Ministry [of External Affairs] hastens to point out is a purely 
internal matter. 130 
The response did little to allay Washingtons concern and noticeably did not mention 
the proposed visit by Kurze and Flohr. As Motley commented, "the answer contained 
no assurances, no concrete measures to safeguard foreign residents, just a bland 
assertion and a blunt slamming of the door. vi 13 1 As will become apparent, by Tuesday 
in Grenada it was doubtful that those in control, to whatever degree, were in any 
position to make such assurances. Final preparations were made for Kurze and Flohr 
to travel to Grenada the following morning. 
"I The Naval Task Force included the Navy's Amphibious Squadron Four (PhibRon 4) and the 
22nd Marine Amphibious Unit (22d MAU). Ronald Spector, U. S. Afarines in Grenada (Washington 
D. C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1984), p. 1. At the same 
time the USS Independent left the naval base at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Bennett, "Grenada: 
Anatomy, " p. 73. 
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In Grenada it was the eve of the Revolution's ultimate destruction. Negotiations 
continued; this time Rupert Roopnarine of the Working Peoples Alliance of Guyana 
and Michael Als of the Trinidad and Tobago People's Popular Movement had 
volunteered to mediate. Als met with Bishop on Tuesday morning and proposed that 
Bishop should remain Prime Minister, address Grenada, on lines agreed with the CC, 
and call for calm and announce that a settlement was in sight and, finally, that he 
should meet with Coard to hammer out their differences and perhaps see if Cuba 
would mediate. 132 Bishop provisionally agreed but wanted to consult with Louison 
and Whiteman before drafting the address. 
When Louison phoned Coard to see if the CC had formulated a final proposal as 
promised the day before, he was simply told that the CC was still meeting and that he 
should call later. After this occurred several times, finally with Coard telling Louison 
that he should try again tomorrow afternoon, he concluded that the CC were stalling: 
Louison and four other pro-Bishop Ministers, Unison Whiteman (Foreign Affairs), 
Jacqueline Creft (Education), Norris Bain (Housing) and Lynden Ramdhanny 
(Tourism) resigned their posts in protest and to mobilize the masses. '33 From around 
5: 00 p. m. Whiteman managed to speak to radio reporters from the Caribbean News 
Agency, Barbados' two radio stations and Radio Antilles based in Montserrat, it was 
the most powerful station in the region and receivable in Grenada, and told them that 
"Coard is running the place singlehandedly" and despite the advancement of a set of 
proposals by the ex-Ministers to resolve the crisis "Coard had shown that he was not 
132 payne et al., Grenada, p. 132. 
133 Diederich, "Interviewing George Louison, " p. 18. Louison was arrested soon after at 6 p. m. Only 
Unison Whiteman, Fitzroy Bain and Norris Bain remained free by alis stage. 
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serious about resolving it"; they were now "apprehensive that Coard may try a 
military solution. 9034 
The masses now began to make their presence felt. Approximately 500 people 
rallied in Grenville, Gouyave and Sauteurs. Students marched on Pearls airport and 
forced it to close for several hours. Schools and factories closed as the people took 
to the streets chanting "No Bishop, no revo! 035 
Four members of the CC, Austin, Layne, James and Bartholemew, visited Bishop 
that evening to deliver their final six-point compromise proposal. Bishop promised he 
would respond by the next morning but, again, wanted to talk with Louison, 
Whiteman and the Cuban ambassador Torres Rizo first. According to Thorridike the 
CC were willing to impose temporary martial law if this final effort failed. 136 
"Bloody Wednesday" 
At 9: 30 a. m. on Wednesday, October 19, Kurze and Flohr left Barbados on a 
Barbadian government Aero Services flight bound for Grenada. The purpose of their 
trip was to get an "on-the-ground update" of the situation in Grenada and "check on 
the Medical School people. " 137 Halfway through the flight the pilot informed the 
134 Nfilan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Update: Cabinet 
Members Resign. Foreign Mnister Criticizes Coard, " 191905Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06372, 
section 1, p. 1. 
135 Marable, Afilcan and Caribbean Polifics, p. 259. 
136 Thorndike, Grenada, p. 159. 
137 Kenneth Kurze's letter to the author dated August 20,1995. Until Kurze and Flohr finally 
reached Grenada on Saturday, October 22. The U. S. had relied on second-hand reports Erom 
Grenadians, the Barbadian government and the British representative on the island. Another source 
of information was the Vice Chancellor of SGU Geoffrey Bourne; "in the early days of the 
revolution. .. [he] regularly reported to the White House and State Department through his son Peter, President Cartces drug advisor. During the Reagan administration Bourne remained in close 
contact with the US. embassy in Barbados. " Mtchel A. Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation 
Building: Proprietary Modical Schools and Development in the Caribbean, 1976-1990" (PILD. diss., 
University of Chicago, 1995), p. 283. This combination of resources must have provided 
Washington with a more than adequate picture of the situation in Grenada. 
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passengers that he had been refused landing permission at Pearls airport and that he 
was returning to Barbados. Unbeknownst to Kurze and Flohr, Bishop had just been 
rescued by his supporters on Grenada. Both diplomats realized the failure to reach 
Grenada meant that "something must be cooking" on the island. 138 
In Barbados there was an important development. From 9: 30 a. m. until 11: 00 a. m. 
Bish met with Adams who began by requesting U. S. assistance in rescuing Bishop, 
his family and seventy political prisoners. 139 He argued persuasively that this was a 
unique opportunity and would produce a favourable world reaction, especially among 
developing countries, with the U. S. being seen in a different light: 
promoting human rights on behalf of a popular leftist dictator, and this would 
be in dramatic contrast to the conventional wisdom that the U. S. supports only 
conservative, right-wing regimes. 140 
He pointed out how "powerful symbolic asset to the West Bishop would be in exile, 
especially if he were assisted out by the U. S. "141 Adams assumed that Bishop was 
under close arrest and that he could not talk alone but believed he would welcome 
rescue, even if it was by the U. S. 142 The hawkish Prime Minister contended that a 
rescue would be less problematic than an occupation and was "feasible, necessary and 
desirable. "143 To reinforce his point he asked hypothetically, "Would the United 
138 Kurze's letter, August 20,1995. Motley interpreted this as a negative signal. Interview %ith 
Motley. 
139 Adams had apparently heard rumours a few weeks before that there was a serious threat to the 
prisoners lives. In a conversation with St. Vincents Prime Minister Milton Cato, Cato had 
questioned the propriety of rescuing Bishop while ignoring "many other political prisoners in 
Grenada, put there by BisholYs government. " Tyler, "The Malcing of an Invasion: Chronology of the 
Planning, " Washington Post, October 30,1983, p. A14. 
140 BisWs notcs. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. Adams was willing to offcr Bishop asylum as well and had in fact donc so long ago. 
143 ibid. 
States consider invading Grenada? If not, we will do so without you. " Adams knew 
this was unlikely, and probably militarily impossible, but such talk persuaded Bish of 
his candour. Bish inquired as to exactly how far Barbados would support a rescue, 
likely Barbadian public opinion and regional support. Adams was unequivocal; he 
offered his country as a staging post, use of the BDF if necessary and assured Bish 
that only Guyana, Belize and Antigua carried a torch for Grenada. 144 He went on to 
outline a possible military takeover by a multinational U. S., Eastern Caribbean and 
Venezuelan force, perhaps under the umbrella of CARICOM, 145 which would 
establish an interim government and lead to free and democratic elections, even with 
Bishop as a candidate. '46 Adams stressed that this was only a scenario and not a 
conclusive plan. A diplomatic-political solution was also discussed whereby the 
OECS might pressure Coard and the PRA to free Bishop and restore order with the 
option of sanctions if necessary. Barbados and Jamaica could "chime in forcefully" to 
reinforce the OECS' efforts. 
Adams was clearly hoping to convince the U. S. of the severity of the situation, the 
Eastern Caribbean's unanimity, the need for external help and the potential benefits 
Bishop's rescue could yield for the U. S. whilst simultaneously probing Washingtores 
receptiveness to the idea of a more extensive operation. Adams had already conferred 
with the British High Commissioner Giles Bullard who was sceptical and he expected 
a similar response from the Canadians later that day. In an emergency meeting of the 
144 ibid. 
"' CARICOM was established in 1973 as a primarily economic entity. Its members include Antigua 
and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat St. Kitts-Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago. 
"" Bish! s notes. 
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Barbados Cabinet it was agreed to "proceed with a rescue plan, in collaboration with 
Eastern Caribbean countries and larger non-Caribbean countries with the resources 
necessary to carry out such an intricate operation. 047 Events in Grenada were soon 
to make the rescue plan redundant. After Adams left, Bish sent a cable to Washington 
reporting that Adams would like to see U. S. involvement in an intervention or the 
OECS would act alone. Bish also sent a "back channel" note to the CIA. 148 
Fort Rupert 
As previously mentioned, Bishop had promised to reply to the CCs proposal by 
Wednesday but only after consulting with Whiteman, Louison and Rizo. Whiteman 
was on the streets whipping up support among the masses and Coard was not about 
to let Rizo talk to Bishop, possibly fearing that Bishop would request Cuban 
assistance. Consequently only Louison, who was already under house arrest, was 
taken to see Bishop at 7: 30 a. m. that Wednesday morning. The two talked over 
breakfast for ninety minutes before Louison was led away. The two men came up 
with a two-point reply to put to the CC: 
there would be a formal negotiating committee set up which would start to 
meet on that day and secondly that he [Bishop] be released from house arrest 
and that a statement be put on the radio from him pointing out that he was no 
longer under house arrest and that negotiations were in process. 149 
The proposal was not destined to see the light of day. 
The nascent public demonstrations of the previous few days reached their zenith 
that morning. By 9: 00 a. m. about 15,000 people, from a population of 85,000, had 
"7 "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 36. 
" According to Bish, Motley claimed he had not seen Bish's cable or that he had been told not to 
act on it which dropped the ambassador in hot water. Interview with Bish. 
149 Interview with George Louison by Hugh UShaughnessy, transcript, rLd., p. 22. 
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assembled in St. George's market square. Shops, offices and schools had all been 
closed. At 9: 00 a. m. about 3-4,000 of the crowd, mainly schoolchildren, led by 
Whiteman, Noel, Fitzroy Bain and prominent businessmen marched towards Bishop's 
house where he was being held. 
While the crowds advanced on Bishop's house the CC met at Coard's house. "0 At 
10: 00 a. m. Cornwall had been sent to the Cuban workers compound near Point 
Salines to inform them not to participate in the pro-Bishop demonstrations that had 
been planned for that morning. "' Coard's house was adjacent to Bishop's and the 
crowds had to pass it to reach Bishop's; the CC witnessed the crowd passing chanting 
"We want Maurice, we want Maurice! " and T for Bishop and betterment; C for 
Coard and communism. " 152 Recognizing their vulnerability, Layne reinforced the 
PRA guard at Bishop's to one hundred and sent for three armed personnel carriers 
(APQ which were brought over by Basil Gahagan. Coard feared that the crowd 
could turn on him and told Layne to contact Bishop and tell him to calm the crowd 
and recommence yesterday's talks. 15' However, Layne and Austin's efforts proved 
futile as the crowd was simply too large and too aroused to listen. Gahagan decided 
to order the APCs to fire into the air as the masses attempted to open the gates to 
Bishop's house. Seeing that the soldiers were shooting in the air the people believed 
they would not fire on them and pushed forward. The PRA officer in charge, Iman 
15'0 Present at the meeting were the Coards, Hudson Austin, Ewart Layne, Leon Cornwall, Colville 
McBarnette, Liam James, Selwyn Strachan, Ian St. Bernard, Challde Vcntour and later Lester 
Redhead. Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 49. 
151 Cotman, The Gorrion Tree, p. 216. 
152 Thomdike, Grenada, p. 159. 
153 AMn, Urgent Fury, p. 5 1. 
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Abdullah, ordered his men to withdraw and by 10: 35 a. m. Bishop and Creft, who had 
been found tied to their beds in their underwear, were brought out. 154 Bishop 
appeared weak and disoriented, he had had little sleep and had allegedly not been 
eating for fear of being poisoned. 
What happened next has been interpreted by some as a fatal mistake that cost 
Bishop and his companions their lives. After vacillating between a car or truck for the 
trip into town to address the huge crowd waiting in the market square, Bishop 
decided to divert to Fort Rupert, the PRA! s headquarters, on the promontory 
overlooking St. George's. In fact, this was a practical move: medical treatment could 
be obtained from the hospital which was adjacent to the Fort, Bishop wanted to use 
the Fort's army transmitter to address the people, there were firearms there and it was 
a defensible position. 155 Fort Rupert's daily security was the responsibility of Lester 
Redhead who commanded the platoon stationed there. The Coard group had believed 
that Fort Rupert was in danger before Bishop reached it at around 1: 00 p. m. and had 
decided it should be barricaded and defended with tear gas if necessary; Redhead was 
sent to Grand Anse police station but there was no gas there and so he had to go to 
the St. George's station instead and by the time he returned Bishop was in control of 
the Fort. 156 
Several hundred Grenadians followed Bishop up the steep and narrow road to 
Fort Rupert, shouting "We get we leader, fuck Coard. " 157 With no physical obstacles 
154 ThoMdike, Grenada, P. 159. 
155 AdIdn, Urgent Fury, p. 53. 
1.56 IbicL, p. 55. 
137 Ibid., p. 56. 
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and the PRA soldiers uncertain what to do the crowd swept into the Fort unopposed. 
The Fort consisted of a main lower square connected to an upper square by steps and 
a tunnel. Bishop's group took up place in the operations room on the upper floor of 
the communications building in the lower square. Bishop ordered that the Fort's 
soldiers should be disarmed and their weapons given to the base commandant Chris 
Stroude. Bishop then summoned Stroude and told him that Coard and his 
accomplices must submit to the will of the masses, negotiations must begin now in 
the operations room, Coard, Layne and Cornwall must be arrested and jailed, the 
PRA should lay down their arms and that the armoury keys must be handed over so 
that arms could be distributed to defend the Fort. 158 Soon after, Bishop announced 
that Einstein Louison had replaced Austin as head of the PRA; Einstein Louison 
arrived at the Fort sometime between 12: 00 p. m. and 1: 00 p. m., having been freed 
from house arrest, and was told to organize the defence of the Fort. '" Arms were 
distributed to members of the militia present. 
Despite his weak condition it seems Bishop had a strategy. He instructed two 
telephone engineers to hook up a line to the radio transmitter. Peter Thomas, an 
immigration officer present, was sent to the Cable and Wireless offices, accompanied 
by two telephone employees with militia training, with a list of numbers to get 
disconnected, especially the lines to Coard's house and Fort Frederick to prevent 
Coard organizing a counterattack. "' Bishop sent his Press Secretary, Don Rojas, to 
Cable and Wireless and told him to tell the world that the Prime Minister had been 
158 Ibid., p. 57. 
159 Ibid., p. 58. 
'60 Ibid., p. 58. Unfortunately the telephone link at the old water works was overlooked and this 
allowed Coard to keep in touch with Stroude at Fort Rupert. 
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freed, that Cuba had not been involved and that all nations, organisations and 
individuals should organize effective opposition to U. S. intervention. 161 When Bishop 
had been freed earlier in the day he had sent someone to the Cuban embassy to seek 
support and in response ambassador Rizo sent a messenger to Fort Rupert to offer 
aid to Bishop. 162 
Having seen the masses free Bishop and sweep him off to Fort Rupert the 
increasingly worried CC retreated to Fort Frederick. Layne phoned Abdullah and told 
him to report in and then left at 11: 00 a. m. for Caviligny to call up reinforcements, 
returning at noon with a squad of twenty-five soldiers. 163 The CC attempted to 
contact Bishop but he refused to speak with them; Whiteman told them bluntly, "No 
negotiations; is manners for all you. " 164 Stroude had been keeping the CC informed 
of the developments at Fort Rupert: 
The civilian members of the committee seemed paralysed: to the PRA leaders, 
the military and political position was intolerable and untenable. They concluded 
from the information they had received that orders had been given by Bishop to 
eliminate them, that the Central Committee was to be arrested and an armed 
assault mounted on Fort Frederick. '165 
As Adkin comments: 
Up to this moment, no decision had been taken to kill Bishop... Negotiations, 
firing in the air, the use of tear gas - everything short of shooting to kill had been 
considered or tried. But now it was a simple matter of Bishop's life or theirs. If 
Bishop triumphed... they were all dead men. '166 
161 Cotman, The Gonlon Tree, p. 216. 
162 Ibid., p. 216. It is uncertain as to what the offer contained. In a 1983 interview, Castro insisted 
that "I would never, under any circumstances, have authorized the Cuban personnel to have become 
involved. Of that you can be sure. Our answer would have been 'no. ' But there wasn't even time to 
answer. There was no need to answer. " Cotman, The Gonlon Tree, p. 217. 
163 
164 
165 
166 
Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 60. 
Ibid., p. 60. "Manners" is a coRoquial Grenadian term for discipline or punishment. 
Thomdikc, Grenada, p. 160. 
Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 6 1. 
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Consequently, Austin was told that it was necessary to recapture Fort Rupert and 
establish military rule for a short period. Austin was not convinced but he could not 
offer a feasible alternative. 167 This decision was taken around 12: 30 p. m.: the three 
armoured personnel carriers (APQ and the platoon of soldiers from Caviligny would 
storm Fort Rupert, their headquarters, and Bishop and his supporters would be killed 
in the fighting. "' 
The three APCs and the squad of soldiers, numbering thirty-five in total, arrived 
at Fort Rupert at 1: 00 p. m. The people in the Fort had seen that the PRA had not 
fired on them earlier that morning and at first thought that the new arrivals had come 
to support Bishop. As one eye-witness who had been in the operations room with 
Bishop recalled: 
With the whole country coming down to town to support Maurice, you wouldn't 
think that it would enter anybody's head to try and take power in the face of all 
that because you'd be fighting the whole nation. 1169 
Tragically this was not the case; the pro-Coard soldiers, led by Officer-Cadet Conrad 
Mayers, did not hesitate when he gave the order to "Concentrate fire on the fort. "70 
They opened fire with machine guns, grenades and rocket shells. Although the 
operations room was hit by a rocket, Bishop and many others with him survived the 
first onslaught. Dumbfounded, Bishop could only utter "My God, My God, they have 
167 Thorndike, Grenada, p. 16 1. 
168 AdIdn, Urgent Fury, p. 63. Thorndike says that the alleged plan was to "take Fort Rupert with 
the minimum of force and to storm the communications building and, if possible, capture Bishop 
and his allies. " Thorndike, Grenada, p. 16 1. 
169 Mamble, Afiican and Caribbean Politics, p. 26 1. 
170 A&jn, Urgent Fury, p. 68. 
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turned the guns against the people. " 171 There was some return fire, Mayers was 
fatally wounded. Between 30 and 40 Bishop supporters were killed, either shot or by 
jumping off the Fort walls to escape, a drop of between 50 and 90 feet, and over 100 
were injured. After the initial burst of shooting had finished "there was a discussion 
among Maurice and some of the fellows to the effect that what we had to do was go 
out and say we surrender, that anything else would be suicide. "172 Bishop then led 
the group out to meet its fate. 
As the last remnants of the crowd were let go, Bishop, Creft, the Bains, Whiteman 
and Brat Bullen were marched to the upper square by Redhead and Abdullah to join 
two others, Evelyn Maitland and Keith Hayling, who were also condemned. Abdullah 
consulted with Stroude in the communications room who remained in touch with the 
CC. 173 The eight prisoners were lined up against the west wall of the square. 
Abdullah then told them that "this is an order from the Central Committee, that you 
shall be executed by fire. It is not my order, it is the Central Committee's. o1174 The 
firing squad, composed of Redhead, Abdullah and three other soldiers, then carried 
out its orders. Thus by about 1: 20 p. m. Bishop and his companions were dead; a 
white flare was fired to signal to the CC that orders had been carried out. 
'7' Gordon K Lewis, Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled (Baltimore, N. J.: Johns HopIdns University 
Press, 1987), p. 57. 
172 MoMdike, Grenada, p. 16 1. 
113 Ibid., p. 162. Adkin says Redhead, Abdullah and Stroude actually went to Fort Frederick to 
report to Coard who was not pleased. 'Me Coards, Austin, Layne, James, Strachan, Cornwall, 
Ventour, McBarnette, Bartholcmew and St. Bernard then voted unanimously to execute the eight 
detainees. This chronology places the executions at 2: 00 p. m. Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 74. 
174 A(Udn' U ent FU p. 76. rg ? YP 
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By 3: 00 p. m. it was decided that a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council 
(RMC) would be formed with its headquarters at Fort Frederick. "' Coard had 
placed himself in "protective custody"'76 and was not an official member of the RMC 
but it is generally assumed that he was pulling the strings. 177 The RMC was officially 
headed by General Hudson Austin; this was a tactical choice as Austin was popular 
with the PRA, of senior rank and, until switching to the Coard camp, had been 
viewed as a Bishop supporter. 178 In reality Austin was a figurehead, the real power 
lying with Coard, Layne, Cornwall and the others. 
A list of potential pro-Bishop opposition figures was compiled and a statement to 
be read on RFG was composed. Also, a communiqu6 was sent to the PRA to explain 
the day's events and remind them where their true allegiances lay: 
Today our People's Revolutionary Army has gained victory over the right 
opportunists and reactionary forces which attacked the Headquarters of our 
Ministry of Defence. These anti-worker elements using the working people as a 
shield entered Fort Rupert. 179 
It concluded by saying "all patriots and revolutionaries will never forget this day 
when counter-revolution, the friends of imperialism were crushed. ""O At 5: 30 p. m. 
175 Ibid., p. 77. Although the PRG was disbanded and the Cabinet dismissed, the 16-mcmber RMC 
contained 5 former ministers. It was headed by Austin with James and Layne as joint vice-chairmen. 
The other members were Major Leon Cornwall, Major Christopher Stroude, Major Tan 
Bartholcmew, Major Keith Roberts, MaJor Basil Gahaghan, Major Ian St. Bernard, Captain Lester 
Redhead, Captain Hughie Romain, Lieutenant Rudolph Ogilvie, Lieutenant Iman Abdullah, 
Lieutenant Kcnrick Fraser and Lieutenant Raeburn Nelson. Coard was not an offical member but 
was the RMC's de facto head. Cotman, The Gor7lon Tree, p. 209. 
176 Shultz, Tunnoil and Triumph, p. 325. 
177 Coard had kept a low profile since resigning on Friday, October 14, and after the massacre the 
CIA were uncertain if he ins still alive. CIA Memo, "Grenada Chronology, 7-25 October, " 
Declassified Documents Catalog NW, no. 5 (September-October 1988), document no. 002449, p. 3. 
"s Indeed, Austin had been an early member of the NJK led the March 1979 attack on the True 
Blue barracks and was appointed head of the PRA in 1981. Timothy Olxary and Denise Cabrera, 
"Austin had close ties to Grenada's Bishop, " Washington 771mes, October 21,1983, p. A12. 
179 GShaughnessy, Grenada, p. 139. 
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RFG returned to the air to request all nurses and Salvation Army personnel to report 
to the hospital and to announce that Austin would speak at 8: 30 p. m. 
Austin finally went on air at 10: 10 p. m. to present the RMC's version of the day's 
events. Having recounted Bishop's freeing and the storming of Fort Rupert, 
emphasizing that the PRA had been ordered only to fire in the air, Austin continued: 
They declared their intention to arrest and wipe out the entire General Commit- 
tee and the senior members of the Party and the entire leadership of the Armed 
Forces as well as to smash the Revolutionary Armed Forces. 
At that point the Revolutionary Armed Forces sent a company of soldiers to re- 
establish control of Fort Rupert. Maurice Bishop and his group fired on the sol- 
diers killing two members of the PRA... 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces were forced to storm the fort, and in the pro- 
cess the following persons were killed: Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman 
181 Vince Noel, Jacqueline Creft, Norris Bain and Fitzroy Bain among others. ' 
The earlier formation of the RMC was announced, stating that it had full executive 
and legislative powers. Austin then warned that: 
Let it be clearly understood that the Revolutionary Armed Forces will govern 
with absolute strictness. Anyone who seeks to demonstrate or disturb the peace 
will be shot. An all day and all night curfew will be established for the next four 
days... Anyone violating this curfew will be shot on sight. 182 
News of the massacre had spread and Grenadians had no reason to doubt this. 
The curfew allowed the RMC to impose some sort of control and to clear up the 
mess at Fort Rupert as well as round-up potential opponents and imprison them at 
Richmond I-Ell. Amongst Grenadians fear gradually turned to anger, "for them, it was 
a simple, straightforward matter that an assault against Bishop... had become an 
180 Ibid., p. 139. 
181 "Statement by General Hustin Austin on Behalf of the Revolutionary Military Council on 
October 20,1983, " Documents on the Invasion, Item V, p. 11. 
182 Ibid., p. 12. 
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assault against 
Ithemselves 
and therefore against the revolution as they understood 
it. ""' For the moment the curfew repressed any thoughts of action against the RMC. 
"Imminent Danger" 
The U. S. embassy in Bridgetown had been kept abreast of the dramatic 
developments in Grenada. Soon after hearing'that Bishop had been freed they learrit 
that he had been recaptured and an unconfirmed radio report from the Voice of 
Barbados that Bishop had been shot. Ambassador Bish cabled Washington to report 
that the: 
situation [is] obviously worsening. The "masses". .. 
decided not to let [the] 
NJM Central Committee and security forces foist Coard on them. The follow-up 
means now there can be no peaceful "Joint Leadership" solution. One group or the 
other will have to come out on top and it could get bloodier. 184 
On BarbAdos, Adams asked his Cabinet to permit him to demand Bishop's release and 
asked Charles to do likewise as head of the OECS. 185 Bish and DCM Flower sent 
another cable to Washington: 
There appears to be imminent danger to U. S. citizens resident on Grenada due to 
the current deteriorating situation, which includes reports of rioting, personnel 
casualties (possibly deaths), automatic weapons being discharged, Soviet-built 
armored personnel carriers in the Grenadian streets, and some loss of water and 
electricity on the island... [American Embassy] Bridgetown recommends that the 
United States should now be prepared to conduct an emergency evacuation of 
U. S. citizens residing in Grenada... We are not yet prepared to recommend an 
evacuation be initiated. Repeat, not yet. But we strongly counsel that all prepa- 
rations be effected in order to deploy immediately as required... It has already 
come to our attention... that the Venezuelans have already initiated action for 
evacuation of dependents in Grenada because of violence. "86 
183 Lewis, Grenada, p. 62. 
194 Milan Bish, confidential telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada Update: Bishop Re- 
arrested, " 192034Z, October 1983, Bridgcto-An 06380, p. 1. 
185 Bislfs notes. 
186 Mlan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Planning for Possible Emergency 
Evacuation of Amcits - Grenada, " 192356Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06387, p. 1. 
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Although Bish was not ready to recommend evacuation he sensibly "urged all 
preparations be immediately taken" as the embassy reviewed contingency plans and 
identified assets. 187 
Sometime that afternoon, Austin called the U. S. embassy to express his concerns 
about invasion rumours and to reassure the ambassador that the students were safe. 
Bish was tough on him and made it clear to Austin that he would be held personally 
responsible if the students were harmed. "' 
That same afternoon Gillespie arrived at the embassy to help Bish and Flower. "9 
He was met at the airport by Flower who told him of Bishop's death. Gillespie had 
already spoken with Charles and was due to meet St. Lucian Prime Minister John 
Compton the next day. He met with Tom Adams that night; the Prime Minister 
explained the difficulties that a revolutionary takeover could pose for the other 
islands and that he was very concemed. '90 Meanwhile, ambassador Bish hosted a 
formal dinner party; at about 8: 00 p. m. the embassy's Defence Attach6, Lawrence 
Reiman, interrupted to inform Bish that Bishop's death had been confirmed. Bish 
187 Intervicw with Bish. 
1" Ibid. Regional radio had reported Manley's call for "some Idnd of intervention. " Bish! s notes. 
189 Gillespie had been in the region by coincidence on a familiarization tour with Vice President 
George Bush that had been arranged back in July. Bush and Gillespie had heard of the unrest in 
Grenada before leaving Washington and decided to discover -what Jamaica's Prime Minister Edward 
Seaga knew when they had their scheduled meeting. Whilst in Jamaica, Gillespie heard of the 
massacre at Fort Rupert on a car radio. Seaga was disturbed by this news. in a breakfast meeting 
with Michael I%bnley, Bush and Gillespie were told that if Grenada "blew up" it could spread and 
pose a serious challenge to Caribbean democracy. Interview with Charles Gillespie, November 27, 
1995, Washington D. C. Motley had suggested Gillespie be sent to the Embassy to help Bish and 
Flower. Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 102. Shultz confirms this in his memoir: "Gillespie went to 
Barbados to ride herd on Ambassador Bish in the embassy there and was poised to go on to 
Grenada. " Shultz, Turmoil and Piumph, p. 333. When the U. S. established an embassy in Grenada 
shortly after the intervention Gillespie became the first ambassador there. 
190 Interview with Gillespie. 
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phoned Adams who corroborated the news. Bish and Gillespie then drafted a cable 
and dispatched it to Washington. "' 
In Washington, RIG met that Wednesday afternoon, probably in response to the 
unconfirmed reports of Bishop's death. 192 The participants, including JCS and CIA 
representatives, discussed "alternate ways of conducting a 'quick in and out' military 
193 
rescue of U. S. citizens" with or without Grenadian government permission. 
Existing concerns about the safety of U. S. citizens grew as the situation in Grenada 
seemed to be deteriorating rapidly; reliable information was scarce as U. S. diplomats 
had not managed to reach Grenada that morning and RFG- had gone off the air. 
Military preparations advanced as the Pentagon provided a preliminary list of military 
resources available for an NEO, possibly hoping to demonstrate that they had 
insufficient military forces in place. 194 Meanwhile, the JCS issued CINCLANT with a 
warning order to contemplate the "possibility of the evacuation of Americans under 
both benign and hostile conditions. "19' Admiral McDonald and his staff made a 
number of plans for an NEO using navy and marines corps units only. Elsewhere, the 
Joint Special Operations Command, the military's special operations unit, was also 
191 Intcrview with Bish. 
192 Interview with Motley. The Barbados embassy had been in frequent contact with the State 
Department throughout the afternoon via cable and telephone. 
193 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 66. The Chairman of the JCS General John Vesscy forced Motley to 
design a quick in and out operation before he would consider action. Interview with Langhorne 
Motley. 
"' The JCS emphasised that intelligence on Grenada was limited, human intelligence practically 
non-existent and intelligence on the Cuban presence inconsistent They argued that the heavily 
overworked logistics system would be an impediment to anything more than a limited military 
operation. Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " P. 23. 
'95 Anderson, "National Decisiomnaking and Quick-Strike Interventions,,, p. 76. 
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working on an evacuation plan; these plans subsequently merged and involved other 
actors. 
196 
That evening Motley briefed Shultz on the situation. Bish! s "inuninent danger" cable 
had probably been received and the two were aware of the unconfirmed reports of 
Bishop's death. 197 RIG had already decided that an NEO at least was necessary; 
Shultz "had to be convinced" that military planning was required but Motley 
eventually got his agreement. 19" Plans were made for the Cabinet-level Crisis Pre- 
Planning Group (CPPG) to convene the next day, Thursday, October 20, as the 
momentum for a military operation gathered. 
Conclusion 
By July 1983 the PRG was in crisis; the economy was faltering, PSIA was 
consuming most of the available money, the PRA and militia were demoralized, 
relations with the U. S. remained cool and, most significantly, connections with the 
masses lessened. At the First Plenary of the CC on July 13 it was reported that: 
over the year under review our Party has demonstrated many weaknesses... 
ideologically, politically and organizationally. At the same time, the emergence 
of deep petty (sic) bourgeois manifestations and influence in the Party has led to 
196 Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " p. 32. 
197 The zealous Menges wasted no time and spent the evening writing three onc-page overviews for 
the CPPG meeting the next day: "First was a short, factual summary of what had happened. Second, 
I put together, from information I had gathered over the previous few days, a summary of the 
reactions from the Caribbean governments, Trade Unions, democratic political parties, and religious 
groups - all of which denounced the bloodshed and urged action to prevent more deaths. Third, I 
described on one page the prodemocracy leadership and institutions that could provide the basis for 
the restoration of democracy. " Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 68. Furthermore, Menges recounts that 
he met with McFarlane and Poindexter and urged them to convene a CPPG meeting and that they 
agreed to this. However, most people interviewed said that whilst Menges was a big proponent of 
action his input actually counted for very little. For example Menges had not been told about the 
RIG meeting on Wednesday, October 19. As Motley recalled, during the crisis period "no one said 
'Here's Menges' invasion pl&. " Interview with Langhorne Motley. 
198 Oberdorfer, "Reagan Soughý" p. A12. 
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two ideological trends. "99 
There was no disagreement amongst the CC that the Party was in trouble, but there 
was not a consensus that the joint leadership proposal put forward in September was 
the solution. Differences between Bishop and Coard undeniably existed: "on one level 
[it] was one of personalities: the spontaneous and charismatic Bishop against the 
calculating and ascetic Coard" and "on another level, the NJM power struggle was 
ideological and political. Coard and his supporters were impatient with the pace of 
social transformation. "20(' A December 1983 CIA report concluded that: 
It was becoming increasingly clear that Bishop, ever confident of his appeal 
to the Grenadian people and his international stature, had paid insufficient 
attention to the inner workings of the party. He thus found himself in a position 
of embodying the Grenadian revolution for most of those on the island who con- 
tinued to sympathize with the New Jewel Movement, but at the same time 
commanded a dwindling base of support within the upper echelon of the party. 201 
This situation led to accusations of "cultism" and "onemanism" from his opponents. 
The argument that Bishop's demise was the result of a long-term operation 
masterminded by Coard may seem plausible, especially given the extent and personal 
nature of the criticism of Bishop at the CC meetings, but as Meeks points out, the 
"inability to escape from a deeply-entrenched cumulative and available ideological 
context of Leninism and hierarchy and not the chimera of conspiracy was the critical 
element in the denouement of the revolution. , 202 
"I "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13-19 July, 1983, " Grenada Documents, 
document no. 110, p. 1. 
200 Valenta and Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada, " p. 16. 
201 CIA Report, "A First Look, " p. A-3. 
202 Meeks, Capibbean Revolufions, p. 178. 
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The joint leadership plan was considered by the majority of the CC to be the best 
solution to their problems but in reality it would have eventually reduced Bishop's 
role to that of a figurehead. Bishop reaked this and found it simply unacceptable. 
lEs reneging on the acceptance of the powersharing arrangement and his efforts to 
circulate rumours of plans to assassinate him infuriated the CC and resulted in the 
irreversible move of placing Bishop under house arrest. 
Even as the demonstrations increased the CC ignored the people. The discussions 
with Louison and Whiteman to find a solution were futile; the final proposal put to 
Bishop on Tuesday, October 18, suggested that he accept full responsibility for the 
crisis and not oppose their commitment to a Marxist-Leninist strategy. Essentially, 
"there was no indication that the committee was prepared to settle the crisis on any 
terms other than its oWn. 003 Added to Bishop's intransigence, it did not seem that 
any agreeable solution would be found. Coard dismissed the protestations of the 
populace but it was at this point that "people power" took over and started the train 
of events that would destroy the revolution and lead the U. S. to intervene. 
The Eastern Caribbean leaders were unsettled by Bishop's arrest. With U. S. 
collusion, a plan to rescue Bishop was underway by Saturday, October 15. By the 
time Adams met with ambassador Dish on the morning of Wednesday, October 19, 
and requested U. S. involvement in a military operation, he was echoing the 
sentiments of most of his Eastern Caribbean colleagues. 
In Washington the State Department's RIG had been meeting daily and by 
Wednesday had decided that an NEO was desirable. An analogy with the Iran 
hostage crisis influenced this decision; Iran was a recent, prominent and negative 
203 Amburslcy and Dunkcricy, Hose Freedom, p. 74. 
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event, factors which all combined to make it a very available analogy. Although RIG 
were aware of Adams' suggestion that this was a perfect opportunity to remove a 
Marxist-Leninist government and reduce Soviet and Cuban presence in the region, it 
appears that the situation was predominantly defined as a potential hostage situation. 
This perception is what set in motion the decisionmaking process that concluded in 
intervention. After the experience of Teheran the U. S. were hypersensitive to any 
possibility of another such crisis. Dam highlighted such feelings after the intervention 
when he said that; "sometimes action is necessary to keep a bad situation from 
getting worse. This was such a time ... 
004 RIG certainly reflected such pre-emptive 
thinking; the office of the JCS were contacted as early as Friday, October 14, because 
a NEO "required the use of military assets and the securing of military targets on 
Grenada 005 
Prior to Bishop's death the military were reluctant to consider action and it was 
only on Wednesday, October 19, that the JCS agreed to examine the resources 
available. Memories of Vietnam and Iran made the JCS more cautious than their 
civilian counterparts and it was only when Grenada was discussed at cabinet-level 
from Thursday, October 20, onwards that the military began to believe an operation 
was conceivable. 20' Once the JCS accepted that there was an operation they argued 
that an evacuation would require the seizure of the island rather than any limited 
204 "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, " U. S. Congress. Senate. 
Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situation in Grenada (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1983), p. 4. 
205 Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 70. 
206 In the post-Vietnam era military caution has become a familiar trend, especially when the 
question of committing troops is raised. As Petraeus observes, "the view of military leaders as 
aggressive and influential presidential advisers on the use of force has been more the premise of 
political debate than the conclusion of rigorous analysis. " David IL Petracus, "Military Influence 
and the Post-Victnarn Use of Force, "Anned Forces and Society 15, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 490. 
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"surgical strike" style action to evacuate foreign U. S. nationals. 207 This was a prime 
example of the military's post-Vietnam doctrine of using overwhelming force to 
ensure quick victories. 
By the end of "Bloody Wednesday" Bishop and six of his colleagues were dead 
and Grenada was under a shoot-on-sight curfew and little intelligence was available 
on the situation. Although the RIG favoured military action before news of Bishop's 
death was received the final decision lay with President Reagan and the National 
Security Planning Group. 
207 Interview with Motley. 
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CIUPTER 5 
PLANNING AN INTERVENTION 
The dramatic events of "Bloody Wednesday" in Grenada took Washington by 
surprise even though they had been following the situation. The murders forced the 
U. S. to focus on the situation as concern about U. S. citizens on Grenada was "raised 
to the highest level. "' RIG's Chairman, Tony Motley, later clarified the situation: 
"After October 19, our primary task regarding the safety of U. S. citizens was to 
determine whether the situation on the ground was likely to improve by itself 
Without clear indication of a return to civil stability, an evacuation would be 
prudent. 9#2 Momentum for a military action had been mounting with RIG 
recommending a non-permissive evacuation operation and several Eastern Caribbean 
leaders making individual invitations to Washington to participate in a collective 
military action. In the next two chapters' I will examine the central period of the 
crisis, Thursday, October 20 to Tuesday, October 25, tracing the important events 
and the decisionmaking process that resulted in the launching of a military operation 
on October 25. 
Jay MaUin, "Army controls Grenada; Caricom nations shocked, V, hington mes, "T as 771 October 21, 
1983, p. 5. At a morning White House press briefing, White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes 
reported that "we've seen nothing to indicate that they were having particular problems. " "Press 
Briefing by Larry Speakes, 9: 17 A. M., October 21,1983, " no. 882-10/21, Container 33, Yhe White 
House: Office of the Press Secretwy (WHOPS), Ronald Reagan Library (RRL), p. 4. 
2 Langhorne A. Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 71. 
' The period is divided into two chapters to maintain the chapter length structure of this thesis 
rather than because of any obvious point of separation. 
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Thursday. October 20 
At 9: 00 a. m. in Washington the President's Deputy National Security Advisor 
Vice Admiral John Poindexter convened the CPPG4 in Room 208 of the Executive 
Office Building, the new "crisis management center. " The meeting began with a 
briefing on the latest developments in Grenada. The RMC were an unknown quantity 
and U. S. intelligence was relatively poor as they had no one on the island, the CC 
had been a secretive group and decisions in Grenada were now being made on the 
spot. ' The general impression of the RMC in Washington was of a group more pro- 
Cuban, pro-Soviet than Bishop. 6 An early analogy was drawn with the Soviet- 
sponsored coup in Afghanistan which removed the government of Mohammed Daud 
and installed a more pliant puppet government. There were "suspicions" that the 
Soviets or Cubans were involved with Bishop's dernise but it was never a significant 
issue. 7 It was noted that the Cuban ship Vietnam Heroica was moored in St. 
George's harbour. 
Most of the participants had already decided that military action of some sort was 
necessary. 8 The option under consideration was a quick and effective evacuation 
although it was unclear how extensive an operation this would require; the difference 
4 In attendance were State Department representatives Tony Motley and Craig Johnstone, NSC 
staffers Oliver North and Constantine Menges, Defense Department officials Nestor Sanchez and 
Fred Ilde, CIA official Duane Clarridge and U. S. ambassador to the OAS William Middendorf. The 
CPPG was formed in 1982 and served essentially the same purpose as the older Special Situations 
Group but as well as Cabinet members it included deputy Cabinet officers and their subordinates. 
5 Interview with Larry Rossin, October 28,1994, Washington D. C. 
6 "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on U. S. Military Involvement in 
Grenada, 9: 3 8 A. M., " October 25,1983, no. 890-10/25, Container 34, WHOPS, RRL, p. 14. 
Interview with Johnstone. 
8 Ibid. 
between evacuating the students and seizing the entire island was perceived to be 
marginal and so the military and logistical requirements for both were discussed. 9 
The CPPG estimated the total armed strength available to the RMC to be 4,000 
Grenadians, 600 Cubans with Castro able to airlift 5-10,000 men there within days. 10 
It was decided that secrecy was essential to prevent this last possibility and reduce 
the chances that "the students might be put under much tighter military control and 
declared hostages to prevent any counteraction. "" After further discussion of a rapid 
in-and-out action, Menges took the opportunity to promote his plan advocating "a 
multinational force that would not only rescue citizens and leave, but also restore 
democracy and eliminate this communist threat permanently. " 12 This plan was 
supported by Middendorf and Ikle; Poindexter then closed the meeting by 
announcing that the NSC Cabinet would meet that evening at 6: 00 p. m. At 10: 00 
a. m. a subsequent secret meeting was held in Ikle's office to discuss logistical 
requirements for a military operation. 13 
The Caribbean Response 
The consensual Eastern Caribbean response was horror and condemnation, no 
one had envisaged such a bloody resolution of the power struggle. Adams described 
the RMC as "brutal and vicious murderers" and announced that "I do not think it will 
be possible to accommodate so wide a range of governments within the Caribbean. It 
9 Jbid. 
10 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 6 9. 
11 lbid., p. 69. 
12 lbid., p. 69. Menges conjectured that the RMC would offer Grenada as a base for Soviet-bloc 
forces and possibly even nuclear wcaponst 
13 Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy, " P. 72. 
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goes far beyond ideological pluralism. This is the difference between barbarism and 
human beings. to 14 Seaga stated that his government, "while not in sympathy with the 
Bishop government, is repulsed by the tragic death of Mr. Bishop and his colleagues 
under the new regime of Cuban-trained Army generals and other Marxist ideologies 
(sic) .. . "15 Even the Jamaican opposition leader, and former Prime Minister, 
Michael Manley, condemned the executions as a "squalid betrayal of the hopes of the 
ordinary people of our region. to 16 The region' s historical and cultural closeness meant 
that all the nations were affected. As Charles later expressed it: "We, as part of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, realizing that we are, of course, one 
region, we belong to each other, are kith and kin. We all have members of our states 
living in Grenada. it 17 Relations with Bishop's government had been strained but 
endurable; the RMC was simply intolerable. 
Prime Minister George Chambers of Trinidad and Tobago was first to take action; 
he announced that no Grenadians would be allowed to enter Trinidad without a visa, 
trade concessions to goods from Grenada would be suspended and Grenadian 
registered ships would be barred from the CARICOM jetty in Port-of-Spain. " Seaga 
followed suit by severing diplomatic relations with Grenada. 
That morning Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia phoned Adams and 
"expressed himself in the strongest possible terms that the situation in Grenada could 
14 Grenada: Background and Facts, p. 4. 
15 UShauglmessy, Grenada, p. 147. 
16 Ibid., p. 147. 
17 "Joint Press Conference with the President of the United States Ronald Reagan and the Prime 
Mnistcr of Dominica Eugenia Charles, " Documents on the Invasion, Item X p. 32. 
18 UShaughnessy, Grenada, p. 148. 
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not remain as it was and he proposed that there be a Caribbean initiative to intervene 
in Grenada on a multinational basis to restore law and order. "19 Compton believed 
that Coard's regime would attempt to "push the Caribbean community into the 
Communist camp. , 20 Adams, unsurprised and pleased, shared Compton's concerns. 
It was decided that the OECS should meet the next day in Barbados. Compton took 
on the task of contacting CARICOM' s head, Chambers, to arrange a meeting of the 
organization. There was some confusion over the setting because Adams preferred 
Barbados but Chambers insisted on Port-of-Spain. It was only on Friday, October 
21, that the venue was finalized as Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on Saturday evening. The 
disagreement over venues underlined the tension that existed between the OECS and 
CARICOM. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Charles Gillespie had been 
due to visit St. Lucia to sign an AID agreement and took the opportunity to sound 
out Compton and discover if he had any better information than the embasSy. 2' 
Meeting privately with Gillespie, Compton asked rhetorically, "What the hell is going 
on? "22He recalled that the situation with the PRG had been uncomfortable enough 
but that further revolutions would put democracy in the region at risk and 
consequently "we" (the OECS) must do something about it; in doing this Compton 
asked Gillespie forthrightly for US help. 2' 
19 "Full Texi of Speech by the Prime Nfinister of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 36. 
" Grenada: Background and Facts, p. 4. 
21 Interview with Gillespie. 
22 Ibid. 
23 lbid. 
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During the meeting Compton outlined a detailed scenario for destabilizing the 
RMC and replacing it with a legitimate government; he, Adams and Charles would 
work to mobilize and unite the Eastern Caribbean leaders in an effort to brand the 
RMC as "murderers, outlaws and illegitimate renegades. 1#24 Compton speculated that 
CARICOM would "provide the best and biggest umbrella for such action" and that 
despite doubts about the supportiveness of Chambers, "initial efforts should be to 
gain the broadest possible base of support. 'M He assumed that: 
pressure from neighboring states (cut all air transport, communications, refusal 
to load vessels and move cargo etc. ) would lead to a public reaction on the island 
which would in turn lead to more violence. That would justify... [the] insertion 
of a Caribbean security force to rid the island of the outlaws and re-establish a 
stable situation. 26 
Once this was achieved Compton described how Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon 
could appoint a cabinet to govern until elections could be arranged in about six 
months. 27 
Compton originally stated that he envisaged U. S. participation in response to an 
OECS request. When Gillespie reminded him of the presence of the U. S. students on 
Grenada, Compton acknowledged that Washington "Might need to act unilaterally 
but urged that we [United States] consult and concert with Caribbean heads of 
government in advance if possible. "2' The meeting concluded with Compton inviting 
Gillespie to the upcoming OECS meeting in Barbados which, along with the as yet 
24 Nfilan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Minister's 
Scenario, " 210058Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06451, section 1, p. 3. 
25 Ibid., section one, p. 3. 
26 lbid., section one, p. 3. 
27 Ibid., section one, p. 3. 
28 Ibid., section one, p. 4. 
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unfinalised CARICOM meeting, Compton saw as "crucial events" which offered "an 
opportunity to act which will be diminished (if not lost) if heads of government doift 
seize it. "29 
Adams was in touch with Compton and Charles and other OECS leaders 
throughout the day. Adams also sent a representative to Jamaica to sound out Seaga 
who firmly supported the idea of a Caribbean initiative. 30 Later that day, the 
Barbadian cabinet summarized feelings that the OECS had expressed before Bishop's 
death, agreeing on "a military intervention together with such fiiendly third countries 
as could assist with the logistic support necessary for such an enterprise. "31 The 
shrewd Adams knew that the U. S. and Britain would require formal requests so he 
planned that the OECS would agree to a military solution and would invite Barbados 
and Jamaica and then depute Barbados to invite the U. S. and Britain to join them. 32 
1 At 12: 00 p. m. Adams met with U. S. ambassador Nfilan Bish to discuss the 
situation and argue the case for U. S. participation in a military action again. He told 
Bish that action was now "more urgent than ever" and that "intervention can only be 
mounted and carried through by the U. S. l#33 He suggested that the intervention could 
be carried out under the auspices of the OECS, who would probably be unanimously 
in favour of action, rather than CARICOM as he expected opposition from such 
countries as Guyana. 34 Adams continued to lobby hard, telling Bish that "there will 
29 Ibid., section one, p. 4. 
3' Hoyos, Tom Adams, p. 115. 
31 Ibid., p. 115. 
32 Adidn, Urgent Fury, p. 97. 
33 BisWs notes. 
34 Ibid. The embassy had earlier come to a similar conclusion: "We might expect there to be finther 
aligning of views and agreement on possible action plans when first meeting of EC leaders takes 
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be enormous private as well as public disappointment throughout the region if the 
U. S. does not act forcefully to save Grenada. "" He portrayed three possible 
outcomes of intervening: the RMC would not resist; the Cubans and the PRA would 
fight; and the PRA would go it alone. Adams favoured the last of these scenarios as 
it would remove all vestiges of authoritarianism; he hinted that "such as it is, I have 
information which suggests that the Cubans would Sit it OUt. 06 After listening to 
Adams with interest, Bish emphasized that U. S. involvement would depend on 
"unequivocal written requests" from the Eastern Caribbean nationS. 37 
After the midday meeting Bish cabled Washington. The U. S. embassy in Barbados 
had been in contact with SGU on Grenada that morning and had been told that the 
students were well and the situation quiet. Bish was very concerned about the safety 
of U. S. citizens and reported that there were between 500 and 1,000 Americans who 
were potential hostages. In contrast to the previous day Bish now advocated action: 
I know there are formidable difficulties, but whatever we have to do to assure 
the safety of American citizens, I urge that we set it in motion now. In the pro- 
cess we could well rid the hemisphere of an obnoxious unwanted regime. 38 
There was no recommendation of timing but Bish did report that it was unlikely that 
the Eastern Caribbean would act alone. However, the OECS were united and would 
support U. S. action "materially and morally" in an operation which should aim to 
evacuate U. S. citizens, remove the RMC and restore democracy to Grenada. The 
place on October 21. Whether that could remain intact in CARICOM is [a] tough question. " Bish, 
"Subject: Grenada: St. Lucian Prime Nfinister's Scenario, " section 1, p. 4. 
35 lbid., section one, p. 4. 
36 lbid, section one, p. 4. Washington had claimed on numerous occasions that the Cuban workers 
on Grenada were actually profcssional soldiers. 
37 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 98. 
38 BisWs notes. 
233 
optimistic ambassador concluded that: "I believe that sentiment in the Eastern 
Caribbean for action is now so strong that it might be possible to elicit a public 
invitation from the regiorfs Collective leadership to the U. S. to act for the sake of 
human decency and human rights. "" In view of the communications between the 
Caribbean and Washington previously this was no surprise. 
That evening on ABC's Nightfine programme, Adams admitted that most West 
Indians hoped for a military intervention. As Sandford and Vigilante conclude, this 
was arguably "a move deliberately calculated to signal the seriousness of the 
situation to the U. S. and to help smooth the way for U. S. action. "40 
Under Curfew 
In Grenada the situation remained tense. The curfew was particularly harsh on a 
population that had few foodstocks and only forty percent of households bad running 
water. As the militia could not be relied upon to enforce the curfew the PRA were 
used; they could not physically patrol the entire island and so in reality hundreds of 
people broke the curfew to get food and water and none were shot . 
4' Nonetheless, 
the round-up of people continued and Richmond IEU prison was soon overflowing. 
Much of the phone network was out of order, RFG broadcast only music and a news 
blackout produced an "atmosphere of suspicion and anger, and did little for the 
image of the RMC, domestically or internationally. Foreign journalists were expelled 
or prevented from entering Grenada... All telex and communication facilities were 
39 ibid. 
40 Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada, p. 3. 
41 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 84. 
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denied. "42 Grenadians relied on the outside radio stations such as Radio Antilles, 
British Broadcasting CorporatioWs World Service and the Voice of America. 
Aware of the opposition to them, both from within Grenada and from other 
countries in general, the next few days witnessed desperate attempts by the RMC to 
restore some semblance of normality to Grenada. They met that Thursday, October 
20, to plan their course of action. One of the first measures taken was to issue a 
statement presenting their version of Wednesday's events: 
Comrades, it must be very clear to everyone that it was never the intention 
of the armed forces to shed the blood of our people. That is why the armed 
forces had firm instructions not to fire when the people invaded Maurice 
Bishop's house and even when they invaded the Fort. 
But comrades the seizure of the military headquarters of the army changed 
the whole character of the issue. Let us be clear that blood was shed because 
when the army came to restore control his group led by Vincent Noel fired on 
the Mifitary. 43 
This selective account ended by stating that the RMC was "committed to continuing 
the work of the revolution and improving it. "44 To retain the loyalty of the PRA a 
fifteen per cent pay rise was awarded and a message sent to them praising the 
bravery of those who defended Fort Rupert. 45 
The RMC correctly exppcted that the OECS and CARICOM would impose trade, 
fuel and transport sanctions on Grenada. Consequently an Emergency Economic 
Programme (EEP) was drawn up by Nazim, Burke, the former permanent secretary in 
Ministry of Finance, and Bernard Coard. The EEP recommended the establishment 
42 Payne ct al., Grenada, p. 137. 
" "Statement Issued by 1ý1qjor Christopher Stroude, Member of the Revolutionary Nfilitary Council 
on October 20,1983, " Documents on the Invasion, Item IV, p. 14. 
44 lbict, p. 14. 
45 payne et al., Grenada, p. 148. 
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of an Emergency Economic Commission and a Political Leader/Minister to guide the 
Commission and report its views to the government. The Commission's first report 
concentrated on conserving food, assessing energy stocks, rationing, locating 
countries willing to provide supplies and making provisions for essential services. 46 
The second target of the report was communications; the regime's ability to 
communicate internationally and the extent to which the island relied on Cable and 
Wireless was to be assessed. A third target area was international and regional 
organizations. Those which Grenada belonged to were identified and it was decided 
that if any of these organizations imposed sanctions the RMC "must get in touch 
with... and insist on our right to be informed of any meeting and to be heard. 1147 
The threat of intervention was already looming for the RMC and contact with 
other countries was seen as essential to survival. The Commissioner for International 
and Regional Organization Merle Collins was instructed to "identify countries on 
whom we can hope to depend in the coming period. As soon as is possible we must 
contact them. At whatever stage our emergency programme has reached, we must 
inform them of our needs and seek assistance. 'M Austin contacted Trinidad's 
president Ellis Clarke to tell him that the RMC was prepared to accept a visit by an 
international group from CARICOM to discuss elections and other matters. 49 In 
reality Cuba was the only country which could possibly help the RMC by this stage. 
'6 Revolutionary Mlitary Council internal memorandum, Emergency Economic Programme: 
Economic Report No. 1, October 1983, p. 5. 
47 Ibid, p. 5. 
48 Ibid., p. 6. 
49 Robert Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada: A Pre- and Post-Mortem, " in Scott B. IýbcDonald, 
Harald M. Sandstrom and Paul B. Goodwin (eds. ), 77ze Caribbean After Grenada: Conflict and 
Democracy (New York. Praeger, 1988), p. 94. Clarke conveyed this message to other regional 
statesman. 
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The RMC decided to ask Cuba for military assistance, a five million dollar 
(Eastern Caribbean dollars) loan to pay civil servants and to work for "the best 
relations" based on "principles of proletarian internationalism. "" Cuba! s reaction 
however surprised and unnerved the RMC. Castro, who had been good friends with 
Bishop, authorized this condemnatory statement: 
Bishop was one of the political leaders best liked and most respected by our 
people because of his talent, modesty, sincerity, revolutionary honesty and prov- 
en friendship with our country. 
No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position and no internal 
division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and 
the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday. 
The death of Bishop and his comrades must be cleared up. If they were exe- 
cuted in cold blood, the guilty should receive exemplary punishment. " 
Castro warned that political relations with the RMC would "undergo profound and 
serious analysis. 02 Although Cuba promised to continue economic and technical 
assistance for the sake of the Grenadian people, the RMC's request for five million 
dollars was refused. Additionally, the regular Cuban air link ceased and Castro 
refused to provide military reinforcements or place Cubans in Grenada under RMC 
control. In fact the Cubans in Grenada "detested" the RMC; the workers at PSIA 
stopped work to protest the arrest of the Grenadian project manager, Bob Evans. " 
Castro had warned in his statement that "imperialism will try to use this tragedy 
and the serious mistakes by the Grenadian revolutionaries to sweep away the 
" Payne ct al., Grenada, p. 142. 
51 "Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the Events in Grenada, * 
Documents on the Invasion, Itcrn ML p. 42. 
52 Ibid., p. 43. 
53 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 9 1. 
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revolutionary process. 04 The statement was an indication of Castro's effort to 
distance Cuba from the RMC to persuade Washington that Cuba was not involved 
and perhaps to forestall a U. S. intervention. The only country which did not openly 
condemn the RMC was the Soviet Union; TASS merely noted that: "An armed clash 
took place which claimed the lives of the Prime Minister and several ministers. The 
Revolutionary NElitary Council assumed full power in the country. It stated its 
determination to uphold the cause of the revolution. "55 The Soviets were too remote 
to offer any useful help and nor were they inclined to. 
The Students 
The RMC probably decided from the outset to be solicitous toward SGU and its 
650 students; any threat to them would provide the U. S. with a golden opportunity to 
act. Therefore, at 9: 00 a. m. on Thursday two armed security guards visited SGUs 
Vice Chancellor Geoffrey Bourne. Bourne initially thought he was being arrested but 
it transpired that they were there to inquire about the students and if they had 
sufficient food and water. 56 Bourne was given a pass to travel anywhere on the 
island. At 10: 00 a. m. a military aide visited Bourne to inform him that General 
Hudson Austin wanted to meet with him at 11: 00 a. m. Before Bourne met Austin he 
asked the British representative John Kelly if he could drop by. They discussed the 
curfew and Kelly suggested that Bourne try to persuade Austin to lift it . 
57 
54 "Statement by the Cuban Party, " p. 43. 
55 O'Shaughnessy, Grenada, p. 148. 
'6 Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies. The Making of an Unfilendly World (New York- Congdon & 
Weed, 1984), p. 412. Bourne told them the True Blue campus only had water for one night and 
within a couple of hours water trucks were sent there. 
57 interview with Kelly. The cuffcw was lifted between 10: 00 a. m. and 2: 00 p. m. on Friday, October 
21. Kelly also met with some of the Grenadian military that day, to discuss the curfew and the 
possibility of people leaving, and with Scoon. 
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Austin arrived at Bourne's house at 11: 00 a. m. According to Bourne, the General 
"looked completely exhausted. He looked like a man completely overwhelmed by 
what he had done and the worldwide reaction it had caused and that he was looking 
for help. "" Austin recounted what had allegedly happened at Fort Rupert and 
bemoaned that "no country will talk to me. None of the Caribbean countries will talk 
and the United States will not even respond. "'9 Austin said that he hoped to end 
military rule soon. Bourne inquired about the press and television blackout and 
whether Austin would be willing to talk to U. S. diplomats if a visit could be arranged. 
Austin agreed to this. He concluded the meeting by asking Bourne about the 
students: "Did I think many would want to leave. What were their reaction in 
general? 00 Austin assured Bourne that the students were in no danger and gave him 
his home phone number to call at any time if there were problems. 
Bourne adjudged Austin to be a man out of his depth but "not particularly 
sympathetic to the Marxist cause. ', 
61 Additionally, he felt that "their attitude was 
62 
unexpected and reassuring, " there was little threat to the students. He telexed the 
substance of the meeting to SGUs' Chancellor Charles Modica in New York. 
Although Modica was initially sceptical of Austins sincerity he trusted Bourne's 
judgment and concluded that: 
[I]n his[Austin] own mind, it was very important that the school remain on the 
58 "Statement of Gcoffrcy Boumc, NW., Vice Chancellor, St. George's University School of 
Medicine, Grenada, West Indies, " U. S. Congress. U. & MilitaryActions in Grenada, p. 188. 
" Leventhal, "Entrcprcncurship and Nation Building, " p. 290. 
60 "Statement by Geoffrey Boumc, " U. S. Congress, US MilitaryActions in Grenada, p. 191. 
61 Pctcr Bourne, "Was Intervention Necessary? " Los Angeles Dines, Novembcr 6,1983, section 4, p. 
1. 
62 LcvenM, "Entreprcneurship and Nation Building, " p. 290. 
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island and classes be held and he was willing to do any, anything and everything 
(sic) to make sure that the students were safe and that the classes were held and 
the employees'jobs were safeguarded. 63 
SGU also telexed the U. S. embassy in Barbados to inform them of Austin's 
64 
agreement to meet with embassy officials. The embassy had tried unsuccessfully to 
get two officials to Grenada on Wednesday, October 19, and accepted the offer. 
According to one official the U. S. were even anxious to talk with the RMC as 
establishing a dialogue is the preferred first option in hostage situations, or potential 
ones. " Irrespective of the RMC's goals and motives, at least a dialogue would 
indicate a degree of rationality. 66 
In two lengthy conversations with the embassy that day, Modica expressed his 
belief that the RMC would do nothing to jeopardize SGU or harm the students to 
avoid giving the U. S. a pretext to act. He was worried that with RFG off air not all 
the students would be aware of the curfew which was making communication with 
them difficult. He feared a "violent backlash" against the RMC with some students 
caught in the middle. 67 Although Modica also identified two possible helicopter 
landing points he speculated as to whether the dispersion of the campuses and 
students and staff would make it safer to leave the students in place or to evacuate 
" PBS Frontline, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 13. For a detailed study of the history of SGU see 
Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building. " 
64 "U. S. House of Representatives Fact Finding Nlission: The Grenada Diary of Congressman Louis 
Stokcs, " Documents on the Invasion, Item XXV, p. 103. 
65 Intcrvicw with Flowcr. 0 
66 R. Reuben Miller, "The Bangkok Solution: Peaceful Resolution of Hostage-taking, " intelligence 
and National Secufity 10 (April 1995): 3 10. 
67 Bish! s notes. 
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theM. 69 In his subsequent conversation just after midnight he considered the situation 
"to be sufficiently tense and threatening so that if it were simply a matter of 
evacuating those resident on campuses. .. USG should move as quickly as 
circumstances dictated. It69 With a curfew in place and the students in multiple 
locations an evacuation would be difficult; additionally Modica felt that "a move to 
evacuate American citizens which did not get all of them off the island would. .. 
trigger vindictive behavior by Grenadians. "70 The Chancellor concluded by saying 
that "violent reaction by Bishop's supporters should be expected within a week or so 
-- if not within the next few days. 01 
By Thursday evening the RMC had taken a number of decisions in an attempt to 
improve their almost untenable position. After Cuba! s negative reaction Coard was 
seen as a burden and dropped out of sight. Curfew passes and escorts were arranged 
for foreign diplomats and those in essential services and all workplaces would be 
reopened on Monday, October 24. Lastly, the RMC decided to "create a I)road- 
based' civilian government within two weeks, a process that would commence with 
the deliberate co-option of businessmen, bank managers and hoteliers in order to 
restore confidence both domestically and internationally. "72 Many of those 
approached by the RMC were reluctant to become involved or simply refused; after 
6' Ibid. When Modica inquired if he should have SGU officials talk to the RMC about moving off- 
campus students on to university campuses, ambassador Bish suggested that such measures might be 
premature and should be put on hold for the moment. Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of 
State, "Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School Toward Possible Evacuation of 
Their Students/Staff, " 200739Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06392, section 1, p. 4. 
69 Bish, "Subject: Grenada: Attitudes of the Grenada Medical School, " section 1, p. 3. 
10 Ibid., section 1, p. 4. 
71 Ibid., section 1, p. 4. 
" Payne et al., Grenada, p. 139. 
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much effort a meeting between a civilian group and the RMC was arranged for 
Sunday, October 23.73 Despite the RMC's frantic manoeuvring it was impossible to 
counter the effect of the massacre of the previous day and it was that which guided 
the Eastern Caribbean and U. S. approach to the new regime. 
The Special Situations Group 
During the afternoon in Washington, Constantine Menges had composed 
background memos for Mice President George Bush to use at the Special Situations 
Group (SSG)74 meeting later that day. With the help of Oliver North, Menges 
summarized the views of the State Department, Department of Defence, CIA and 
NSC. North had grown more interested in Grenada but "predicted that the State 
Department would oppose action and argue for negotiation and that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff would oppose any military action. "75 The SSG convened at 4: 45 p. m. in the 
situation room in the sub-basement of the West wing of the White House. 7" There 
were two main topics of discussion: the safety of the students and the availability of 
military forces and the time required to ready them for action. 
13 Interview with Kelly. 
7' The SSG was a crisis management group that was chaired by the Vice President and included the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, heads of the CIA and the JCS. 
75 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 71. McFarlane recalls North having "as large a role as anyone" in 
affairs. Ben Bradlee, Guts and Glory: 7he Rise and Fall of Oliver North (New York: Donald I. Fine, 
1988), p. 179. North was an indefatigable all-purpose Pentagon action officer who liaised between 
ambassador Bish, the military and the intelligence community. Motley kept him on a short leash 
throughout the crisis as he was aware that good judgment was not North! s forte. Interview with 
Motley. 
"' The meeting was chaired by Bush and also attended by McFarlane, North, Menges, Weinberger, 
Vessey, Ikle, McMahon, Eagleburger, Middendorf and Meese. Shultz and Motley arrived about 5: 15 
p. m. after testifying at Congress. 
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Reports from the U. S. embassy in Barbados had recommended action to rescue 
the students and possibly topple the RMC. Washington knew little about the 
membership of the RMC or the balance of power within it. 77 In the absence of 
reliable information about the students situation, decisionmakers, Lawrence 
Eagleburger in particular, drew an analogy with the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979- 
198 1. Weinberger echoed this thought: 
[W]e naturally had to think about how we could either extricate the Americans, 
or prevent their being seized as hostages in a reprise of the frustrating and very 
dangerous Iranian seizure of our citizens and capture of our Embassy in Teheran 
in 1979.78 
Comparing the RMC to a group of Iranian militants brought to mind a protracted 
hostage situation with the U. S. reluctant to act. As Carothers notes, "the Iran 
experience had left such deep scars in the U. S. psyche that it was enough for the 
vague possibility of another hostage-taking situation to arise for alarm bells to go off 
in the U. S. government. 09 The uncertainty of the situation in Grenada played on 
Washingtotfs fears; as Dam revealed, "it was never clear that Austin or any other 
coherent group was in fact in charge. The RMC indicated no intention to function as 
a new government. "so, Motley expressed similar concerns: 
The danger aspect for the students came from the fact that (sic) the absence of 
assurances from any bona fide authorities. Every report that we got showed that 
there didn't seem to be much organization or discipline on the island, other than the 
fact that there was this curfew... we didift have any assurances... there were 
six hundred U. S. citizens in four different concentrations on this island. That 
gave cause for alarm. The thought, early on, crossed the minds of .. many people 
77 Telephone interview with Foreign Service Officer, January 31,1995. 
78 Weinberger, Fighfing For Peace, p. 74. 
79 Thomas Carothers, In the Name ofDemocracy. US Policy Toward Lafin America in the Reagan 
Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 114. 
80 "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Darn, Deputy Secretary of State, " U. S. Congress. Senate. 
Committee on Foreign Relations. The Situafion in Grenada (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1983), p. 4. 
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that it was a... situation ripe for hostages. " 
This genuine concern for the students and the use of the Iran analogy provided the 
background for the second point of discussion; a military option. 
Earlier that day CINCLANT had produced six options for an evacuation-type 
operation, as had been requested on Wednesday, October 19, and briefed General 
Vessey at Norfolk, Virginia. 82 The discussion was "framed in terms of the action 
being a combined rescue and restoration of democracy. 03 Essentially, the political 
parameters of any subsequent operation had been set; citizen safety and the removal 
of the RMC. The Director of the CIA, William Casey, stated his preferences 
unequivocally: "Hey. .. fuck it, let's dump these bastards. to 
84 Shultz, backed by 
McFarlane, supported a less ambitious plan but favoured readiness for possible 
military action. 85 According to Motley, "initially we looked at a surgical type action, 
and then a decision was made, properly so by the military, that the situation was such 
that you could not have a surgical action per se. So the operation became more 
81 PBS Frontline, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 11. 
82 Admiral McDonald! s staff had assumed the required forces would be available, no hostile country 
y evacuation would take place near Point Salines. Of the six options, two would intervene and arr 
were under friendly conditions, three under hostile conditions and the final one a "show of force" 
action. Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 117-18. 
83 Menges had prepared a one-page overview of "genuine democrats who could establish an interim 
government leading to fair and free elections. " Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 72. 
94 Woodward, VEIL, p. 329. 
85 Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " p. 24. Shultz and Motley were both proponents of the "diplomacy not 
backed by strength is incffectual" school. As Shultz explained in his memoirs: "The use of force, 
and the credible threat of the use of force, arc legitimate instruments of national policy and should 
be viewed as such... The use of force obviously should not be taken lightly, but better to use force 
when you should rather than when you must, last means no other, and by that time the level of force 
and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over. " Shultz, Turmoil and Piumph, p. 345. 
Emphasis in original. 
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expanded. lt86 Despite this, General Vessey was reluctant to act and got the support 
of Weinberger in asking for more time and intelligence. 87 After the meeting Vessey 
notified CINCLANT to prepare advanced planning for an evacuation from a hostile 
environment. " 
There was a general consensus amongst the SSG in favour of action and when 
Oliver North mentioned that a Navy Task Force had left Norfolk on Tuesday, 
October 18, en route to the Mediterranean, Motley, who was unaware of this, 
proposed that the Task Force be diverted south towards Grenada. He argued that this 
would be a "precautionary measure"" and a "prudent, low-profile, low-risk" move 
which would provide Washington with a military capability nearby. 90 Vice Admiral 
Moreau, Vessey's assistant, flatly refused; he told a frustrate& Motley that the JCS 
86 U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Lessons Learned as a 
Result ofthe U. S. Military Operations in Grenada (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1984), p. 19. 
87 Apparently some participants were astonished that no contingency plan existed and that the most 
recent aerial photos were five months old. Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy, " p. 72. It was decided that 
the CIA should get someone onto Grenada. It appears that one attempt to do this failed: the CIA 
contacted Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Stilwell at 4: 00 p. m. that afternoon to request 
his help in getting an agent onto Grenada in forty-eight hours. Stilwell called Lieutenant Colonel 
Foster at the Seaspray office in Fort Eustus, Virginia. Foster organized the transport of two 
helicopters needed for the operation from their base in California to Barbados in time only for the 
expatriate Grenadian agent to "bottle out. " Steven Emerson, Secret Wartiors. - Inside the Covert 
Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York- G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1988), p. 145. According 
to Bish the CIA got someone else onto Grenada that day and by Friday a satellite radio guidance 
device had been placed in St. George's harbour. Interview with Bish. 
88 The plan was to move as quick as possible to secure Point Salincs, Pearls, the medical school 
campuses, Scoon and political prisoners. The Marines would land in the northeast near Pearls and 
the Rangers in the southeast at Point Salincs and then link up and move north and west to rescue the 
students and work with the Special Forces to rescue Scoon and the political prisoners at Richmond 
11ill and capture Radio Free Grenada. Weinberger, Fighlingfor Peace, p. 76. 
89 Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 70. 
90 Shultz, Turmoil and Diumph, p. 327. Admiral McDonald later explained that the diversion was 
designed to "provide that type of alertness and responsiveness to protect our citizens and to provide 
potential for evacuating those citizens in a peacefid environment" U. S. Congress. Senate. 
Committee on Armed Services. Organization, Structure, and Dedsionmaking Procedures of the 
Department ofDefense, Part 7 (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1983), p. 285. 
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would not consider such a measure without a written Presidential order. This 
obstructionism was soon overcome after the meeting when McFarlane drafted an 
order from the President to General Vessey to divert the Task Force south. 
Washington had received news of Adams' conversation with Bish urging military 
action to safeguard foreign citizens, restore law and order and remove the RMC. It 
was noted that the OECS were unsettled and would be meeting the next day. As 
Menges recalls: 
I knew from our infonnation that these leaders had a practical problem: what 
if they asked formally for military help from the United States and then were 
refused? Would the RMC take retaliatory action? Might Castro? Their problem 
was very real. 9' 
An official OECS request for help reduced concern that this would be a unilateral 
operation. Where military action is involved there was a feeling in Washington that if 
only the U. S. felt this was a good idea then it was not a good idea. 92 It was thus 
decided that before any commitment to military action was made, Washington would 
wait for the outcome of the OECS meeting. It was widely expected in Washington 
that the OECS would request help, a measure that would aid the U. S. ' political and 
legal justification for intervention. 
The U. S. ambassador to the OAS, William Middendorf, was instructed to "test 
the water" amongst the Latin America community to see if the OAS were likely to 
issue a condemnatory resolution against the U. S. should they intervene. 93 A final 
91 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 72. 
92 Interview with Johnstone. 
' Interview with Middendorf. Grenada had little support in Latin America. A resolution 
condemning intervention could not be introduced by Grenada because its representative, Dessima 
Williams, was absent. The Bolivian OAS Chairman was pro-Grcnada but no one seconded his 
position. The US. was always cautious about the Latin American countries views but Washington 
has traditionally had a low opinion of the OAS and this time was little different; Shultz and 
McFarlane for example were far more concerned about U. S. citizens and their concerns overrode 
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measure was to maintain secrecy, 94 the schedules of top officials remained unchanged 
in an effort to mislead the Cubans, the Soviets and the media as to Washington's 
intentions. 
After the SSG meeting concluded at 5: 45 p. m. McFarlane, Poindexter, North and 
Menges assembled to outline the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that 
would function as Reagaifs written "prepare-for-action" order to all government 
departments. 95 Menges then composed a memo from McFarlane to the President, 
summarizing the SSG meeting and recommending the President sign the NSDD. A 
revised draft of the NSDD was produced and McFarlane delivered this to Reagan 
who ordered planning to proceed. 96 This was not the final decision which authorized 
a military operation though. 
The decision to divert the Navy Task Force was enacted around midnight on the 
Thursday, October 20, when Captain Carl Erie was instructed to turn his fleet, just 
north of Bermuda at the time, south and take up position five hundred miles northeast 
of Grenada. No explanation was given but Erie was told that if no further word was 
received by midnight on Sunday, October 23, the fleet should resume its course to 
those who worried about anti-U. S. feeling in Latin America. Thomas M. DeFrank and John Walcott, 
"The Invasion Countdown, " Newsweek, November 7,1983, p. 44. 
94 By one official's estimation, until the Lag day or so before intervention when the number of 
people who knew about the operation had to be expanded, only about twenty-five people in 
Washington knew what was going orL Interview with Roger Fontaine, July 15,1994, Washington 
D. C. 
95 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 73. NSDD's arc different from other Presidential orders in that they 
do not have to be disclosed to any other branch of goVen1ment, notably Congress; President Reagan 
issued some 200 NSDD's during his presidency. Eve Peff, "The Backbone of lhddcn Government, " 
7he Nation, June 19,1989, p. 83 8. A collection of the Reagan and Bush administrations' NSDDs 
can be found in Simpson, National Security Directives. 
96 Bcnnctt, "Grcnada: Anatomy, " p. 74. 
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the Mediterranean. 97 Erie discussed the order with Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) 
Commander Colonel James Faulkner and his staff who believed that if the MAU was 
to be involved it would be in an NEO. 9' Although Erie and his colleagues had 'no 
information on the location or precise numbers of American citizens to be evacuated. 
.. planning proceeded on the assumption that such information soon would be 
provided. '99 
The meeting of the SSG marked the elevation of the Grenada crisis to cabinet- 
level. As in previous RIG meetings there was agreement on the need for a military 
solution with, predictably, only the JCS protesting. A number of important decisions 
had been taken: the safety of American citizens was of utmost importance; the RMC 
should be removed; intelligence needed to be improved; the JCS were instructed to 
prepare an advanced plan for a hostile environment evacuation; the Task Force en 
route to the Mediterranean was diverted south towards Grenada; secrecy was 
deemed essential to the operation at this stage; the legal aspects of intervention were 
to be examined to provide a firmer basis for any operation; and the results of the 
OECS meeting in Barbados the next day would be awaited before any final 
intervention decision was made. '00 
ý7 Ronald H. Spector, U. S. Afarines in Grenada (Washington D. C.: 1-fistory and Museums Division 
Headquarters, 1987), p. 2. 
98 Ibid., p. 2. 
99 Ibid., p. 2. 
100 Beck, Ae Grenada Invasion, p. 107. 
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FridU. October 21 
Friday began in Washington with a 7: 30 a. m. meeting of the NSC chaired by 
McFarlane. The industrious Menges gave McFarlane a full report of the situation so 
far and informed him that the State Department was readying a detailed political plan 
to be reviewed at a midday RIG meeting. '01 In addition a CPPG meeting would be 
held later that afternoon. 
Friday was a busy day in Barbados as the OECS met to discuss the events in 
Grenada and U. S. involvement in a multinational military solution. That morning, 
ambassador Bish traveled to St. Vincent to attend a pre-arranged destroyer visit and 
DCM Flower and Gillespie met with the Foreign Minister of Barbados Louis Tull and 
his Permanent Secretary H. Brazane Babb. 102 The U. S. embassy also sent a 
diplomatic note to the RMC to request permission for Kenneth Kurze and Linda 
Flohr to visit Grenada on Saturday, October 22. At 9: 45 a. m. the embassy received 
the first news of the arrest the previous night of a U. S. citizen, Michelle Gibbs. 'O' 
Later that morning the embassy cabled Washington that in contrast to earlier reports 
there were now "life threatening situations in Grenada. "'04 
101 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 74. 
102 Bish's notes. The destroyer monitored Grenadian communications and provided residual security 
support to St. Vincent. "Sixteen days that shook the Caribbean, " Caiibbean Insight 6, no. II 
(November 1983), p. 5. 
103 Bish's notes. Gibbs had been in Grenada since 1980, worldng as a teacher, and was sympathetic 
to the PRG's ideology. After the intervention she was Invited to leave as she was on a list of "those 
people who present[ed] a threat to the country. " "U. S. House of Representatives: Critics of American 
Invasion Wained-U. S. Troops Act on Request of Grenada's Governor General, " Documents on the 
Invasion, Item XW, p. 106. 
104 Bish! s notes. 
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Prime NEnister Adams met with the I-figh Commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago 
to tell him in confidence for transmittal to Prime Minister Chambers that he [Adams] 
would be unable to attend the upcon-dng CARICOM meeting because "a military 
intervention was being contemplated by the OECS with Barbados and other 
countries, in which participation of all CARICOM countries would be invited. "", At 
12: 30 p. m. Adams met the British High Comn-dssioner Giles Bullard'06 to notify him 
that the OECS was "contemplating" inviting the U. S. and that Britain would also be 
invited. Finally, Adams met with ambassador Bish to tell him to inform Washington 
that the OECS was deliberating over intervention and that the U. S. should await a 
formal request which the Prime Nlinister was confident would be forthcoming. 107 In 
reply Bish "undertook to convey the facts to President Reagan while awaiting a 
formal request should one be issued. " 108 The U. S. would not have long to wait as the 
OECS was scheduled to convene at the Dover Convention Centre near Bridgetown 
shortly after lunchtime. 
Back in Grenada 
In Grenada the curfew was lifted from 10: 00 a. m. until 2: 00 p. m. to enable people 
to stock up on supplies. The RMC appeared "weakened, divided, and totally isolated 
from the rest of the Caribbean. "109 Stung by Cuba! s rebuff, the RMC criticized 
Castro, claiming that his personal friendship with Bishop "had caused the Cuban 
105 "Full TeN1 of Speech by the Prime Nfinister of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 37. 
106 Bullard had been keeping Adams in touch with developments on Grenada through his contacts. 
Hoyos, Tom Adams, p. 114. 
101 Bish! s notes. 
108 "Full Tc., d of Speech by the Prime Nfinistcr of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 37. 
109 Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada, " p. 93. 
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leadership to take a personal and not a class approach to the developments in 
Grenada" and that "the Cubarfs (sic) position creates an atmosphere for speedy 
imperialist intervention. """ As one RMC member despaired: "almost have no militia, 
no social base. Only country which can help is fucking around. ""' 
There was a glimmer of hope for the RMC when St. Vincent's Prime Minister 
Milton Cato offered to meet with Austin to "negotiate a way out of the 'tragic events' 
on Grenada. 012 Considering the RMC's tenuous position, Austitfs twenty-four hour 
delay in accepting this offer is puzzling, perhaps underlining the turbulence and 
inexperience within the RMC; Austin eventually responded to Cato's proposal at 2: 30 
p. m. on Saturday, October 21. By this time Cato was attending the OECS meeting 
which issued a request to the U. S. to participate in a military action. Irrespective of 
Austirfs delayed response, Cato's initiative was soundly resisted by Vincentians, his 
Caribbean colleagues and the U. S. 113 
Between 1: 30 p. m. and 1: 50 p. m. that afternoon the U. S. embassy were in telex 
contact with SGU who relayed an "apparent invitation" from Austin for U. S. officials 
to visit Grenada. 114 Austin told SGU officials that he would not oppose the departure 
of the students but was keen to ensure that the School remained open; he promised 
110 Cotman, The Go? 7! on Tree, p. 219. 
111 Ibid., p. 219. 
112 Patrick E. Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Plannin&" Washington Post, 
October 30,1983, p. AM Cato "particularly wished to take positive steps to put an end to further 
bloodshed, as well as minimize the danger to Vincentian nationals in Grenada. " "Bridgetown 
CANA report by Albert Brandford, 00: 30 a. m. (GMr), October 22,1983, " Unclassified FBIS - 
Latin Amefica, October 24,1983, p. S5. 
113 Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada, " p. 93. When asked about the offer on Saturday, October 22, 
Cato simply replied, "I have no meeting with Gen. Austin. " Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion, " p. 
A14. 
114 BisWs notes. 
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that Grenadian forces would protect the School and "instructed the administrators to 
consolidate the student body on the main campus. "115 The RMC also issued a note 
stating that: "Not one American citizen has been harmed, neither has any other 
foreign citizen in Grenada been harmed in any way. "116 This may well have been 
technically true but obscured the wider picture. As Kelly recalled, on Friday an ever- 
growing number of people came to see him about leaving Grenada. He started to find 
out how many people wanted to leave and began arranging evacuation flights for 
Monday, October 24.117 At 6: 00 p. m. that Friday the SGU Bursar Gary Solin got in 
touch with the embassy to report that of 200 students that had been contacted, 34 
had signed up to leave. However, he was "certain that when emboffs (embassy 
officers) arrive the urge to leave will snowball. """ The embassy cabled Washington 
to suggest that "we will have to consider arranging charter flights or [a] sea lift for at 
least fifteen per cent of U. S., Canadians, and British nationals. "119 
Meeting at Foggy Bottom 
At 12: 00 p. m. RIG met for two hours; a political plan for the rescue of U. S. 
citizens and the establishment of an interim government had been composed. A 
number of issues were discussed; which pro-U. S. countries would be informed and 
115 Intelligence reports offered two interpretations: "valid assurances, or a move to make it easier to 
hold the students hostage. " CIA Memo, *Grenada Chronology 7-25 October 1983, " Declassified 
Documents Catalog XIV, no. 5 (Scpternber-October 1988), docurncnt no. 002449, p. 2. 
116 George Skelton and David Wood, "U. S. to Post Task Force Off Grenada, " Los Angeles 7-Imes, 
October 22,1983, section 1, p. 3. 
117 Interview with Kelly. There were about 200 Britons on Grenada but Kelly was approached by 
other nationalities as well as many Grenadians who had worked with the PRG. 
118 Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: WelfareAVhcreabouts of St. 
George's Medical School Students, " 212328Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06503, p. 1. 
119 lbid, p. 1. 
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when, the post-intervention role of Governor-General Scoon, the formation of an 
interim government and the domestic and international legality of an action. 
The secrecy surrounding the decisionmaking process militated against notifying 
allies in advance. RIG knew the unrest in Grenada provided an opportunity to "install 
a process where [a] government would be elected more favourable to our 
interests" 120 and reasoned that Governor-General Scoon would be the focus of post- 
intervention political authority and the creation of an intenm government. 121 
The introduction of the State Department's lawyers was the result of the 
suggestion of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs James 
Michel; Motley agreed, feeling that should an intervention occur a plausible legal 
justification would be advantageous. As he subsequently commented, "I didet want 
nine thousand years of [post-invasion] Security Council debate. "'22 The lawyers 
began to examine the relevant aspects of the OECS, OAS and UN Charters and also 
the War Powers Resolution. 
With the OECS convening in Barbados that afternoon their position was 
considered. In Menges' opinion: 
The Caribbean leaders hesitated to suggest military action in Grenada - an 
ally of Cuba - unless they were certain that the United States would participate. 
If the United States were unwilling to join them, the best they could do would be 
to deplore the violence on Grenada and avoid arousing additional hostility from 
Cuba or the new communist faction that conrolled (sic) Grenada. 
At the same time, some in our government were hesitant to act unilaterally. It 
was my view that a collective security action was by far the most desirable for 
political and strategic reasons, but that if the Caribbean countries were too afraid 
120 Interview with Johnstone. 
12' As Shultz recounts, "Tony Motley and Larry Eagleburger met with the British ambassador to 
Washington, Sir Oliver Wright, who provided detailed information in writing on the Grenada 
constitution and on the precise line of authority from the queen to the Commonwealth, the 
Governor-General, and the Grenada government. " Shultz, Turmoil and Piumph, p. 327. 
122 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 9 1. 
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to ask for help, the United States had the right to act alone to protect American 
citizens. 12' 
Menges felt that the likelihood of an OECS invitation would be increased if 
ambassador Bish "could tell the Caribbean leaders that the probability of U. S. military 
action would be much higher if they requested military action collectively. " 124 It 
would be late that evening when word of the OECS' decision reached Washington. 
Before Shultz left Washington for a weekend in Augusta, Georgia, 125 he met with 
Motley. Motley told his superior of the OECS meeting in session and that the OECS 
leaders were "out in front" and that Venezuela were unlikely to join in. 126 Both men 
were especially worried about the students and by this stage were "increasingly 
convinced we had run out of ways to accomplish a peaceful evacuation of the 
American students and that the situation on the ground was deteriorating into total 
anarchy. Conditions were ripe. .. for hostage taking. it 
127 Dam later explained 
Washington's unease: 
Our concern for their welfare was heightened by the murders, the curfew, and 
difficulty in getting accurate information on their well-being and future prospects. 
The RMC's failure to reopen the airport to allow free departures suggests that 
anything was possible. 128 
121 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 75. The Caribbean nations would have been surprised if the U. S. had 
not helped considering their proximity, the plan to rescue Bishop and the general good relations 
they had with the Eastern Caribbean. Interview with Edmunds. 
124 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 76. 
125 Reagan, Shultz, McFarlane, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and former New Jersey senator 
Nicholas Brady left Washington D. C. late Friday afternoon for a weekend of golf at the Augusta 
National Golf Club just outside Atlanta. According to Shultz, the situation in Grenada was part of 
the reason why McFarlane accompanied them. Shultz, Plumph and Turmoil, p. 323. 
126 Shultz, Tunnoil and Piumph, p. 328. 
127 lbid, p. 328. 
128 "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, " U. S. Congress, 7he Situation in Grenada, p. 5. 
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For Motley, the question was how to quantify the students! safety; "Our mission just 
has to be either to get the students out, peacefully if possible, or to get 100 percent 
assurances that they are safe. "129 It is difficult to imagine how such a guarantee was 
ever possible. Motley later admitted that for him the situation was simpler; either the 
students were allowed to leave or the U. S. would intervene. 130 At 4: 00 p. m. Reagan 
signed a preliminary NSDD, ordering planning to proceed, before flying to Augusta 
for the weekend. 
At 5: 00 p. m. Poindexter reconvened the CPPG. According to Menges: 
Now the tone of our discussions had shifted from whether we would act to 
how this could be accomplished with minimum casualties while insuring speed 
to avoid the likelihood of Cuban or Soviet counteraction. 131 
The State Department representatives, Motley and Johnstone, presented a revised 
preliminary plan of action based on the earlier RIG meeting. As yet the U. S. had not 
received a formal invitation from plausible authority: "An invitation from Grenada! s 
neighbours would be of inestimable value in the diplomatic fallout that the State 
Department saw as inevitable after the U. S. action. 11132 McFarlane, amongst others, 
considered this angle: 
I also instructed that we determine whether the other Caribbean states, includ- 
ing Dominica, Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and others might be in- 
clined to coordinate a call for assistance from the United States that would 
legitimize our involvement. 133 
'29 Shult4 Turmoil and Piumph, p. 328. 
130 Interview with Motley. 
131 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 76. 
132 UShaughnessy, Grenada, p. 155. 
133 Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York. Cadell & Davies, 1994), p. 
258. 
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Despite the strong support for military action amongst civilian decisionmakers the 
final decision between an NEO and takeover of Grenada had not been made. The JCS 
had previously opposed action but once they accepted that action was necessary they 
argued that the dispersal of students in three areas and the multiple targets that an 
operation would entail meant seizing the entire island. 134 As a result the JCS were 
instructed to plan for both eventualities; that evening CINCLANT was ordered to 
develop plans to include an occupation and restoration of democracy. "' According 
to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's instructions, the military were to "plan 
to begin the operation at the soonest possible time consistent with the maximum 
safety of our forces, and with the actual time needed to assemble both the forces and 
supplies for a successful action. 036 Vessey estimated that Tuesday, October 25, was 
the earliest "safe" date. Despite cautions about the need for secrecy, officials were 
"appalled" to learn that the lead story on CBS' Evening News was the diversion of 
the fleet. 
That evening after the meeting Menges and North spent four and a half hours 
composing background and decision memoranda for the next day's NSPG meeting. 137 
Poindexter reviewed them and then sent them to Augusta. 
134 Vessey's philosophy was to minimize casualties which meant the use of overwhelming force. 
interview with Weinberger. Vcssey's was a typical post-Vietnam military doctrine. 
135 Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " p. 33. 
136 Weinberger, Fighlingfor Peace, p. 78. 
137 Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 76. 
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The OECS Meeting 
The meeting began after lunch at the Dover Convention Centre in Bridgetown. 138 
Firstly, the Defence and Security Committee met and then the main Authority of the 
OECS convened. The members expressed their horror at "what had happened in 
Grenada over the previous few days. They felt such brutal behaviour was as 
unprecedented as it was unacceptable. 039 The OECS were worried about the 
domestic repercussions of the coup and "expressed the fear that the bloody leftist 
military takeover on Grenada could embolden Havana-leaning revolutionaries in their 
own nations. j#140 As Seaga warned: 
If a whole government can be wiped out overnight either by political or military 
extremists and the governments of the Caribbean remain silent and passive, then 
no government elected by the people can be safe from madmen of one type or 
another who would seek to replace a government of the people, elected by the 
people with one selected by a chosen few of whatever nature. 
If we ignore the occurrence of brutal military take-overs or political over- 
throws of governments, we would immediately give heart to every subversive 
group in the region. 141 - 
In their formal request to the U. S. on Sunday, October 23, the leaders clearly 
communicated their concerns, painting a grim picture of the situation: 
[M]ilitary forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate 
138 Six of the seven OECS states were represented: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Montserrat, St. 
Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. Grenada was for obvious reasons not represented. Thiswas the first 
time the OECS had met in a non-member's country. It was also the first time representatives of non. 
member countries, Barbados and Jamaica, attended a meeting. Bish and Gillespie were also present 
at the Centre but did not participate in the meeting as some have suggested. Interview with Bish. 
Their presence there does perhaps indicate the importance of the OECS, request to the US. 
139 Payne ct al., Grenada, p. 149. 
" John Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction, " 7he University of 
Miami Inter-Amefican Law Review 18 (Winter 1986-1987): 306. 
141 "Statement to the Nation by the Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Rt. Hon. Edward Seaga, on 
Developments in Grenada, Tuesday, October 25,1983, " Documents on the Invasion, Item XVI, p. 
69. 
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the position of the regime and that country can be used as a staging post for acts 
of aggression against its neighbours; and that the capability of the Grenadian 
armed forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal 
needs of that country. '42 
Most felt that as long as the RMC endured it could "undermine political, social and 
economic stability and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the 
preservation of peace and security in the OECS sub-region as a whole. it 143 
Something had to be done and without delay. 
The participants were unanimous and quickly reached a decision: 
Within a half hour, we all knew we were going to go into Grenada and do some- 
thing... Everyone came with their minds made up, without any discussion, that 
we were going to go in. 144 
As Braveboy-Wagner comments, the OECS was a small, coherent group with leaders 
who were well acquainted and of similar political persuasion. Their decision to use 
force was as much personal preference as any rational ends-means decision. 145 The 
leaders choice was made easier by the fact that regional public opinion generally 
favoured some sort of decisive action as well. Although the OECS had the inclination 
to act they did not have the muscle; as Charles recalls, "we sat back and said Mut 
142 "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Darn, Deputy Secretary of State, Accompanied by Maj. Gen. 
George Cristo U. S. Marine Corps, " U. S. Congress, U. S. MilitaryActions in Grenada, p. 10. 
143 to Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Request For US. Assistance in Grenada, " October 
23,1983, American Foreign Policy Current Documents (AFPCD), document no. 656 (Washington 
D. C.: GPO, 1983), p. 1397. 
"4 ffigbie, Eugenia, p. 228. The only opposition to military action from within the OECS came 
from Lester Bird, Deputy Prime Nfinister and Foreign Mnistcr of Antigua and Barbuda, who 
abstained from the OECS vote. However, when ambassador Bish learnt of this he phoned the 
Antiguan Prime Nfinister Vere Bird Sr., Lester's father, to explain the correctness of a military 
solution. It is reasonable to assume that Bish! s intervention influenced Vere Bircrs subsequent 
decision to withdraw the abstention vote. Interview with Bish. It seems that negotiations were half- 
heartcdly discussed and the idea of the OAS as a peacekeeper suggested but ruled out as it was too 
time-consuming and almost certain that the Latin nations would oppose action. Bravcboy-Wagner, 
The Caribbean in WorldAffairs, p. 184. 
145 Ibid., p. 189. 
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how do we go in? What do we have? I have ten policemen, you have ten, you have 
twenty, and so on, it diddt add up to one hundred'. "'46The OECS knew they needed 
the support of a larger nation; Britain, Canada, France and Venezuela were 
considered but the U. S. were the most likely to help it was decided. 147 Adams, 
Charles and Compton had all discussed the possibility of military assistance with U. S. 
officials in the past few days"' and now "the diversion of the U. S. fleet provided a 
dramatic demonstration of U. S. seriousness and of the availability of a military 
OptiolLmI49 Charles confirmed this, "we asked America because they already had 
slips in the area because they'd come close to [unintelligible]; they had to evacuate 
the people. "150 
The situation in Grenada forced the OECS to confront unanswered security 
questions such as what constituted a threat and how a security arrangement could 
function in the region. Issuing an invitation to a superpower was possibly a 
precedent-setting measure that reinforced the belief that [in times of crisis] Eastern 
1 46 Higbie, Eugenia, p. 228. St. Kitts had only recently gained independence and had no forces and 
the FCO had previously explained the position of Montserrat as a British dependency: "it is the 
intention of the Colony of Montserrat to withhold its participation in respect of Foreign Affairs and 
Defence and Security matters of the Organization, to the went that any decisions of the 
Organization or any committee or institution thereof may require action to be taken by the 
Government of Montserrat inconsistent with the views, directives, policies and obligations of Her 
? &jesty's Government of the United Kingdom. " Gilmore, 7he Grenada Intervention, p. 87. 
147 Adams later claimed that the "preference would have been for our traditional protector, Britain, 
to have taken a or the leading role in restoring democracy. * U. K. Parliament. House of Commons. 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report. Grenada (London: WASO, 1984), p. )d. 
148 In fact, Charles had dropped in on Bish, who was in another room at the convention centrc, to 
push for military help again during a recess of the OECS meeting. Higbie, Eugenia, p. 228. 
149 Pastor, 'rhe In-vasion of Grenada, " p. 93. 
150 "Grenada Invasion/ Beirut Debate, " 7he MacNeikEehrer News Hour, transcript no. 2107, 
October 25,1993, p. 6. 
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Caribbean security relied on the involvement of extra-regional powers. However, this 
was an unprecedented problem and called for a commensurate solution. 
The legal aspects of an intervention did not concern the OECS, indeed several 
leaders were lawyers by vocation. According to the OECS' Director General, 
Vaughan Lewis, they knew the legal definition of self-defence was subjective and 
concepts of humanitarian intervention disputable. 151 Subsequently, under Article 8 152 
of the OECS Treaty, the leaders voted to: 
take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security 
against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries to 
provide transport, logistic support, and additional military personnel to assist 
the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern 
Caribbean. 
The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with 
the assistance of fiiendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions 
of tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human 
rights pending the restoration of constitutional government. 153 
As it was considered that Grenada had no government, Governor-General Scoon, 
who had been retained by the PRG as a figurehead, could usefully act as the lawful 
authority in Grenada. 154 Probably to mask their true intentions, the OECS voted in a 
package of political and economic sanctions which included no official contact with 
151 Vaughan Le-Aris, "Small States, Eastern Caribbean Security, and the Grenada Intervention, " in 
Heine (ecL), A Revolution Aborted, p. 260. 
152 Paragraph four of Article 8 reads: "The Defence and Security Committee shall have 
responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the 
preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties 
among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including 
measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal 
or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. " Gilmore, 7he Grenada Intervenfion, 
p. 81. 
153 "Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Pxquest, "AFPCD, p. 1398. 
154 According to Hoyos, Adam sent two emissaries to see Scoon that Friday and he was "persuaded 
to give his approval to what the OECS intended to do, but indicated that he would issue a formal 
invitation when it was safe to do so. " Hoyos, Tom Adams, p. 116. 
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the RMC, no further issuing of currency to Grenada by the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Authority and the cutting of all air and sea links. 151 This last measure made 
any evacuation operation even less feasible. 
Having voted, the OECS requested that Adams attend the meeting. The 
Barbadian Prime NEnister arrived around dusk via a back entrance. The OECS then 
issued an invitation to Barbados to join them. Another late addition to the meeting 
was Jamaica! s Prime NEnister Seaga who had arrived in Barbados earlier that day 
with the Second-in-Command of the Jamaican Defense Force Colonel Ken Barnes. 
Seaga was unaware of the OECS decision and proposed a naval blockade of Grenada 
by the U. S. and Venezuela "in order to preclude the Cubans from augmenting their 
personnel on the island or taking [any] pre-emptive action. ot 156 Once apprised of the 
OECS' earlier decision he agreed that a blockade was superfluous. Seaga then also 
received an invitation from the OECS for Jamaican participation. The meeting ended 
with troop numbers being settled and planning commencing and Adams being 
deputed to inform the U. S. and Great Britain of the decision. 
Between 9: 30-11: 00 p. m. Charles, Adams and Seaga met with Bish, Flower and 
Gillespie"' at Adams' residence. Now the U. S. was formally invited to participate in 
a multinational force "to depose the outlaw regime on Grenada by any means. "158 
Several other points were addressed during the evening. The leaders explained that 
155 Gilmore, 7he Grenada Intervention, p. 92. 
156 Bislfs notes. 
15' One account reports that Gillespie was informed of the OECS' decision immediately after the 
meeting closed by Charles in an anteroom. Don Obcrdorfer, "Reagan Sought to End Cuban 
'Intervention!, " Washington Post, November 6,1983, p. A2 1. 
158 Ibid., p. A2 1. 
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Article 8 could be used to legitimize an intervention. They cautioned that their 
decision was not public knowledge and they had no intention of announcing it yet. "" 
However, Charles stressed that the invitation was official and formal and "it is not 
repeat not a tentative one to be later withdrawn or denied. to 160 Great Britain, France 
and "others" would be asked but if the U. S. acceded to the request the OECS would 
not wait for "latecomers. " 161 
With the CARICOM meeting due the next day, Saturday, October 22, Adams and 
Charles feared that CARICOM was "leaky" and hoped the U. S. would reach a 
decision prior to the meeting. Adams had already decided not to attend the 
CARICOM meeting and both leaders were pessimistic about the chances of Trinidad 
joining them; Adams remarked that holding the meeting in Port-of-Spain was "simply 
a gesture to satisfy that country's vanity. to 162 He informed the Americans that the 
OECS would not cancel the CARICOM meeting as this would be a negative signal 
that could jeopardize intervention plans; with low expectations of anything useful 
resulting from the meeting, it was decided that other issues would be placed on the 
agenda rather than simply intervention. 163 The discussions then drew to a close. 
159 Interview with Bish. Although news of the actual invitation had not been revealed, it was no 
secret in the Caribbean that something was afoot According to Tyler, "opponents... were lealdng 
details of the proposed invasion from private council chambers to the news media and to supporters 
of Grenada's lcftist government. " Even Charles let slip to newsmen after the OECS meeting that 
"the range of options under consideration for Grenada included military intervention. " Tyler, "The 
Making of an Invasion, " p. Al. 
160 Intcrview with Bish. 
161 Ibid 
162 ibi(L 
163 ibid. 
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Sometime between 12: 00 a. m. and 1: 00 a. m. DCM Flower drafted a report of the 
meeting which was signed by Bish and Gillespie and then cabled to Washington. 
Wake Up the President 
The news in Washington was received by Motley who instructed Gillespie to 
inform the OECS that a written request would be required by the U. S. Motley 
contacted Poindexter around 1: 00 a. m. and he relayed the message to McFarlane. 
Simultaneously Bush, Weinberger, Vessey, Baker, Meese and McMahon were 
summoned to the White House. At 2: 45 a. m. in Augusta, McFarlane called Shultz 
and the two met in the Eisenhower cottage to discuss the OECS cable which 
"basically gave the OECS states analysis of the situation and stated their very strong 
feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they 
were not able to do it on their own, and so they asked if we would help them. ""' 
The OECS advocated swift action to deny the RMC and Cubans time to prepare their 
defences or take hostages and recommended Sunday, October 23, as the best time to 
act. "5 The OECS cable was the logical conclusion of the previous few days 
communications between Washington and the Eastern Caribbean; as McFarlane later 
recalled, "It was the call we had expected. 11166 
At 3: 35 a. m. in Washington, Bush chaired a meeting of top advisers joined by 
Shultz and McFarlane on a secure conference call line from Augusta. Shultz 
confirmed that the OECS had issued a request and he apparently urged that action be 
164 "Secretary Shultz's News Conference, October 25,1983, " Department of State Bulletin 83 
(December 1983): 70. 
165 O'Shaughness3r, Grenada, p. 158. 
166 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 261. Whilst the request was expected the fervour of it 
surprised some in Washington. Interview with Johnstone. 
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taken on Sunday, October 23, as the OECS had suggested. 167 Weinberger expressed 
his opposition to any rushed operation, emphasizing that there was not enough 
available information for an operation yet and that Vessey had advised him that 
Tuesday, October 25, was the earliest "safe" date for an intervention. Nonetheless, it 
was agreed that "the ships heading for Grenada should be deployed for possible 
action, but without arousing suspicion. "IN Bush was worried that this would be an 
all-English-speaking operation and suggested that the help of Venezuela should be 
enlisted. 169 Although Weinberger had opposed a Sunday operation it now appeared 
certain that a military operation would be undertaken in the next few days. 
Weinbergees comments confirmed Shultis fears; in a separate conversation with 
Motley after the meeting at 4: 30 a. m., Shultz stated: 
We had to move quickly, before this window of opportunity closed. We couldnt 
let the Pentagon drag out our preparations until it was too late, which I feared 
they might do. 170 
President Reagan was woken sometime between 4: 30 a. m. and 5: 00 a. m. and 
appraised of developments by McFarlane and Shultz at 5: 15 a. m. Reagan had met the 
OECS leaders in Barbados in April 1982 and was apparently impressed and moved 
by their request. 171 McFarlane presented the case for acting: 
The United States is seen as responsible for providing leadership in defense of 
Western interests wherever they may be threatened. .. 
For us to be asked to 
help and to refuse would have a very damaging effect on the credibility of the 
United States and your own commitment to the defense of freedom and democ- 
racy. 172 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 114. 
Quigley, "The United States Invasion of Grenada, " p. 34 1. 
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 329. 
Ibid., p. 330. 
Interview with Fontaine. 
McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 26 1. 
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Reagan asked McFarlane how long the Pentagon needed to prepare a "rescue 
mission. " When he told him that the JCS believed it was feasible in forty-eight hours 
Reagan simply replied "Do it. " 173 McFarlane described Reagan' s response as "very 
unequivocal. .. He couldn't wait. "174 Reagan 
later explained, in terms similar to 
McFarlane's, his support for an intervention: 
We couldn't say no to those six small countries who had asked us for help. 
We'd have no credibility or standing in the Americas if we did. If it ever became 
known, which I knew it would, that we had tumed them down, few of our 
friends around the world would trust us completely as an ally again. 175 
The secure conference phone-line was reopened at 6: 00 a. m. Reagan spoke with 
Weinberger and Bush; Weinberger restated his belief that there was insufficient 
intelligence for an operation yet but Reagan was not deterred. 176 Reagan felt that 
Bush's suggestion to approach Venezuela would only delay the operation - and 
increase the possibility of a leak. 177 He then approved military planning for an 
operation, most probably for Tuesday, October 25. In response to the OECS request, 
173 Reagan, An American Life, p. 450. 
174 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 44 1. 
175 Reagan, An American Life, p. 45 1. Given the concerns over the students already expressed by the 
administration, the students were undoubtedly discussed and played a role in Reagan! s decision. 
This statement was perhaps more a reason for accepting the invitation. 
176 In his memoir Weinberger affirmed that Reagan "was aware of the difficulties, but generally 
seemed to me to be willing to accept the risks. He urged us to continue developing the detailed 
plans. " Weinberger, Fightingfor Peace, p. 77. 
177 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 329. The secrecy aspect of planning was a high priority, 
Reagan felt that "Cuba was near enough that with forewarning it could send troops to the island in a 
hurry. If there were any leaks, the result could be war between us and Cuba... and the taking of 
hundreds of Americans as hostage. " Reagan, An American Life, p. 450. Reag&s memory of 
Vietnam provided him with another reason for secrecy. He felt that the post-Vietnam syndrome 
would cause Congress to oppose any use of force abroad-, "I suspected thatý if we told the leaders of 
Congress about the operation, even under terms of strictest confidentiality, there would be some who 
would leak it to the press together with the prediction that Grenada was going to become 'another 
Vietnam!. " Ibid., p. 451. 
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Reagan told Bush to "tell Mrs. Charles that we recognize the problem, we'll be glad 
to respond, and we'll stay in close touch with her while we get busy planning. 078 
Having completed the call Shultz advised that Reagan call back and ask General 
Vessey how many troops would be required and that "after he has told you, Mr. 
President, I suggest that you tell him to double it. "179 Shultz felt that this would 
underline Reagans determination to act and, along with the order to the State and 
Defense Department to "move beyond a 'warning order' status and prepare for a 
noncombatant evacuation order, including an invasion plan, " would keep the Defense 
Department moving. 180 A SSG meeting was scheduled for 9: 00 a. m. that morning in 
Washington; the presidential group decided to remain in Augusta and keep in touch 
by phone to avoid raising suspicion and maintain the secrecy surrounding planning so 
far in Washington. 
For those at Augusta the day's drama was not over. Around 2: 15 p. m. an armed 
unemployed pipefitter named Charles Harris crashed his truck through a side entrance 
to the golf club and took seven people hostage, including two of Reagarfs entourage, 
in the pro shop. Out on the course the president's group had reached the sixteenth 
green when an armoured limousine appeared and they were ushered inside. Uncertain 
if Harris was acting alone the Secret Service issued the "Launch Nighthawk Two" 
command and within ten minutes an evacuation helicopter was hovering overhead. "' 
Harris demanded to talk to Reagan; the president made several unsuccessful attempts 
178 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 262. The OECS leaders were not told that the U. S. had 
accepted their invitation until the eve of the intervention. 
179 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 329. 
180 Ibid., p. 329. 
181 Ibid., p. 330. 
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to talk to Harris by phone but he insisted on talking with Reagan in person. This was 
obviously impossible and Reagans party was escorted to the Eisenhower cottage at 
the course. The situation ended peacefully a few hours later when Harris was 
persuaded to surrender. 
Saturday. October 22 
The SSG was convened in Washington at 9: 00 a. m. by Vice President George 
Bush. 192 President Reagan and Secretary Shultz participated via conference phone 
from Augusta for five minutes. The meeting began with an overview and update of 
the situation in Grenada; the CIA had "continued to receive unconfirmed reports that 
Coard had been killed" and "conflicting reports about who was actually in charge 
indicated that the power struggle was not over. " 183 Essentially, intelligence indicated 
that the RMC were an unsavoury bunch who were more hard-line than the PRG and 
demonstrated no pro-US tendencies, or the possibility of them, and that it was 
unlikely relations would improve in the foreseeable ffiture. 184 
The State Department representatives then focused on the political aspects of an 
intervention. A PERT chart time-line was distributed; this was a detailed outline of 
actions to be done up until the moment an intervention was launched. "' As with 
previous high-level meetings the Iran hostage analogy was invoked. One participant 
at least "had a real fear that it could be a very bad situation. Desert One all over 
182 Present were Poindexter, North, Menges, McMahon, Claridge, Eaglcburgcr, Motley, 
Weinberger, Vessey and IkIc. 
183 CIA Memo, "Grenada Chronology 7-25 October 1983, " p. 3. 
184 InterViCW With Johnstone. 
185 Speaking hyperbolically, Johnstone recalled that it contained "thousands of items. " Ibid. 
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again. 086 Eagleburger then argued that doing nothing would cause the U. S. to lose 
face in the region, particularly Central America, at a crucial time. "' Although the 
safety of U. S. citizens was a prime concern it is important not to underestimate the 
influence of such Cold War thinking. 
The OECS' oral request received the previous night was also discussed. It was 
decided that ambassador Frank McNeil would be dispatched to Barbados to "make 
certain that the Caribbean leaders had in fact a common position and would secure 
from them a formal written invitation. " 188 McNeil would be accompanied by Two- 
star General George Crist who "would help signal to the Caribbean leadership 
Washington! s serious intent and in the event that the military option were taken, 
'make sure that the [Caribbean] flags'were brought in early. '"" Washington realized 
that without an OECS request they would have to reevaluate the level of anticipated 
threat to the students against the prospect of a unilateral operation: a further 
indication of threat, perhaps the shooting of a student, would be needed. 190 Thus 
decisionmaking was guided to an extent by the importance of a potential multilateral 
intervention. As Beck suggests, the CARICOM meeting scheduled for that evening 
in Trinidad was also probably discussed; CARICOM was "an international 
186 Ed Magnuson, Douglas Brew, Bernard Diederich and William McWhirter, "D-Day in Grenada, " 
Time, November 7,1983, p. 19. 
197 Reynold A. Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada: An Account of the U. S. -Caribbean 
Invasion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) p. 139. Eagleburgcr admitted that "resolve against the 
communist threat was the proper 'button' to push. " Beck, 7he Grenada Invasion, p. 125. 
189 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 135. McNeil was ambassador-in-residence at Tufts University at 
the time. 
189 Ibid., p. 135. A cable was sent to Adams, Charles and Seaga informing them of McNeil and 
Crist's arrival, explaining that "the purpose of this trip would be to coordinate our response to this 
fast [breaking] situation. " Bish's notes. 
I' Interview with Johnstone. 
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organization larger, older, and better recognized than the OECS, though not a 
regional security organization, [that] might decide to request American 
assistance. "91 The SSG must have been aware of ambassador Bislfs report of his 
meeting with Tom Adams on Thursday, October 20, when Adams had told Bish he 
believed CARICOM would not support an intervention, with particular opposition 
expected from Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana. Guyana was the only 
other undemocratic regime in CARICOM and the PRG had been a socialist ally of 
Burnham; military intervention, especially by the U. S., was not a precedent Burnham 
wanted to endorse. 
Discussions proceeded with the military aspects of an intervention. Weinberger 
and Vessey insisted that not enough was known about the numbers and ability of the 
Grenadian and Cuban opposition they would face and that more time was needed to 
gather intelligence. Consequently, Weinberger -got approval for the use of Navy 
SEAL forces to collect pre-landing intelligence. 192 Despite their obvious reservations 
the JCS was ordered to continue planning on the basis of a "go" order. 193 
The draft NSDD which had been circulated contained three objectives: 
ensuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada; in conjunction with OECS 
friendly government participants, the restoration of democratic government on 
Grenada; [and] elimination of current, and prevention of further, Cuban interven- 
tion on Grenada. 194 
191 Beck The Grenada Invasion, p. 133. 
192 Weinberger, Fighfing for Peace, p. 77. SEAL stands for the navy's elite "sea, air and land" 
special forces. 
193 "Britain's Grcnada Shut-Out, " 7he Economist, March 10,1984, p. 22. 
194 Bcnnctt, "Grcnada: Anatomy, " p. 74. 
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The first and last objectives were not unrelated; theoretically, if the RMC had been 
pro-U. S. and anti-Cuban the students would not have been perceived to be in such 
danger and the Cubans would have had to leave. 195 The pros and cons of going 
beyond an NEO were discussed with Bush querying the NSDD objective of restoring 
democracy. Reagans response was succinct: "Well, if we've got to go there, we 
might as well do all that needs to be done. " 196 Another participant warned Reagan 
that there would be "a lot of harsh political reaction" to an intervention. Reagan was 
not dissuaded; "I know that. I accept that. 11197 
A perfunctory discussion of the applicability of the War Powers Resolution'" to 
an intervention concluded that any action would be finished long before Congress 
became involved. A final issue was the need for absolute secrecy. Some SSG 
members had been dismayed that the papers were already carrying report of the 
diversion of the fleet towards Grenada. 199 Measures were authorized to deceive the 
Cubans and Grenadians. 200 The presidential party would remain in Augusta as 
planned to avoid attracting attention by returning early. U. S. allies would remain in 
195 IntcMew with Johnstone. 
196 Bcnnctt; "Grenada: Anatomy, " p. 74. 
197 Magnuson ct al., "D-Day in Grenada, " p. 19. Spealdng after the intervention about the negative 
European reaction Dam said, "We realized that the reaction would be on the critical side. We 
certainly did not expect enthusiasm about it. " U. S. Congress, The Situafion in Grenada, p. 16. 
198 The War Powers Resolution passed by Congress in November 1973 required the president to 
consult with Congress before committing troops to combat and stipulated that if troops were used 
they would have to be withdrawn within 90 days unless Congress approved the deployment. See 
Michael Rubner, *The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion 
of Grenada, " Political Science Quarterly 100, no. 4 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 627-47. 
199 One who was not was Motley. He pointed out that troop movements in Central America were a 
regular occurrence. Considering the U. S. ' post-Vietnam military malaise and the image of Reagan 
as all-tallc, Motley felt that the "leak" was not so detrimental. Telephone interview with Motley, 
September 25,1995. 
Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought, " p. A2 I. 
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the dark as Reagan later explained; "We did not even inform the British beforehand, 
because I thought it would increase the possibility of a leak at our end and elevate the 
risk to our students. 001 Secrecy within the administration was just as important; 
from the start Shultz had insisted that the situation be "close held. " He had 
established the ground rules and cut out all manner of people who would normally be 
involved in the decisionmaking process. 202 One prime example was Larry Speakes 
who was only informed on the morning of the intervention. 
The SSG also decided, at Weinberger's suggestion, that the media would be 
excluded from the operation for the first forty-eight hours. 203 The official reason 
given for this exclusion was the need to preserve the secrecy of the operation and 
ensure the element of surprise and also the inability to guarantee the safety of non- 
combatants. Another reason is what Block and Mungharn describe as the "Vietnam 
legacy" and the "Falklands inheritance. "204 Amalgamating the perceived lessons of 
Vietnam and the Falklands, Washington decided that "five television coverage of 
201 Reagan, An American Life, p. 451. When two British embassy officials met with the Deputy 
Director of Politico-Military Affairs Jonathan Howe at the State Department later that day they were 
only assured that the Britain would be consulted by Washington before any final decision was made. 
Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and 7hatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990), p. 128. Likewise when the 
Canadian ambassador met Eagleburger and Dam at a social event that evening no mention of a 
possible intervention was made. Thomas Walkon and Charlotte Montgomery, "Canada and the 
Grenada Invasion, " Toronto Globe and Afail, November 17,1983, p. 3. 
202 Telephone interview with Motley. 
203 Interview with Motley. As Pearson points out, this was unusual because "deceptions generally 
persist only until an operation is underway. At that moment, the intentions of the source are 
obviously made clear, but this knowledge provides little benefit to the target audience since the 
deception has already given the source the advantage of surprise that was the purpose of the 
deception in the first place. During Operation Urgent Fury, to the contrary, much of the deception 
took place after the operation was history, and thus well after it could have served any practical 
military value with respect to the invasion itself. " David Eric Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and 
Trust by Government: Deception as Process and Practice" (PILD. diss., Yale University, 1988), p. 
448. 
' Marcia Block and Geoff Mungharn, "The Military, The Media and the Invasion of Grenada, " 
Contempormy Oises 13 (June 1989): 9 1. 
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casualties and civilian destruction in the early stages was to be avoided, and almost all 
press commentary which might be critical was to be postponed. , 205 As with previous 
administrations the Reagan one was not entirely happy with the media! s coverage of 
foreign policy; as Shultz complained, "[t]hese days, in the advocacy journalism that's 
been adopted, it seems as though the reporters are always against us and so they're 
trying to screw things up, and when you! re trying to conduct a military operation you 
dorft need that. 006 Deciding to exclude the media was one of the easier choices 
made. 
By the conclusion of the meeting at 11: 30 a. m. it was apparent that a consensus 
had been reached. As with other decisionmaking meetings during this period there 
was a noticeable absence of anyone arguing against intervention; the Department of 
Defense may have wanted more time to gather intelligence, State interpreted this as 
unwillingness to act, but there is no evidence that they actively opposed intervention. 
Thispattern is partly explained by the intentionally small number of officials involved 
207 which automatically limited the chance of opposition. They obviously also shared 
similar political beliefs although some were noticeably more hard-line than others. In 
general it appears that different opinions were sought, points of disagreement 
discussed and everyone allowed to have a say before a decision was made. The 
seeming lack of opposition was also indicative of the fact that Washington felt it had 
a fair idea, rightly or wrongly, of what was happening in Grenada and that they had 
to act; framed in these terms there was, in the words of one official, "not much of a 
205 George IL Quester, "Grenada and the News Media, " in Dunn and Watson (eds. ) American 
Intervention in Grenada, p. 119. 
206 Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust, " p. 228. 
207 Ibid., p. 228. 
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decision to be made. 
008 As Dam stated; "Inaction would have increased... [the] 
dangers, including the possibility of a hostage situation, and made any subsequent 
efforts even more CoStly.,, 
209 
The SSG meeting marked the point at which most of those "in the loop" on 
Grenada believed that military action was necessary and likel Y. 210 The final decision 
to intervene had not been made yet but during the SSG meeting Reagan had made a 
"75 percent" commitment to action . 
21 1 At 11: 45 a. m. McFarlane met Reagan and 
Shultz at the ninth green of Augusta to update them on the situation. At 12: 45 p. m. 
Shultz conferred with the State Department by secure phone. 
Soon after the SSG meeting Weinberger met with the JCS at the Pentagon to 
review planning. An initial planning conference for a full operation and evacuation 
had been held that morning at CINCLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. 
Weinberger told the JCS to "double whatever CINCLANT says he needS. "212 This 
measure reflected Weinberger's underlying philosophy from Vietnam that if there was 
no intention of winning the operation should not be done; if something was to be 
done more troops than are strictly necessary should be used, it should be done swiftly 
and with clear objectives. 213 
208 Telephone interview with former Department of Defense official. 
209 "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam, " U. S. Congress, 7he Situation in Grenada, p. 5. 
210 Telephone interview with Edwin Meese, January 10,1995. According to one official at the SSG 
meeting, "Everyone was gung-ho. " Magnuson et al., "D-Day in Grenada, " p. 19. 
211 "Britain! s Grenada Shut-Out, " p. 22. Reagan had accepted the OECS offer and dispatched 
McNeil to Barbados, ordered the JCS to proceed with planning for full-scale operation, implemdnted 
secrecy measures and acknowledged and accepted the political fallout. 
112 Weinberger, Fighfingfor Peace, p. 77. 
213 Interview with Weinberger. 
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Back on Barbados 
On Saturday morning in Barbados ambassador Bish met with Adams, Compton, 
Seaga, St. Kitts-Nevis Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, Montserrat's Chief 
Minister John Osbourne and Barbadian Foreign Minister Louis Tull. 214 The leaders 
again pressed for quick action. Bish underlined that Washington was still studying the 
possibility of an intervention and even if the U. S. did act they could only remain in 
Grenada temporarily. 215 Seaga and Compton repeated that an early decision would 
be helpful; Seaga needed six hours to mobilize his armed forces and Compton was 
concerned about what he should tell Chambers who was unaware of the pace and 
direction of U. S. -OECS discussions and the strong possibility of intervention. 216 The 
leaders then discussed the forthcoming CARICOM meeting in Trinidad. They warned 
Bish of Chambers' "unpredictability" and Guyanese "untrustworthiness. "217 Adams 
also pointed out that Belize was unlikely to participate as British consent was 
required before Prime Minister George Price could make any military decisions. 219 
214 The other two OECS leaders, Charles and Bird, had already lcft for Port-of-Spain. Interview 
with Bish. 
215 Washington feared getting bogged down in a long occupation operation to restore democracy. 
Ironically the OECS feared this would happen too and believed that if the U. S. acceded to their 
request they should hand over Grenada to the OECS as soon as possible after victory had been 
secured, one leader suggested forty-eight hours, and allow the restoration of democracy to be a 
predominantly Eastern Caribbean affair. Interview with Bish. As it transpired, the last U. S. forces 
involved in Urgent Fury left Grenada on December 15. Three hundred "support personnel" 
remained, including the Ist Psychological operations Battalion. It was June 12,1984, when the last 
U. S. peacc-keeping troops departed. Vijay Tiwathia, 7he Grenada War: Anatomy ofa Low-Intensity 
Conflict (New Delhi: Lanccr International, 1987), p. 190. 
21 6 Bish! s notcs. 
217 ibid. 
218 Adams'prediction was fulfilled later that day when Price met with Adams and "indicated that he 
did not wish to participate. " "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Nfinister of Barbados, " Documents 
on the Invasion, p. 38. Belize also had an ongoing border dispute with Guatemala and were 
dependent on the British military presence in Belize for their security. 
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Adams suggested that the CARICOM meeting be prolonged to detain the media who 
were becoming increasingly suspicious that something was afoot. 219 Concerned about 
the U. S. ' noncommittal stance, and aware that two embassy officials were due to visit 
Grenada that day, Adams advised Bish that the U. S. should have no contact with 
Austin as it would only legitimize him. 220 
Ambassador Bish clearly favoured action and urged the Eastern Caribbean leaders 
to take the lead in advocating action but the wily Adams knew that the "political 
costs" were too great for the leaders without a U. S. guarantee of action. 22' This, of 
course, Bish was not authorized to provide them with. The ambassador later cabled 
Washington recommending that "to stop the carnage and spread of communism I 
recommend that you positively support the call for help by our fiiends and 
neighbours. "222Motley instructed Bish to be careful and work closely with the OECS 
because it was their action. m 
Whilst the ambassador met the leaders the embassy was making final 
arrangements for Kurze and Flohes visit to Grenada. They would be accompanied by 
the British Deputy High Commissioner David Montgomery. A last minute problem 
was encountered when RMC representative Major Leon Cornwall contacted Bish 
and attempted to delay the flight until the next day, Sunday, October 23, and have the 
diplomats stay for two days. Bish reported back to Washington that Cornwall "said 
219 Intervicw with Bish. 
220 Bislfs notcs. 
221 ibid. 
222 JbiCL 
223 Ibid. Emphasis added 
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to please say that they have the best intentions of cooperating with your seeing the 
Americans here and can best facilitate it this way. , 224 Having had the flight turned 
away once, on Wednesday, October 19, any further delays were unacceptable and the 
U. S. was insistent that the visit be that same day. The embassy contacted SGU's Solin 
to try and remedy the situation; Bourne later recalled: 
I called New York and talked to [Chancellor] Modica who had been keeping in 
close touch with Washington and the U. S. ambassador in Barbados... He imme- 
diately got on the phone to Maj. Stroude and finally got him to agree that we 
should let the American diplomats come at once. 22' 
Bourne telexed the embassy at 11: 15 a. m. to report that the problem had been 
resolved and the flight could proceed as planned. 
Visiting the Students 
The diplomats flight left Barbados at midday, arriving in Grenada forty-five 
minutes later. Kurze and Flohr's instructions were "to learn more of what was going 
on; to check out the situation and morale at the Medical School; to talk to other 
American citizens as possible; to impress on those whom. .. 
[they] met the wider 
implications of the RMC's actions. 026 Montgomery similarly was to check on British 
citizens and also meet with the Governor-General. On arrival the threesome noticed 
an anti-aircraft gun emplacement at the end of the runway and PRA soldiers on the 
roof of the terminal building with guns trained on them. Unaware of their destination 
the group were escorted by armed soldiers directly to SGU in two cars, the 
224 Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: First Telex Contact of the 
Day with Medical Students, 0905-0845, " 221539Z, October 1983, Bridgcto, %m 06517, pp. 1-3. 
225 Geoffrey Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition: What Happened in Grenada, " 
Nuftmon Today (January/February 1985): 21. 
226 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. 
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Americans in one and Montgomery in the other. During the journey Kurze observed 
that the streets were empty; "It was an eerie atmosphere, with an obvious RMC show 
of strength/ 'we are in full control' effort behind it. e1227 
On arriving at SGU Kurze and Flohr met with Bourne for approximately an hour 
whilst Montgomery waited with his car outside. 228 Bourne had hoped that: 
once these officials realized that the students and faculty were in no danger and 
had also a chance to see the political direction in which Austin wanted to move 
it would be clear an invasion was entirely unwarranted. ' 
After leaving SGU the Americans were driven to the Ross Point Inn to check in; 
Montgomery meanwhile joined John Kelly and toured the island checking on British 
citizens and seeing how many wanted to leave. 
Kurze and Flohr visited the SGUs Grand Anse campus" and addressed the 
students at 6: 00 p. m. The diplomats problem was that they could not shout 
"everybody evacuate" because they did not know how feasible an evacuation was and 
also could not promise that Washington would actually get them out. " Isolated on 
Grenada, 99.9 percent of the students were oblivious of Grenadian politics and the 
extent of the crisis and regional uproar. 232 Kurze emphasized the outrage in the 
227 Ibid. As Gilmore concludes, "the RMC was through the instrumentalities of repression available 
to it in effective control of the entire territory of the state within the meaning of international law. " 
Gilmore, The Grenada Intervenfion, p. 73. 
228 Montgomery recalled that after about five minutes groups of somewhat scared students appeared 
out of nowhere all wanting to ask him questions, wanting to know what was happening as they had 
no idea. Interview with Montgomery. 
2-'9 Peter Bourne, "Was the US. Invasion Necessary?, " p. 1. 
230 Flohr visited SGUs other campus, True Blue, the following morning. She also arranged to meet 
with about 150 students who lived off-campus in the same area as Bourne at Bourne's house at 7: 00 
a. m. that morning. Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition, " p. 23. 
231 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. Although Kurze fclt that evacuation was a possibility, Flohr 
believed that whilst an evacuation was technically feasible there was no way out for the students 
under the present conditions. Telephone interview with Linda Flohr, December 19,1994. 
232 Telcphone intcrview with Pctcr Boume, Septcmber 6,1995. 
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Eastern Caribbean and their calls for the U. S. to "do something. " He also felt it 
imperative "to impress on people our view that just lifting the curfew [on Monday, 
October 24J would not stabilize the situation. Radicals had taken power. Where 
would it end? 433 Kurze and Flohr had attempted to impress upon the students what 
a "hot" situation they were part of and reassured them that they should remain calm. 
They did not encourage the students'to leave simply because there was no way out 
presently without the RMC's cooperation. 
News of the diversion of the U. S. fleet and the scheduled OECS and CARICOM 
meetings had made the RMC increasingly agitated. Cornwall issued a notice 
commandeering vehicles and instructing owners to deliver them to Tanteen pasture, 
Grenville or Sauteurs by 12: 00 p. m. that day. Ominously, the notice warned that "any 
one who resist in any way or another this directive of the RMC will be dealth (sic) 
with in the strickest (sic) manner. 434 At 2: 30 p. m. RFG broadcast a mobilization 
order for the militia "in view of the threat facing Grenada. "23' Such announcements 
were being monitored back in Washington and could only have increased 
decisionmakers concerns. 
Continuing the RMC's conciliatory line, Pearls airport was to be opened on 
Monday, October 24, at 6: 00 a. m. and the curfew would be reduced to 8: 00 p. m. to 
5: 00 a. M. 236 At 6: 40 p. m. that evening Stroude read out the RMC's "Statement of 
Intention" on RFG. He announced that a new cabinet would be established within ten 
233 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. ' 
234 Revolutionary Nfilitary Council, Notice From The R. M. C., Wobcr 22,1983. 
235 Tyler, "The Maldng of an Invasion, " p. A14. 
" Grenada: Background and Facts, P. 4. 
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to fourteen days, "ensuring that all social classes and interests in our country are 
represented. "237 More promptly: 
efforts would be made to immediately explain the real situation in Grenada to the 
many countries and organizations, as well as to our Caribbean neighbours, to 
counter the lies being told in the foreign press. Efforts made recently to better 
relations with the United States government would continue. 238 
Additionally it was stated that all SGU students should be treated with the "utmost 
consideration" by the PRA. 29 Whatever Grenadians made of this it was apparent that 
there was a difference of opinion between Bourne and the U. S. diplomats. Bourne 
had already met with General Austin and believed he had established a good dialogue 
and with the arrival of Kurze and Flohr thought that a peaceful resolution was 
possible, 240 in his eyes this announcement was "very encouraging. 99241 Contrastingly, 
Kurze's interpretation was that "it was bullshit, farcical, really. They were stalling for 
time. , 242 Whichever interpretation was most accurate, the broadcast conveyed the 
image of an RMC desperately scrambling to preserve their tenuous position. 
Also that Saturday Cuba clarified their position. In a message to ambassador Rizo, 
Castro ruled out evacuation as "highly demoralizing and dishonourable for our 
country in the eyes of world opinion. 043 Cuban personnel should strengthen their 
237 Adkin, Urgent Fury, P. 85. 
238 lbid., p. 85. 
239 Beck, Yhe Grenada Invasion, A 142. 
240 Telephone inteMew with Peter Bourne. 
241 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 414. 
242 lbid., p. 414. 
243 "Statement by the Cuban Party and Revolutionary Government on the imperialist intervention of 
Grenada, " in Nora 1ýbdan (ed. ), Statements by CUBA on the events in GREIVADA: October 1983 
(La Habana, Cuba: Editora Politica, 1983), p. 6. 
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positions and "vigorously defend" themselves "but only if .. directly attacked. 
444 
The Army and Nfinistry of Interior advisors were to remain at their posts and await 
further orders whilst trying to "exert as much positive influence as possible on the 
behaviour of the [Grenadian] Army and the Security forces towards the people. 045 
When Rizo met with RMC officials he told them that Castro had precluded the 
sending of reinforcements as "impossible and unthinkable. "246 Furthermore, the RMC 
should seek a "reconciliation with the people" by clarifying the deaths at Fort Rupert 
and "seeking out those responsible" and "try to prevent affording a pretext for 
intervention by publicly offering and reiterating total guarantees and facilities for the 
security and evacuation of U. S., English and other nationals. "247 Finally, Cuban 
officials emphasized that Cuban personnel would not go beyond the perimeter of 
Point Salines under any circumstances and RMC troops should not enter this area or 
attempt to coordinate their defences with the CubanS. 248 If the RMC had harboured 
any hopes of Cuban help this must have dispelled them. 
DraftinR the NSDD 
In Washington the level of activity increased. After the SSG meeting Menges 
went to his office to draft McFarlane's memo to Reagan and a final version of the 
NSDD. The document contained a "total action plan" that would "land U. S. and 
allied Caribbean military forces in order to take control of Grenada no later than 
244 lbicL, p. 7. 
245 lbid, p. 7. 
246 Ibid., p. 7. 
247 lbid., p. 8. 
248 Cotman, 7he Gonion Tree, p. 219. 
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dawn Tuesday, October 25. #1249 At 2: 10 p. m., after Poindexter, 2'0 North and several 
senior officials contacted by phone had checked it, the NSDD was dispatched to 
State, Defense and the CIA. This was another preparatory step in the intervention 
timetable rather than any final decision; as Motley underlined, Washington "retained 
the ability to halt final implementation until the last moment. 
Pursuant to the SSG decision, William Montgomery, Eagleburger's executive 
assistant, set about contacting Ambassador McNeil in Boston. He eventually reached 
McNeil between 1: 30 p. m. and 2: 00 p. m.; the ambassador was only told to come to 
Washington and bring tropical clothing. 252 Also rounded up was Larry Rossin who 
would accompany McNeil to Barbados and "assist in any way necessary Ambassador 
McNeil in his special mission. 053 
When the U. S. had received the OECS' request the legal implications had to be 
seriously considered. The State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor Michael Kozak 
249 Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy, " p. 74. 
2`0 According to Menges he told Poindexter that Washington had just received information that the 
RMC had reopened the -airport and want to talk In reply Poindexter joked, "Constantine, tell the 
State Department to inform Grenada that we will send some people to talk, and that they will arrive 
early next week. " Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 79. This is rather bizarre considering Kurze and Flohr 
were already on Grenada. 
I" Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 71. 
252 McNeil chose to drive and arrived in Washington around 3: 00 a. m. on Sunday. Robert I Beck, 
"The McNeil Nfission and the Decision to Invade Grenada, " Naval Mar College Review 44 (Spring 
1991): 98. 
253 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 137. At the time Rossin was the Peru desk officer in the State 
Department but prior to that had been a political officer at the U. S. embassy in Barbados from 1980- 
82 and had visited Grenada several times. He expected to "stay in Barbados a couple of weeks 
assisting with reporting from the Embassy there, though everything was very fluid and. ,. [he] 
quickly realized that nothing was firm. " Ibid., p. 137. He finally left Grenada in January 1984. 
Rossin was one of a number of political officers who had previously served at the Barbadian 
embassy that were hastily recalled to Barbados; the others included Barbro Owens and Ashley Wills. 
These measures were "an attempt to help the Embassy staff cope and to give Motley and Gillespie 
simultaneously more control over the Embassy. " Kenneth Kurze letter to the author dated March 11, 
1996. 
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assembled lawyers from the State Department, the Justice Department and the 
Defense Department. As well as studying all the domestic and international legal 
angles, 'the lawyers had to prepare an outline or list of essential points to be included 
, 254 in any formal OECS written request for assistance. It was this Est that McNeil 
would take with him to Barbados for his meeting with the OECS leaders. 
At 4: 54 p. m. the JCS issued CINCLANT with orders to plan to: 
conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U. S. and designated foreign 
nationals from Grenada, neutralise Grenadian forces, stabilise the internal situ- 
ation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/ friendly government 
participants assist in the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada. 255 
In the Caribbean the task force had continued to steer a southern course, unaware of 
the decisions being made in Washington. That evening the head of the 22d MAU on 
the USS Guam, Colonel Faulkner, met with two of his Lieutenant Colonels, Ray 
Smith and Granville Amos, to discuss options for an evacuation operation. They 
focused on the capture and securing of an evacuation site rather than the extensive 
operation Washington had authorized. Z6 Despite this planning, most aboard echoed 
Faulkner's belief that it was "doubtful that we'll be called upon to carry out this 
mission. 057 
254 Ibid., p. 138. 
253 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 126. CINCLANT was responsible for the overall plan that the JCS would 
have to approve before Urgent Fury could be launched. However, CINCLANT lacked the 
intelligence and communications facilities and planning expertise for an operation of this magnitude 
which would involve the navy, air force and army contingents. As a result an ad hoc joint 
headquarters was established at Norfolk with an on-scene commander, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf 
III, in charge of the Joint Task Force. Ibid., p. 126. 
256 More precisely, the plan envisaged a "combined surface and air assault, with the primary 
objectives being: the Grand Anse Beach area on the southwest coast, south of the city of St. 
George's; the partially completed Salines airfield at the southwestern tip of the island, and the high 
ground overlooking the Salines area, which controlled the road network through which all traffic 
from St. George's would have to Pass. " Spector, US. Marines in Grenada, p. 3. 
257 Ibid., p. 3. 
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At 10.00 p. m. however, Captain Eric reccivcd the message to move south 
towards Grenada. A second message provided Scncral information about the strength 
and disposition of forces on Grcnadaý" and stated that further intelligence would 
follow. A final message from hictcalf informed Eric that the Army were planning for 
an airborne assault. 29 
A Messa-ge From Cuba 
Cuba's relations with the RNIC were cool at best; Castro made it clear that the 
RMC had made "serious errors" and that Cuban forces would not come to the rescue 
of the revolution. The OECS had made little effort to hide their sentiments and the 
diversion of the U. S. fleet was public knowledge by Saturday-, cognizant of the 
likelihood of U. S. military action Castro sent a message to the U. S. Interests Section 
of the Swiss Embassy in Havana at 9: 00 p. m. that evening: 
That the U. S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada; that it is also 
aware of our position on these developments and of our determination of not 
interfering in the internal affairs of that country. That we arc aware of their con- 
cem about the numerous U. S. residents there. That we are also concerned about 
the hundreds of Cuban cooperation personnel working there in different fields 
and about the news that U. S. naval forces are approaching Grenada. 
That according to the reports we have, no U. S. or foreign national, nor our 
personnel has had any problems. It is convenient to keep in touch on this matter, 
so as to contribute to solve favorably any difficulty that may arise or action that 
may be taken relating to the security of these individuals, without violence or 
intervention in the country. 260 
2" The estimated force strength on Grenada %vas as follo%%s: 1,200 PRA soUcrs, 2.5,000 militia 
members, 3-400 policemen, 30-50 Cuban military ad%isors and 600 Cuban workcm lbid., p. 3. 
259 Ibid., p. 3. 
" "Statcmcnt by the Cuban Party, * Madan (od. ), Statements by CUR4, p. 8. It is uncertain %%hcthcr 
Cuban intelligence had Icarnt of the OECS' request to the U. S. by this time 
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It was not until 8: 30 a. m. on Tuesday, October 25, three hours after Urgent Fury 
began, that the U. S. replied to the Cuban letter. As Motley explained, Washington 
viewed the Cuban reaction to events in Grenada as "smart. " Grenada had been 
"tailor-made" for Cuba to "bug" Washington via a surrogate country and they had 
made a big investment in Grenada. By this rationale Bishop's demise would have been 
seen as irresponsible and wasteful and in the aftermath Castro had no interest in 
seeing something he had some influence over escalate into an international 
episode. 261 
BritaiWs Involvement 
Grenada was one of the microstates that had gained independence (1974) from 
Britain in the wave of decolonization that swept the region in the late 1970's and 
early 1980's. 262 As former Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe commented; "we 
[Britain] had learned to refrain from post-imperial intervention in the affairs of several 
newborn Commonwealth states. By now we had come to regard their chequered 
post-independence history. .. as no longer our business. 
063 Britain remained 
concerned about the island though never to the same degree as the U. S. appeared to 
be. 
With a representative on Grenada and established contacts within the region, 
Britain was a valuable source of intelligence for the U. S. throughout the crisis period. 
261 Telephone interview with Motley. 
212 Dominica gained independence in 1978, St. Lucia in 1979, St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 
1980, Antigua and Barbuda in 1981 and St. Kitts-Ncvis in 1983. 
263 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict ofLoyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 326. Prime Minister Charles 
described the situation thus: "The British made it quite clear when they gave us our independence 
that they have nothing to do with our security in the future. " Barbara Reynolds, "Anarchy in 
Grenada was really frightening, " U&4 Today, October 27,1983, p. 7. 
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However, the secrecy surrounding decisionmaking in Washington and the OECS' 
request to the U. S. led a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Report on 
Grenada to conclude that "it was not the intention of the United States Government 
that the United Kingdom should be actively involved in the military intervention in 
Grenada, and that the timing, nature and extent of the information provided... by the 
United States were consistent with this position. 064 In reality the British had a 
reasonable idea of what was occurring. 
On the morning of Saturday, October 22, Adams confirmed what British High 
Commissioner Bullard had learnt of the night before: the OECS' intention to form a 
multinational force. He explained that British participation would be desired and 
other countries, France, Canada, Venezuela and the U. S., would also be asked. 
Adams also explained that a formal written request would follow shortly. 26' At 1: 00 
p. m. local time Bullard reported this news to London where it was received by duty 
minister Richard Luce. 266 Luce and FCO officials apparently agreed that it was 
unlikely that Britain would participate and informed Washington and Barbados of 
267 this. It was also decided to wait for the outcome of the CARICOM meeting before 
making any further decisions. One decision was made; the West Indian guardship, 
I U. K. Parliament, Grenada, p. xvi. Similarly the Economist stated that Britain was "planned out 
of the operation from the start. " "Britain! s Grenada Shut-Out, " p. 22. 
... However, this formal written request was never received. Adams explained that "our attitude was 
that the formal request in writing would go when the oral request had been answered and since the 
oral request was never answered. .. the formal written request was overtaken by the operation itself. " U. K. Parliament Grenada, p. xiv. Eugenia Charles, Head of the OECS, recalled that, "I was 
supposed to send letters to England and Canada... but I never got around to doing it because things 
were happening too fast after that and so they had only been invited verbally, never in writing. " 
Higbie, Eugenia, p. 229. 
" Luce was in charge as Thatcher was at Chequers, Howe in Athens and junior Nfinister Lady 
Young in Cyprus. Luce was in regular contact with Chequers and Howe received copy telegrams 
from the British embassy in Athens. Howe, Conflict ofLoyalty, p. 326. 
267 "Britain's Grcnada Shut-Out, " p. 22. 
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HMSAntrim, and her supply ship Pearleaf, were diverted from Cartagena, Colombia, 
to Grenada as a "precautionary measure, " echoing the diversion of the U. S. fleet, 
should an evacuation of British citizens be necessary. 
Mission Impossible 
London's apparent unwillingness to become involved generated a post- 
intervention feeling in the region that by not participating, Britain had "failed both the 
people of Grenada, and the people of the Caribbean in general. "268 As Tom Adams 
explained, London knew "from the word go that the Eastern Caribbean States hoped 
069 for a military intervention in which British forces would take part. 
The belief that Britain deserted the Caribbean nations in their hour of need is 
misleading. The reality was that Britain simply could not mount an operation in the 
timescale envisaged by the Eastern Caribbean leaders. The only British forces in the 
region were the British Forces in Belize who numbered 1,800.270 As Deputy High 
Commissioner Montgomery told Adams, it would take weeks rather than days for a 
British intervention to be planned and executed. Washington felt no need for British 
involvement and so all Britain could realistically do was offer "tea and sympathy and 
make a few belligerent noises. 071 
268 U. K pkarliaMCnt. Grenada, p. )d. 
269 Ibid., p. xi. As Sutton observes, Britain! s relationship with the region contains "a sensitivity to 
local context and a familiarity of approach which is often lacldng in US assistance. " Sutton, "The 
Politics of Small State Security, " p. 7. The Caribbean were used to dealing with Britain who 
remained a major export market. 
270 The force consists of army, air force and navy elements. The Afilitaq Balance, 1983-84 
(Cambridge, England: Heffers, 1983), p. 42. Belize became indepedent in 1981 at which time an 
ongoing territorial dispute with ncighbouring Guatemala led Britain to maintain a military presence 
there to guard against Guatemalan aggression, assist in training the Belize army, gathering 
intelligence on the situation in Central America and help with disaster relief. Griffith, The Questfor 
Secutity, p. 69. 
271 Interview with Montgomery. 
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Fishing for Clues 
British embassy officials in Washington had been "fishing" for indications of the 
U. S. ' intentions. At 5: 00 p. m. Washington informed London that they "were 
considering... [the OECS request], had made no decision on how to respond and 
were proceeding very cautiously, and we [London] were assured there would be 
consultation with us before any further steps were taken. "272 This promise would 
prove to be not entirely true. 
The CARICOM MeetinR 
The emergency CARICOM273 meeting was scheduled to start at 9: 00 p. m. in 
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. Representatives from all of the CARICOM nations, except 
for Grenada, assembled at the Trinidad Hilton shortly before 9: 00 P. M. 274 They were 
kept waiting by Forbes Burnham who did not appear until 9: 00 p. m. sharp. As 
previously discussed, the OECS did not expect much from the meeting but did not 
cancel, a negative move that would have aroused suspicion. 
Talks centred on a peaceful settlement; Seaga! s contention that the use of force 
should not be ruled out was flatly rejected by Chambers, Burnham, Pindling and 
272 U. K. Parliament, Grenada, p. lxxK. 
273 CARICOM came into existence in 1973 with the Treaty of Chaguaramus, replacing the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association. CARICOM was primarily a trade organization and its Treaty did 
not include any security provisions. Eugenia Charles for one viewed it in such terms; "I have refused 
to ever attend a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of CARICONL I think it is unnecessary. * 
Bravcboy-Wagncr, The Carihhean in MorldAffairs, p. 60. 
274 The participants at the meeting were: Lester Bird (Antigua and Barbuda), Eugenia Charles 
(Dominica), John Osbournc (Montserrat), Kennedy Simmonds (St. Kitts-Nevis), John Compton (St. 
Lucia), Mlton Cato (St. Vincent and the Grenadines), Edward Seaga (Jamaica), Louis Tull 
(Barbados), George Price (Belize), Lynden Pindling (the Bahamas), George Chambers (Trinidad 
and Tobago) and Forbes Burnham (Guyana). 
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Price. The OECS group remained silent about their request to the U. S.; as Seaga 
stated, "we did not want anything to leak Out. "275 For the moment the OECS decide 
to go along with CARICOM proposals that there should be no external involvement 
in what was an internal problem wMch required a CARICOM solution that would 
respect international law and restore normalcy to Grenada. 276 The Governor-General 
in Grenada would be the point of contact for these efforts to avoid the possibility that 
the RMC interpret this as some sort of official recognition. Four aims were outlined: 
the establishment of a broad-based civilian government that would arrange elections 
at the earliest possible date; a fact-finding mission by eminent CARICOM state 
figures; arrangements to ensure the safety of foreign citizens in Grenada and/or their 
evacuation and the deployment of a CARICOM peacekeeping force. 277At 3: 06 a. m. 
the meeting was adjourned. With even the OECS representatives proposing people 
for the fact-finding mission Chambers was confident that a consensus had been 
reached. The one problem for those who favoured a peaceful solution faced was what 
271 should happen if the RMC refused to comply with CARICONfs measures. 
Charles, Bird, Seaga and Tull immediately met secretly to consider how to steer 
CARICOM back towards the issue of a military solution. The first session had 
perhaps gone worse than expected. Sometime around 4: 00 a. m. Adams phoned the 
2'5 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 140. 
276 "Statement by the Honourable Prime Minister George Chambers to the House of Representatives 
of the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago on October 26,1983 on the Grenada Crisis, * Documents 
on the Invasion, Itcm XVII, p. 76. 
277 lbicL, p. 77. 
278 Ibid., p. 77. 
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group; it was probably at this stage that the OECS group decided to proceed with 
their plans irrespective of CARICONTs position. 
The reconvening of the meeting later that morning, Sunday, October 23, was 
delayed by one hour because the U. S. ambassador to Trinidad met with the OECS 
group. When things did get underway certain Heads of Government announced that: 
there was no consensus on the proposals and that in any event they were of the 
opinion that no further discussions should continue along those lines. 279 
Continuing the offensive Charles introduced the sanctions the OECS had previously 
agreed on. Additionally, Seaga put forward a proposal that human rights and 
democracy become qualifications for inclusion in a restructured CARICOM and the 
unanimity voting regulations be changed in some areas. The later was part of a 
deliberate OECS ploy to put other issues on the meetings agenda to mask their 
intentionS. 280 The meeting finally closed by imposing sanctions on Grenada and 
voting by eleven to one to expel Grenada from CARICOM. 281 
The opposition to the use of force from the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana and 
Trinidad underlined the divisions over the question of security within CARICOM. As 
Vaughan Lewis explained: 
there are two views in the region: one is that in certain kinds of crisis it is nec- 
279 IbicL, p. 78. 
" Interview with Bish. 
11 The official reasons for the expulsion were: the manner of the RMC's assumption of power, the 
RMC did not represent the rights and obligations of the government of Grenada; the situation was a 
security threat to the region; the integrity of the Caribbean must be restored and the rights and 
property of Grenadians must be protected. "CARICOM Suspends Grenada, " Daily Nation, October 
24,1983, p. 1. As the OECS had expected, the sole opponent to these measures was Guyana who 
had been a close socialist ally of Bishop% Grenada. Forbes Burnham explained his position thus; 
"It's not binding because in the first place it is not a decision of CARICOK because one of the 
constituents of CARICOM was not invited - Grenada... even if it were a CARICOM decision, the 
fact that Guyana was opposed to any suspension or expulsion makes any majority decision worthless 
in terms of the CARICOM treaty which on an issue like this calls for unanimity. " "Burnham: Why I 
don't agree, " Daily Nation, October 24,1983, p. 1. 
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essary to seek external assistance; the other is that in all crises the resolution 
ought to be handled indigenously. By October 1983 these debates were being 
postponed over and over again, so that when the crisis erupted, there was no 
mechanism in place. The discussion was incomplete; alternative mechanisms had 
to be sought. 282 
In the aftennath of Grenada the OECS-CARICOM relationship was slow to heal. 
282 Lewis, "Small States, " in Heine (ccL), A Revolution Aborted, p. 260. 
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CHAPTER6 
PLANNING AN INTERVENTION: PART 11 
At 12: 22 a. m. Washington time on Sunday, October 23, a suicide bomber crashed 
a truck laden with almost two tons of TNT into the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Lebanon. The massive explosion which followed claimed the lives of 241 marines. In 
Augusta, Reagan was woken early, 2: 27 a. m., for the second successive day by 
McFarlane to be told; "We! ve had a terrible attack on the marines with a substantial 
loss of life. "' According to McFarlane, "the President's face turned ashen when I told 
him the news; he looked like a man, a 72-year-old man, who had just received a blow 
to the chest. All the air went out of him. ot2 It was the start of a long and arduous day 
for Reagan; he later remembered it as the "saddest day of my presidency, perhaps the 
saddest day of my life. l13 After talking with the Marine Commandant General Paul X. 
Kelley at 3: 00 a. m., Reagan met with McFarlane and Shultz for two hours. At 6: 30 
a. m. the presidential group left Augusta Golf Club for Washington. After an hour- 
long flight they touched down at Andrews Air Force Base (AFB) at 8: 17 a. m. and 
transferred by helicopter to the White House, arriving at 8: 38 a. m. 
1 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 443. At that moment the number of kno%Nm fatalities was forty-six. 
Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought, " p. A21. 
2 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 263. 
3 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 443. 
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"Beirut. then Grenada" 
Reagan dived straight into the first of the day's two National Security Planning 
GroUP4 (NSPG) meetings at 8: 40 a. m. The subject of both meetings that day were 
identical: "Beirut, then Grenada. "5 Critics have suggested that intervention in 
Grenada was a reflex action. This reasoning portrayed the U. S. as a weak and 
impotent power in the face of Third World chaflenges; swift and successful action in 
Grenada would help restore U. S. credibility. 
Apart from Reagan, three other senior officials were particularly affected by 
Beirut. Shultz, a former marine himself, was shocked and saddened. Likewise 
McFarlane who had visited the troops, knew many of the officers and as Reagan's 
former Personal Representative to the Middle East had supported their presence 
there. 6 Weinberger was "horrified and fiustrated. " He and the JCS "were convinced 
that Shultz and his diplomats were blind to the dangers of allowing the Marines to 
remain in the hostile environment of Lebanon" with no clearly defined mission and 
inadequate forceS. 7 Weinberger had argued for the Marines withdrawal as recently as 
Tuesday, October 18, and lamented that he "had not been persuasive enough in the 
long series of meetings to secure approval for the withdrawal of our marines from the 
international force. "' In the first half of the morning meeting Weinberger and the JCS 
4 Present were Bush, Weinberger, Shultz, McFarlane, Poindexter, McMahon, Baker, Deaver and 
Vessey. The NSPG is the top level group that meets to discuss foreign affairs. 
5 Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought, " p. A2 1. 
6 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 443. 
7 lbid., p. 418. 
8 Weinberger, Fightingfor Peace, p. 79. 
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made their position clear: the situation in Lebanon was futile and the Marines should 
be withdrawn as soon as possible. 
For the second half of the meeting the Grenada group, Eagleburger, Motley, 
Menges, We and North, who had been waiting in McFarlane's office were called in to 
update the group on the situation and military preparedness. Reagan asked everyone 
for their opinions. Speaking for the nfditary, JCS Chairman John Vessey gave a "very 
clear, sober, cautious" assessment "without recommendation": 
there are a lot of questions, we dont know the answers... We have very bad 
intelligence, our Navy SEALS are down there collecting intelligence, but we 
don't have much from them... it is going to be a violent, opposed landing and 
we are going to lose some people and I believe we can prevail Mr. President, 
but it is going to be a fight and I can! t guarantee you that it will be easily secured. 9 
Nonetheless, the primary issue was whether Beirut should affect planning for 
Grenada. 'O Having got everyone! s views Reagan made his position clear: 
If this was right yesterday, it's right today, and we shouldn't let the act of a 
couple of terrorists dissuade us from going ahead. " 
It is clear that Beirut did not derail intervention plans but it obviously did have 
some impact on decisionmakers: it was a question of degrees rather than direction 
though. A "do something" mentality could be detected in certain quarters; Shultz for 
one pursued intervention in Grenada with more "fervour" post-Beirut. 12 For the 
9 interview with Robert McFarlane by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Randall Bently and Stephen Flynn, 
November 10-11,1988, Washington D. C., transcript, Oral History Project, International Security 
Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., p. 146. 
10 When North had heard about Beirut he feared that Reagan would cancel Grenada. Bradlee, Guts 
and Glory, p. 179. Eugenia Charles was also concerned: "My God, this is going to prevent them 
from coming to help us. " Higbie, Eugenia, p. 229. 
11 Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy, " p. 75. Reagan reportedly also reasoned that; "We cannot let an act 
of terrorism determine whether we aid or assist our allies in the region. If we do that, who will ever 
trust us again? " Magnuson et al., "D-Day in Grenada, " p. 20. 
12 IntcMcw With johMtonC. 
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Grenada group the disaster in Beirut did not have much impact; what it did do that 
Sunday was to provide good cover as the press overlooked the presence of the 
Grenada group at the White House. 13 It is evident that the decision to intervene was 
not a product of Beirut, it was simply too soon afterwards to be a reflex action, nor 
was it particularly affected by the bombing. Reagan had not signed the "go" order yet 
but Grenada had been discussed at cabinet level since Thursday, October 20, and 
preparations were well underway by the Sunday, October 23. Fundamentally, 
Grenada and Lebanon existed on "parallel but separate tracks. to 14 
Over at the State Department that morning, ambassador Frank McNeil was given 
the details of his special mission. McNeil had been collected from his hotel at 7: 00 
a. m. by a member of the Grenada Task Force and informed about the situation in 
Grenada en route to the State Department to attend an 8: 00 a. m. RIG meeting. " The 
ambassador was told that Reagan wanted another assessment of the situation before 
he made any final decision. A list of instructions and essential points, prepared by 
Kozak's legal team the previous day, to be included in any formal OECS request was 
presented to McNeil; he felt that the list was unsuitable as it lacked orderliness and 
" Interview with Motley. 
14 Interview with Weinberger. It is ironic that in his televised "Address to the Nation" on October 
27, Reagan specifically juxtaposed the two crises: "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though 
oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both 
countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. " "Address to 
the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, October 27,1983, " PPP, p. 152 1. This redefinition 
and simplification of events in both places diverted attention from Reagan! s foreign policy problems. 
Additionally, Grenada may not have been a response to Lebanon but Reagan! s "rhetoric about 
Grenada functioned in such a way to do so. Literally overnight, Grenada became a condensation 
symbol (sic) of victory and pride, reminding citizens of gains in tangible and symbolic resources. 
Lebanon! s failure seemed blunted - almost forgotten -in the aftermath of Grenada's triumph. " 
Denise M. Bostdorff, "The Presidency and Promoted Crisis: Reagan, Grenada, and Issue 
Management, " Presidential Stu&es Quarterly= (Fall 1991): 74 1. 
15 The meeting was headed by Motley as usual with Crist, North, Kozak and Johnstone also present. 
Beck, "The McNeil Mission, " p. 99. 
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might be interpreted as a Washington-written invitation. 16 For half an hour after the 
meeting McNeil met with Eagleburger, Motley, Howe, Crist and a few others to 
review his instructions. It was emphasized that McNeil should make his own 
independent appraisal. IEs written instructions were supplemented by oral 
instructions from Shultz, via Eagleburger, informing the emissary that no final 
17 decision had been made and that he should give no hint of his recommendations. 
McNeil later summarized the purpose of his trip: 
I was to make crystal clear to the OECS that the president had not yet decided 
whether to intervene and that the decision could go either way. I was to assess 
with the Caribbean leaders the situation on the island, including particularly 
that of the American students... and discuss in depth with the Caribbean 
leaders their rationale for intervention. Finally, after assessing such other infor- 
mation and intelligence as might be available on the scene, I was to report back 
my assessment and my recommendations. 18 
He was wMsked off to Andrews AFB to board a C-140 Jetstar to take a 10: 30 a. m. 
flight to Barbados. 19 
A Walk in the Garden 
In the aftermath of the intervention one of the justifications advanced was the 
issuing of an invitation by Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon. Adams revealed that his 
16 lbid., p. 99. 
17 lbid., p. 99. 
18 McNeil, War and Peace, p. 174. McNeil was not sanguine about the possibility of action: "When 
I lcft I sensed that we would probably not intervene. The White House, shocked by the loss of 250 
marines in the Beirut bombing, feared the political consequences, and the Department of Defense 
was reluctant at the least, wanting more time to prepare. " Ibid., p. 174. 
" The night arrived in Barbados at 4: 56 p. m. having stopped at Homestead AFB, Miami, at 12.50 
p. m. to refuel. Accompanying McNeil on the journey were Crist, his assistant Jim Connelly, Larry 
Rossin, Gary Alexander (a State Department Administrative Support official) and a CIA official. 
BisWs notes. McNeil reviewed his instructions with Crist and formulated a checklist of twenty-eight 
points to be raised in the impending meeting with the Caribbean leaders. Beck, The Grenada 
Invasion, p. 153. The CIA official was sent to establish ground communications. McFarlane and 
Smardz, Special Trust, p. 263. 
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"views were sought well before the military operation commenced on the issuing of 
an invitation of fiiendly countries to enter Grenada and restore order. 40 An 
examination of the legal validity of Scoon's request is beyond the scope of this study; 
Scoon obviously issued a request but the doubt surrounding its authorship has 
attracted some strong criticiSM. 21 
Although the PRG had suspended the constitution in March 1979 People's Law 
Number Three stated that: "The Head of State shall remain Her Majesty the Queen 
and her representative in this country shall continue to be the Governor-General who 
shall perform such functions as the People's Revolutionary Government may from 
time to time advise. "22 Politically, Scoon was just a figurehead with minimal power. 
Lewis describes him as an "obedient and deferential colonial public servant" who had 
"developed a finely honed instinct for survival, so that he was able to serve, without 
any evident qualms of conscience, four different governmental regimes of different 
ideological characters. "23Austin had visited Scoon to inform him of the RMC's plans 
and asked him to remain in office and help establish a civilian-based government. 
During the days prior to Montgomerys visit Scoon had been in contact by phone 
with Buckingham Palace, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Shridath 
20 "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Nfinister of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 39. 
21 The Economist concluded that the request was walmost certainly a fabrication concocted between 
the OECS and Washington to calm the post-invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was 
flimsy. " "Britain! s Grenada Shut-Out, " p. 24. A British Foreign Affairs Committee report was also 
critical: "Both the timing and nature of this request ... remain shrouded in mystery, and 
it is 
evidently the intention of the parties directly involved that the mystery should not be dispelled. " 
U. K. Parliament, Grenada, p. xvi. 
' Peter Fraser, "A Revolutionary Governor-General? The Grenada Crisis of 1983, " in D. A. L40w, 
Constitutional Heads and Political Olses: Connnonwealth Episodes, 1945-85 (London: Macmillan, 
1988), p. 154. 
23 Lewis, Grenada, pp. 140-1. 
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Ramphal, Prime Minister Chambers and Vaughan Lewis among others; he had not 
requested help on any occasion. If anything it seems that Scoon insisted on talking to 
24 
the Queen! s Secretary to ask advice on what he should do. During Sunday morning 
Scoon met with Montgomery for an hour. The Governor-General was unaware of the 
advanced state of intervention planning and Montgomery presented him with an 
"appreciation of the developing situation" and advised him that "it cannot be ruled 
out that there will be some sort of military action. "25 He told Scoon to prepare 
himself for such an eventuality and emphasised that as Governor-General he was the 
only constitutional authority on Grenada: if the U. S. intervened they could not run 
Grenada, only he could and consequently Scoon should plan the appropriate political 
measures. 26 Scoon certainly did not request help of his own volition and it was only 
when Montgomery directly asked him, "Would you welcome intervention? " that 
Scoon admitted that he saw it as the "only solution. 07 The Governor-General was 
not informed beforehand of the formal written invitation that he eventually signed 
after being rescued on Wednesday, October 26. The meeting ended sometime after 
11: 00 a. m. when Kelly, who had accompanied Montgomery, received a phone call 
informing them of a meeting that had been arranged with Cornwall. 
" Intcrview with Rossin. 
' Interview with Montgomery. Scoon possibly knew more because he told Montgomery that he had 
been in touch with the OECS'Dircctor-Gcncml Vaughan Lewis. Interview with Kelly. 
26 Interview with Kelly. 
27 IbicL Montgomery told the Foreign Affairs Committee that Scoon "gave the impression, indeed, 
that his best course of action would be to wait in Government House and see what opportunities 
might arise for him to play a proper role in the light of the revolutionary situation on the island. " 
U. K. Parliament, Grenada, p. lxxxi. Although not exactly the image of someone who allegedly 
requested military intervention, Scoon did not have many options at the time: if he had made any 
public condemnation of the events at Fort Rupert or openly condemned the RMC they would have 
most likely turned on him. Interview with Kelly. Marshall states that Scoon requested help in the 
"restoration of law and order" from Montgomery. Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " p. 27. 
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Meeting the RMC 
As the NSPG met in Washington and CARICOM met in Port-of-Spain another 
important meeting was occurring in St. George's. At 9: 00 a. m. that morning a RMC 
military aide had visited Bourne with a message from Cornwall. He asked Bourne to 
arrange a time and place for a meeting with the U. S. and British representatives; 
Bourne proposed 11: 00 a. m. at the Ross Point Inn where the diplomats were 
staying. 28 
The meeting with CornwalP was attended by Kurze, Flohr, Montgomery, Kelly, 
Bourne and Solin. Cornwall began by admitting that mistakes had been made and 
time was needed to restore normalcy but that the RMC was in control. The curfew 
would be lifted and a cabinet formed soon. Montgomery felt this was just a 
"catalogue of reassuring noises" for the diplomats benefit and if the RMC were really 
in control why was the curfew still in place. 'O Montgomery asked to see Coard as 
soon as possible but Cornwall nonchalantly replied that he was not even sure if Coard 
was still on the island. When Montgomery pressed Cornwall about Coard later in the 
meeting he was told that today's meeting was to discuss practicalities and that 
28 "Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, " U. S. Congress, U. S. Militaq Actions in Grenada, p. 192. 
Bourne was also invited to attend the meeting. The group were kept waiting for an hour by Com, %211 
who arrived around noon. The meeting eventually lasted from 12: 00 p. m. until 12: 50 p. rn. 
2' The U. S. diplomats had been instructed not to meet with Austin to avoid implying any sort of 
diplomatic recognition. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 412. Adams had previously made this 
suggestion and it is probable that the embassy had followed his advice. It -A-as assumed that Austin, 
the number five in the RMC, was a "puppct"; possibly unstable and acting under duress as he was 
"too close to Bishop to go this far wholeheartedly. " Wan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, 
"Subject: Grenada: Comments/Plans of Grenada Democratic Movement, " 202026Z, October 1983, 
Bridgetown 0643 1, section 1, p. 1. 
30 Interview with Montgomery. 
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another meeting could be arranged for tomorrow. 31 The main topic of conversation 
was the students and the possible methods of evacuation, Kurze and Flohes primary 
interest was to get an assurance that if evacuation flights were arranged they would 
get clearance. 32 Cornwall made repeated assurances that the students were in no 
danger and "bragged that things would be back to 'normal' the next day when the 
curfew was lifted. 03 He promised that Pearls would reopen on Monday, October 24, 
and that "those US. .. citizens who want to 
leave Grenada for whatever reason 
would be able to do so tomorrow following normal procedures" on regularly 
scheduled flightS. 34 Kurze emphasized that CARICOM had suspended LIAT flights 
and that Pearls could only accommodate 46-seater planes and therefore any 
evacuation would be too time-consuming and the difficult journey across the island to 
the airport made it difficult to ensure safety. Plane evacuation was further 
complicated by the RMC insisting that flights would be properly organized and 
formalities such as customs would not be waived; "If it took hours or even days to 
process all 1,000 Americans, very well, they would have to wait. 05 When Cornwall 
revealed that the RMC was willing to let 40-50 people leave each day at most, both 
31 Ibid. Cornwall was well aware that Montgomery and Kurze were scheduled to leave that 
afternoon. 
32 Interview with Montgomery. 
33 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. 
34 Tyler, "The Making of an Invasion, " p. A14. Corn, "all also approved the use of civilian charter 
planes. Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 413. Beck reports that charter flights were not allowed. Beck, 
The Grenada Invasion, p. 144. Motley had leased three Pan-Amcrican jets in Nfiami but was unable 
to get landing permission for them from the RMC. Interview with Motley. 
35 Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada, p. 8. The RMC wanted a list of those who wanted to leave and 
opened the passport facilities especially on Sunday so that students could obtain the necessary 
paperwork. Telephone interview with Peter Boumc. 
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Kurze and Montgomery told him he was not being realiStiC. 
36 Other alternatives were 
examined. 
Kurze suggested an evacuation by a large ship, not necessarily a warship, from St. 
George's harbour as it was more central than Pearls. Cornwall rejected evacuation by 
warship believing it to be "tantamount to allowing a military occupation of his 
state 07 and an evacuation by the cruise-liner Countess, volunteered by Cunard in 
response to an embassy request, was never pursued. 39 When the meeting ended after 
fifty minutes Kurze was not hopeful; "We wanted a quick evacuation; the RMC was 
stalling, stressing normalcy and no need to rush as everyone was safe; no progress 
was made. 09 
That afternoon two more U. S. diplomats, James Budeit and Gary ChafK40 
arrived to replace Kurze whose mother had just died. Their arrival was not 
uneventful. On the plane's first approach their pilot could not contact the Pearls 
36 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. 
57 Bcck, The Grenada Invasion, P. 144. 
38 The Countess was apparently an embassy initiative but not one authorized by Bish. He told the 
political officer who had made the inquiry to "forget it" as the U. S. had its own resources to call 
upon. Interview with Bish. Budeit said that Cornwall "okayed in principle" the cruise liner and 
Chafin recalls him "skirting the cruise-liner issue noncommittally. * Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 
415. Motley states that, "we explored the possibility of using a Cunard-line cruise ship then in the 
vicinity to evacuate Americans. It became apparent, however, that conditions on the island would 
not permit evacuation by civilian carrier. " Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 71. The 
Countess had been due to call in Grenada on Tuesday, October 25, but Cunard decided that the ship 
would only stop if Washington so desired and even then only with a US. naval escort and a request 
from the RMC. Kelly recalls being told much later that Cunard! s headquarters in New York were 
told by Washington not to send the Countess anywhere near Grenada because the students were not 
to be evacuated as this would undermine the U. S. ' rationale for intervening. Interview with Kelly. 
39 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. Flohr expressed the same sentiments. Telephone interview with 
Flohr. 
40 Chafin was a political officer and had instructions to get information on the political situation 
and as well as the students. Wanting to know exactly what type of situation he was going into he 
had been told by DCM Flower in Barbados that no action decision had been made but that he should 
expect something to happen. Interview with Gary Chafin, November 20,1995, Washington D. C. 
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control tower and refused to land without confirmation, diverting instead to Union 
Island about fifteen minutes away. Budeit and Chafin contacted the embassy 
explaining what had happened. The embassy phoned Bourne to discover what had 
happened; it transpired that Austin! s secretary had misdialed the airport's number to 
alert them of the plane's arrival . 
41 Bourne straightened the problem out and the plane 
was allowed in but the drama was not over. 
Upon landing the plane was surrounded by the security forces who "looked and 
behaved like Caribbean pirates. io42 Budeit and Chafin were already running late and 
there was no sign of Kurze and Montgomery who were due to return to Barbados 
and nobody knew where they were. Their pilot grew agitated, telling the diplomats 
that the tower had told him the plane had been shot at on its approach. Budeit and 
Chafin now became worried that they had walked into a trap; they heard gunfire, the 
sonic booms of U. S. reconnaissance planes overhead and rumours that a 
counterrevolution was underway in St. George's. 43 Soon after, one of the APC's that 
had wreaked havoc at Fort Rupert arrived. Budeit had already decided that if Kurze 
"hadn't come out, I wasrft going in"44 and Chafin began to think it might be wise to 
reboard the plane and leave. He phoned the embassy to report that their plane had 
allegedly been shot at and, somewhat ominously, that Kurze and Montgomery were 
"mysteriously missing"; the embassy told them to "stay pUt. "45 Kurze and 
41 Bourne recalled later that "we were doubled up with laughter during this period.. It -42s just a 
bunch of people inexperienced at running that Und of operation and unable to make command 
decisions. " Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 414. 
42 Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition, " p. 22. 
43 interview with Chafm. 
44 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 415. 
' Chafin had arranged a code phrase with the embassy that he would use if he felt the situation was 
threatening and that he and Budeit. should leave while they could. The phrase was "I think I have 
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Montgomery had simply been delayed and arrived at Pearls in one piece about two 
hours later. Their flight left without incident at 3: 30 p. m. 
No Way Out 
Back at the embassy Budeit and Chafids dramatic, but inaccurate, reports 
presented officials with an exaggerated picture of the volatility of the situation on 
Grenada. Kurze and Flohr's reports were not positive either. Kurze noted that the 
students were safe and well and there were no reports of injuries or threats being 
made but that a significant number of students were scared and wanted OUt. 46 
However, he felt that: 
you could not have an orderly evacuation of large numbers of foreigners in a 
situation controlled by the military council, given their shakiness and the large 
chance of violence. Therefore, if you! re going to do this, you have to secure 
control of a certain area. 47 
if an evacuation was problematic then a negotiated solution was even less likely; "A 
piecemeal deal with the RMC would not work. The RMC had no local support, was 
over its head, and would likely fall like a house of cards. "4' Images of another 
hostage crisis weighed heavily on the two diplomats minds; they believed the RMC 
would have little compunction about using foreign citizens to get themselves out of a 
lost my passport. " However, when Chafin said this over the phone the embassy, obviously having 
forgotten about the arrangement, told him not to be so careless in the futurcl Interview with Chafin. 
' Kurze estimated that 22/85 Canadians, 40-50/200 British and 2-500/1000 Americans wanted to 
leave. Secretary of State, secret telegram to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, "Subject: 
Grenada Situation Report No. Eight, " 241128Z, October 1983, Washington D. C. 30245 1, p. 1. 
47 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 414. Kurze told the press that before he lcft Grenada "he did not 
recommend.. that the American citizens , 
leave in any particular time. " "Results of US Survey by 
Today, " Daily Nation, October 24,1983, p. 16. This was because he believed they could not be got 
out rather than because there was no danger as many assumed. 
48 Beck, 77ie Grenada Invasion, p. 182. 
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comer. As Kurze's explained, "these were desperate people, heavily indoctrinated to 
boot. I think that if the situation had dropped out, without an intervention to nip it, 
this [hostage-taking] was a clear possibility. "49 The diplomats told Bish that the 
RMC had no organizational structure, no coherent leadership and could disintegrate 
rapidly. More worringly, it seemed that the RMC simply did not understand the 
problem; they believed that if they held on to the students they would be safe when in 
fact the opposite was true. 50 As far as the RMC were concerned an evacuation was 
the prelude to an intervention. They probably felt that the longer they could prevent 
intervention by diplomatic means any external intervention would be harder to justify 
internationally. Kurze and Flohl's conclusion was that the U. S. had run out of choices 
and that an intervention was necessary to rescue American citizens. Their report was 
naturally read with interest in Washington; as Speakes explained, the report 
"amplified our thinking. It increased our worries. "51 
The British Mgh Commission received a different picture from Montgomery. He 
reported that between 30 and 40 British citizens and 22 Canadians wanted to leave 
but that they were not in imminent danger. Montgomery described the situation on 
Grenada as "calm, tense, and pretty volatile" but was in "no doubt that members of 
the revolutionary council would keep their word"52 and open Pearls on Monday to 
49 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. Flohr later stated that the students "food and water supply was 
totally controlled by the government. These students were in effect at that point hostages for four 
days. " NBC Evening News, November 7,1983, Weekly News Summmy, Week of 07-13 November 
1983, White House Communications Agency Videotapes (WHCAV), RRL. Back in Washington 
Motley was concerned that the RMC would develop a "bunker mentality" and seize hostages. 
Telephone interview with Motley. 
50 Telephone interview with Flohr. 
51 "Press Briefing by Larry Speakcs, 1: 00 kNt, October 26,1983, " MHOPS, no. 892-10/26, 
Container 34, RRL, p. 34. 
52 "StiU no word on Coard, " p. 16. 
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allow people to leave. He also reported his conversation with Scoon to Bullard. 
Bullard had received an oral request from the OECS on Saturday, October 22, and 
after Montgomery's report he now recommended to London that Britain should 
participate in any action. The FCO backed this with the qualification that the impact 
on the Commonwealth be taken into consideration. Downing Street approved 
participation, although they favoured a slower time frame to allow the insertion of an 
elite Special Air Services (SAS) team onto Grenada to secure certain targets and 
prepare the way for a full-scale intervention. " Despite British willingness to act, it 
seems that Washington did not take London into its full confidence. The Foreign 
Affairs Committee later concluded that British officials' inquiries in Washington 
yielded little more than the promises that Washington was proceeding "very 
cautiously" and that Britain would be "consulted immediately if the United States 
decided to take any action" or "before further steps are taken. 04 
NSPG 11 
In Washington a busy day continued as the final decision to intervene loomed. 
After the morning NSPG meeting Vessey requested a further meeting with Reagan; 
also present were McFarlane, Weinberger, Shultz and McMahon. Vessey briefed the 
group about the stage of military planning, the intention to use the Special Forces and 
the possible dangers they faced. At 11: 00 a. m. CINCLANT submitted its plan for 
5' The SAS team were aboard the HAIS AnMm which had been diverted toward Grenada the 
previous day. Interview with Kelly. 
54 U. K Parliamcný Grenada, p. xv. 
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Urgent Fury, the assigned code name, to the JCS and after some minor alterations 
received approval. 55 
At the State Department decisionmakers were increasingly worried that Defense's 
cautiousness would undermine the central rationale for intervention; the unstable 
conditions in Grenada and the concomitant threat to American citizens. Another day 
or two and the situation there might de-escalate, making any action harder to justify 
politically at home and abroad. At 2: 45 p. m. Shultz reviewed the military aspects of 
an intervention with Howe who told him that: 
Timing is important... and we are losing time. Some reconnaissance flights 
have been out. There are some advance CIA elements under way. But the Pen- 
tagon officers are still saying that if we invade, we have to do it right. They are 
reflecting Cap Weinberger's mood. 46 
Shultz felt that Weinberger's request for more time and information was "the counsel 
of no action at all. "" 
At 4: 00 p. m. the NSPG reconvened again to discuss Lebanon and Grenada. 's 
According to Bennett, the discussion centred on the political risks of the operation 
and the possibility of hostage-taking. Reagan was not deterred by the possibility of 
failure in Grenada being amplified by the Beirut bombing; he felt an obligation to the 
55 Vice Admiral Metcalf, who would be in command of nT 120, thought it was a "lousy" plan, 
weakened by the "jointness" philosophy that advocated the use of all the military forces rather than 
just the Marines. Interview with Joseph Metcalf III, August 16,1994, Washington D. C. This 
accentuated the inescapable problems of interservice rivalry. 
56 Shultz, Turmoil and Tilumph, p. 33 1. The reconnaissance flights referred to were F-14's from the 
USSIndependence which were equipped with cameras and infrared detection capabilities. Also used 
were the SR-71 Blackbird and U-2 spyplanes; which carried "photo reconnaissance and signal 
collection assets [which] provided coverage of Cuba and Grenada prior to and throughout the 
operation. " Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " p. 9. 
57 Ibid., p. 9. 
58 As before, the Grenada group waited in McFarlane's office. Menges claims that during this time 
he cornered Eagleburger, enthusing that "Grenada could be a positive example of reconciliation 
after liberation from communist dictatorship. " Menges, Inside the NSC, p. 80. 
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U. S. citizens in Grenada and the OECS who had requested help. " Even with only 
the slightest chance of a hostage situation the Iran analogy was invoked as Reagan 
reputedly bemoaned that "I'm no better off than Jimmy Carter. 00 Not wishing to 
continue the parallel Reagan asked whether an intervention could precipitate hostage- 
taking. 61 The State Department representatives told him that if the operation was 
done soon and done quickly the chances of this would be low. They advised that "it 
was risky to abort the operation... news of it might leak out and... [the] Americans 
would be seized before the Marines could land. 02 Irrespective of the political risk of 
an intervention so soon after Beirut and the nightmare of a potential hostage crisis, 
Reagan remained resolute. As Meese says, "the negatives arrayed against decisive 
action in Grenada were almost too numerous to count. Not only did the operation 
proceed in the very wake of the disaster in Beirut, it flew in the teeth of fashionable 
opinion about the uses of American military power. , 63 It appears that the only thing 
that would have deterred Reagan was the "flat military infeasibility of it and nobody 
implied that. , 64 
The military still urged caution; Weinberger told Reagan that he favoured a delay 
and reconsideration of the situation. Weinberger was understandably concerned about 
59 Bennett, "Grenada: Anatomy, " P. 76. 
60 "Britain! s Grenada Shut-Out, " p. 22. According to Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U. S. ambassador to the 
UN at the time, Reagan "always had a 'particular horroethat he would face a large-scale hostage 
situation like his predecessor! Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike 
Interventions, " P. 77. 
61 Interview with Weinberger. 
62 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 149. 
63 Edwin Meese III, With Reagan: 77ze Inside Story (Washington D. C.: Rcgney Gateway, 1992), p. 
217. 
64 Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strike Interventions, " p. 63. 
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the safety of the troops and anxious that Reagan understood the risks, the lack of 
intelligence and the need for a larger force. " State feared that the opportunity for 
positive action was slipping away. Motley asked Defense officials if they could 
guarantee to the president that the situation on Grenada would not deteriorate and 
hostages taken. 66 Naturally they could not guarantee this and Motley had clearly 
made his point. Perhaps in response to this Vessey asked Reagan if a definite decision 
had been made: "Not yet" was the reply. 67 For the last hour of the meeting discussion 
focused on Lebanon and Grenada. 
When the meeting ended Reagan made what Shultz described as a "tentative" 
decision to accede to the OECS' request and conduct Urgent Fury as planned. This 
was essentially a "confirmation of the decision that had been 75% made on Saturday" 
at the SSG meeting. 68 After the meeting Reagan gave McFarlane the oral "go" 
order. Later that evening McFarlane delivered the "smooth copy" of the NSDD to 
Reagan to sign "go. " Once again this decision was not irreversible; as Speakes 
subsequently claimed: "If at any time up until 5: 00 a. m. on Tuesday morning... we 
had been in any way certain that we could have accomplished this short of a n-dfitary 
situation, we would have done So. j169 This scenario was highly improbable but not 
impossible. 
's Interview with Weinberger. 
66 Motley later leamt that his vocalization of their reluctance had irritated the military. Telephone 
interview with Motley. 
6' Oberdorfer, "Reagan Sought, " p. A2 1. 
68 "Britain! s Grenada Shut-Out, " p. 22. 
69 "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1: 00 P. M., October 26,1983, " p. 11. 
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The McNei Visit 
As we have seen, Special Emissary McNeil's party had arrived in Barbados just 
before 5: 00 p. m. local time. Having checked in at the Sands Hotel, McNeil and Crist 
were escorted to Government House for their 6: 30 p. m. meeting with the Caribbean 
leaders. Bish, Flower and Gillespie were also in attendance for the meeting with 
Adams, Charles, Seaga, Foreign Ministers Louis Tull and his Jamaican counterpart 
Neville Gallimore amongst others. The OECS had still not received a definite answer 
from the U. S. and had grown agitated. Adams had cabled Washington the previous 
day to report that the OECS "felt they must do something about it on their own if the 
U. S. was not going to participate. ""0 Charles was similarly concerned by 
Washington's procrastination: "a the way going I was thinking, 'we must hurry the 
Americans up, if they're going to come with us, we must hurry them Up'. 01 The 
Caribbean leaders knew that they had to convince McNeil of the need for action. 
McNeil came to verify from an independent and external viewpoint the OECS request 
and to ensure that the U. S. embassy had not "gone native" in recommending that 
Washington support the request and to that end he came "appropriately skeptical. "72 
From Nebraska to Bridgetown 
As the crisis in Grenada unfolded it became clear to Washington that the embassy 
in Bridgetown, Barbados, would play a major role in relaying the views of the 
Eastern Caribbean countries. However, the State Department noticeably lacked 
70 Hardt, "Grenada Reconsidered, " p. 303. 
71 11igbie, Eugenia, p. 230: Motley confirmed that the U. S. almost had to drag Charles back from 
acting alone. Telephone interview with Motley. - 
12 Interview with Flower. Bish also thought McNeil was skeptical. Interview with Bish. 
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complete confidence in the U. S. ambassador Milan Bish. Blish was a Nebraskan 
businessman with friends in Washington D. C.; he was a staunch Reaganite and a 
heavy contributor to the 1976 and 1980 campaign coffers. The reward was an 
ambassadorship in the quiet diplomatic backwater of Barbados in late summer 198 1. 
At the State Department there was a certain "skepticism" about Bish! s abilities. 
For his part Bish believed he was there to serve the President above all. As a political 
appointee he was not concerned about his fiiture career in government and was 
therefore very candid. 73 In his memoirs Shultz is particularly harsh on Bish: 
We found that Bish had recently prohibited embassy political and U. S. Infonnat- 
ion Agency officers from even visiting Grenada to do the normal contact and 
reporting work. His rationale... seemed to be: these are communists; therefore, 
they are evil and not trustworthy; therefore we shouldift talk to them... The 
upshot was that we had neither current information nor good contacts with 
whom to talk. 74 
The ambassador was never accredited to Grenada by Washington, although many 
other embassy officers were. The embassy maintained chiefly consular-level links. 
Bish did view the PRG as Communists and was not sanguine about embassy foreign 
service officers' suggestions that consular and reportage trips to Grenada be 
increased, but he never banned it as Shultz claims. 75 
As the crisis broke, Bish was instructed to use the OECS meeting on Friday, 
October 2 1, to approach the Heads of Government to discuss Grenada and: 
to advise of our [U. S. ] willingness to consider supporting others in an effort to 
restore freedom to the Grenadian people, but only after a strong request from 
73 Interview with Bish. Doubts about the "outspoken" ambassador led the State Department to send 
an emissary from the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA) to "check Bish out"; he reported 
back that nothing was amiss at the embassy. Interview with Flower. Bish was able to rely on his 
competent DCM Ludlow Flower. 
74 Shultz, Turmoil and THumph, p. 327. 
73 Kurze letter, August 20,1995. Other interviewecs concur with this. Bish admits that he was 
dismayed that embassy staff had been discussing the need to increase travel to Grenada behind his 
back but that was all. Interview with Bish. 
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our fiiends and after knowing what kind of forces others are willing to COMMit. 76 
As we have seen, Bish intervened in the OECS proceedings to phone Antigua! s Vere 
Bird to persuade him to withdraw Lester Bird's opposition to an intervention. 
Washington felt that Bish was "out of his depth" and possibly "exceeding his 
instructions"; there was concern that Bish was "too readily committing us 
[Washington] to a course we might not be able to pursue or defend. "77 Indeed, by 
Thursday, October 20, the very next day after Bishop's death, Bish had cabled 
Washington to express his "strong conviction that if we must, and we may have to, 
we should: (1) evacuate American citizens, by force if necessary and (2) depose the 
thugs who have taken over, and (3) restore Grenada as a free society. "U As one 
participant recalled, Bish was ready to act without all the facts, essentially an 
"intervention on principle. "7' 
In July 1983 Charles Gillespie had arranged a familiarization tour of the region as 
part of his newjob as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. 
11is presence in the Caribbean that October was coincidental and a bonus for his boss, 
Tony Motley, who wanted someone more professional at the embassy to provide a 
situation report. Gillespie was "Motley's man" and it has been suggested that once in 
Barbados he "ran the show. " Bish had no problems with GiHespie's presence and was 
glad of the help as the embassy lacked the manpower. Gillespie offered his advice and 
76 Department of State, "Consultations Chronology, " nd., p. 1. 
77 William Russell Nylen, United States-Grenada Relations, 1979-1983: American Foreign Policy 
towards a 'BacAyard"Revolution, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 306 (Washington 
D. C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1988), p. 34. According to 
Nylcn, Gillespie cabled a similar assessment to Washington. 
78 Mlan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Ambassadoes Assessment of the 
Situation on Grenada, " 200749Z, October 1983, BridgetoiN-n 06393, p. 3. 
79 Telephone interview with Fmnk McNeil, December 13,1995. 
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opinion and handled most of the late night meetings, along with Flower, due to Bish's 
poor health, but ensured that the ambassador was kept informed of developments. " 
He was not sent to replace Dish though. In a similar move, ambassador Frank McNeil 
was dispatched to Barbados as someone who was "not expected to salivate at the 
notion of sending in troops"81 to "check Bish out" and confirm the embassy's reports 
that the OECS were champing at the bit. 
Bish's handling of the SGU has come under scrutiny. Beck states that on 
Wednesday 19, October, on his own initiative Dish phoned SGU's Chancellor in New 
York Charles Modica to persuade him to fly to Barbados and publicly request 
intervention. 82 Bish did not recall doing this and other embassy officials were 
extremely skeptical that it occurred. Motley had assigned Grenada Task Force 
member Richard Brown to handle Modica. A call for intervention that early would 
only have served to panic the students. According to McNeil, Dish dealt with SGU 
rather badly, tending to get into shouting matches with officials instead of explaining 
thatthe U. S. would have to make its own assessments of the situation. " 
In retrospect Bish's performance during the crisis was perfectly adequate; his 
reports to Washington may have been enthusiastic in tone but they did not distort the 
strength of feeling amongst the Eastern Caribbean countries. McNeil's visit validated 
Bish's reportage; he spoke to the same people and came to the same conclusions: the 
Eastern Caribbean nations were united in their support for U. S. action and were 
so Interview with Gillespie. 
81 Nylen, United States-Grenada Relations, p. 34. 
92 Beck, ne Grenada Invasion, p. 103. 
83 Telephone interview with McNeil. 
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ready, with the U. S., to share the inevitable "knee-jerk" type criticism that an 
intervention would draw from various quarters. 84 
Without a Doubt: McNeil Meets the Caribbean Leaders 
The meeting began with McNeil emphasizing that the Caribbean request was 
under "active consideration" in Washington but no final decision had been made. The 
initiative for military action had to originate with the Caribbean leaders and they 
would have to take the lead. McNeil stressed that whilst Eastern Caribbean concerns 
about the threat to regional security were understandable the U. S. ' main concern was 
the safety of its citizens. Adams picked up on this and asked whether "the restoration 
of Grenada to a constitutional government could be a legitimate U. S. goal. "s The 
emissary told Adams that "we [the U. S. ] might be supportive of such a policy 
objective but only if set by local initiative and fully supported at the local and regional 
level. "86 Aware that U. S. diplomats had met with an RMC official over the past two 
days, Adams wanted to know what would happen if the RMC offered safe passage 
for U. S. citizens; would Washington's inclination to help wane? 87 As an emissary, 
McNeil had no authority to speculate and simply restated that Washington! s 
paramount worry was the citizens, but reassured Adams that they were also 
concerned about Grenada and the restoration of the rule of law, although the Eastern 
11 Kurze letter, March 11,1996. 
85 Milan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes of 
Meeting Between Ambassadors Bish and McNeil with West Indian Heads of Government to Discuss 
Grenada Situation, " 252203Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06654, section 1, p. 3. 
86 lbicL, section 1, p. 3. 
87 Ibid., section 1, p. 3. 
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Caribbean leaders would have to lead the way on this. McNeil later recalled that 
judging from the signals the RMC's actions emitted no such decision was necessary. " 
McNeil told the leaders that if there was to be U. S. involvement an appropriate 
and official method for the OECS to request assistance, a written invite, would be 
essential for the record. Adams revealed that they had been "grappling" with the 
problem a afternoon. He was happy to "go along with whatever language and 
content met the needs of the OECS and would be favorably received by the United 
States. "'9 McNeil had brought a Washington-written draft invite but felt it was badly 
worded and its use would cast doubt over the origins of the invite. He would not 
have mentioned the draft but discovered that Gillespie had already apprised the 
Caribbean leaders of it and so they asked to see it. McNeil let them peruse the draft 
but told them they could produce a better version. 
Prime Minister Seaga commented that McNeil's draft seemed to focus on the 
"vacuum of authority" in Grenada as a justification for action. Seaga argued that the 
world leftist movement would quickly condemn an intervention and therefore it was 
necessary to rely on the best argument for intervention: foreign interference. In 
Seaga! s mind: 
the overthrow of Bishop was accomplished by forces hostile to the values of 
the Caribbean and coming from outside the region... the Russians and Cubans 
took over Grenada in order to now have complete control over the island as a 
platform to project their power into the Caribbean. " 
Seaga also explained that if he contributed 150 soldiers as part of a Caribbean force 
and 30 were IdIled an abstract justification such as a "vacuum of authority" would be 
88 Telephone interview with McNeil. 
89 Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Infortnal Minutes, " section 1, p. 4. 
' ibid., section 1, p. 4. 
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incomprehensible to the Jamaican populace. What he wanted was "a tough, believable 
justification like foreign intervention to make his case at home. "91 He reiterated his 
position strongly several times throughout the meeting. 
The other leaders did not doubt Soviet and Cuban involvement but as Adams 
pointed out, at this stage their precise role was ambiguous and there was a lack of 
hard evidence. 92 McNeil asked Seaga to elaborate on his claims of external 
interference; Seaga told McNeil that there had been much communication between 
Grenadian and Jamaican Marxists and that there had been constant activity at the 
Soviet embassy in Kingston. 9' Possibly to appease Seaga, McNeil acknowledged that 
"it could be said that foreign interference on Grenada provided the ambiance even if 
not the spark for the violence and collapse of authority. v194 Adams, like Charles a 
lawyer by training, explained to the Americans that Article 8 of the OECS Charter 
provided for "the possibility of a preemptive strike by member countries in the 
interest of their collective security"95 and would therefore legitimize any action. He 
proposed that human rights violations on Grenada should be stressed and that the 
OECS' letter should quote from the Charter as much as possible as its validity relied 
91 Ibid., section 3, p. 2. WNW reassured Seaga that it would make little sense exposing 
inexperienced regional forces to the same risks as experienced U. S. forces; Crist elaborated by 
explaining that the type of intervention under consideration would reply on "overwhelming force" 
which only the U. S. could provide. Ibid., section 3, p. 3. 
92 Adams told McNeil that he saw "a typical Soviet footprint in the fact that the previous political 
arrangement between the factions of the PRG had now come apart in violent ideological warfare... 
a typical Russian tactic for destabilization. * He felt that the Cub= "might be as shocked as others 
by the brutality of the violent schism now apparent in the New Jewel Movement" rbid-, section 2, p. 
4. 
93 lbid, section 2, p. 3. 
' lbid, section 2, p. 4. 
9' lbid, section 2, p. 4. 
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heavily on it. ' The Americans accepted this as a reasonable approach to the 
situation. Adams deputized his Foreign Minister Louis Tull to chair a drafting 
committee on the spot to prepare another draft. They returned about forty minutes 
later with the new document and after a few minor amendments it was approved by 
the Caribbean leaders. 
Another topic of discussion was Montgomery's meeting with Governor-General 
Scoon that afternoon. According to McNeil the fact of Montgomery's visit was 
known but not the substance or result of the meeting. " As Adams later argued, 
"Scoon was the only one who, in addition to any treaty rights which might and did 
exist, could issue a formal invitation to foreign countries. "" Consequently 
Washington figured it would be expedient to discover Scoon! s views prior to any 
intervention. At some time that Sunday, McNeil received a cable instructing him to 
"ask OECS military representatives if it would be possible to communicate with 
Governor-General Scoon in advance of military operations to elicit a request for 
military assistance from Scoon. "99 They believed it might make things easier if Scoon 
characterized the situation as an emergency and his request a cry for help. 100 There 
96 Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes, " section 2, p. 4. 
' Telephone interview with McNeil. However, Montgomery had returned to Barbados several hours 
before McNeil's meeting and it is quite possible that Scoon! s request had been conveyed to the 
meeting's participants and was subsequently discussed. 
99 "Full Twd of Speech of the Prime Minister of Barbados, " p. 38. 
99 Department of State, "Consultations Chronology, " p. 6. Following up on this the next day the 
State Department provided the text of a draft letter the OECS might want to send to Scoon to elicit a 
request. The draft contained an "assurance that any request received from the Governor General 
would be kept private until he is safc" and promised "assistance as long as necessary to permit the 
people of Grenada to reconstitute governmental institutions. " Ibid., p. 6. 
"0 Interview with Gillespie. Deputy Secretary of State Dam later stated that Scoon! s request "carried 
exceptional legal and moral weight. " "Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Darn, " US. Congress, 7he 
Situation in Grenada, P. 5. 
315 
was a feeling that Scoods request would be important at some stage but Washington 
was not going to hold its breath waiting for it. The Caribbean leaders probably 
reasoned that if Washington had an invitation from a Head of State it might make 
their final decision easier and quicker. 
Prime Minister Adams took the opportunity to remind the group of two examples 
of Grenada's overt aggression against St. Vincent: the Union Island uprising in 1981 
and later an armed PRA incursion onto one of St. Vincent's Grenadine islands in 
pursuit of escapees. Reflecting on the years since the Grenadian revolution in 1979, 
Adams told the other leaders: 
we all knew what Bishop was all about from the very beginning... we knew 
that the instability introduced into our sphere of small parliamentary democracies 
by Bishop's unconstitutional takeover would ultimately lead to where we are 
today. '" 
Eugenia Charles was especially conscious of the security threat having been the 
target of several coup attempts. McNeil posed several questions: 
Was resistance to the hardline faction growing on the island? Was a civil war on 
Grenada likely? In the event of such a conflict, what was the probability that the 
communist forces would prevail? How would the Soviets and Cubans react in 
the event of a civil war? 102 
The leaders replied that a bloody civil war appeared likely and that the Soviets and 
Cubans would become involved. They also revealed that Coard's car had been seen 
daily at PRA headquarters and that in due process he would probably reappear as a 
Communist puppet leader. 103 Eventually, the leaders argued, democracy in the entire 
region would be undermined. 
101 Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes, " section 3, p. 2. 
102 Beck, "The McNeil MissiOn, "P. 101. 
103 Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Informal Minutes, " section 3, p. 3. 
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Another question McNeil posed was the likely reaction of Grenadians to an 
intervention. Latin American countries in general had a natural antipathy towards 
U. S. interventionism in the hemisphere. Seaga and Adams both asserted that anti- 
Cuban sentiment on the island was growing, as was pro-U. S. sentiment. The Prime 
Ministers pointed out that during the demonstrations on Wednesday, October 19, 
Grenadians had carried banners reading "America we love you. " McNeil was assured 
that an intervention would be welcomed. Adams astutely commented that "the U. S. is 
so used to dealing with countries where the U. S. is unpopular that it may not know 
how to deal with countries where it is popular or at least not unpopular. " 104 
The Caribbean leaders raised the question of what McNeil termed the "endgame. " 
They feared the U. S. would secure their students and then leave, rather than staying 
to improve conditions in Grenada. Post-intervention elections would be an 
opportunity to provide a firm base for democracy. There was some difference of 
opinion over the timetable for elections. Seaga did not favour early elections because 
he felt there were too many problems on Grenada and that "to do it [elections] right 
would take time. Not to do it right would risk a return of the Russians and 
Cubans. "105 Adams acknowledged Seaga! s point but suggested that: 
an early election would be desirable because while the U. S. intervention on 
Grenada would be very popular he didn't want to see the purity of the motive 
come to be questioned in a long and drawn-out interim government and election 
process. 106 
A timetable of six months was eventually agreed upon. The leaders also emphasised 
that Eric Gairy would not be permitted to have any political role in elections. 107 
104 Ibid., section 3, p. 4. 
105 Ibid, section 4, p. 2. 
106 lbicL, section 4, p. 3. 
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Repeating that Washington had not made a final decision yet, McNeil told the 
leaders that he thought that Washington would be "willing to provide technical 
assistance in this area to assure an early and fair election" and that "it would be very 
important for there to be good effective international supervision of the election in 
order that its fairness could not be later questioned. "'08 McNeil raised the subject of 
an interim government should intervention occur and if the Governor-General would 
be a suitable figure to head it. Adams indicated that if it came to intervention Scoon 
would be the sole remaining legitimate authority and a "good prospect" to form an 
interim government, one that had a strong anti-Gairy and anti-Bishop bias. 109 
A final topic of discussion was what to do with the Cubans, Soviets, Libyans and 
other Eastern bloc officials on Grenada and also the RMC and NJM members. Adams 
asked McNeil if Washington had any thoughts about the Cubans on Grenada and if 
they should be allowed to complete the airport project. McNeil had discussed this 
subject in Washington before he left but had not received exact instructions beyond a 
general "get them out of there" brief"O He thus recommended that all the Soviets, 
Cubans, Libyans and Eastern Bloc nationals should be invited to leave on the first 
available transports. Charles was characteristically adamant on the subject: "The 
Russians, Cubans, Libyans --- out! IIIII 
`7 ibid., section 4, p. 3. Charles went as far as to propose that the first law to be passed by the new 
government should be to prohibit Gairy from ever returning. Adams agreed with Charles! sentiments 
but questioned the legality of such a measure; he instead suggested an unwritten secret protocol. 
108 lbid, section four, p. 3. McNcil apparently made a hypothetical offer of $750,000 of assistance 
which Adams readily accepted 
109 ibid., section 4, P. 3. 
110 Telephone intervicýv with McNeil. 
111 Bish, "Subject: Uncleared Inforrnal Nfinutes, " section 4, p. 4. 
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It was decided that the PRA would be disarmed and disbanded although the police 
force, who were less politicized, were to be retrained. In the case of the RMC itself 
McNeil proposed two options: trial and punishment or exile. Once again Seaga took 
the hardest line by suggesting that show trials would be useful for public education 
but it appears the majority favoured the traditional form of justice: arrest, trial and 
conviction according to the law. 112 The meeting then concluded with McNeil yet 
again underlining that no final decision had been made' 13 but that he would indicate 
to Washington the need for a quick decision either way. The Americans then returned 
to the embassy. 
Judging by the comprehensive nature of the discussions, the Caribbean leaders 
knew this meeting was crucial in securing U. S. assistance. As one participant 
recalled, the leaders "wanted it [an intervention] badly. 014 Washington's concern was 
that the Caribbean countries would not stand up to be counted in the aftermath of 
intervention when they had time to reflect upon everything in the cold light of day. " 5 
As McNeil realized a mere ten minutes into the meeting these concerns were 
unfounded; everybody was deadly serious and "no one expressed second 
thoughts. "' 16 
At 11: 00 p. m. Major General Crist met with Caribbean military officials at 
Barbadian Defense Force headquarters to be briefed on the military situation and 
112 lbid., section 5, p. 3. 
113 Unknown to all the participants Reagan had made a "tentative" decision to respond to the OECS 
request during the meeting. 
114 Telephone interview with Bish, November 2,1995. 
115 Telephone interview with McNcil. 
116 Ibid. 
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discuss contingency plans. He reminded the officials that U. S. participation should 
not be presumed. Crist was told: 
we are very small countries. We do not have military forces. We are basically 
police and there they are with weapons, troops. They have murdered their lead- 
ers. What can you do? Can you help US? 117 
Part of Crist's mission was to convey that the Eastern Caribbean ought to be willing 
to contribute forces as a sign of seriousness and to "ensure that in the event of an 
invasion, Caribbean troops would quickly be introduced to the island, thus facilitating 
an early U. S. withdrawal. ""' Back in Washington prior to his trip, Crist had reflected 
the JCS' position that all this was "a lot of effort for something that probably won't 
happen" because the RMC would "bottle out. "119 Once in Barbados, Crist found it 
was a "different world" and he was highly impressed by the Caribbean leaders. He 
finally returned to the embassy around 1: 00 a. m. 
"Get the Hell Out" 
Sometime on Sunday evening Budeit and Chafin met with the students to conduct 
a census to discover how many wanted to leave. When Kurze and Flohr had arrived 
on the Saturday they reported that about fifteen percent of the students wanted to 
leave. Kurze and Flohr had not encouraged the students to leave and reassured them 
that their best course of action would be to stay put for the moment. When Budeit 
and Chafin met and addressed the students they painted a grim picture of imminent 
117 U. S. Congress, U& 
. Afifitary Actions in Grenada, p. 42. Castro knew this and communicated it 
to the RMC: "Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada, and in that case 
they [RMCI could defeat them with their own forces without greater difficulties. " "Statement by the 
Cuban party, " IýIadan (ed. ), Statements by CUBA, p. 9. 
1111 Beck, "The McNeil Mission, "p. 101. 
"' Intcrvicw with Flowcr. 
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danger; Chafin believed it was important to emphasize that if a peaceful evacuation 
was arranged the students should not reject the opportunity lightly because this 
situation was serious and with the possibility of military action things could become 
very dangerous. '20 Bourne observed that "as the students asked questions. .. the 
U. S. diplomats made it clear they felt the wise course was to get off the island. 11121 
Critics have suggested that Budeit and Chafirfs tone appeared "more oriented toward 
worrying them about their future safety than to ascertain their honest views. " 122 In 
fact Budeit and Chafin's advice reflected their own personal feelings; after their 
eventful arrival they had grown very concerned about their own safety. 123 
The diplomats may have unsettled the students but they emphasized that the 
students had to make up their own minds. As one student commented, "they really 
left it up to us to decide if we were in danger... The [School] administration was 
attempting to quell our fears, but not giving us any real information. " 124 Irrespective 
120 Interview with Chafin. 
"' Edward Cody, "Medical School Director Says He Backs Invasion, " Washington Post, November 
1,1983, p. A12. Apparently when Budeit was asked by a student what he would do in their situation 
he replied "Get the hell out. " Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 413. flaving previously reassured the 
students to keep them calm, Flohr was stunned by the diplomats encouraging students to leave. 
Interview with Flohr. On Monday, October 24, Budeit visited the married students homes near RFG. 
He explained the danger they would be in in the event of a countercoup because RFG would be a 
prime target. Budeit admitted "scaring the hell out of those people" and when he saw them later 
"they were weeping, crying. .. I stayed the hell away from them. I had done my bit, and gotten them 
out of there. " Ibid., p. 414. It would seem that the diplomats never discussed emacuation 
arrangements with SGU officials. Telephone interview with Peter Bourne. 
122 Nburicc Waters, "The Invasion of Grenada, 1983 and the Collapse of Legal Norms, " Journal of 
Peace Research 23 (1986): 243. 
'23 Telephone interview with David Ostroff, October 27,1995. 
124 David Nfichael Ettlin, "Invasion abruptly ended medical students' doubts, " Baltimore Sun, 
October 30,1983, p. 3. At the embassy in Barbados a student who had left Grenada by boat on 
Friday, October 21, told officials that "many medical students were terrified and Bourne [was] not 
being honest with the students on the political danger. " U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Miscellaneous Legislation Conceming Various Foreign Policy 
issues (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1984), p. 64. 
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of the extent to which the diplomats convinced the students they were in danger, 
there was another cause of the increasing numbers of students who wanted to leave. 
With the conclusion of the CARICOM meeting people on Grenada heard: 
rumours from outside radio, mostly Caribbean stations, that the Caricom coun- 
tries were going to invade Grenada. That stirred up the students quite a bit. 
They were scared, and that jumped the number who wanted to leave to over 50 
percent by Monday. 125 
Upon telexing the U. S. embassy and inquiring about the veracity of these reports, 
Boume was given a "No comment" reply. He then contacted Chancellor Modica in 
New York to see if he could get any information from the Washington end. Modica 
telexed back that an intervention was unlikely. Boume did not believe that the 
Caribbean countries could arrange an intervention so quickly and "pooh-poohed" the 
idea. 126Nonetheless, the prospect of military action now loomed one step closer to 
the students, the majority of whom had been uncertain as to what was going on until 
then. 
The View From SGU 
With the question of student safety one of the central rationales for intervention it 
is interesting to note that SGU officials in Grenada and New York maintained until 
after Urgent Fury that intervention was unnecessary. It is arguable that as the School 
had been there since 1976 they were as "in touch" as anyone. SGU had enjoyed good 
relations with the PRG. As Maurice Bishop had explained: 
Our government... is very happy to have the school with us in Grenada. We are 
very conscious of the benefits which the school has brought to our people and our 
125 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 414. 
126 Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition, " p. 24. According to one student, "the only 
reason why one hundred percent of the students didn't want to go right away is because we didn! t 
know what was going on. * ABC News, Thursday, ober 27,1983, Weekly Ns Summar ,Wk 
of 24-30 October 1983, WHCAV, RRL, Tape IV. 
W ew y ce 
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country over the years, in terms ofjobs, in terms of foreign exchange, in terms of 
direct government revenues... [and] in several intangible ways also. 127 
in his dealings with the RMC, Bourne got the impression that they were 
struggling and, with Coard reviled by the populace, Austin had been thrust into the 
limelight "unprepared, unequipped and on his own. to 128 It would seem that Austin 
respected Bourne's judgment and at one stage simply asked "Tell me what to do. I 
need advice. " 129Modica, who relied heavily on Bourne's reports from Grenada, felt 
that: 
the negotiations I had set up with the U. S. Embassy and the Grenadian officials 
were working. They did produce two people to leave (sic) the country on Mon- 
day, and I felt that would open up on Tuesday and Wednesday and Thursday, we 
could probably get most, if not all, the students who wanted to leave off of the 
island. "O 
Bourne met with the students twice each day, keeping them informed of the situation 
and getting their reactions which were "pretty controlled"; he advised them that he 
believed it was "pretty safe" and that the School had been through one revolution in 
1979. "l Modica and Bourne were confident that the economic impact of the School 
127 Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building, " p. 264. Boume estimated that SGU 
contributed around five million dollars to the Grenadian economy per annum and, %-as the largest 
employer on the island. "Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, " U. S. Congress, U. S. Afilitary Actions 
in Grenada, p. 185. The emergence of the hardliners in the NJM makes it important to note that 
they only tolerated the School, aware of the security risk it was and also the Leninist contradictions 
of having a capitalist transnational business contributing so much to the economy. Leventhal, 
"Entrepreneurship and Nation Building, " p. 28 1. 
128 Telephone interview with Peter Bourne. 
" According to Peter Bourne, Austin sent a cable to former Carter official Robert Pastor in 
Washington D. C. saying that he was ready to do whatever was necessary to resolve the impending 
conflict. Telephone interview with Peter Boume. 
130 "Grenada Aftermath/Coronary Bypass Rcport/Argentine Elections, " 7he AfacNeikEehrer News 
Hour, October 27,1983, transcript no. 2109, p. 2. 
131 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 413. 
323 
on the island's economy would guarantee its future, even under hard-line rule. 132 By 
Sunday, October 23, Bourne sensed that events were moving inexorably towards 
intervention and he tried forlornly to stall this process; his concern was that should an 
intervention occur students would most likely be killed which was exactly what an 
intervention was supposedly meant to prevent. 133 
A Willinness to Surrender? 
That same evening Cornwall sought out Budeit, Chafin and Flohr to plead for 
talks to avoid bloodshed; a similar message was sent to Tom Adams. 134 The 
diplomats were in periodic contact with Gillespie at the embassy keeping him up to 
date. Upon hearing of Cornwall's request, Gillespie instructed Chafin to take the line 
that Washington was interested in seeking a way out without military intervention to 
see what type of flexibility Cornwall would offer in response. 135 Chafin and Flohr met 
Cornwall who "looked like death warmed up" as rumours of divisions within the 
RMC and Austin's death circulated. Cornwall presented details of a civilian cabinet 
that would be set up and told the diplomats that he was willing to "entertain 
suggestions as to the make-up of the cabinet. " 136 Some have argued that this was a 
rnissed opportunity but the details Cornwall had of the cabinet suggested they would 
"I As Leventhal speculates, "It is likely that the paranoid Coard faction, "ith its monopoly over the 
security apparatus, saw the medical school as a much more real and immediate security threat. From 
the perspective of internal security, therefore, it appears medical school prospects would have been 
unpromising under hardline rule. " Leventhal, "Entrepreneurship and Nation Building, " p. 284. 
Leventhal concludes that "the economic argument may still have held sway in a post-Bishop 
environment, despite the ideological unpalatability. " Ibid., p. 285. 
133 
134 
135 
Telephone interview with Peter Bourne. 
Bish's notes. 
Interview with Chafin. 
136 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 416. 
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be puppets and merely a cosmetic change. 137 The RMC had already spoken to 
businessmen, Scoon and Bourne about establishing a civilian government and 
appeared serious although with the hopelessness of their situation becoming 
evermore apparent it could have been a stalling effort. 
In an effort to establish who exactly was in command the diplomats asked if 
Coard was still alive or dead but Cornwall was non-committal. The gravity of the 
situation was communicated to Cornwall and he was advised that the RMC should be 
flexible. Chafin still felt that if the RMC had been willing to make concessions at that 
stage an intervention could possibly have been forestalled. 139 
Chafin and Flohr reminded Cornwall that they were there mainly to discuss the 
students. The use of the Cunard liner to evacuate them was raised but Cornwall 
evaded the issue, joking that he did not want them to drown. Whilst arrangements to 
evacuate those students who wanted to leave were discussed Austin phoned Bourne, 
complaining that Chafin and Flohr were insisting on military planes and helicopters to 
evacuate all the students, rather than the ten percent Bourne had estimated wanted to 
leave. According to Bourne the General was not pleased: "he [Austin] reacted very 
strongly to me and as a result of that I actually had grave doubts if they [ the 
students] could have been gotten out. " 139 Again Bourne acted as go-between, 
phoning Budeit to inform him of Austin's fears. The consul explained that they were 
only discussing what might be necessary if an evacuation had to be executed 
quickly. 140 Bourne related this to Austin who seemed to be placated. 
137 Intcrvicw with Chafin. 
138 ibid. 
139 "Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, " U. S. Congress, U. S. Military Actions in Grenada, p. 177. 
140 Ibid., p. 193. 
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Back at their hotel Chafin and Flohr contacted the embassy to report that it was 
uncertain who was in charge of the RMC. Cornwall, or the RMC, or both, had 
proved inflexible during discussions and it appeared that they were determined to 
remain in power. This report, and subsequent ones, did nothing to deter intervention. 
At 10: 00 p. m. Chafin and Flohr were visited by Cornwall again at their hotel. He 
looked "tired, eyes bloodshot, flexibility gone" and told the diplomats that the RMC 
had decided to retain its links with the Cubans and Soviets and that a diplomatic note 
would be delivered to them at 2: 00 a. m. which: 
will request a clear, definite and immediate response regarding a U. S. commit- 
ment not to invade Grenada, will point out that Grenada is a sovereign nation, 
and will restate that recent events are an internal matter. The government will 
also point out that an invasion will be resisted to the last man. "' 
Reach Out and Touch Someone 
At 6: 10 p. m. an unusually well-informed RFG had announced that: 
Member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, along with 
Barbados and Jamaica this afternoon took a decision to send military forces to 
invade Grenada and to call on foreign forces also to invade our country. 
The decision was opposed by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas 
and Belize. However, some islands have already sent armed forces to Barbados 
as a jumping off point for this invasion of Grenada and units from Jamaica and 
Antigua are on their way to join them. 
At this time a warship is only seven and-a-half miles from Grenada, well inside 
our territorial waters. An invasion of our country is expected tonight. 142 
The broadcast was by turns beHicose and appeasing as it stated that the RMC were 
"prepared to fight to the last man and woman to defend our homeland, though it is 
equally prepared to hold discussions with any of these countries in order to find a 
141 Secretary of State, secret telegram to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, "Subject: Grenada 
Situation Report No. Eight, " 241128Z, October 1983, Washington D. C. 30245 1, p. 1. 
142 "Invasion Fears, " Daily Nation, October 24,1983, p. 1. Adams for one, suspected that Forbes 
Burnham had leaked details of the CARICOM meeting to the RMC. 
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peaceful solution. " 143 That evening the RMC dispatched a diplomatic note to the 
U. S. embassy in a desperate effort at self-preservation: it announced that any invasion 
would be viewed as "a rude violation of Grenada! s sovereignty and of international 
law" and that "[t]he present situation in Grenada is of an entirely internal and 
domestic nature and presently peace, calm and good order prevailed. " The embassy 
was assured that: 
the lives, well-being and property of every American and other foreign citizen 
residing in Grenada are fully protected and guaranteed by our government. 
However, any American or foreign citizen in our country who desires to 
leave Grenada for whatever reasons can fully do so using the normal procedures 
through our airports on commercial aircraft. As far as we are concerned, these 
aircraft can be regular flights or chartered flights and we will facilitate them in 
every way we Can. 144 
The note was ignored ; 145 events had overtaken any possibility of a peaceful solution 
to the RMC's predicament. The RMC also fired off a cable to the FCO, including a 
copy of the note to the U. S. embassy, requesting Britain to act to prevent an 
intervention. 146 
After the lengthy meeting that evening, McNeil called Motley in Washington to 
report that the Caribbean leaders were firmly behind their request. McNeil, Gillespie 
143 Ibid. This suggests a RMC uncertain of what to do, possibly divided and feeling totally isolated 
from its neighbours. 
144 Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, pp. 934. The note also quixotically detailed its plans for a 
civilian government which would "pursue mixed economy with state cooperatives and private 
sectors and would encourage foreign and local investment within the framework of the national 
interest of the country. " lbid. 94. 
14' The U. S. embassy finally replied at midnight on Monday, October 24, that under Grenada's 1973 
constitution Governor-General Scoon was the "remaining legitimate authority, and not the ruling 
military council" and therefore the U. S. "could not respond to the message received, but reiterated 
U. S. concern over recent violence and the safety of American citizens on Grenada. " "Press Briefing 
by Larry Speakes, 1: 00 P. M., October 26,1983, " p. 9. 
146 The comedy of errors continued. the RMC, %ms using an out-of-date fax number which had been 
reallocated to a plastering company, Scanplast. Scanplast contacted the FCO about the RMC fax and 
were told to "Put them in an envelope" and "leave them at the front desk" Sensing a lack of interest 
and urgency Scanplast decided to post the material. UShaughnessy, Grenada, p. 152. 
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and Flower then reviewed the latest intelligence on Grenada; things were happening 
very fast and McNeil wanted to wait and assess the situation more thoroughly. 
Gillespie called an increasingly impatient Motley to tell him that McNeil would call 
soon. At 11: 30 p. m. McNeil spoke to Chafin on Grenada who told him that the island 
had become an "armed camp" with constant military activity. An atmosphere of fear 
was prevalent and several hundred students wanted to leave. Chafin reported 
Cornwall's dramatic plea for talks but that during the meeting he was initially 
interested in providing assurances about the students but subsequently backed away 
and became intransigent. 147 
McNeil cabled his appraisal to Washington: 
The new Grenadan (sic) government seems stupid as well as brutal. But they 
have put two and two together and come up with something near three and a 
half They clearly expect the U. S. and the Caribbeans to come storming across. 148 
The RMC's plea for talks perhaps suggested a "willingness to surrender" but when 
the subject had come to light during McNeil's meeting with the leaders they 'wanted 
to charge ahead. Doift want to respond to Grenada! s message. Only Adams even 
contemplates the notion of giving them an UltiMatUM., 149 
McNeil suggested that if Washington could nail down who was actually in charge 
within the RMC an ultimatum might be possible. He outlined the case against such a 
move first: 
-- Tip our hand and permit them to take hostages, kill political enemies or other- 
wise do things that would raise the potential loss of fife. 
-- Plays into the hands of what may simply be a ploy to buy time. 
147 Telephone interview with McNeil. 
'48 Nfilan Bish, secret telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks, " 
240639Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06575, p. 2. 
149 lbicL, p. 2. 
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-- And, even if they are serious, would ultimately fail because they probably 
couldn! t accept the Adams formula, the only one that would be acceptable to the 
Caribbeans and, we are sure, to the people of Grenada. 150 
In favour of the ultimatum was the fact that: 
-- How could we turn down out of hand the possibility, though slim, of achieving 
our objectives without any bloodshed, which might include Amcits, bringing 
about public and congressional protest that we had needlessly gotten people hurt 
in order to exercise our military capabilities. "' 
McNeil did not believe the RMC would respond to an ultimatum but, following his 
instructions to be objective, advised Washington not to distniss it out of hand: 
It is a close call. I conclude that Washington should -- with Ambassador Bish 
and DAS Gillespie -- game plan a contingency scenario for a last minute ulti- 
matum and consult it with Prime Mnister Adams... so that Caribbeans (not yet 
the US) could go ahead with ultimatum if we judge that there is some prospect of 
success. 152 
It is doubtful that there were many supporters for an ultimatum by this stage; 
certainly not among the Eastern Caribbean leaders who had maintained constant 
pressure on the U. S. for assistance. 
At 12: 30 a. m. Tom Adams called the embassy; he told DCM Flower that the 
British High Commissioner had contacted him to inform him that during 
Montgomery's afternoon meeting with the Governor-General, Montgomery had 
received an oral request for OECS assistance. Flower conveyed the message to 
Gillespie and McNeil and after further discussion Motley was contacted in 
Washington. 
150 Ibid., p. 3. Adams'ultimatum envisaged the RMC surrendering peacefully and therefore possibly 
going into eýdle rather than facing trial although this plan had its problems. 
151 lbicL, p. 3. 
152 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Motley viewed the Governor-General's request as an "added stimulus" and a "nice 
legal justification. " 153 McNeil reaffirmed the conclusions of his earlier cable: the 
RMC believed an invasion to be imminent and were not keen to let the students 
leave, possible planning to use them as bargaining chips, and the situation on the 
island was deteriorating steadily. Recalling the Iran hostage crisis, he consequently: 
recommended sending in the troops, so long as it was done quickly before sur- 
prise was lost. In doing so, I was mindful of Teheran... It is far easier to prevent 
a hostage situation than to deal with it once it was consummated, and I judged the 
danger to the students was growing. 154 
Having made his recommendation McNeil was told that the military intervention 
would proceed as planned. Gillespie learnt of this later when Motley called to tell him 
that Washington felt that having a civilian in charge in Grenada after the intervention 
was essential and that he would be , it. 055 No final decision had been made though 
and a couple of fail-safe measures remained in place. 
In the waters off Grenada the USS Guam moved within helicopter flight distance 
of Antigua. Instead of the State Department officials that had been expected, two 
liaison officers from CINCLANT were flown aboard with additional intelligence and 
a draft operation order for the assault on Grenada. 156 At this point D-Day was set for 
Tuesday, October 25, at 2: 00 a. m. 
"' Interview with Motley. Legally Scoores request was an embellishment; even the Statement 
Dcpartmcnfs Legal Advisor Davis Robinson conceded that the legal justifications for the 
intervention would have been no weaker without the request. Interview with Davis Robinson, 
August 17,1994, Washington D. C. 
154 McNeil, War and Peace, p. 174. 
I" The job was originally offered to McNeil but he was not interested. Interview with Gillespie. 
156 Metcalf "assigned the amphibious force, now designated Task Force 124, the mission of seizing 
Pearls Airport and the port of Grenville, and of neutralizing any opposing forces in the area. 
Simultaneously, Army Rangers (rask Force 121) - together with elements of the 82d Airborne 
Division (rask Force 123) - would secure points at the southern end of the island, including the 
nearly completedjet airfield under construction at Point Salines. A carrier battle group (Task Force 
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Metcalfs Morning Mýe n 
As head of JTF 120 Metcalf wanted it understood that he would coordinate forces 
and tell commanders "what" to do rather than "how" to do it and to ensure he got 
this point across, and to meet his commanders "eyeball to eyeball, " he arranged for a 
meeting of the available commanders at Norfolk on Monday, October 24, at 7: 00 
a. m. 157 The meeting was basically a preparatory one; in a frank and candid session 
participants discussed their problems and clarified their responsibilities. 15' McDonald 
began by stating, "[b]efore we get into the operational plan, everyone should bear in 
mind the strong possibility that we woret have to carry it out. The crisis is still being 
handled through diplomatic channels, and we are told it is very likely that the rebels 
will back down. "'" The discussion started with a review of the coup de main 
operation. The optimistic briefers assured the commanders that the opposition would 
melt away: 
Intelligence had portrayed the PRA as poorly armed and with such low morale 
that it was not expected to resist, and had portrayed the Cubans as not likely to 
fight. The intelligence depicted anti-aircraft defenses as three or four guns with 
20.5) and air force elements would support the ground forces. " Spector, 77ie U. S. Marines in 
Grenada, p. 5. 
157 Joseph Metcalf III, "Decision Maldng and the Grenada Rescue Operation, " in James G. March, 
Roger Weissinger-Baylon and Pauline Ryan (eds. ), Ambiguity and Command: Organizational 
Perspectives on Milita? y Decision Afaking (London: Pitman, 1988), p. 283. Present at the meeting 
were Metcalf, McDonald, deputy commander of JTF 120 Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
commander of the 82d, Airborne forces Major General Edward Trobaugh, commander of the Special 
Operations forces Major General Richard Scholtes, the JCS' Deputy Director for Plans and Policy 
Commodore Jack Darby and Craig Johnstone from the State Department. In a highly unusual 
arrangement State had sent Darby and Johnstone to ensure that the military did not find a reason to 
delay the operation. 
158 Interview with Johnstone. 
"" Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Pctre, General 11. Norman Schwarzkopf. - 7he Autobiography. ' It 
Doesn't Take a Hero (London: Bantam Press, 1992), p. 246. Johnstone apparently confirmed this 
although by this stage it was unlikely that a diplomatic solution was possible; the U. S. had accepted 
the OECS request, Scoon had made a request and the U. S. diplomats had reported back from 
Grenada that the RMC were unstable and the students in danger. 
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poorly trained crews. 
160 
Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, deputy commander of JTF 120, was concerned 
about these assumptions and Major General Richard Sholtes, commander of the 
Special Operations forces, was worried about the deployment of the Rangers; they 
were due to parachute into Point Salines but he felt it would be safer if they could 
simply land at the airport. One SEAL team had been lost on Sunday evening when 
their boat foundered twenty-five miles off Grenada and Sholtes wanted a twenty-four 
hour delay to gather more intelligence. McDonald was amazed: "I can't believe what 
I'm hearing around this table. All you're going to face is a bunch of Grenadians. 
They're going to fall apart the minute they see our combat power. Why are we 
making such a big deal of this? " 161 
As the State Department representative, Craig Johnstone began to feel that 
nothing would get done at this rate. Whilst some military officials did have genuine 
fears about the potential opposition they would face, he felt that others would do 
anything to find a reason to halt, or delay, an operation. 162 Feeling that the military 
might conclude that it was impossible to act on Tuesday, October 25, Johnstone, 
supported by navy Commodore Jack Darby who courageously argued against 
CINCLANT and the JCS, countered that the size of Grenada alone made it ridiculous 
to say that the operation could not be done militarily. 163 Johnstone also told the 
group that Washington would oppose any delay because: "The Organization of 
"0 Marshall, "Urgent Fury, " P. 14. 
161 Schwarzkopf with Petre, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, p. 248. 
162 Interview with Johnstone. 
11 Ibid. Motley echoed this: "If the Pentagon can! t knock it over overnight then it ought to 
disappear. " Telephone interview with Motley. 
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Eastern Caribbean States, which asked us to intervene, is a shaky coalition at best. 
There's no telling how long it's going to support this thing. 064 This statement was 
most likely tailored for the audience; Johnstone and Darby had been specifically sent 
to ensure the military did not falter. The OECS were the strongest advocates of 
intervention and were keen that the U. S. should help. 
After hearing Johnstone and Darby out, McDonald was convinced that Urgent 
Fury should proceed as planned although Sholtes did get H-Hour delayed by two 
hours until 4: 00 a. m. Metcalf later postponed it again by one hour to 5: 00 a. m. With 
this confirmed Johnstone outlined the political parameters of the operation: the 
removal of the RMC, the securing of the students and Governor-General Scoon. The 
students were the crucial factor. Failure to secure them or indeed the Governor- 
General would make the operation a political failure. 165 Other critical components 
were the rescue of political prisoners, who were thought to be at risk, and the use of 
the minimal level of force necessary. "" 
In Washington at a morning CPPG meeting the situation in Grenada had not 
appeared to worsen and no hostages had been taken. Nonetheless Weinberger argued 
in favour of an ultimatum rather than an intervention. 167 At noon Weinberger, having 
found no support for an ultimatum, met with Vessey at the Pentagon. Vessey was 
164 Shultz, Tunnoil and Piumph, p. 334. 
165 IntcMcw with Johmtone. 
166 Adams had previously claimed that he had Icarnt of a number of political prisoners held in the 
condemned cell who were to be executed at an "early date. " Hoyos, Tom Adams, p. 114. It transpired 
that the political prisoners were not in danger and therefore not a political priority and it would not 
have been unacceptable if fatalities had been incurred. Interview with Johnstone. 
167 Shultz, Turmoil and Mumph, p. 331. Weinbcrgees position was most likely the result of McNeil's report from Barbados. 
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told "Be sure we have enough strength and was authorized to use the 82nd Airborne 
as back-up if required. 068 
Meeting with the JCS 
From 2: 15 p. m. to 3: 30 p. m. Reagan met with Weinberger and the JCS for a final 
technical planning meeting. News of the loss of one SEAL team had reached the 
White House and, according to McFarlane, "concern about the mission began to 
grow; we faced the possibility that our lack of knowledge about the beach and the 
level of resistance we might face could end up aborting the operation. " 169 Despite 
this, when Reagan polled each member of the JCS they all assured him that the 
operation could be done, casualties were expected to be low and that they were ready 
to go. After the experience of Vietnam, and especially the failed Iran hostage rescue 
mission, the JCS also stressed that once the operation commenced it was important 
that the White House left the military to do theirjob. 170 
The JCS appeared more concerned about the political problems of an intervention. 
Vessey told Reagan that "there is a potential public opinion downside to this because 
of what happened to the marines. " 17' He also allegedly cautioned Reagan against 
intervention because it would jeopardize the 1984 election. Reagan admonished him 
with the warning that if he heard anything like that again he would be looking for a 
new Chairman of the JCS. 172 Reagan had considered the political costs of action in 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
Weinberger, Fighfingfor Peace, p. 77. 
McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 264. 
Telephone interview with Meese. 
Meese, With Reagan, p. 218. 
Interview with Bish. 
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the previous few days and had not been dissuaded; '7' he knew the cost of unpopular 
action but had made definitive action decisions since his days as a Governor in 
California. 174 The president simply asked the JCS, "Is there any military reason for 
not going ahead with the operation? " 175 The JCS replied "no. " 
The meeting concluded at 3: 30 p. m. and a "semi-final military decision" 176 to 
intervene had been made. Weinberger concluded that "by this time it was clear to me 
from his [Reagan] comments and questions that the President had decided to move 
into Grenada unless something was done by Grenada to free the American students 
from danger. ""The final "go" decision would be considered later that day. 
Sgýdng Good-bye to Seaga 
That morning in Barbados McNeil and Gillespie met with Adams and Seaga, at 
the latter's request, at the airport for an hour before Seaga departed for Jamaica. 
Washington had not given the Caribbean leaders a final answer yet; Adams expressed 
the leaders satisfaction with the talks. He also played the Scoon card again, assuring 
the Americans that Scoon was prepared to cooperate and would issue a formal 
request for assistance from the OECS to establish a secure peace once he had been 
173 Shultz speculated that Reagan! s resoluteness was probably "bolstered by the fact that, by chance, 
he had been in Augusta with McFarlane and me, two strong supporters of the action, and therefore 
was insulated somewhat from the Pcntagon! s reluctance. " Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 344. 
1" Telephone interview with Meese. As Cannon says, "California had been on the cutting edge of 
the peace movement. .. and the student protests against the Vietnam War had left a lasting impression. " Cannon, President Reagan, p. 78. Reagan had also taken decisive action to end an air 
traffic controllers dispute with mass dismissals. 
175 Meese, With Reagan, p: 218. 
176 Shultz, "Secretary ShultZs News Conference, * p. 70. 
177 Weinberger, Fighlingfor Peace, p. 77. 
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rescued. 17' Adams and Seaga agreed that the Caribbean troops participating would 
form the Caribbean Peace Force (CPF) and the U. S. would support them but not be a 
member. The two leaders suggested that "no provisional government can or should 
be established immediately" and that the OECS defence committee would work with 
the Governor-General and forces commander to direct activities on Grenada for one 
week. '79Yet again McNeil could only reiterate that no final decision had been made 
but did deviate slightly from his instructions by revealing that he had "urged 
Washington to act immediately if it were to act at all. " 180 
McNeil and Gillespie saw Seaga off and returned to the embassy. McNeil reported 
back to Motley in Washington and was told to collect Eugenia Charles from 
Guadeloupe. "' Charles had returned to Dominica, via Antigua, after the McNeil 
meeting unsure if the U. S. would participate; she decided to travel to Washington to 
make a final effort to elicit help. Her message was that "it doesn! t take much - just a 
cell of twenty or so determined men, and they wouldn't have any trouble finding 
recruits, to overthrow a state like Dominica" and that the PRA "has access to an 
airstrip more than 9,000 feet long. .. [and] clearly for military use. A thousand armed 
Cuban advisers are there to help them. That's what it's all about: to point a dagger at 
the Eastern Caribbean states. " 182 When McNeil left Barbados around 5: 00 p. m. with 
178 Bish's notes. Crist was subsequently informed that Scoon! s rescue would be a priority. 
179 ibicL 
180 Beck, The Grenada Inva! don, p. 166. 
181 Charles had been invited to Washington by Bish who was talked into it by Motley. Interview 
with Bish. Charles herself claims that she phoned the embassy to arrange a seat on McNeil's plane. 
lEgbie, Eugenia, p. 23 1. Charles was flown to Guadeloupe by the French because Dominica's airport 
was too small to accommodate McNeil's plane. 
182 Gerson, TheUrkpaMckAfission, pp. 221-2. 
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the OECS' official request for assistance under Article 8, he had been told that unless 
he heard otherwise by 4: 30 p. m., to inform Charles that Washington had acceded to 
the request at 6: 00 p. m. Washington time. 
Countdown in Grenada 
By Monday, October 24, the RMC's situation looked grimmer than ever: the 
OECS and CARICOM had imposed sanctions; domestically and internationally the 
RMC was a pariah; Cuba had made it clear that it would not get involved in 
Grenada's internal political problems; fuel and money were running low and U. S. 
warships were massing on the horizon for an expected intervention. On Grenada a 
modicum of normality was restored; shops and offices reopened and classes at SGU 
resumed although schools remained shut and the curfew in place from 8: 00 p. m. to 
5: 00 a. m. 
The embassy received the official results of the student survey that day, 
confirming earlier reports that about half wanted out. The U. S. diplomats also 
reported that they felt the RMC had "changed their tone, " asking for six hours notice 
of evacuation flight schedules. "' More ominously the embassy learnt that anti- 
aircraft guns had been positioned near the SGU campus and the Ross Point Inn. 194 
The RMC had promised on Saturday, October 22, that Pearls would be opened on 
Monday for people who wanted to leave. As far as Washington was concerned there 
had been "lots of promises about the airport being open but very little action. " 185 At a 
183 Hedrick Smith, "Reagan Aide says U. S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup, " New York 
Times, October 27,1983, p. A10. 
184 Tclcphone iniCrVieW With Fjohr. 
185 U. S. Congrcss, US MilitaryActions in Grenada, p. 37. 
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press briefing Speakes asserted that "[n]o one has been leaving the island on regularly 
scheduled or chartered air flights. .. The situation remains unstable. Trouble and 
considerable uncertainty remain. it 186 In fact four planes did land at Pearls that day. 
During Congressional hearings, Congressman Stephen Solarz pressed Dam on 
whether the U. S. renewed its request for the students to be allowed to leave once it 
learnt about the planes that had left. Dam replied that: "I am not clear as to what 
extent we were aware. We were certainly aware planes were not getting in. To what 
extent we were aware the small planes had been able to get out. I do not know. " W 
The embassy had initially been unable to confirm if LIAT would be able to operate 
flights if the curfew was raised on Monday, October 24. They were eventually 
assured that LIAT would have five flights available; the embassy simultaneously 
explored the possibility of chartering planes if LIAT was unable to carry all those 
who wanted to leave. "' Undeniably the RMC had complicated and obstructed a 
straightforward evacuation, stalling for time, but it appears that air flights were 
hindered by the OECS countries as well. 
At the OECS meeting on Friday, October 21, it was decided to suspend air and 
sea links with Grenada. On Saturday, October 22, the Canadian High Comn-dssioner 
Noble Power had chartered a plane from LIAT having been assured by the RMC that 
186 "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 12: 16 P. M., October 24,1983, " no. 889-10124, Container 34, 
WHOPS, RRL, p. 15. 
187 U. S. Congress, U. S. Afifitary Actions in Grenada, p. 46. It is reasonable to assume that the 
embassy in Barbados was aware of which planes were leaving. Chafin returned from Grenada that 
afternoon with a Peace Corps couple and a pregnant lady and Consular Officer David Ostroff flew to 
Grenada to replace him. Bish's notes. The U. S. also has an agreement with Canada and Britain that 
if they have space on evacuation flights they will carry Americans so the embassy would have been 
aware of the progress of these planes. Telephone interview with Motley. 
188 Nfilan Bish, unclassified telegram to Secretary of State, "Subject: WIW: Anicits in Grenada, " 
241339Z, October 1983, Bridgetown 06547, p. l. 
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Pearls would be open on Monday. On Sunday, October 23, the Canadian flight was 
blocked by Adams. LIAT was apprised of the OECS decision to suspend all air and 
sea links and that they were "not allowed to make flights even for humanitarian 
reasons. "89 On Monday, October 24, minutes before the Canadian flight was due to 
leave for Grenada at 11: 00 a. m., Barbados again blocked the flight. It was 
rescheduled for 2: 30 p. m. only to be vetoed by the Heads of Antigua, Montserrat and 
St. Kitts. '90 After Charles' mediation the situation was resolved and the flight given 
the go ahead but it was too late to find A crew and too dark for planes to land in 
Grenada. '91 There was no question of a large-scale evacuation but the planes that did 
leave encountered no problems as a former U. S. government official Robert Myers 
recalled: 
There were no police, no military; we got to the airport, everything was calm. 
There were about one hundred people trying to get out on the few charter planes, 
but there was no rioting. '92 
By this time intervention was a virtual certainty and the departure of a few planeloads 
of people, even if it contradicted Washingtores argument that the airport was closed 
and no one could leave, was not about to disrupt this. 
189 Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, p. 63. After British and Canadian pressure, flights on 
humanitarian grounds were permitted. 
190 Walkon and Montgomery, "Canada and the Grenada Invasion, " p. 4. Verc Bird was the strongest 
opponent of flights to Grenada for any reason. Interview with Kelly. Canada suspected that U. S. and 
OECS had prcssurised LIAT. "Ottawa probing if Grenada flights purposely scuttled, " Toronto Globe 
and Mail, November 12,1983, p. 1. 
191 Ibid., p. 1. 
192 "Grenada Aftermath/Marines' Families, " 7he AfacNeillLehrer News Hour, October 28,1983, 
transcript no. 2110, p. 7. Myers was a retired director of the Social Security administration and had 
been hired by the OAS as a technical advisor to Grenada to aid the government with its National 
Insurance Scheme. Spencer Rich, "Ex-U. S. Official Saw Grenada After Coup, " Washington Post, 
October 27,1983, p. AIO. 
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In addition to the four charter planes that flew in that day, a Cuban plane carrying 
Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas, Carlos Andres Diaz Larranga and a twelve-man flight 
and security team arrived at 11.5 0 a. m. 193 Tortolo had been sent to take charge of 
the Cuban contingent and ensure that the RMC knew that the Cubans would only 
defend their positions, would not undertake other missions and advised that the area 
around SGU be demilitarized. 194 In Washington, Tortolo's arrival, 195 made Motley 
nervous; he knew of Tortolo's past and felt Cuba had "upped the ante, " 196 perhaps 
increasing the danger to the students. 
At least one of the U. S. diplomats on Grenada now knew that an intervention 
would occur the next morning. 197 Discussion about evacuation had ceased. When 
Budeit met Cornwall at the Foreign Ministry at 4: 00 p. m. he told him off-handedly 
193 Cotman, The Gonion Tree, P. 220. Tortolo m2s a senior figure in the Cuban militaty, he had 
graduated from the Soviet Armys Frunze Academy and Voroshilov Staff College. He had risen to 
prominence commanding Cuban forces in Angola and in October 1983 was Chief of Staff of the 
Army of the Centre in Cuba. He had also been head of the Cuban military mission on Grenada from 
1981 until May 1983. Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War. 1975-1986, An Era of Holent Peace 
(Novato, Calif.: Prcsidio, 1988), p. 280. Larranga was a PCC expert on Grenada; he was killed 
during the intervention. Cotman, The GoMon Tree, p. 220. 
194 "Statement by the Cuban Party, " Madan (ed. ), Statements by CUBA, p. 10. OShaughnessy writes 
that Tortolo's job was to instruct the Cuban contingent on what to do if they were attacked and that 
he was due to return to Cuba the next day. UShaughnessy, Grenada, p. 15. 
19-5 Tortolo's arrival was observed by Chafin who was at the airport to meet his replacement 
Consular Officer David Ostroff and return to Barbados with the RMC! s diplomatic note. Ostroff 
thought Chafin looked "scared and upset" and Chafin felt that Ostroff, who had been told he was 
being sent to register students who wanted to leave, had been treated a bit unfairly but that he 
(Chafin) was glad to be out of the picture. In retrospect Ostroff concluded that the notable absence of 
efforts to evacuate the students peacefully meant that he and Budeit had been sent as "sacrificial 
lambs" for public relations purposes. Telephone interview with Ostroff. 
196 Motley never believed Castro would try to reinforce Grenada but he knew that Tortolo had been 
sent to establish good command and control over the available forces there and that the US. forces 
job had been made a little bit harder. Any delay would only give the Cubans more time to organize 
themselves. Telephone interview with Motley. 
II John Kelly was told of the action and that it would be a "pushover. " Interview with Kelly. Chafin 
left with a clear picture of the timing of the intervention and that it n-dght be as early as that 
evening. Interview with Chafin. 
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that the U. S. had no evacuation proposal for the RMC because it had taken a long 
time to relay it to President Reagan. Cornwall was now "rather pressing" and more 
interested in getting an assurance that the U. S. would not intervene rather than 
guaranteeing the welfare of American citizens. 19' Probably in desperation Cornwall 
asked Budeit, "Can you tell me, really confidentially, what you advise me to do? 
Budeit could only reply, 'I caret advise you anything. Wait for the response'. "199 In 
fact, Navy SEALs had already carried out reconnaissance missions and Urgent Fury 
was scheduled for just before dawn the next day. 
"News Distorted and Exaggerated" 
Although lectures had resumed at SGU, about half of the students now wanted to 
leave. At a turbulent meeting at the True Blue campus with Bourne and other 
officials, they were ready to blame the SGU administration for the entire situation. 200 
Bourne still felt the students were not in danger and telexed his son, Peter, in 
Washington to report that; "we are all still well and safe. News distorted and 
exaggerated. "201 
With rumours of intervention rife and U. S. warships on the horizon the RMC 
knew intervention was only a matter of time. Around 1: 00 p. m. Bourne received a 
198 Michael Ryan, "Scenes of a War, " People Meekly, November 14,1983, p. 42. 
199 Kwitny, Endless Enemies, p. 416. In a bizarre conclusion to the meeting Cornwall invited Budeit 
to a local disco. Budeit politely declined. "I c&t go to discos together. Our president called them a 
gang of leftist thugs, although Cornwall seemed a nice enough guy and might not have murdered 
anyone. What he was trying to indicate was, 'We could be influenced along the way. There's no need 
to shake us upý. " Ibid., P. 416. 
200 Bourne, "Revolution, Intervention and Nutrition, " p. 24. 
2" Peter Bourne, "Was the U. S. Invasion Necessary? " section 4, p. 1. 
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call from a sombre Austin saying, "I want to thank you for all you have done and I 
am not going to forget it. " Bourne concluded that: 
If General Austin knew an invasion was coming when he spoke to me, then I as- 
sume[d] that he meant by his statement that his revolutionary army would not 
harm the students or attempt to take them hostage. I believe this may have been 
the correct interpretation of what he said. 202 
Austin had previously asked Boume frankly what he should do to defuse the situation 
and avert an intervention and possibly asked Boume again, out of despair more than 
hopefulness by this stage. Boume decided to contact his son in Washington who in 
turn contacted Robert Pastor and Sally Shelton, two other former Carter 
administration officials, to compose a "strategy paper. 003 The paper was telexed to 
Boume from SGUs New York office at 11: 00 p. m.; Boume planned to present it to 
Austin the next morning but this initiative was overtaken by events. 
Another futile cable was sent to London asking them to raise the crisis issue in the 
UN and to "condemn publicly this planned invasion which is a blatant violation of 
international law. 9v204 Once again though the RMC's plea ended up at the Scanplast 
offices. 
202 "Statement by Dr. Geoff-rcy Bourne, " U. S. Congress, U. S. Military Acfions in Grenada, p. 178. 
203 Pastor was a member of Carter's NSC and Shelton was a former U. S. ambassador to Barbados. 
The trio suggested that any approach to Austin should be based on scepticism and designed to test 
his sincerity. The paper recommended "that Austin treat his regime as a transition to parliamentary 
democracy... he should make a statement aimed at regaining the trust of the CARICOM countries. 
Austin should say he was deeply hurt by what happened and explain the bloodshed as a necessary 
act to prevent Bishop from consolidating his control as a dictator. .. He should say he was determined to break with past. They recommended that he say nothing about the Cubans, but let 
things work themselves out with goals of democracy, early elections and a free press. * Tyler, "The 
Making of an Invasion, " p. A14. 
204 UShaughncssy, Grenada, p. 152. 
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Let's Go to Work 
In Washington the decisionmaking had been done and attention focused on the 
handling of Congress, allies and the media. On Monday afternoon, around 4: 00 p. m. 
to 4: 30 p. m., a final NSP&5 meeting was held where a final confirmatory decision 
was taken. Shultz, accompanied by Motley, presented a comprehensive ten-point 
checklist of "plans and actions" including: a signed, formal request from the OECS; a 
carefully prepared legal justification; press statements; a guarantee from the JCS and 
CINCLANT that the CPF would "land at a respectable time, not after everything was 
over"; a plan for immediate transition to civilian power; the establishment of an 
embassy on Grenada; and the dispatch of Larry Rossin, to join the SEALs rescuing 
Scoon, to brief him on the situation because "[h]is first public statements would be 
CritiCal. 9006 At 6: 00 p. m. Reagan made an immutable decision. Motley recalls that 
everyone: 
gave their appropriate briefings, there were some questions raised by some of 
the members, exploratory, not aggressive type of questions. To the point. The 
president asked, made a couple of questions himself .. then asked if there were 
any other questions, any other comments and there ensued a silence that probably 
lasted thirty seconds... And after this silence, he said, "O. K., let's go. "207 
205 Present were Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, Vesscy, McFarlane, Motley and a few others. 
206 Shultz, Turmoil and Tfiumph, p. 334. The importance of securing Scoon had increased after 
news of his request had reached Washington. According to Shultz, Rossin *was well known to the 
governor-gencral. We wanted to make sure that when the SEALs, in black uniforms and black faces, 
woke the govcrnor-gencral up in the middle of the night and said, 'Hi there, we've come to help you, ' 
he would see a friendly face. " Ibid., p. 334. In fact Rossin had only met Scoon once and was not 
"well known" to him. Interview with Rossin. 
207 PBS Frontline, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 16. 
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A Letter From America 
In London the British had been promised by Washington that they would be kept 
informed. At 10: 00 a. m. (GMT) on Monday, October 24, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher chaired a cabinet meeting that reviewed reports of the OECS and 
CARICOM meetings, * Montgomery's meeting with Scoon and news from 
Washington. Ministers made clear their opposition to intervention at this time and a 
list of legal, constitutional and practical difficulties of an intervention was 
. 
208 -rey Howe was in the House of compiled At 4: 00 p. m. Foreign Secretary Geoff 
Commons; when asked by Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey, "Can the 
Foreign Secretary assure us that there is no question of American military 
intervention on the island? " he could only reply, "I know of no such intention. "209 At 
12: 00 p. m. in Washington the British ambassador, Oliver Wright, communicated 
British reservations about an intervention to Jonathan Howe. Howe contacted 
Eagleburger who phoned Wright to express his disappointment and explain that a 
message would be sent to Downing Street. 
At 2: 00 p. m. McFarlane suggested to Reagan that: "This [Urgent Fury] is going 
to be something which may create some misgivings among allies who never want you 
to do anything but support Nato, and at any time you get very far off that course they 
begin to worry. So you ought to consult. "2'0 Thatcher could not be reached however. 
208 Adkin, Urgent Fury, p. 123. 
209 U. Y- House of Commons. Parliamentzzuy Debates (Hansard). Sixth Series - Volume 47, Session 
1983-84, October 24 - November 4,1983, Grenada, p. 24, col. 27. 
210 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, p. 126. 
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Probably as a result, at 2: 15 p. m. Reagan sent a letter to Downing Street . 
211 It 
cited Bishop's elimination, the violence and danger to U. S. citizens as causes for 
Washingtods concern and advised London that the U. S. had received a request from 
the OECS and that it was understood that London had received such a request. The 
letter referred to emissary McNeil's meeting and that he had told Tom Adams that the 
U. S. "firmly endorses the political objectives of restoring order and security to permit 
the formation of a provisional goverment to hold elections. "212 Reagan concluded 
by stating that he was "giving serious consideration" to the OECS' request for 
assistance and that he would "welcome" Mrs. Thatcher's "thought and advice. "213 
Thatcher was at a farewell function for the U. S. Ambassador J. J. Louis when she 
was informed of Reagan's letter. She gave instructions for a reply to be drafted 
reiterating the British position on intervention. During dinner she received a phone 
call to return to Downing Street. Arriving back at around midnight, (GMT) she was 
informed that a second letter from Reagan had been received at 11: 50 p. m.; the 
President had decided to "respond positively" to the OECS request. 214 She met with 
Howe, Heseltine and the military to prepare a reply to Reagans letters. The reply was 
sent at 12: 30 a. m. and made four points: 
First, the only credible justification for intervention would be the need to pro- 
tect the safety of US and British citizens. Their lives were far more likely to be 
endangered by military action than the reverse... Secondly, we had particular 
and express reason to be fearful for the life of the Governor-General in such 
circumstances. Thirdly, we had received no formal request for help from the 
211 The Department of State's "Consultations Chronology" records the letter being sent at 1: 00 p. m. 
(GMT). As every other account cites the later time, including Thatcher and HoiNVs versions, I have 
retained the later time. 
212 Ibid., p. 5. 
213 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 329. 
214 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 33 1. 
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OECS, and most members of the CARICOM... had declared themselves against 
the use of force. Fourthly... the action would be criticized as an unjustified 
intervention by a Western country in the internal affairs of a small independent 
nation. 215 
Thatcher emphasized her own personal feelings: "I cannot conceal that I am deeply 
disturbed by your latest communication. You asked for my advice. I set it out and 
hope that even at this late stage you will take it into account before events are 
irrevocable. 016 In Washington that stage had already been reached. 
In accordance with his instructions, McNeil informed Charles of the presidential 
decision shortly after 6: 00 p. m. as theirjet left Homestead AFB having refueled. 217 In 
Barbados, Bish informed Adams of the decision at 7: 02 p. m. local time. Bish and 
Adams briefly discussed the U. S. ' objectives: the protection of citizens and facilitation 
of the evacuation of those students who wished to leave; helping Grenada! s 
neighbours to stabilize the island, working in close cooperation with the OECS 
forces; and importantly "the restoration of functioning institutions. "21' The continued 
uncertainty and potential for further violence on Grenada and its threat to regional 
security would be emphasized once the intervention was underway. 219 
215 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, p. 330. 
216 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 33 1. 
"' According to McNeil, Charles was slightly surprised and said "My, thats fasil" Telephone 
interview with McNeil. In a recent biography Charles recalls saying: "Why didn't you tell me so in 
Guadeloupe before we went .. thats what I'm coming up for manl I wouldn! t have left home, I 
would have slept in Guadeloupe and gone home the next dayl I wouldn! t have come all the way up 
here with you! The only reason for coming was to make them hurry up and make a decision! " 
Ifigbie, Eugenia, p. 231. After letting her finish McNeil told Charles that she would be meeting 
Reagan the next morning. 
21 8 Bislfs notes. 
219 ibid. 
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Canadian efforts to evacuate their citizens had been unsuccessful and the 
Canadian government was not informed before the event. Jacques Roy, a Canadian 
embassy official was told by Motley at 7: 00 p. m. that a number of options were being 
considered although no intimation about intervention was made. 220 
"Preposterous! " 
The administration had stressed the need for secrecy and when the media picked 
up on a possible story on the eve of the intervention the response was emphatic. 
Around 5: 00 p. m. that afternoon at Grantly Adams International Airport, Barbados, 
Sharon Sakson of ABC and Mark Potter, a correspondent, saw a U. S. jet land and 
fifty marines transfer to helicopters and fly off towards Grenada. An embassy 
spokesman offered that, "What you are seeing could be used as Part One of the 
option to effect a departure of the Americans (from Grenada) and to ensure their 
security. 021 CBSBill Plante approached Speakes with this story. Speakes checked 
with NSC Spokesman Robert Sims who contacted Poindexter. Poindexter's response 
was "Preposterous! " Speakes was told to "Knock it down hard. "222 Plante agreed not 
to pursue the story and relayed the message to colleagues in Washington and New 
11 Walkon and Montgomery, "Canada and the Grenada Invasion, " p. 4. 
221 "U. S. 'copters seen in Barbados; Grenada landings denied in U. S., " Washington 771mes, October 
25,1983, p. 1. An inquiry from ABC's Pentagon correspondent John McWerthy got the response 
that the marines were left behind by the carrier group going to Lebanon and were catching up with 
their ships. Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: 71e Press and the Reagan Presidency (New York: 
Shocken Books, 1991), p. 206. 
I Larry Speakcs, Speaking Out (New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p. 152. As Pearson 
concludes the administration followed a pattern of deception throughout the period: "Its initial 
manifestation was secrecy - hiding the U. S. ' actual intentions. When information about the 
movement of forces could not be concealed, these were described in as innocent a fashion as 
possible... It was only when administration officials were directly asked whether there would be an 
invasion was the response to flatly lie, saying reports to that effect were 'Preposterous. " Pearson, 
"The Betrayal of Truth and Trust, " P. 177. 
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York. 223As far as Speakes knew he was telling the truth; "I suspected we might send 
troops into Grenada at some point to rescue the American students, - 
but I had no 
inkling that that was imminent, nor did I have any idea that we might launch a full- 
scale invasion. 024 Not only were the public misled but sections of the administration 
too. 
Briefing Congress 
At 8: 00 p. m. the bipartisan leadership of Congress were assembled at the White 
House to be informed of the intervention by Reagan and his advisors. 22' The briefing 
was restricted to the bipartisan leadership because the administration felt it was 
"impossible to have any kind of leak-proof contact with Congress. Therefore, it was 
important to keep this [the Urgent Fury decision] as close hold (sic) as possible until 
Grenada went down. 426 The President opened the two hour meeting by announcing 
his decision to assist the OECS and that the troops would land at 5: 00 a. m. the next 
morning. Reagan handed over to McFarlane who provided a background to the 
crisis: McFarlane reported that: 
I As Plante explained: "There are unwritten rules concerning the qualifiers and statements made 
by White House spokesmen and with that much of a knockdown, there m-asn! t much choice... you 
have to assume they're not lying. " Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee, p. 214. 
224 Speakcs, Speaking Out, P. 152. Speakcs began to suspect something was going on around 8: 00 
p. m. when he saw the Congressional leaders arriving at the White House. He was only given the full 
story at 5: 45 a. m. on the day of the intervention, with a thick wad of papers to digest before the 7: 00 
a. m. press briefing. Dismayed at being misled by his superiors, Speakes sent a strong message to 
Baker the next day warning that the credibility of the administration was at stake. Interview with 
Larry Speakes, July 27,1994, Washington D. C. Baker later claimed that the "White House had been 
leaking like a sieve, and there were American lives at stake... It was my view that because the 
military operation depended on surprise, and lives therefore depended on surprise, we should make 
certain there was no risk of premature disclosure. " Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee, p. 214. 
225 Present at the meeting were Speaker of the House Tip OrNeiji, Senators Howard Baker and 
Robert C. Byrd, Congressmen Robert H. Michel and James C. Wright, Reagan, Shultz, Weinberger, 
Vesscy, McFarlane, Meese, Deaver, Baker, Darman and Dubcrstcin. 
2'6 Anderson, "National Decisionmaking and Quick-Strikc Interventions, " p. 79. 
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there were six hundred Cubans in Grenada, building an airport, and that Cuba 
had several hundred armed troops there as well. He added that some of Grenada's 
neighbors were afraid the island was being used for training terrorists. But the 
most pressing reason we were going into Grenada was to protect approximately 
a thousand Americans, most of whom were medical students. 227 
Weinberger and Vessey then detailed the military aspects of the operation. Reagan 
related the OECS' request and his belief that Washington had "absolutely no 
alternative but to comply, "22'emphasized that the need for military action to avert a 
possible hostage situation and warned that "failure to act now... would mean the 
prospect of a permanent, Soviet-sponsored Cuban presence on the island. , 229 
The Congressional leadership's response was unenthusiastic. Speaker ONeill 
thought the intervention was premature and warned Reagan that he was "going to 
take a lot of heat over this. Americans dodt want their kids put at risk for something 
that's none of our business. "230 A number of questions were asked but the 
Congressional leaders did not raise any strong objections. Eventually, 07,1eill told 
Reagan that "if you are determined [to act] we'll support you. 031 Having been 
presented with a fait accompli the Congressional leadership left with the distinct 
impression that they had been "informed but not consulted. 032 Reagan had listened 
to their views but was not discouraged. 
227 Thomas P. aNeill, Man ofthe House (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 365. 
228 Weinberger, Fightingfor Peace, p. 8 1. 
229 McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 265. 
230 Ibid., p. 264. Elsewhere, McFarlane had said of the Congressional leadership that "not one of 
them supported it" and that ONeill was "violently opposed" and thought it was a "nutty idea. " 
Interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project, p. 149. 
231 Intcrview with Wcinberger. 
232 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 335. Senator Pell later raised the same point: "there is a world 
of difference between being consulted and being asked do we think this is wise or noL or being 
informed, saying we are doing this at 5: 00 a. m. tomorrow. " U. S. Congress, The Situation in 
Grenada, p. 11. In defence of the administration Hall argues that under the War Powers Resolution 
Congressional participation in a presidential decision to use force is unnecessary-, "The President is 
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London Callin 
In London it was clear that Washington had decided that, for whatever reason, it 
could not accede to Britaires desire to insert an SAS team to protect the Governor- 
General and prepare the ground for an intervention. 2" Thatcher decided to call 
Reagan on the secure telephone link between Downing Street and the White House; 
the 12: 50 a. m. (GMT) call reached Reagan in the middle of the Congressional 
briefing. In his memoirs Reagan remembers that "[a]s soon as I heard her voice, I 
knew she was very angry" and that she asked him to call off the operation "in the 
strongest possible language. 034 Thatcher was uneasy about speaking at length on the 
phone, the conversation lasted only fifteen minutes, but apparently repeated the 
points she had made in her reply to ReagaWs earlier letters. McFarlane recalls that 
Reagan told her that: "I cannot sit here with a formal request from a group of friendly 
governments who are facing a threat that I have declared as the central dimension of 
threat to stability in the world today and refuse it and you must know that. "235 
free. .. to decide, without the benefit of congressional advice, that the use of armed force is 
warranted under a particular set of circumstances and to consult with Congress after making the 
initial determination. What the President must do... is give Congress the opportunity to offer an 
opinion and to engage the President in debate prior to the commencement of hostilities. " Hall admits 
that the definition of "Congress" in these circumstances is problematical but concludes that "the 
most reasonable interpretation... is that it requires the President to consult with the congressional 
leadership. " David Locke Hall, The Reagan Wars. ý a Constitutional Perspective on the War Powers 
and the Presidency (Boulder, Colo.: Wcstview Press, 199 1), pp. 196-7. 
11 Interview with Kelly. The SAS team on IMSAnffim were put on alert at 1: 00 a. m. local time. 
Interview with Bish. 
234 Reagan, An American Life, p. 454. Britain was never likely to outrightly condemn the U. S. 
action, abstaining in the UN vote on the intervention, and defended the U. S. ' reputation. Thatcher 
was critical, most publicly in a World Service interview when she commented: "We in the Western 
countries, the Western democracies, use our force to defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk 
into independent sovereign territories... If you! re going to pronounce a new law that wherever 
communism reigns against the will of the people, even though its happened internally, there the 
USA shall enter, then we are going to have really terrible wars in the world. " Shultz, Tunnod and 
Diumph, p. 340. 
Intaview with McFarlanc, Oral History Project, p. 153. 
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Reagan heard Thatcher out but told her that "we are already at zero. , 236 On this note 
the conversation concluded. 
Reagan sent a third letter at 7: 00 a. m. (GMT) thanking Thatcher for her thoughts 
but informing her that he had decided to go ahead with the operation. He restated the 
danger to U. S. citizens and acknowledged that "military operations will pose risks 
but... that the risks assumed by not acting are larger. , 237 He also assured Thatcher 
that there was "special planning" to protect the Governor-General. 23, Elaborating on 
his decision Reagan explained that the: 
formal written request from [the] OECS... weighed heavy in his decision... 
[R]elying on economic and political sanctions would give the new regime more 
time to consolidate itself, with [the] likelihood that it would be even more closely 
aligned to Cuba and the Soviet Union than was the Bishop regime. 2" 
Reagan was surprised and disappointed by Thatcher's response; he had been 
hoping for understanding at least . 
240 Downing Street's response was an indication of 
Thatcher's "personal frustration. .. mixed with her indignation 
041 in a situation 
where her government had adually supported action but then been shut out by 
Washington at the last stages of decisionmaking. Another important factor was the 
`6 Thatcher, The Douving Street Years, p. 33 1. 
237 "Consultations Chronology, " p. 5. 
238 Ibid., p. 5. 
239 Ibid., p. 5. 
240 Other officials were "irritated" by Thatchces position. In 1982 Weinberger had "bent over 
backwards" to help Britain in the Falklands. Interview with Motley. There was probably a feeling in 
Washington that London should return the favour over Grenada. Another view in Washington was 
that Britain had no need to participate, they had demonstrated their resolve in the Falklands and 
non-participation put them back in the political mainstream in Latin American eyes after the harm 
caused by the Falklands conflict. Interview with Johnstone. The Foreign Affairs Committee report 
noted that British non-involvcment had avoided damaging relations with the rest of the 
Commonwealth. U. K. Parliament. Grenada, p. )dx. 
241 Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, p. 129. 
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political embarrassment for her government involved, it had "been made to look 
impotent; at worst. .. deceitful. io242 Indeed, Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign 
Secretary Howe faced a tough time in the Commons in the following days. 
Last Touches 
After the White House meeting Weinberger and the JCS returned to the Pentagon 
to issue the "execute" order and review the latest information available. One SEAL 
team were already missing at sea and it was now feared another two SEALs had been 
lost and still "no real pre-landing intelligence" had been gathered. 243 At 11: 30 p. m. in 
the situation room a final NSC meeting was held; present were McFarlane, 
Poindexter, North, Menges and Sims. The response of the Congressional leadership 
was discussed and McFarlane assigned several present to brief a few members of the 
House and Senate Foreign Relations committees . 
244 This done, the meeting broke up. 
Urgent Fury was now in the hands of the military. 
Conclusion 
The execution of Bishop and his associates at Fort Rupert on Wednesday, 
October 19, led to a convergence of thinking in Washington and the Eastern 
Caribbean that would climax in a U. S. -Caribbean military intervention six days later. 
With Bishop's death the Caribbean leaders were immediately convinced of the need 
242 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 331. At the time the lack of consultation was also 
interpreted in terms of the state of U. S. -British relations in general and the impending stationing of 
U. S. Cruise missiles in England. McFarlane recalls Thatcher telling Reagan that: "it may be the 
right thing to do Ron, but it is going to make clear that you don't have a very high regard for my 
government because you told us one thing and you did another... In short, it uill be seen to be a 
deception and I will be fairly embarrassed by it, so don! t do it. " Interview i4ith McFarlane, Oral 
History Project, p. 153. 
243 Wcinberger, Fighfingfor Peace, p. 82. 
244 Mcngcs, Inside the NSC, p. 83. 
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for a swift military solution. The central concern was that whilst it was Grenada 
today it could be any one of their countries tomorrow. 245 The OECS leaders were all 
resolute, articulate individuals with strong conservative views and the decision to use 
force was a reflection of personal preference combined with public pressure for 
decisive action rather than a diplomatic solution. A triad of sorts shaped the 
proceedings with Adams as the brains, Compton as the engine and Charles as the 
spokeswoman. 246 
The OECS were under no illusions about the situation as Charles explained: 
We looked at the options that were available to us to regularize the situation 
because it was a situation we thought that was extremely dangerous to us, know- 
ing firstly the military might that was in Grenada and, secondly, in whose hands 
this might was. And therefore we realized that the only thing we had was a mili- 
tary option, and we examined our resources to see what we had available to us. 247 In the Eastern Caribbean we did not have enough. 
The consequence was a request to Washington for assistance; as Adams explained, 
"aid was sought where aid was most easily available. "248 The leaders were pessimistic 
about gaining CARICOM support. CARICOM was a much looser organisation with 
different political orientations, different perceptions of the crisis and different leader 
personalities. 249 When certain CARICOM countries ruled out the use of force almost 
immediately it confirmed the OECS' expectations that the CARICOM involvement 
would only cause delays. The RMC had shown no remorse and retained the 
allegiance of most of the PRA; quick and decisive action was necessary to prevent 
245 Interview with Edmunds. 
246 Interview with Bish. 
247 MacNeilUhrer, "Grenada Aftmiath, " p. 8. 
248 U. K. Parliament, Grenada, A xvii. 
249 Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in MorldAffairs, p. 189. 
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the RMC becoming entrenched. They knew they had little influence in Washington 
beyond the extent to which their views and objectives coincided with Washington's. 
Hence they stressed the serious danger to the political, economic and social security 
of the region, the opportunity to remove a Marxist-Leninist regime and reduce the 
Soviet and Cuban presence in the area and the threat to U. S. nationals. The OECS 
leaders talked of military action in terms of "how" rather than "whether" and to the 
delight of Washington were "way out in front" in calling for intervention. 
In Washington the OECS request was not unexpected and it marked the moment 
when U. S. decisionmaking escalated: 
The drastic changes that had occurred in Grenada and the reaction of the neigh- 
boring Caribbean governments raised the level of concern and the possibility of 
involvement of Washington. Rather than thinking in a reactive manner about 
what should be done to forestall a hostage crisis or to protect U. S. citizens should 
the situation in Grenada worsen, the United States was instead being asked to 
consider invasion - invasion as a partner, by invitation. 250 
The early morning consultations between Washington and Augusta on Saturday, 
October 22, effectively signalled the stage at which military planning was officially 
transformed from an NEO to a takeover of Grenada. 
The degree to which the American citizens on Grenada were in danger is 
imponderable but memories of Teheran, combined with the lack of intelligence 
available on the situation, undoubtedly generated genuine concerns for their safety. 
251 
Essentially, the presence of the students gave proceedings a sense of urgenCy. 
252 The 
250 Buffowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada, p. 138. 
251 Dam later admitted that the administration had "no information" on any harm/threat to the 
students after October 19. Reagan clarified the situation on Tuesday, October 25: "They were in no 
danger in the sense of that, right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that there 
was concern on the part of those, because already we! d been informed of several hundred who 
wanted to leave. But the airports were closed. There was no way of leaving. " "Remarks of the 
President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, " PPP, p. 1507. 
252 Interview with Weinberger. 
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origins of the RMC and its seemingly unstable nature meant Washington "didn't trust 
them... so, consequently, any assurances they gave us, in our opinion, werent worth 
two cents. 053 Although the signals Washington got from the RMC were not overly 
aggressive they were nothing that could be relied on. 254 With time passing and 
students dispersed around the island the RMC began to stall, fearing intervention, and 
grew intransigent. The U. S. diplomats that visited Grenada assessed the RMC official 
they met with as "obstructionist and uncooperative. "25' This rekindled Washingtons 
initial fears and led to a situation where Reagan: 
had to decide which was the greater risk, the risk that we might go in in response 
to this request in order to safeguard American lives... or the risk that we would 
wait and find that, as in Iran, it was too late, that we had hostages or we had dead 
'A 'MeriCanS. 
256 
In this case Washington erred on the side of caution and decided action was 
necessary. 
At the first SSG meeting on Thursday, October 20, there was a consensus that 
planning for a military operation was necessary; with the diversion of the fleet that 
night and the receipt of the OECS' oral request the next day the odds on action 
shortened. At the SSG meeting on the Saturday, October 22, Reagan made a 
"seventy-five per cent" commitment to act and a NSDD was drawn up. 
The presence of the students on Grenada was easily the strongest political and 
legal justification for action but it would be cynical to suggest that efforts to evacuate 
253 "Press Briefing by Larry Speakes, 1: 00 P. M., " p. 20. 
754 Interview with Motley. 
255 Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 71. 
256 U. S. Congress, U-& MilitaryAdions in Grenada, p. 32. 
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them were superficial. As one sympathetic member of the bipartisan Congressional 
mission to Grenada concluded: 
every attempt was made to extract the students prior to the intervention, but 
those attempts were met by a persistently hardening opposition on the part of 
the revolutionaries. The State Department was prepared to bring in a commer- 
cial cruise ship, Pan American aircraft, military aircraft, charter aircraft, civilian 
boats, and military boats to get the students out, but all of these avenues were 
rejected by Revolutionary Nfilitary Council official Leon Cornwall. 257 
The State Department were the main proponents of military action and a certain 
amount of opportunism was involved. As Brands states; "Instability provided the 
opportunity for intervention in that in an unstable and fluid situation the possibility of 
tipping the balance in a direction favourable to the United States was increased. 058 
Washington estimated that there was a very low probability of Soviet or Cuban 
counteraction and Grenada! s size made prompt military victory inevitable; senior 
military officials dismissed a protracted conflict as "not a serious military 
consideration. "259The State Department were confident that Grenada was a low-risk 
opportunity that an ideologue like Reagan would not refuse. However, the "Window 
of opportunity" would not remain open for long: 
257 Congressman William Broomfield in Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 202. Motley likewise 
states that; "Under the situation of what we knew, the time frame which we were working, I am 
totally satisfied that we took every possible step. " PBS Frontline, Operation Urgent Fury, p. 15. In a 
recent interview though Motley did speculate that perhaps a more senior figure should have been 
sent to visit Grenada. Telephone interview with Motley. 
258 H. W. Brands Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, 
and Grenada, " Political Science Quarterly 102 (1987): 621. Domestic instability has long been 
recognized as a cause of external intervention but as Pearson concludes, "assassinations, coups 
(successful or unsuccessful), political executions, purges, and governmental crises were quite 
unlikely to result in... intervention from abroad" and that foreign intervention is usually aimed at 
"preserving rather than destroying a target government. " Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Mlitary 
Interventions and Domestic Disputes, " International Studies Quarterly 18 (September 1974): 286. 
See also Karen A. Festc, Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War (New 
York: Praeger, 1992). In Grenada's case the political violence, deaths and curfew associated with the 
instability were repugnant to the particularly close-knit Eastern Caribbean states and promoted 
intervention to remove a government. 
2'9 Anderson, "National Decisiorunaking and Quick-Strike Interventions, - p. 63. 
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The chance would exist for a few days, a week at most, before events and world 
opinion made intervention impossible... The opportunity for inflicting military 
defeat on a rigid Marxist dictatorship, establishing democratic government, and 
getting away with it virtually unscathed was unlikely to be repeated. 260 
The Defense Department were concerned about lack of planning time and shortage of 
good intelligence. When Washington received news of the Beirut bombing it was the 
JCS who raised the potential political costs of action in Grenada so soon afterwards. 
Over at the State Department they knew that any significant delay would make an 
operation politically untenable. Craig Johnstone's trip to CINCLANT on the day 
before the intervention was the most obvious manifestation of their concern. 
During the preceding days a significant momentum had built up in favour of 
intervention and when Reagan signed the NSDD on Sunday, October 23, it almost 
guaranteed Urgent Fury would be undertaken. As Motley recalled, all the "diplomatic 
rabbits were out of the hat" by that stage. 261 Monday was a day of military 
preparation; all the important decisions had been made. Washingtons fears about a 
hostage situation, desire to remove a Marxist regime and the Cuban presence in the 
area, and the OECS' request for assistance combined to result in a military 
intervention. 
260 Adkin, Urgent Fury, P. 107. 
261 TCICphone interViCW With MotlCy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
HISTORICAL ANALOGIES AND THE GRENADA INTERVENTION 
This concluding chapter will assess how three particular analogies - the Iran 
hostage crisis, Vietnam and Cuba - helped define the situation in Grenada, affica the 
options that decisionmakers had to chose between and shaped the military 
intervention. It also examines the influence of the OECS request and the perception 
of events as a challenge to U. S. credibility. 
The ReaRan Administration and-Histo 
In examining the use of history by the Reagan administration it is obviously 
unfeasible to study the beliefs of each decisionmak-cr, however, it is fair to assume 
that the President sets the tone and style of the administration, appointing like- 
minded individuals, and therefore his lessons of history will be somewhat 
representative of the wider administration! s views. ' 
In his biography of Reagan, Lou Cannon noted that the President's perspectives 
were: 
the product of the past. Reag&s mental pictures of the world had been formed 
when the Nazi storm was gathering in Europe and imperial Japan was on the 
march in China. He viewed the world through World War II eyes, and he had 
learned his generatioes lesson that unwillingness to prepare for war invites 
2 aggression... the word "appeasement" carried connotations of "surrender. " 
1 Joanna Sp= and Phil Williams, Belief Systems and Foreign Policy (Nc%v York- Pracger, 1990), 
P. 191. 
I Cannon, President Reagan, p. 334. 
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Throughout his presidency Reagan made constant rcrcrcncc to the Munich analogy. 
In a March 1983 address before the Evangelist Society about the threat or Marxist- 
Leninism he criticised the "historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what 
they are... We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's" and cautioned that, "[i]f history 
teaches us anything, it teaches that simplcmindcd appeasement or wishful thinking 
about or adversaries is folly. 0 In August 1983 he told the American Legion that: 
"Neville Chamberlain thought of peace as a vague policy in the 1930's, and the result 
brought us closer to World War Two. History teaches us that by being strong and 
resolute we can keep a peace. "4 
Other top officials such as Bush, Shultz, Weinberger and Casey shared Reagan's 
belief that appeasement invited aggression and that peace was attainable through 
strength. Shultz wrote that: "History teaches. .. that peace is not achieved merely by 
wishing for it. Noble aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim must always be to 
shape events and not be the victim of cvcnts. "s Similarly, Wcinbcrgcr had been 
concerned by Europe unpreparedness for war and the U. S. ' isolationism in the 193 O's 
and explained that: "I was determined to apply all the lessons I had learned from the 
past and I determined to fight for peace -a peace we could win and keep if we were 
strong. "" Against this background the Reagan administration! s first term followed a 
fundamentalist Cold War paradigm. 
3 Sterling J. Kcmck, 'Historical Refloctions on the Dangers Ahead,, nrginla Quarterly Review 60, 
no. 2 (Spring 1994): 199. 
" Bock, "Munich7s Lessons. " P. 16 1. 
s George P. Shultz, "Foreword. " in Home (&L), Me Presidency and National Security Policy, P. 5. 
6 NVcinbcrgcr, Fighting For Peace, p. IS. 
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Reagads simple, black-and-white view saw the Cold War world "divided into two 
camps, with all morality on one side, all evil on the other, with two possible 
outcomes - to win or to lose. "7 In this bipolar world Communism was a "diabolical 
and conspiratorial"s monolith, the cause of all the unrest in the Third World, 
pursuing world revolution and Soviet domination. Continuing the American doctrine 
of global containment and the maxim of pcace-tlirough-strcngth, the Reagan 
administration increased defence spending massively, increased military assistance to 
its allies and emphasised its commitment to NATO. 9 
The administratiorfs idea of peace-through-strcngth was inevitably influenced by 
Vietnam. Reagan befieved that the war hid been fought for a "noble causc"10 but lost 
due to the government's lack of will to win. Ile rcaliscd that Vietnam was a divisive 
and frustrating issue for the populace, that it had left the nilitary disaffected and 
disillusioned and that "it was realistically impossible for any President to commit U. S. 
troops to a protracted war that lacked public support. "" Reagan thus entered office 
promising "no more Vietnams" but simultaneously determýincd to cure the Vietnam 
syndrome. 12 
7 Glad, "Black-and-White Thinking, " p. 48. 
' George NV. Brcstaucr, *%Vhat Have We Lzarned About Learning?, * in Orcstaucr and Tctlock (ods. ), 
Learning in US and Soilet Foreign Policy, pý 832. 
' Bct%iccn 1980 and 1984 Reagan incrcascd ini-litary spending by 40 percent, fmm 1.1 trillion 
dollars to 1.5 trillion dollars. LaFcbcr, Me American Age, p. 671. 
10 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 26. 
11 Ibid., p. 336. The Victnam analogy restricted Reagan's policy toward Central Amcrica and 
resulted in the support of the Contras in Nicaragua and the evolution or the so-called Reagan 
Doctrine. 
12 Zakhcim, defines the Vietnam Syndrome as: *(I) an inward-looking mentality, and in some 
quarters, a somcmhat isolationist %imv of the U. S. role in the world4 (2) a fatalistic resignation to the 
'face of America's limited ability to influence world events, (3) a mca culpa attitude to the worlSs 
troubles. .. (4) the implicit and sometimes explicit acceptance of the notion that America was a 
reactionary power that had come to tcmis iiith progressive dc%vlopments taking place In the Third 
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The military establishment was haunted by Vietnam and its shadow was apparent 
in every military recommendation. 13 Weinberger was shocked by the post-Victnam 
backlash against the military. In a November 1984 speech he proposed six critcria, 
reflecting the lessons the military had drawn from Vietnam, that should be met before 
the use of n-filitary force was considered appropriate. 14 Whcn Secretary of State 
Haig, Shultz's predecessor, advocated that Reagan "go to the source" of the problem 
in Central America (Cuba), the JCS and Weinberger "insistently raised the specter of 
Vietnam and worried over the possibility that the president would be drawn into 
'involuntary escalation'. "11 It is the Vietnam analogy that helps to explain the 
administratiorfs restraint in using force in Nicaragua, opting instead for economic 
pressure and covert operations. 
World War Two had shaped the beliefs of many of the key members of RcagaWs 
administration and contributed to the president's image of the Soviet Union. Vietnam 
had made Reagan aware of the limits of the U. S. ' reduced power. 
World, and (5) suspicion about American militM modernization programs. * Dov S. Zakhciniý Mic 
Grenada Operation and Superpower Relations: A Pcrspecti%-c from the Pcntagon, " in Jiri Valenta 
and Herbert J. Ellison (eds. ), Grenada and Soiiet, Cuban Policy. Internal Crisis and US. 10ECS 
Intervention (Bouldcr, Colo.: Wcst%ic%v Press, 1986), p. 179. 
13 Cannon, President Reagan, p. 347. 
14 The six criteria for the use of combat forces arc: (1) a situation '%ital to our national intcrcst or 
that of our allies, " (2) the commitment should be nude % holcheartcdly, and %%ith the clear intcntion 
of vvinning, " (3) "clearly defined political and military objcctiNvs, " (4) constant rcassessmcni of the 
commitment, (5) "reasonable assurance" of public and congrcssional support, and (6) the 
"commitment of U. S. forces to combat should be a last rcsorL" DaNid T. T%ining. "Victnam and the 
Six Criteria for the Use of Nfilitary Force, " Parameters XV, no. 4 (1985): 10-15. 
15 Melanson, "Action I-listory, " p. 242. 
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Options 
Before analysing how analogies affected the decision to intervene in Grenada, it is 
necessary to list the possible options Washington had: (1) do nothing and let events 
take their own course, (2) provide diplomatic backing to an OECS or CARICOM 
non-military solution with a possible show of force to support this, (3) a rapid and 
limited military action to evacuate foreign nationals, under friendly or hostile 
conditions, and (4) a full-scale military intervention to scize the island and depose the 
RMC. The range of options was naturally affected by the time and information 
constraints typical of a crisis situation. 
Which AnaloRies? 
In the aftermath of Grenada, administration officials invoked a plethora of 
analogies in pubHc to justify and explain their decisions. The analogies in question 
included: the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Lcbanon, 
the Dominican Republic and Suriname amongst others. As Time magazine rcmarkcd, 
it was the "worst outbreak- in memory of the 'anothce syndrome. "16 The vast majority 
of official U. S. government records on Grenada remains classified; however, 
declassified documents, public statements'? by administration officials after the event, 
memoir accounts by participants" and interviews provide a fair indication of the 
16 "Ghosts (Or'. Docs History Rcpcat? ), " Time, No-mmber 21,1983, p. 38. 
" Assessing the degree to which public statements rcflcct private beliefs has bccn a much-studicd 
subject. It is safe to assume that there is a diNision bctA%=n what dccisionmak-crs say in privatc and 
public but on awrage public statements function as an accurate mflection of private dclibcrations. A 
democratic government can mislead the public some of the time but not all of the time. Public 
pronouncements might be an exaggeration of the pri-t-ate position but the audicnccs are %try 
diffcrcnL 
18 Political mcmoirs must likmisc be approached uith a degree of scepticism; as Matahon, saysý 
the *amalg= of. commercial, historical, political, and personal moti, %-ations on the part of the 
memoirists and their publishers combine to create books u hosc %-cry raison crdtrc stands at odds uith 
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analogies which were used most. In this case it appears that the dominant analogies 
were: the Iran hostage crisis, Vietnam and Cuba. 
The Iran Hostage AnaloSy 
On November 4,1979, the U. S. embassy in Tehran was overrun by several 
hundred Iranian militants and 53 embassy staff taken hostage. Ayatollah Khomeini, 
the spiritual leader of the Iranian revolution stated his support for the action. Aflcr 
diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions were unsucccssrul, President Carter 
approved an ambitious airborne military operation to rescue the hostages. The 
mission ended prematurely in the Iranian desert when two helicopters suffered 
mechanical malfunctions and a third one crashed lulling eight Americans. The crisis 
effectively destroyed Carter's re-election chances; the hostages were eventually 
released on January 20,1981, the day Carter lcft office, after 444 days in captivity. 
President Reagan was particularly sensitive to the Iran analogy: "Having ridden to 
office on charges of his predecessor's incompetence in handling the Iranian affair, 
Reagan did not intend to experience such a predicament himself "19 This made the 
analogy very available as a base: it was dramatic, recent, a failure and first-hand for 
most decisionmakers. As weH as the potentially disastrous domestic political 
repercussions of such a crisis, Iran represented U. S. humiliation, helplessness and loss 
of credibility on the world stage. The taking of Americans as hostages was Reagan's 
greatest concern; an earfier draft of his "Address to the Nation" on October 27 read: 
the needs and standards of scholarly discourse. " Robert j. McMahon. 'RcNic%v Essay* KaUng Scnsc 
of American Foreign Policy during the Reagan Ycars, " Diplomatic History 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 
369. However, as many of these accounts utilise classified documcnts thcy can be an important 
source of information. 
19 Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intcr%, cntion, " p. 620. 
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"It is the sworn duty of every President to protect American lives, never to gamble 
with them. 00 
It is interesting to note that the hostage analogy had also been used by the Carter 
administration in November 1979 when two U. S. citizens were arrested by the PRO 
and denied access to a U. S. consul. Two PRG officials hinted that hostage-taking 
might be considered to encourage the U. S. to extradite deposed Prime h1inistcr Eric 
Gairy. The State Department were "fearful that [the] PRG may take adverse action 
against Americans once the PRG is informed of our inability to move more promptly 
on the extradition of Gairy. "21 Although Menges refers bricfly to this episode in his 
account of the intervention decisionmakin? it is unlikely that it was even known of 
by most involved. In Washington there was a new administration and at the U. S, 
embassy in Barbados there was the standard two-year rotation of foreign service 
officers. 
When RIG convened during the first few days aflcr Bishop's arrest on October 13 
it was the Iran analogy that they drew upon. With around 1,000 U. S. citizens on 
Grenada the potential for an "Iran-in-the-Caribbean" hostage situation was evidcnt. 23 
The U. S. embassy in Barbados reported that Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard 
had staged a Marxist coup against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, the PRA were 
20 "Presidential Address to the Nation: Foreign Policy, Ilursday, October 27,1983. ' (Ellioat)-cr) 
October 26,1983,9: 00 a. m., White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA8206, RRI., 
P. 9. 
11 vance, "Subject: Talldng Points for Meeting with PNI Bishop, * p. 9. 
22 Menges, Inside the IVSC, p. 69. 
23 Ibid., p. 69. The majority, about 650, of thcsc citizens uvrc students at the priN2tcly owned 
American SGU. As McNcil pointed out, the fact that they were students only there to study, rather 
than retirees or businessmen who had chosen to go there, seemed to incrc= the emotional image of 
them as "innocents abroad. " Telephone intcnicNv with McNeil. 
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divided in their support for Coard, the Cubans! position was unclear and mass 
demonstrations were occurring. Ambassador Bish stated that the situation was 
fluctuating and whilst there was no threat to the students yet, further disorder could 
. 
24 1 
easily reverse this situation The failure of two embassy oflicials to reach Grenada 
and the Grenadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' reply to a U. S. diplomatic note 
promising that "the interests of U. S. citizens are in no way threatened by the present 
situation in Grenada... which is a purely internal affair, 03 sounding like a warning to 
keep out, only reinforced Washingtons anxiety. 
The Chairman of RIG, Langhorne Motley, thus decided to review the standard 
evacuation procedures. CINCLANT were simultaneously informed to review their 
plans for such operations. As the situation in Grenada remained uncertain, RIG 
favoured a NEO be planned for to pre-empt a possible hostage situation. They 
envisaged an Entebbe-style quick in-and-out rescue mission by specially trained U. S. 
soldiers. 26 
When the massacre at Fort Rupert occurred on Wednesday 19 it became the prism 
through which Washington viewed the RMC. With Grenada under a shoot-on-sight 
24 hour four-day curfew, the imprisonrnent of certain prominent figures, the cutting 
of communications and expulsion of journalists, fears of a hostage situation grew. 
Ambassador Bish felt that Americans "could be taken hostage, as in Iran" and 
24 Bish, "Subject: Cuffent SituatiOn, " P. I. 
25 Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 7L 
26 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, p. 98. In June 1976, Palestinian terrorists had hijacked a Frcnch 
aircraft en route from Tel Aviv to Paris and diverted it to Entebbe airport, Uganda. All non-Isracli 
nationals were released, 96 Israelis remained hostages. Several days latcr Isracli airbomc 
commandos stormed the plane and freed the hostages. Natalino RonzittL Rescuing Nationals 
Abroad Through Afifita? Y Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p. 37. 
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therefore whatever measures were necessary to assurc their safcty should bc "sct in 
motion" whilst the U. S. could also "rid the hemisphere of an obnoxious unwantcd 
regime. 07 The RMC were young and inexperienced group in a highly chargcd, 
politicized situation; even if it was a suicidal move Washington Nt they might scizc 
hostageS. 2' A U. S. military intervention could not be rcsistcd for long but "[w]ith 
fifty or so students locked up... it would become a very different ballgamc. Dcmands 
for the invasion force to withdraw or at the least for the RNIC's safe conduct out or 
the country would be difficult and costly to refuse. "29 
The discussions between embassy officials and RNIC member Leon Cornwall did 
little to dissipate the fear of a hostage situation. The RNIC were not kcen to allow a 
quick evacuation. The diplomats reported that it was not clear who was in charge; 
the RMC appeared to have no organizational structure or coherent leadership and 
could disintegrate quickly when the curfew was lifted. 30 Cornwall's last minute plea 
for talks on Sunday 23 displayed some interest in arranging the students' evacuation 
but he became intransigent and the U. S. concluded that the RNIC were trying to stall, 
fearing an imminent intervention. It is probable that the RNICs strategy was to try 
and delay an intervention for a few days or a week by alerting the world to the U. S. 
and OECS' plans, thereby increasing the political cost of action for the interveners. 31 
In Washington though: 
The specter of Teheran... was beginning to take on a more definite and f6ght- 
27 Bish, "Subject: Ambassadoes Assessment, " p. 2. 
28 interview vdth Weinberger. 
29 AWn, Urgent Fury, p. 108. 
30 Kurzc's letter, August 20,1995. The embassy N%2s not sure to %%hat txtcnt ComwaH had authority 
or if he was reporting accurately to RNIC or if he was pcrhaps afraid to. Intcr%icw mith Chafin. 
31 Adkin, Urgent Fury, P. 158. 
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ening shape. The students were not yet hostages and perhaps thcy would ncvcr 
have become hostages. But, as of this conversation with Comwall, thcy had bccn 
made into pawns. 32 
For Washington it was obvious that the RNIC believed an evacuation was the 
prelude to an intervention and they were not keen to let the students leave. The 
students safety was the bottom line for decisionmak-crs and in their cycs the MIC 
may well have seized hostages to preserve its position or to "make something 
happen. 03 
The Iran analogy had already advanced the argument for an NEO but it also 
suggested the timing of a military operation. The prevention of a hostage situation 
was essential and therefore the analogy promoted a pre-emptive action as soon as 
possible. The JCS favoured such action because if the students were taken hostage 
the "military forces might not be permitted or able to rescue them. "34 Inaction would 
only give the RMC more time to consider hostage-taking; as Senator Tom Foley said 
afterwards: 
the President did not have the luxury of waiting a week to see how things devel- 
oped before making a decision. "Waiting a week was a decision", ... There is no doubt in my mind that the President would have been irresponsible had he risked 
so many American lives by delay. 33 
A rapid, secret military operation would minimise the chance of hostage-tak-ing. 
32 Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada, p. 8. 
33 Interview with Gillespie. 
34 Richard Halloran, "Joint Chiefs Supported US. Action as Feasible, "New York Timcs, Octobcr 
27,1983, p. 23. 
35 John Norton Moore, "Grenada and the International Double Standard, " American Journal of 
International Law 78 (1984): 150. The consensual view in Washington u-as that "a governmcnt 
ought not to be forced to wait until its citizens are harmed or killed before taldng action... [it is] 
best to eff on the side of haste when lives, and not mcrc ideology, arc at stak-c in an uncertain and 
highly volatile situation. " Richard P. Dicguez, "The Grenada InN-asion: lllcgal in Forniý Sound as 
Policy, " New York University ofInternational Law and Politics 16 (Summer 1984): 1198. 
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The Iran analogy also served as a justificant of the intervention. In his 
announcement of Urgent Fury to t. he press, President Reagan explained that action 
was taken because: "First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, 
including up to a thousand Americans. "'6 In his "Address to the Nation, " Reagan 
invoked the hostage analogy again: "The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must 
never be repeated. 07 On November 4 Reagan remarked that: 
With 1,000 Americans, including 800 students, on that island we weren't about 
to wait for the Iran crisis to repeat itself, only this time in our own neighborhood 
-- the Caribbean. 
39 
In a "Questions and Answers" session on November 3 Reagan commented that, "I 
know your frequent use of the word invasion. This was a rescue mission. "39 As 
Bostdorff observes, "by renaming the Grenada crisis a 'rescue mission, ' Reagan 
allowed the Americans the chance to relive the hostage situation and win. "40 In 
retrospect, "with the Iran hostage crisis still fresh in American minds and world crises 
having prompted a national state of anti-Communist fervor, a more calculated appeal 
36 "Presidents Remarks, October 25,1983, " Deparhnent ofState Bulletin 83 (Dcccmbcr 1983): 67. 
The same point made by number of government officials over follo%iing days. 
17 "Address to the Nation, " PPP, p. 152 1. An earlier draft read. "A fc%v years ago ivc all watched in 
agony for 444 days as a tyrannical regime held more than 50 of our fcllow citizens hostage. I could 
not risk seeing that tragedy rcpcatedL" "Address to the Nation: Thursday, October 27,1983. " 
(Elliot/Mycr/Gcrgcn) October 26,1983,3: 00 p. m., White House Office of Specchwriting: Speech 
Drafts, OA8206, RRL, p. 12. 
38 "Text of Remarks by the President to Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station Personnel and 
Families, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, No%vmbcr 4, 
1983, " Press Release 12: 00 noon, WHOPS, no. 3333, RRL, p. 1. 
'9 "Presidenfs Remarks and Qucstion-and-Ansm-cr Session (Excerpts), November 3,1983, " 
Department ofState Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 79. 
40 Bostdorff, "The Presidency and Promoted Crisis, " p. 744. 
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to unchecked emotion would be hard to imagine. "" The protection of nationals has 
been a traditional justification for military interventions. 
The Vietnam Analogy 
As previously discussed the Reagan administration had cntcrcd office promising 
"no more Vietnams" determined to dispel the Vietnam Syndrome. The promise of 
"no more Vietnams" was complicated by the fact that there remains no conscnsus on 
what the lessons of Vietnam are. Some argued that "no more Victnams" means 
avoiding conflicts in far-off places of minimal strategic interest, where the causes arc 
questionable, success is unlikely and casualties likely to be high. "2 This scenario 
would be unacceptable to the U. S. populace. The alternative interpretation suggests 
that when the U. S. does intervene it should do whatever is necessary to win. "' It was 
this interpretation of "no more Vietnams" that the Reagan administration embodied. 
in his memoirs Reagan explained that: "I understood what Mictnam had meant for the 
country, but I believed the United States couldn't remain spooked forever by this 
experience to the point where it refused to stand up and defend its legitimate national 
security interests. "" Washington was careful to select its battles and then do what 
was necessary to win quickly. In this respect Grenada was an almost irresistible 
opportunity. 
41 Ralph E. Dowling and Gabrielle Marraro, *Grenada and the Great Communicator A Study in 
Democratic Ethics, " Western Journal ofSpeech Communication 50, no. 4 (Fall 1986): 265. 
4' Khong, Analogies at War, P. 258. 
43 Ibid., p. 258. 
44 Reagan, An American Life, p. 45 1. 
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Vietnam, compounded by the unsuccessful Afq), q&we. -'3 and Iran cmbassy rcscue 
operations, had the greatest impact on the military who had expcricnccd: 
sound tactical and strategic decisions overturned for "political reasons"; rcstric. 
tions on winning; the military, individually and collectively, trashed on the cam- 
puses, in the news, and in Congress. All this left a bitter taste for many years, 
and especially among the military professionals, who spent years rebuilding the 
pride, prestige, and capabilities of their institutions. " 
As Petraeus states, even before Vietnam caution rather than activism has 
characterized military participation in decisions to use force . 
47 This trait was 
heightened by Vietnam and in the White House and State Department there was the 
feeling that; "the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not just resist mounting an operation, they 
could take forever to put one together. #08 
When RIG presented the idea of an NEO to JCS representative Vice Admiral 
Moreau on Monday, October 17, he was unenthusiastic and wanted higher 
authorization before beginning planning. By Wednesday, October 19, the Pentagon 
had given notice that a lack of human intelligence and overstretched logistics made 
any action problematic. With decisionmakers growing more concerned about the 
possibility of a hostage situation and the OECS clearly willing to support a U. S. 
military action to rescue the students and depose the RNIC, the military were forced 
to begin serious planning. 
's In May 1975 a Cambodian gunboat had seized the SS Mayaguez, a U. S. merchant ship in transit 
from Hong Kong to Thailand. The 40-man crmy, "we taken to Koh Tang island. The crcw vi-cre 
then transferred to the mainland by sea despite U. S. cfforts to force the boat to turn back. BclicNing 
the crew to still be on Koh Tang the U. S. Marines launched a ill-conccived attack on Koh Tang. The 
Mayaguez crew were released by the Cambodians shortly after reaching the mainland. The final 
U. S. casualty toll for the operation was 4 1. Chris Lamb, "Belief Systems and Decision Making in the 
mayaguez Crisis, " Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 4 (%Vintcr 1994-85): 681-2. 
46 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 343. 
47 Petraeus, "Military Influence, " p. 49 1. 
48 Shultz, Turmoil and Plumph, p. 343., 
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Once the politicians had decided to use force, the military argued that the multiple 
targets and dispersed locations of U. S. citizens meant that to evacuate citizens safely 
would require a stable and political environment which in tum required a complete 
takeover of the island. Vietnam had made the Pentagon extra cautious and they had 
"real misgivings"49 about military action, not unreasonably, due to the lack of 
intelligence. Thus, up until the eve of the intervention Weinberger and the JCS 
argued in favour of delaying military action to enable more intelligence to be 
collected. 
In keeping with the lessons of Vietnam, Urgent Fury would use overwhelming 
force to "get in there in a hurry and overwhelm the opposition... and in a very short 
period of time. "'0 Such decisive strategy had become doctrine because: 
Gradualism is a mistaken way to achieve success. .. 
it exaggerates the illusion 
of control, violates the strategic principle of force, and encourages underesti- 
mation of the domestic political costs entailed by any use of American military 
force abroad. 5' 
A quick victory, and the restrictive rules of engagement, would serve to minimise 
casualties. 52 The Pentagon also insisted on clear arrangements for their withdrawal 
once victory had been achieved. 53 
49 Interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project, p. 139. 
'0 Interview with John W. Vesscy, 14-15 June, 1986, transcript, Oral 11istory Proyect, International 
Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass., p. 124. Vice 
Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, commander of the Joint Task Force, described the csscnoe of his orders 
as "Do it fast and minin-dzc casualties. " Metcalf, -"Decision Making, " in March ct al., Ainhiguity and 
Command, p. 281. The U. S. troop level on Grenada peaked on October 31 at 7,335. LaN%-rcncc S. 
Germain, "A Chronology of Events Concerning Grenada, " in Dunn and Watson, American 
Intervention in Grenada, p. 175. The high level of troops deployed N%as also a result of a lack of 
knowledge of whether the Cubans would fight and what percentage of the Grenadian PRA and 
militia would turn out. As Admiral James D. Watkins put it the intervention force %Nas "sized for the 
unknown. " US. Congress. Senate., Committee on Armed Scr%iccs. Organization, Structure and 
Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense. Part 8 (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1983), 
p. 332. 
11 Weinberger quoted in Tiwathia, The Grenada War, p. 138. It is arguable that the small-scale 
nature of Urgent Fury perhaps made it difficult to imagine the incremental use of force. 
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Another lesson military and civilian decisionmakers adhered to from Vietnam 
concerned the handling of the media. In Vietnam the absence of formal censorship, 
adversarial journalism and television coverage had all contributed to reducing public 
support for the war. As a consequence of this, and the careful management of the 
media by the British in the FalklandS, 54 the military requested, and were granted, a 
total media exclusion from the operation for the first 48 hours. 's 
Vietnam, and the Iran hostage crisis, had underlined the dangers of 
micromanagement of operations from the White House. Thus the military made it 
clear that once Reagan had signed the final "Go" order, they should have full 
authority to execute the operation and be left to get on with it. 
The administratioWs last-minute briefing of the Congressional leadership reflected 
not only the perceived need for secrecy but Congress' post-Vietnam resistance to any 
use of military force abroad, as epitomised by the 1973 War Powers Resolution. As 
Reagan recalled: 
I knew that if word of the rescue mission leaked out in advance, we'd hear this 
from some in Congress: "Sure, it's starting small, but once you make that first 
commitment, Grenada! s going to become another Vietnam. "56 
52 The rules of engagement were as follows: 1) "Use force and weapons as may be essential to the 
accomplishment of the mission, " 2) "Minimizc the disruptive influence of military operations on the 
local economy commensurate with the accomplishment of the mission, " and 3) "Execute initial tasks 
readily with minimum damage and casualties. " Metcalf, "Decision Making, " in March et al., 
Ambiguity and Command, p. 28 1. 
53 Weinberger felt that this was necessary to avoid charges of colonial impicrialism. Interview with 
Weinberger. Metcalf also felt quick military withdrawal was essential as he did not want the 
military to become an occupying force. Interview with Metcalf. 
54 As Speakes said of the British management of the media during the Faimands conflict: "That's 
the way to run a war. " Interview with Spcakes. 
55 The official reasons for the exclusion was: to maintain the secrecy of the operation, prcscnc the 
element of surprise, reduce casualties and not burden the troops uith protecting non-combatants. 
U. S. Congress. Miscellaneous Legislafion, p. 61. The question of the mcdWs total exclusion almost 
became as big a story as the intervention itself. The military's request for media exclusion A2s not 
opposed as there was little sympathy for the media amongst decisiorunakcrs. 
56 Reagan, An Ametican Life, p. 45 1. 
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The Cuba Analo 
After the 1959 Cuban revolution Washington! s Caribbean Basin policy was based 
around a "no more Cubas" position. President Johnson's 1965 intervention in the 
Dominican Republic was motivated by this rationale. Grenada did enjoy good 
relations with Cuba; as Manigat observed, there was a kind of "Cuban fixation" in 
Grenada and the island seemed to be the "mini-Cuba of the Eastern Caribbean. "" If 
Washington did not view Grenada as an exact replica of Cuba, it was variously 
described as a prot6g6, vassal or appendage of Cuba. The analogy was particularly 
used in reference to PSINs potential military use, the export of revolution and, in 
general, another pro-Castro country in Washington! s backyard. 
On several occasions Reagan invoked the Cuba analogy. In March 1980 he 
warned; "Must we let Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador all become additional 
Cubas, new outposts for Soviet combat brigades. "58 The hard-liners in the 
administration perceived a hostile Cuba-Nicaragua-Grenada "red triangle" in the 
region. In February 1982 Reagan cautioned that: "If we do not act promptly and 
decisively in defence of freedom, new Cubas will arise. .. We will face more 
totalitarian regimes tied militarily to the Soviet Union - more regimes exporting 
subversion. "" In May 1982 he was more specific; "Grenada. That country now bears 
57 Leslie Manigat, "Revolutionary Shockwave, Crisis and Intervention, " in Jorge Heine and Leslie 
Manigat (eds. ), The Caribbean and World Polific& Cross Currents and Cleavages (New York- 
Holmes & Mcier, 1988), p. 187. 
58 John Lehman, Command ofthe Seas (New York: Charles Scribnces Sons, 1988), p. 294. 
" "Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, " PPP, p. 214. 
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the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus 
among its neighbors. it6O 
The Cuba analogy represented the geostrategic concerns of Washington. A 
second Cuba meant the "institutionalization of another well-armed Communist state. . 
. supported 
by the Soviet Union and working actively against U. S. interests and 
friends who depend on US.,, 61 At the UN, ambassador Kirkpatrick stated that "the 
familiar pattern of militarization and Cubanization [was] already far advanced in 
Grenada , 62 and a Coard-run Grenada only promised closer alignment with the Soviet 
Union and threat of further Soviet and Cuban subversion in the region. As Pearson 
states: 
To reports of an extant military threat in place on Grenada, administration 
officials offered the dark prophesy (sic) that Grenada would become "another 
Cuba, " ... Once accepted, this prophesy virtually guaranteed that any action 
taken would be military. 63 
Eagleburger confirmed that "fears of 'another Cuba! were 'clearly involved' in the 
administration's invasion decision. 04 
The analogy promoted a preventative military action. 65 As McFarlane recalled: 
"The prospect of a second Cuba at our doorstep, with all that implied for the export 
'10 "Remarks in Bridgetown, " PPP, p. 448. 
6' "Prepared Statement of the Honorable Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-Amcrican Affairs before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, January 29,1985. " file FG (Federal Government - 
Organizations) 011 National Security Council, White House, no. 8500943, RRL, p. 4. 
1 "Ambassador Kirkpatricles Statement, UN Security Council, Octobcr 27,1983, " Department of 
State Bulletin 83 (December 1983): 74. 'In fact, "[dlcspite its profound influence Cuba had little 
lasting positive impact on its ally's domestic politics. Cuban political advice proved incapable of 
forestalling the NMs drift towards authoritarian politics. " Cotman, "Cuba and the Grenada 
Revolution, " P. 212. 
"' Pearson, "The Betrayal of Truth and Trust, " p. 173. 
'4 Bcck, Me Grenada Invasion, p. 227. 
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of revolution to countries in South America, was a serious challenge from Moscow. 
We were going to have to act. 06 Reagan shared such a view; "he saw this as the 
Russians trying to come into his backyard on his watch and he wasn't about to let that 
happen. 1167 Reinforced by the domino theory, which implies direction action is 
necessary in such situations, Washington chose a rapid pre-emptive intervention to 
nip the situation in the bud before it threatened to become another Cuba. According 
to Pastor: 
Reagan was convinced that the United States should never forget one important 
lesson learned from the Cuban revolution - that the best time to confront a radi- 
cal regime was at its conception. " 
Preventing another Cuba in Grenada therefore meant eliminating current and future 
Cuban intervention on the island. 
On October 27 in a television address to the nation, Reagan described Grenada as 
a "Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and 
undermine democracy. "69 The large stockpiles of weapons discovered on Grenada 
and the PRGs secret military agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba and North 
Korea did reinforce the Cuba analogy somewhat but the Gre? zada Documents do not 
65 Richard Betts describes this t)w of action as that taken "in anticipation of eventual vulnuability, 
not against immediate threats, 'and is designed to engage the enemy before he has improved his 
capabilities. " Dorothea Cypher, "Grenada: Indications, Warning, and the U. S., " in Dunn and 
Watson (cds. ), American Intervention in Grenada, p. 46. 
' McFarlane and Smardz, Special Trust, p. 257. Weinberger echoed this: "One Cuba, ývc felt, was 
enough, and we counted our preventing the establishment of a second Cuba in Grenada as being not 
only a great success, but a necessity. " Weinberger, Fightingfor Peace, p. 87. 
61 interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project. 
68 Hybel, How Leaders Reason, p. 271. 
I "Address to the Nation, " PPP, P. 152 1. 
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support the U. S. ' claims that the weapons were for offensive purposes and or that 
there were any existing plans for Grenada to become a Soviet-Cuban military base. 
An earlier draft of Reagarfs address was more direct: 
Grenada will not become another Cuba, The Cuban presence has been re- 
duced... Democracy has been strengthened by ourjoint actions, not only for 
Grenada, but for the rest of the Caribbean as well... [L]et there be no mistake, 
the tide of Cuban aggression and subversion in the Caribbean is receding... 
There will be no more Cubas in this hemisphere. 70 
After citing the protection of U. S. citizens and the OECS' request as justifications for 
acting, Washington now added the prevention of "another Cuba. " 
Three Analoaies and Four Options 
1. Do nothing: the presence of some 1,000 U. S. citizens on Grenada automatically 
triggered the Iran hostage analogy and made this option more complicated. Doing 
nothing is usually an option chosen when it is believed that the problem will disappear 
if no action is taken or as a last resort measure . 
7' Reports from the embassy indicated 
that the situation was uncertain. The OECS' advocation of action and the massacre 
on Wednesday, October 19, effectively ruled out this option. 
2. Support for a non-military solution: there has been much criticism along the 
lines that "the administration turned to the military option as a first step rather than a 
last resort. j172 With momentum for an intervention gathering in Washington, 
CARICOM met in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on October 22-23, to discuss a peaceful 
solution to the crisis. Their four-point plan envisaged: the creation of a civilian 
10 "Address to the Nation, Thursday, 27 October, 1983, " (Elliot/Myer), Wbite House Office of 
Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, OA 8206, RRL, p. 11. 
" Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, p. 54. 
72 Pastor, "The Invasion of Grenada, " p. 103. 
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governinent to arrange elections; a CARICOM fact-finding mission; arrangements to 
protect and/or evacuate foreign nationals and the deployment of a Caribbean 
peacekeeping force. 73 Judging by the RMC's behaviour and determination to retain 
power, it is far from clear that any CARICOM solution was feasible or would have 
worked; if it had been tried and failed, then what was to be done? There was strong 
public pressure in the region to "do something" and the CARICOM solution did not 
seem to promise this. By the time CARICOM met the OECS had already requested 
U. S. help and embassy officials reported from Grenada that the RNIC were 
"obstructionist and uncooperative 04 and not anxious to evacuate the students. 
Washington was now thinking primarily in military terms. 
When Cornwall delivered a last minute plea to Linda Flohr and Gary Chafin it is 
possible that if the RMC had made some concessions, fundamentally this meant 
relinquishing power, an intervention might have been averted. In his cable to 
Washington, Special Emissary McNeil considered that, apart from being a possible 
ploy to buy time, an ultimatum might allow the RMC to take hostageS. 7' 
Additionally, both the Vietnam and Cuba analogies promoted a pre-emptive military 
operation that would seize the entire island and remove the RMC and the Cuban 
presence. 
The U. S. did not consider referring the crisis to the OAS or UN. As Karas and 
Goodman note, "the Latin American obsession with proclaiming an absolute doctrine 
73 " Statement by the Honourable Prime Nfinister George Chambers, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 
76. 
14 Motley, "The Decision to Assist Grenada, " p. 71. 
75 Bish, "Subject: Grenada: Request for Talks, " p. 3. 
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of non-intervention and binding every nation in the hemisphere. .. to adherc"76 meant 
that the OAS would never have supported an intervention. " Those in Washington 
who voiced their concern about the impact of an intervention on inter-American 
relations were overruled by Shultz and McFarlane who were more worried about 
another hostage situation . 
78 According to Gerson, "not a second's thought was given. 
.. to 
bringing the crisis in Grenada to the United Nations. "79 Ikle later explained, 
with some hyperbole, that: 
Well, we could have gone on for 6 weeks or 6 years in the United Nations 
addressing concerns. But within 6 days the island would have been much more 
fortified. 
On the Monday [24th] before the operation, we saw some Cubans going in, 
organizing the resistance. Another day or so and our losses would probably have 
been much more severe. Another 2 days and perhaps students would have been 
kidnapped, held ransom, or held hostage. 80 
Essentially the U. S. and OECS' perception that the "window of opportunity" for 
action would not remain open for long precluded any likelihood of a CARICOM, 
OAS or UN solution. 
3. A NEO: this was the option that RIG favoured after reviewing standard 
evacuation procedure and assessing the situation in Grenada. It was challenged when 
the Pentagon believed that to effect an NEO a takeover of the island was necessary 
and finally discarded when the OECS' oral request was received. This reflected the 
76 Jon M. Karas and Jerald Nt Go(xhnan, "The United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise in 
Realpolitik, " 7he University ofMami Inter-American Law Review 16, no. I (Spring 1984): 80. 
77 This was especially true after the U. S. ' support of Britain during the Falklands conflict in 1982. 
78 DeFrank and Walcott, "The Invasion Countdown, " p. 22D. 
7' Gerson, The Drkpatrick Mission, p. 22 1. Gerson was the Legal Adviser to the U. S. Nssion to 
the UN. 
go U. S. Congress, Lessons Learned, p. 3 7. 
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militarys post-Vietnam policy of using overwheln-dng force in quick-strike 
operations. The desire to prevent "another Cuba" by taking the opportunity to 
remove a Marxist-Leninist regime and restore law and order also argued against a 
simple NEO. Finally, Washington had to consider the OECS' worry that if the U. S. 
intervened just to evacuate their nationals what state would they leave a post- 
intervention Grenada in. " 
4. Military intervention to remove the RMC: after Bishop's death on Wednesday, 
October 19, a military solution appeared more likely. The concern about another 
hostage crisis formed the backdrop for consideration of a military operation. As we 
have seen, the military's belief that an occupation of Grenada was necessary to secure 
the safety of U. S. citizens, the willingness of the OECS to publicly request a full 
intervention and Washingtores desire to remove the RMC and Cubans, accounts for 
the selection of the full-scale intervention option. 
The Influence of the OECS Request 
The history of U. S. -Grenadian relations since 1979 has led many authors relegate 
the OECS' role to that of providing a justification for the intervention when in 
actuality the Eastern Caribbean nations did influence Washington to a larger degree 
as has been demonstrated. 
When Washington received the OECS' oral request on Friday, October 21, it 
prompted lengthy early morning discussion between top officials in Washington and 
Augusta. The dispatching of Special Emissary McNeil reflects the importance 
81 Telephone iritervicw with McNeil. 
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Washington attached to the request; it was imperative that the initiative for military 
action clearly come from them. 
It would be inaccurate to suggest that the OECS request was the decisive factor 
in Washingtores decision to intervene but it was an important part of it and "cleared 
up a lot of doubts" circulating amongst decisionmakers. 92 A multinational 
intervention was preferable to any unilateral U. S. action and in this respect it was 
important for Washington to have serious democratic leaders in the Caribbean laying 
out a cogent case for intervention. 8' 
Finally, both Washington and the military were keen to withdraw the troops once 
the military objectives had been achieved to remove any chance of a long-term 
occupation developing. The Eastern Caribbean leaders shared this view and they 
provided Washington with the option of maintaining political support whilst the 
Eastern Caribbean forces oversaw Grenada! s return to democracy. 
Credibility: No More "Paper Tiger" 
Washington! s decision to intervene is frequently framed in realist terms as a test of 
credibility in regard to the U. S. ' commitment to allies and to the exercise of power to 
contain communism. Credibility itself is intangible and subjective, relying essentially 
upon influencing the perception and beliefs of other states and the lessons one state 
believes another will draw from its actions. As McMahon concludes, credibility is "a 
blend of resolve, reliability, believability, and decisiveness. 
82 Intcniew with Weinberger. 
83 Interview with Gillespie. 
84 Robert J. McNbhon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in 
Postwar American Diplomacy, " Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 455. 
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Several senior administration officials emphasised the wider importance of 
honouring the OECS' request for help. Shultz felt that the U. S. could not afford not 
to act: 
it i, s precedentially terribly important that a formal request from small countries 
for our help against a significant, and yet certainly not towering opposition, 
could be reffised, is out of the question... We must win this one. It is terribly 
important not just for the outcome in Grenada, but the precedent it sends all 
over the world, from Moscow to Korea, to European capitals. " 
In 1983 there was a palpable feeling amongst many White House and State 
Department officials that a credible show of force was needed to counter the image 
of the U. S. as a "paper tiger. 06 
In this respect the intervention restored a degree of self-confidence, especially 
amongst the military who were "back on their feet and standing tall"17 having seen 
that the effective use of force was still possible. Military action also gave some 
substance to Reagan! s hardline rhetoric, demonstrating that the U. S. was willing and 
capable of exerting force to protect its interests. According to Woodward, "Grenada 
grew as a positive symbol in Administration lore. It was routinely invoked as a sign 
of a new toughness. "" 
The U. S. ' action against Grenada also served to increase the credibility of a U. S. 
military intervention in Central America. Although Washington stressed that the 
11 Shultz quoted in interview with McFarlane, Oral History Project, p. 147. It is important to note 
however that only the OECS wanted an intervention; Britain were in favour but on a slower 
timetable. Whether any of the U. S. ' allies were reassured, or felt the need to be at that time, by 
Washington! s honouring of the OECS request is moot. European governments were more concerned 
about Washington! s willingness to use force. --- 
" Interview with Motley. 
87 president Reagan quoted in Juan Williams, "President Defends Using Force, " Mashington Post, 
December 13,1983, p. Al. 
88 Woodward, VEIL, p. 336. 
381 
intervention was the result of a unique combination of circumstances and should "not 
[be] taken as a sign about anything else, "89 the Nicaraguan government feared they 
would be next. Indeed, the Sandinistas 'gave every appearance of being prepared to 
go toconsiderable lengths to achieve settlement. '90 It seemed that Suriname's military 
leader Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse, who had had good relations with the PRG, 
also received a message from the intervention; only days afterwards he expelled 
nearly 100 Cuban embassy staff, including the ambassador, and military advisors. " 
Decisionmakers in Washington were undoubtedly concerned about containing 
communism in Grenada as the portion of the NSDD which cited the prevention of 
current and future Cuban intervention as an objective highlighted. 
The perceived fundamental importance of the Caribbean is the result of 
geographical proximity and history. The intervention was therefore an important 
symbolic roll back of the Soviet Uniotfs Third World advances in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan and Central America in the past decade. As Reagan later 
'9 "Secretary Shultz's News Conference, October 25,1983, " Deparhnent of State Bulletin 83 
(December 1983): 70. Gerson explains the reason for this: "How we chose to characterize the 
Grenada operation - whether as a flukc, as an isolated incident in U. S. foreign relations" or "as part 
of the pattern and strategy of U. S. foreign policy - would help determine U. S. foreign policy. Our 
explanations... would give the world notice on how the Administration perceived the Grenada 
operation, and whether othcr'Grenadas! might be in store in the future. " Gerson, 7he Qr1patrick 
Mission, p. 225. Some officials were not so quick to dismiss the possibility of other intcr%, cntions. 
See Fred Barries, "Weinberger reftises to rule out American invasion of Nicaragua, " Baltimore Sun, 
Novcmbcr 7,1983, p. 1. 
90 McNcil, War and Peace, p. 175. McNeil felt that the success in Grenada "created a magnificent 
opportunity for a durable peace in Central America. ". Ibid., p. 175. Johnstone concurred that 
Grenada opened up certain avenues which resulted in two rounds of negotiations in Nicaragua. 
interview with Johnstone. 
91 It is likely that the decision to expel the Cubans was made before the intervention rather than 
being a knee-jerk reaction to it. However, "it is possible that the move was a more calculated and 
opportunistic gesture to woo, or at least disarm, Brazil, the United States and The Ncthcriands. " 
Edward Dew, "Did Suriname Switch? Dialectics a la Dante, " Cafibbean Review 12, no. 4 (1983): p. 
29. 
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emphasised: "Communist subversion is not an irreversible tide. We have seen it rolled 
back in Venezuela and, most recently in Grenada. "92 
Whilst considering the importance of containment and credibility factors it is 
important to remember that although Washington wanted the Cubans out of Grenada 
it was never going to act for that reason alone. "' There were other factors, the safety 
of U. S. citizens and the OECS request, at work. 
The perceived opportunity to strengthen U. S. credibility was a by-product of the 
turmoil in Grenada. The suggestion is that this credibility had been steadily eroded 
since Vietnam and Washington saw Grenada as an opportunity to reverse the trend. 
As previously mentioned, the intervention did bolster the U. S. ' credibility, notably in 
theTegion itself, demonstrating a willingness to act to protect U. S. interests. 
Elsewhere, the issue of credibility was overshadowed by the "sledgehammer to 
crack a nut" aspect of the intervention,, the general perception of the action as a 
violation of international law, comparisons with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the prospect of the evolution of a Grenada Doctrine as a guide for future military 
interventions. 
in Somebod3ýs Bac! zLa-rd 
Ever since the Monroe Doctrine, Washington has made it clear that it viewed the 
Caribbean "backyard" as a region vital to national security. Such beliefs were 
especially prominent amongst the Reagan administration. Within this "realpolitik 
fiefdOM"94 Grenada was a fly in the ointment, especially considering Reagans pro- 
92 Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p. 174. 
9' Telephone interview with McNeil. 
94 Interview with Montgomery. 
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democracy and anti-Communist policy for the region. The rapid deterioration of 
U. S. -Grenadian relations led the U. S. to adopt a "distancing" policy. Grenada was 
soon on the receiving end of various political, economic and military pressure tactics 
from Washington. The Reagan administration's approach was undeniably exaggerated 
but it was prudent. to be concerned; there was a lot of left-wing activity in the region. 
As one diplomat explained, taken in isolation Grenada was not a major item but when 
it was placed in a wider context there was enough to form a "picture of concern. "95 
Grenada! s lack of elections, a poor human rights record and anti. U. S. rhetoric 
were all important factors in accounting for frosty relations but it was the PRG's 
foreign relations that particularly concerned Washington. Apart from the large Cuban 
investment and presence in Grenada, there were military agreements with the Soviet 
Union and North Korea. 
The Bishop-Coard schism and its dramatic denouement was the finale to a wider 
problem that affected the PRG and precipitated its demise: the failure to reconcile 
their ideology with reality. As the regional hegemon the U. S. was an inescapable fact 
of life for Grenada and as Thorndike astutely concluded; "to believe that Grenada 
was not in anybody's backyard was an exhilarating experience - but it was an 
illusion. 906 Similarly, the pursuit of the socialist path of development did not take into 
consideration local socio-economic, socio-cultural and geopolitical realities and 
imported wholesale authoritarian models that were discordant to the local situation. 97 
95 Ibid. 
96 Thomdikc, Grenada, p. 118. 
91 Smith, "The Development Strategy, " p. 570. 
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Who's Afraid of the RMC? 
As we have seen there was a dual approach to Grenada by its neighbours. Firstly, 
apart from concern over the coup process itself, there was concern about the military 
buildup, the PRG's human rights practices, press restrictions and lack of elections. 
This last factor was particularly significant because Bishop's: 
ridiculing of elections as "rum and sardines" events did not sit well with leaders 
whose whole decolonization struggle had been centred on the right to self-deter- 
mination through universal suffrage and free elections. " 
Contrastingly, Grenada was accepted as a fact of life for the Eastern Caribbean. One 
of the PRG's foreign policy "Principled Positions" was support for regional 
cooperation and integration in CARICOM and the OECS, a commitment that all the 
Member States recognised as essential to their prospects. 
For the OECS the real threat Grenada posed was not military. The PRG was 
supported by socialist movements throughout the Caribbean who saw it as a 
breakthrough. Grenada! s neighbours fears were not unfounded; in his report on 
Grenada's relations with the Soviet Union, Grenada's ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, Ian Jacobs, noted that Grenada figured in a "very minute way" in the Soviet 
Union's global relationships and recommended that: -, 
For Grenada to assume a position of increasingly greater importance, we have 
to be seen as influencing at least regional events. We have to establish ourselves 
as the authority on events at least in the English-speaking Caribbean, and be the 
sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in the region. " 
" MaingoL 7he UnitedStates, p. 118. 
99 "Grenada's relations with the USSR, " Seabury and McDougall (eds. ), Ae Grenada Papers, P. 
207. 
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Admittedly, after a string of right-wing governments took power in the Eastern 
Caribbean in 1980 the political climate in the region was not conducive to such 
activity. 
When the PRG imploded in October 1983 the Eastern Caribbean leaders' unease 
that "a set of circumstances had been put in train that perhaps could be emulated and 
copied in their territories""' led them to conclude that something had to be done, 
and quick. The RMC were beyond the pale: 
not only the Caribbean politicians and leaders felt this. The Caribbean man-in-thc- 
street also felt strongly that the guys in Grenada had to go. That was the gut Car- 
ibbean reaction, and they left the delicate questions of international law, sovcr. 
eignty and constitutional exercise to the experts. They just knew those guys had to 
go. 101 
As Braveboy-Wagner suggests, the events in Grenada were "a threat to the 
Caribbean way of life, to Caribbean ideals and morality. " 102 
Conclusion 
Even though the Caribbean leaders were fairly confident that the U. S. would 
accede to their request, they were wary about asking because if for whatever reason 
Washington declined the Caribbean leaders would have been left "high and dry. " 103 
Unsurprisingly though the leaders found a willing ear in Washington. Amongst the 
White House, State Department, Defense Department, CIA and NSC there was a 
too 
101 
102 
103 
U. S. Congress. Workshop, The English-Speaking Caribbean, p. II 
Ibid., p. I 11. 
Bravcboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in Wor/dAffairs, p. 186. 
Telephone interview with Flower. 
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consensus on the use of force if not on "all aspects of the timing, means, and 
objectives. " 104 
It is evident from a study of the crisis period that the primary motivating fear for* 
the U. S. was the prospect of another hostage crisis. As Beck suggests, to claim that 
Washington was unconcerned about the students and viewed them as an excuse to 
act is to "impute to every Reagan administration decisionmaker either a cavalier 
disregard for life or Machiavellian motives in the extreme. "105 As the primary 
motivating hope the Cuba analogy communicated Washington! s desire to oust a pro- 
Cuban, pro-Soviet Marxist regime and prevent another potential offensive military 
facility in the Caribbean. 
The tragedy of "Bloody Wednesday" led to a convergence of thinking in the 
Caribbean and Washington. The Caribbean leaders, especially Barbados' Prime 
Minister Adams, did pressure the U. S. to act but this in itself would never have been 
enough to persuade Washington. However, in combination with the possibility of 
hostage-taking it was an important factor. 
After four and a half years of PRG warnings about U. S. invasion plans and CIA 
destabilization, the U. S. finally did intervene in Grenada. On this occasion though it 
was not Bishop's PRG that was the target but the RMC who were, judging by their 
actions, little more than "a brutal group of leftist thugs. " 
106 Considering the history of 
unilateral U. S. interventionism in the region, operation Urgent Fury was, by contrast, 
"truly. .. a collective enterprise. .. 
brought about through collective actions and 
104 Brands, "Decisions on American Armed Intervention, " p. 616. 
105 Beck, The Grenada Invasion, P. 202. 
106 "Remarks of the President and Prime Nfinister Eugenia Charlcs, "PPP, p. 1505. 
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wishes. " 107 Appropriately, it was Tom Adams, the architect of the OECS request, 
who concluded that: 
The pros and cons of the action of the Caribbean Governments will long be 
debated. So will those of President Reagan in coming to our aid. But I think that 
history will agree with the verdict of public opinion in the Eastern Caribbean. 
There has seldom in these islands been such virtually unanimous support in the 
media and at political and popular level for an action so potentially divisive. 108 
107 Anthony p. Maingot, "American foreign policy. in the Caribbean, " p. 327. 
. k' II'- 
109 "Full Text of Speech by the Prime Nfinistcr of Barbados, " Documents on the Invasion, p. 35. 
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APPENDIX I 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE 
Carter Administration (1977-81) 
Zbigniew Brzezinski - National Security Adviser 
John A. Bushnell - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
James E. Carter - President 
Robert A. Pastor - NSC Latin American Director 
Viron P. Vaky - Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
U. S. EmbasV. Bridgetown. Barbados 
John Eddy - Deputy Chief of Mission 
Frank V. Ortiz - U. S. Ambassador, Barbados (until June 1979) 
Sally Shelton - U. S. Ambassador, Barbados (until January 1981) 
Reagan Administration (1981-84) 
James A. Baker III - White House Chief of Staff 
George H. Bush - Vice President 
William J. Casey - Director of the CIA 
Duane R. Clarridge - Latin America Division Chief of the Directorate of 
Operations, CIA 
Kenneth W. Dam - Deputy Secretary of State 
William P. Clark - National Security Adviser (resigned October 13,1983) 
Major General George Crist - accompanied Special Emissary McNeil to Barbados 
Commodore Jack N. Darby - Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, JCS 
Michael K. Deaver - Presidential Assistant 
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Lawrence S. Eagleburger - Undersecretary for Political Affairs 
Roger W. Fontaine - NSC Latin American Director 
Charles A. Gillespie - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intcr-Amcrican 
Affairs 
Rear Admiral Jonathan Trumbull Howe - Director of Political-Military Affairs 
Fred C. Ikle - Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
Craig Johnstone - Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick - Ambassador to the United Nations 
Michael G. Kozak - Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser 
Admiral Wesley McDonald - Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces 
Robert C. McFarlane - National Security Adviser (appointed October 17,1983) 
John N. McMahon - Acting Director of the CIA 
Francis J. McNeil - President's Special Emissary 
Edwin Meese 1H - Presidential Counselor 
Constantine C. Menges - National Security Assistant for Latin America 
Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf IH - commander of Joint Task Force 120 
James H. Michel - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs 
William J. Middendorf - Ambassador to the Organisation of American States 
William Montgomery - Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary for Political 
Affairs 
Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr. - Assistant to the Chairman of the JCS 
Langhorne A. Motley - Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North - Deputy Director of Political-Njilitary Affairs 
Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter - Deputy National Security Adviser 
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Ronald W. Reagan - President 
Davis R. Robinson - Department of State Legal Adviser 
Lawrence G. Rossin - Foreign Service Officer 
Nestor D. Sanchez - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-Amcrican 
Affairs 
George P. Shultz - Secretary of State 
Larry Speakes - Principal Deputy Press Secretary 
General John W. Vessey - Chairman of the JCS 
Caspar W. Weinberger - Secretary of Defense 
U. S. EmbasV, Bridgetown, Barbados ., 
Milan D. Bish - Ambassador to Barbados 
James Budeit - Consul General 
Gary Chafin - Political Officer 
Linda Flohr - Third Secretary 
Ludlow Flower III - Deputy Chief of Nlission 
Kenneth A. Kurze - Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs 
David Ostroff - Consular Officer 
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Reiman - Military Attach6 
British Govermnent 
Giles Bullard - 9gh Coninýssioner, Barbados 
Geoffrey Howe - Foreign Secretary - 
John Kelly - British Representative, Grenada 
Richard Luce - Nfinister of State 
David Montgomery - Deputy Mgh Conunissioner, Barbados 
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Margaret Thatcher - Prime Minister 
Oliver Wright - British Ambassador, U. S. 
OECS 
Vaughan Lewis -Director General 
Lester Bird - Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Antigua and Barbuda 
Vere Bird, Sr. - Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda 
Milton Cato - Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Eugenia Charles - Prime Minister of Dominica 
John Compton - Prime Minister of St. Lucia 
John Osbourne - Chief Minister of Montserrat 
Kennedy Simmonds - Prime Minister of St. Kitts-Nevis 
The Other Caribbean States 
Tom Adams - Prime Minister of Barbados 
H. Brazane Babb - Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Minister of Barbados 
Forbes Burnham - President of Guyana 
Fidel Castro - President of Cuba 
George Chambers - Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago 
Neville Gallimore - Foreign Minister of Jamaica 
Brigadier General Rudyard Lewis - commander of the Barbados Defence Force 
Lynden Pindling - Prime Minister of the Bahamas 
George Price - Prime Minister of Belize 
Bernard St. John - Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados 
Edward Seaga - Prime Minister of Jamaica 
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Louis Tull - Foreign Minister of Barbados 
Grenada IIýII 
Geoffrey Bourne - Vice Chancellor of SGU 
Charles Modica - Chancellor of SGU (based in New York) 
Paul Scoon - Governor-General 
Gary Solin - Bursar of SGU 
Julian Torres Rizo - Cuban Ambassador, Grenada 
Bishop Faction 
Fitzroy Bain - Trade Union Leader 
Norris Bain - Minister of Housing 
Maurice Bishop - Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Interior and Carriacou 
Affairs 
Jacqueline Creft - Minister of Education, Youth and Culture 
Major Einstein Louison - Army Chief of Staff 
George Louison - Minister of Agriculture 
Vincent Noel - Trade Union Leader 
Kendrick Radix - Minister of Legal Affairs, Agro-Industries and Fisheries 
Lynden Ramdhanny - Minister of Tourism 
Unison Whiteman - Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Coard Factio 
General Hudson Austin - Nfinister of Communications, Works and Labour, 
Commander of the PRA 
Major Tan Bartholomew - PRA 
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Bernard Coard - Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance 
Phyllis Coard - Head of RFG and National Women's Organisation 
Major Leon Cornwall - PRA, Grenadian Ambassador, Havana, Cuba 
Lieutenant Liam James - PRA 
Ian St. Bernard - Commissioner of Police 
Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne - PRA 
Selwyn Strachan - Minister of National Mobilisation 
Major Christopher Stroude - Political Commissar of the PRA 
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STRUCTURE OF A U. S. EMBASSY 
Executive Section 
Ambassador 
Deputy Chief of Nlission 
Two secretaries 
Political Section 
Counselor for political affairs 
Four political officers 
Three secretaries 
Economic Section 
Counselor for econon& affairs 
Two econon& officers 
Two secretaries 
Consular Sectio 
Consul general 
Four consular officers 
Foreign Agriculture Service* 
Counselor for agricultural affairs 
Assistant agricultural attache 
United States Information Servic 
Counselor for public affairs 
Executive officer 
Information officer 
Assistant information officer 
Cultural affairs officer 
Two assistant cultural affairs officers 
Secretary 
Administrative Section 
Counselor for administration 
Two general service officers 
Personnel officer 
Budget and fiscal officer 
Security officer 
Two secretaries 
Communications supervisor 
Two support communicators 
Two telecommunications 
specialists 
Seven marine guards 
Foreign Commercial Service* 
Counselor for commercial affairs 
Two commercial officers 
Director, Export Development 
Office 
Agency for Intemation 
Development 
Mssion director 
Deputy Director 
Executive officer 
Controller 
Project development officer 
Program officer 
Agricultural development officer 
Rural development officer 
Health/population officer 
Science/technology adviser 
Secretary 
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Non-Foreign Affaris Agencies 
Se ce Attach6 
Defence attach6 (and air attach6) 
Army attach6 
Assistant air attach6 
Administrative officer 
Two clerks 
Peace Corps 
Peace Corps representative 
Deputy representative 
Physician 
Militajy Assistance AdvisqZ 
" -, Group 
Commander 
Chief, Army section (and deputy 
commander) 
Four officer advisers 
Chief, Air force section 
Three office advisers 
Administrative officer 
Three clerks 
Six NCO trainers 
Source: "U. S. Staffing at a Hypothetical Medium-sized Embassy, " in Andrew L. 
Steigman. 7he Foreign Service of the United States. - First Line of Defellse. Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview, 1990, p. 125. 
* No representatives at the U. S. embassy in Barbados. 
All U. S. embassies have basically the same core structure but at smaller embassies such 
as Barbados the Political Section and the Economic Section are a joint section under 
one counselor. Similarly the Service Attach6 only consisted of a Defense Attach6 due 
to a lack of branches of the services in Barbados. 
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APPENDIX 3 
ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES 
REQUEST FOR U. S. ASSISTANCE IN GRENADA 
Your Excellency, . 
October 23,1983 
The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States presents her 
compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States to the Eastern 
Caribbean and has the honour to transmit herewith a re 
, 
quest for assistance under 
Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. 
The Chainnan of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States avails herself of this 
opportunity to renew the assurances of her highest consideration. 
Sincerely 
Eugenia Charles 
Attachment: 
TEXT OF OECS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE 
The authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met at 
Bridgetown, Barbados on Friday 21st October 1983 to consider and evaluate the 
situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the Government led by Prime 
Minister Maurice Bishop and the subsequent kilfing of the Prime Minister together 
with some of his colleagues and a number of other citizens. 
The authority is aware that the overthrow of the Bishop administration took place 
with the knowledge and connivance of forces unfriendly to the OECS leading to the 
establishment of the present military regime. 
The meeting took note of the current anarchic conditions, the serious violations of 
human rights and bloodshed that have occurred and the consequent unprecedented 
threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in 
Grenada. 
The authority was deeply concerned that military forces and supplies are likely to 
be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can 
be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members. 
The authority further noted that the capability of the Grenada 'armed forces is 
already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that 
country. Furthermore the member states of the OECS have no means of defence 
against such forces. 
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The member governments of the organisation hold the strong view that such a 
situation would further undermine the political, social and economic stability and 
would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and 
security in the whole OECS sub-region as a whole. 
The authority noted that the present regime in Grenada has demonstrated by its 
brutality and ruthlessness that it will stop at nothing to achieve its ends and to secure 
its power. 
Under the authority of Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States, the authority proposes therefore to take action for collective 
defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by 
requesting assistance from fiiendly countries to provide transport logistics support and 
additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS, to stabilize this most 
grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean. 
The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the 
assistance of fiiendly neighbouring - states to restore on Grenada conditions of 
tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights 
pending the restoration of constitutional government. ý,, I 
Source: "Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Request For U. S. Assistance in 
Grenada, " American Foreign Policy Current Documents (1983), Document 656, pp. 
1397-98. 
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APPENDIX 4 
LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF GRENADA 
TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF BARBADOS , 
October 24,1983 
Dear Prime Minister, 
You are aware that there is a vacuum of authority in Grenada following the killing 
of the Prime Mnister and the subsequent serious violations of human rights and 
bloodshed. 
I am therefore seriously concerned over the lack of internal security in Grenada. 
Consequently I am requesting your help to assist me in stabilizing this grave and 
dangerous situation. It is my desire that a peacekeeping force should be established in 
Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to peace and tranquillity and also a return to 
democratic return. 
In this connexion I am also seeking assistance from the United States, from 
Jamaica, and from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States through its current 
chairman the hon. Eugenia Charles (Prime Minister of Dominica) in the spirit of the 
treaty establishing that organization to which my country is a signatory. 
I have the honour to be, 
Yours faithfully, 
PauIScoon, 
Govemor-General. 
Source: William C. Gilmore, 7he Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation 
London: Mansell, 1984, p. 95. 
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